WHITE vs.
BUGTAS, AM No. RTJ-02-1738, Nov. 17, 2005.
"X
x x.
At
the outset, it must be noted that Bagaporo was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from four years and two months to eight years and one
day. It is not disputed that he began to serve sentence on February 9,
1996. Counting four years and two months from said date the minimum period
of Bagaporo’s sentence should have been completed on April 9, 2000.
Hence, we agree with the observation of the Investigating Justice that it is
wrong for respondent to claim that Bagaporo had already served the minimum of
his sentence at the time that he was granted bail on recognizance, that is, on
February 16, 2000.[18]
Furthermore,
it is patently erroneous for respondent to release a convict on
recognizance.
Section
24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant
of bail after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to
serve sentence. It provides:
SEC. 24. No bail after final
judgment; exception. – An accused shall not be allowed bail after the
judgment has become final, unless he has applied for probation before
commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense being within the
purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for
probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail
was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his
release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In
no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve
sentence.[19]
The
only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court is when the
convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve sentence,
provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation
Law.
In
the instant case, there is no showing that Bagaporo applied for
probation. In fact at the time of his application for release on
recognizance, he was already serving sentence. When he was about to
complete service of the minimum of his sentence, he filed an application for
parole. However, there is no evidence to show that the Board of Pardons
and Parole approved his application. We agree with the Investigating
Justice in holding that a convict’s release from prison before he serves the
full term of his sentence is either due to good conduct allowances, as provided
under Act No. 1533[20] and Article 97 of the
Revised Penal Code, or through the approval of the convict’s application for
parole. A good conduct allowance under Act No. 1533 and Article 97 of the
Revised Penal Code may be granted by the Director of Prisons (now Director of
the Bureau of Corrections), while the approval of an application for parole is
sanctioned by the Board of Pardons and Parole. In addition, a convict may
be released from prison in cases where he is granted pardon by the President pursuant
to the latter’s pardoning power under Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution.[21] In the present case, aside from
the fact that there is no evidence to prove that Bagaporo’s application for
parole was approved by the Board of Pardons and Parole, there is neither any
showing that he was extended good conduct allowances by the Director of Prisons,
nor was he granted pardon by the President. Hence, there is no basis for
respondent in allowing Bagaporo to be released on recognizance.
Moreover,
respondent should know that the provisions of Sections 5 and 16, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court apply only to an accused undergoing preventive imprisonment
during trial or on appeal. They do not apply to a person convicted by final
judgment and already serving sentence.
We
have held time and again that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just
a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.[22] It is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative
doctrines.[23] He should strive for excellence
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the rule of law.[24] When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than
that would be gross ignorance of the law.[25] In the present case, we find
respondent’s ignorance or utter disregard of the import of the provisions of
Sections 5, 16 and 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as tantamount to gross
ignorance of the law and procedure.
As
to the imposable penalty, Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious
charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, the imposable penalty, in
case the respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, ranges from a fine
of not less than P20,000.00 but not more
than P40,000.00
to dismissal from the service.
This
is not the first time that respondent judge was found guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and procedure. In Docena-Caspe vs. Bugtas,[26] respondent was fined P20,000.00 for having
granted bail to an accused in a murder case without conducting hearing for the
purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. He was
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely. Hence, we deem it proper to impose the penalty of P40,000.00.
X
x x."
