Below is the jurisprudence part of a pleading that we have
filed in a LIBEL case that we are handling, where the respondent is our client,
and which is pending preliminary investigation before a public prosecutor. We are
sharing the same for legal research purposes of our followers.
“X x x.
I.
SUBSTANTIVE
DISCUSSION.
1. Xxx
admits in his Reply that his case was filed
out of time, having allegedly discovered
the alleged crime of Libel on July 6,
2012. (See: Par. 27, xxx Reply).
Note: The “Date And Time Of Commission” part of the Investigation Data Form of this
complaint that Xxx has signed shows that, according to him, the crime of Libel
that I had allegedly committed took place in June 2012.
If we reckon the prescriptive
period from June 2012, it is with
more reason that this case should be dismissed
outright for having been filed out of
time.
The instant case was filed on July 8, 2013.
He admits in his Reply that he
has failed to comply with the one-year
prescriptive period for Libel under Art.
90, Par. 4, of the Rev. Penal Code.
His only argument against the
delay was that it was too minor a reason to cause the dismissal of his
complaint.
We repeat: For failure of Xxx to meet the one-year prescriptive period for Libel, this case
should be dismissed outright.
The purpose of an Investigating
Prosecutor is not to indict per se
but to find out the truth, to seek justice, and to save an innocent citizen
from the pains, tediousness and expense of unwarranted trial.
In the case of JOSE BERNARDO vs. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, G.R.
No. L-37876, May 25, 1979, it was
held that although “prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that
they may properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice
x x x, (it) should be realized, however, that when a man is haled to court on a
criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but
for his family as well” and that “therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh
the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of
a prima facie case before filing the information in court”, otherwise, it, held
that, it “would be a dereliction of duty”.
In the case of SUSANA
B. CABAHUG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SANDIGANBAYAN, 3rd
Division, and OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
G.R. No. 132816, February 5, 2002, the Supreme Court ”(admonished) agencies
tasked with the preliminary investigation and prosecution of crimes that the
very purpose of a preliminary investigation is to shield the innocent from
precipitate, spiteful and burdensome prosecution”. It added that such
investigating agencies were “duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely necessary,
open and public accusation of crime not only to spare the innocent the trouble,
expense and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary expense on
the part of the State for useless and expensive trials”. It held that “when at
the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima
facie case or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient
belief as to the guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution
must desist from inflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial”.
Thus, the Court held:
“x
x x.
We
cannot overemphasize the admonition to agencies tasked with the preliminary
investigation and prosecution of crimes that the very purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and
burdensome prosecution. They are duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely
necessary, open and public accusation of crime not only to spare the innocent
the trouble, expense and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent
unnecessary expense on the part of the State for useless and expensive trials.
Thus, when at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or that
the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of
the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting
on any person the trauma of going through a trial.
X
x x”.
2. I
have shown in my Counter-Affidavit and in this Rejoinder that I have acted in
GOOD FAITH and WITHOUT MALICE OR INTENT TO COMMIT THE FELONY OF LIBEL, which
are essential elements to indict a person for Libel.
In the case of Cabahug
v. People, GR No. 132816, February 5, 2002, it was held that “good faith is always presumed”; that “the very
purpose of a preliminary investigation is to shield the innocent from
precipitate, spiteful and burdensome prosecution”; that “they are duty-bound to
avoid, unless absolutely necessary, open and public accusation of crime not
only to spare the innocent the trouble, expense and torment of a public trial,
but also to prevent unnecessary expense on the part of the State for useless
and expensive trials”; that “when, at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a
prima facie case or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient
belief as to the guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution
must desist from inflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial”.
Thus, the Court held:
“X
x x.
Contrary
to the Ombudsman’s ruling that bad faith on the part of petitioner was
deducible, good faith is always presumed.
Therefore, he who charges another with bad faith must prove it. In other words,
the Office of the Ombudsman should determine with certainty the facts
indicative of bad faith. However, the records show that the Office of the
Ombudsman was clearly uncertain of its position on the matter of existence of
bad faith on the part of petitioner Cabahug. X x x.
X
x x.
Clearly,
any further prosecution of petitioner is pure and simple harassment. It is
imperative that she be spared from the trauma of having to go to trial on such
a baseless complaint. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie
case and it is evident that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient
belief as to the petitioner’s guilt.
X
x x. Judicial power of review includes the determination of whether there was
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Under this definition,
the Sandiganbayan should have, considering the divergent positions in the
Office of the Ombudsman, granted the motion for redetermination of probable
cause after reviewing the evidence thus far submitted, and dismissed the case
against petitioner. Thus, respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
in allowing the case to proceed.
X x x.”
Further, in the case of FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ, et. al. vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al., G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999, it upheld “the
rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the
basis of good faith”.
3. Xxx
has alleged in the Investigation Data
Form of this case that he would present 4
witnesses to prove his complaint, namely: x x x.
Why are they missing now? Xxx
has failed to explain this matter. Why has Xxx not presented their Affidavits
to corroborate his allegations, despite all the opportunities to do so?
Likewise, Xxx has failed to explain this matter.
All that he has presented as of
now are his own Complaint and Reply, which are self-serving and which are unsupported by convincing evidence.
Further, Xxx has failed to present
the Affidavits of the persons whose Facebook (FB) messages he has attached to
his Complaint.
As the complainant, Xxx has the burden
of proof to prove his case against me and to prove that his FB sources had
given their formal consent to use their FB messages as electronic evidence against me.
Without the written permission
of his FB sources, whose FB messages are private
in nature, the Anti-Wire Tapping Act
deems such FB messages to be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.
Clearly, Xxx has failed to meet
the quantum of evidence (“substantial evidence”) to establish probable cause to indict me for
Libel.
Substantial evidence has been defined to be “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”. (Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141
SCRA 226).
4.
ADDITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON LIBEL. –
4.1.
CONSTITUTION.
- In this criminal proceeding, I am entitled to the CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE. (Sec. 14 [2], Article III, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution).
The presumption of innocence is a basic and
universal human right that forms a crucial part of my right to DUE PROCESS OF
LAW and EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW (cf. 1947 U.N. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
4.2.
RULES
OF EVIDENCE. - Rule 131, in
general, of the Rules of Evidence commands that he who makes an
affirmative allegation has the burden of
proof to show and establish the veracity thereof.
Sec. 3 of Rule 131 sets forth
certain basic legal presumptions, e.g., “that a person is innocent of crime
or wrong”, “that official duty has been regularly performed”, and “that the law
has been obeyed”.
4.3.
MALICE. - In the light of the foregoing
constitutional and statutory presumptions, the complainants in a libel case
have the heavy burden of proof to destroy the aforementioned presumptions and
to show, with clear, credible, and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt
that the respondents had acted with ACTUAL CRIMINAL MALICE in making the
questioned news articles.
4.4.
EQUIPOISE
RULE. - Under the EQUIPOISE OF EVIDENCE RULE, all things being equal,
that is, where the evidence proffered by the complainants would show neither
the guilt nor the innocence of the respondents, the aforesaid constitutional
and legal presumptions of innocence should ipso facto operate in favor
of the respondents to protect their civil and human rights under the
Constitution.
4.5.
REVISED
PENAL CODE ON LIBEL. “ACTUAL MALICE” REQUIRED. - Under Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, IF NO
GOOD INTENTION AND JUSTIFIABLE MOTIVE for making it is shown, EXCEPT
in the following cases of PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS:
“1. A private communication made by any person
to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.” (emphasis supplied).
Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, inter alia,
provides that “in every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be
given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as
libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the
defendants shall be acquitted”.
Under Article 362 of the Revised Penal
Code, ACTUAL MALICE, not merely presumptive malice, is required to
remove a respondent from the legal protection of the privileged
communication rule under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.
Article 362 provides: “Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter
privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice,
shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing
editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.”
In the case of Vasquez v. CA, et.
al., GR 118971, September 15, 1999, the Supreme Court, in discussing
the rule on ACTUAL MALICE, held that the prosecution “must prove not
only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner
made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether
they were false or not”.
In the said case, the Court further held
that “a rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of
allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for
making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised
Penal Code”; that “ it would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression”;
that “such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members
of a self-governing community”; that “without
free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a
nation would be stifled”; and that “public discussion is a political duty and
the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people:. (citing: Whitney v.
California, 247 U.S. 357).
4.6.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. - In BRILLANTE vs. CA, ET.
AL., G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine of
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION under Article 354, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code,
and it clarified that “the interest sought to be protected by the person
making the communication need not be his own, but may refer to an interest
shared by the other members of society”.
According to the Supreme Court, “indeed,
the purpose of affording protection to privileged communication is to permit
all interested persons or citizens with grievances to freely communicate, with immunity,
to the persons who could furnish the protection asked for”.
In the case of
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., G. R.
NO. 107566, November 25, 2004, the Supreme Court held that the rule
on PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION applies
to “fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that which
is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon
reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds”.
The Supreme
Court further held that “the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to
show proof that an article was written with the author’s knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”
While the law
itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, “the
privileged character of a communication destroys said presumption.”
The burden of proving actual malice “shall then rest on the plaintiff”.
4.7.
MERE
ERRORS AND INACCURACIES. - In BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, supra,
the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in the prior case of Borjal vs.
CA, G.R. No. 126466, 14 January 1999, 310 SCRA 1, and held that,
“even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error,
inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice”. It further held:
“Errors or misstatements
are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate.
Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to
account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the
choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as
well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance
can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our
democracy.”
X x x.”
