Monday, January 5, 2015
The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
GRACIA R. JOVEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL A. PATRON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 59, Lucena City, Roberto Paguia & Fernando Lasala, respondents. G.R. No. 80739, August 20, 1992.
“x x x.
The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution, the statute seeks to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which might ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy. Another purpose is to discourage those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. 9
Under Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, there is forcible entry when one in physical possession of a land or building is deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To constitute the use of "force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. 10
It is noted that the petitioner instituted the action for annulment of mortgage on December 3, 1985, while the deed of sale in favor of the private respondent was executed on December 17, 1985. Paguia cannot say that when he took possession of the subject land on January 30, 1986, he was acting in good faith. Neither can be claim that he had no knowledge of the pendency of that litigation because he was in fact one of the defendants in that case. In any event, the fact that the titles were still in the name of the petitioner should have warned him of the need to ascertain the status of the properties before he took possession of them.
X x x.”