IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION
OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER, G.R. No.
149615, August 29, 2006.
“x x x.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is
disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines; that respondent was aware
of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same; and that
respondent’s purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to
obtain exclusive possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of
ownership of the Antipolo property but merely reimbursement; that the funds
paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to
petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity
demands that respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled
to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo
property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified
from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the
case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held:
Under section 1 of Article XIII of
the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this
constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves
who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to
prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as
follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision
closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak
into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of
public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of
Filipino citizens. x x x
x x x x
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be
construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural,
the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole
towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their
names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf
courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are
not, in appellant’s words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s Brief,
p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is
beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and
expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court.11 He declared that he had the Antipolo
property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. 12His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust
was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage
to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines
is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its
express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of
the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow circumvention
of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of
law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that
equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity must do equity, and
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently
stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done
inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied
relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in
issue. 15
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership
as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To
allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by
law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16
Finally, the fundamental law
prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged
with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention
that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he
knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In
any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent
sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property.
To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding
that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will
not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if
it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition,
the considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutional grounds,
against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share
of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition
or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in
the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)
X x x.”
Footnotes
