Monday, February 15, 2016

Co-ownership; a co-owner has the right to sell his undivided share. If he sells the entire property without obtaining the consent of the other co-owners, the sale is not null and void; only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.



CORINTHIAN REALTY, INC. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIO MARTIN (now deceased), MATILDE MARTIN, TEOFILO GUINTO (now deceased), DELFIN GUINTO, PRUDENCIO GUINTO and MARGARITA GUINTO, G. R. No. 150240. December 26, 2002.

“x x x.

Indeed, only the pro-indiviso shares in the property of the co-owners - signatories to the deed were affected by the deed, private respondent Delfin Guinto and the heirs of spouses Tomas de Leon and Francisca Medina who were therein named co-owners-vendors not having affixed their respective signatures.

That petitioner paid specific amounts of money to the co-owners-private respondents-signatories to the deed and even had said -deed notarized in spite of the absence of the signatures of the other co-owners bars the claim of petitioner that it dealt with the co-owners of the property collectively.

Petitioners invocation of Article 1590 of the Civil Code which reads:

Art. 1590. Should the vendee be disturbed in the possession or ownership of the thing acquired, or should he have reasonable grounds to fear such disturbance, by a vindicatory action or a foreclosure of mortgage, he may suspend the payment of the price until the vendor has caused the disturbance or danger to cease, unless the latter gives security for the return of the price in a proper case, or it has been stipulated that, notwithstanding any such contingency, the vendee shall be bound to make the payment. A mere act of trespass shall not authorize the suspension of the payment of the price.

to justify its suspension of the payment of the balance of the purchase price on the basis of, so it claims, a well-grounded fear that its possession or ownership of the property would be disturbed by a vindicatory action which private respondent Delfin Guinto may institute against it fails. And so does its invocation of Article 1191 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

For under Article 493 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 493.- Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership,

a co-owner has the right to sell his undivided share. If he sells the entire property without obtaining the consent of the other co-owners, the sale is not null and void. Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.[24]

The transferee gets only what his transferor would have been entitled to after partition.[25]

Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.[26]

X x x.”