Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.

Wednesday, May 31, 2023

Right to privacy

"x x x

On petitioner's right to privacy

One of the arguments raised by petitioner before this Court concerns the admissibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution, which was taken from his Facebook messenger account. He claims that the photos presented in evidence during the trial of the case were taken from his Facebook messenger account. According to him, this amounted to a violation of his right to privacy, and therefore, any evidence obtained in violation thereof amounts to a fruit of the poisonous tree.

We disagree.

The right to privacy is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities." It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned." Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."29 In his Separate Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen expounded on the concept of privacy, as it has developed throughout the digital age, thus:

Chief Justice Puno sparked judicial interest in the right to privacy. In his speech that I cited in my separate opinion in Versoza v. People,30 he discussed the three strands of privacy in American Jurisprudence, namely, locational or situational privacy, informational privacy, and decisional privacy.

Locational privacy, also known as situational privacy, pertains to privacy that is felt in a physical space. It may be violated through an act of trespass or through an unlawful search. Meanwhile, informational privacy refers to one's right to control "the processing—i.e., acquisition, disclosure and use—of personal information."

Decisional privacy, regarded as the most controversial among the three, refers to one's right "to make certain kinds of fundamental choices with respect to their personal and reproductive autonomy."31

This speech has been influential in several of our jurisprudence.32 To this day, we are still refining our concept of privacy, particularly the right to informational privacy.33

As early as Morfe v. Mutuc,34 we have recognized the increasing importance of the protection of the right to privacy in the digital age. Such right is of particular importance given the nature of the internet and our inescapable dependence on it despite the possible disruption that it can bring. In my separate opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice,35 I explained:

The internet or cyberspace is a complex phenomenon. It has pervasive effects and are, by now, ubiquitous in many communities. Its possibilities for reordering human relationships are limited only by the state of its constantly evolving technologies and the designs of various user interfaces. The internet contains exciting potentials as well as pernicious dangers.

The essential framework for governance of the parts of cyberspace that have reasonable connections with our territory and our people should find definite references in our Constitution. However, effective governance of cyberspace requires cooperation and harmonization with other approaches in other jurisdictions. Certainly, its scope and continuous evolution require that we calibrate our constitutional doctrines carefully: in concrete steps and with full and deeper understanding of incidents that involve various parts of this phenomenon. The internet is neither just one relationship nor is it a single technology. It is an interrelationship of many technologies and cultures.

....

While the Internet has engendered innovation and growth, it has also engendered new types of disruption. A noted expert employs an "evolutionary metaphor" as he asserts:

[Generative technologies] encourage mutations, branchings away from the status quo — some that are curious dead ends, others that spread like wildfire. They invite disruption —along with the good things and bad things that can come with such disruption.

Addressing the implications of disruption, he adds:

Disruption benefits some while others lose, and the power of the generative Internet, available to anyone with a modicum of knowledge and a broadband connection, can be turned to network-destroying ends ... [T]he Internet's very generativity — combined with that of the PCs attached —sows the seeds for a "digital Pearl Harbor."

The Internet is an infrastructure that allows for a "network of networks." It is also a means for several purposes. As with all other "means enhancing capabilities of human interaction," it can be used to facilitate benefits as well as nefarious ends. The Internet can be a means for criminal activity.

Parallel to the unprecedented escalation of the use of the Internet and its various technologies is also an escalation in what has been termed as cybercrimes.36

Privacy scholars explain that the right to informational privacy, to a certain extent, requires "limitation on inspection, observation, and knowledge by others."37 Thus, it has the following aspects: (1) to keep inalienable information to themselves; (2) to prevent first disclosure; and (3) to prevent further dissemination in case the information has already been disclosed. More recently, the European Union has paved the way for the fourth aspect —the right to be forgotten, or the right to prevent the storage of data.

As regards the first component of the right to informational privacy, a person has the right not to be exposed on the internet in matters involving one's private life, such as acts having no relation to public interest or concern. Closely related to the first component is the right to prevent first disclosure, allowing individuals to regulate the extent, time, and manner of disclosure, if at all, of their information. In case the data have been illegally disclosed, a person does not lose protection since they have the right to prevent their further dissemination. In some cases, one has the right to prevent the storage of their data, which gives one the right to be forgotten. Privacy scholars describe this right as "forced omission," or the process of making the information difficult to find on the internet.38

Under the 1987 Constitution, the right to privacy is expressly recognized under Article III, Sec. 3 thereof, which reads:

SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

While the above provision highlights the importance of the right to privacy and its consequent effect on the rules on admissibility of evidence, one must not lose sight of the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect private individuals against government intrusions. Hence, its provisions are not applicable between and amongst private individuals. As explained in People v. Marti:39

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)40

While the case of Zulueta v. Court of Appeals41 (Zulueta) may appear to carve out an exception to the abovementioned rule by recognizing the rule on inadmissibility of evidence between spouses when one obtains evidence in violation of his/her spouse's right to privacy, such a pronouncement is a mere obiter dictum that cannot be considered as a binding precedent. This is because the petition brought to the Court in Zulueta simply asked for the return of the documents seized by the wife and thus, pertained to the ownership of the documents therein. Moreover, documents were declared inadmissible because of the injunction order issued by the trial court and not on account of Art. III, Sec. 3 of the Constitution. At any rate, violation of the right to privacy between individuals is properly governed by the provisions of the Civil Code, the Data Privacy Act (DPA),42 and other pertinent laws, while its admissibility shall be governed by the rules on relevance, materiality, authentication of documents, and the exclusionary rules under the Rules on Evidence.

In this case, the photographs and conversations in the Facebook Messenger account that were obtained and used as evidence against petitioner, which he considers as fruit of the poisonous tree, were not obtained through the efforts of the police officers or any agent of the State. Rather, these were obtained by a private individual. Indeed, the rule governing the admissibility of an evidence under Article III of the Constitution must affect only those pieces of evidence obtained by the State through its agents. It is these individuals who can flex government muscles and use government resources for a possible abuse. However, where private individuals are involved, for which their relationship is governed by the New Civil Code, the admissibility of an evidence cannot be determined by the provisions of the Bill of Rights.

Here, the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were properly authenticated when AAA identified them in open court. As further pointed out by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda during the deliberations of this case, the DPA allows the processing of data and sensitive personal information where it relates to the determination of criminal liability of a data subject,43 such as a violation of R.A. No. 10175 in relation to R.A. No. 9775 and when necessary for the protection of lawful rights and interests of persons in court proceedings,44 as in this case where the communications and photos sought to be excluded were submitted in evidence to establish AAA's legal claims before the prosecutor's office and the courts.

Be that as it may, the act of AAA cannot be said to have violated petitioner's right to privacy. The test in ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy has been explained in the case of Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr.45 as follows:

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.46

Here, petitioner's expectation of privacy emanates from the fact that his Facebook Messenger account is password protected, such that no one can access the same except himself. Petitioner never asserted that his Facebook Messenger account was hacked or the photos were taken from his account through unauthorized means. Rather, the photos were obtained from his account because AAA, to whom he gave his password, had access to it. Considering that he voluntarily gave his password to AAA, he, in effect, has authorized AAA to access the same. He did not even take steps to exclude AAA from gaining access to his account. Having been given authority to access his Facebook Messenger account, petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy, in so far as AAA is concerned, had been limited. Thus, there is no violation of privacy to speak of.

While the messages and photos were taken from the Facebook Messenger of petitioner because AAA was forced by BBB to do so, such does not deviate from the fact that petitioner allowed another person to access his account. When he gave his Facebook Messenger password to AAA, he made its contents available to AAA, and the latter would then have the latitude to show to other persons what she could access, whether she be forced to do so or not. The availability of accessing these photos limited the scope of his right to privacy, especially that these became essential in pursuing AAA's claims to protect her rights.

In any case, it bears pointing out that petitioner failed to raise his objection to the admissibility of the photos during the proceedings in the RTC. Basic is the rule that in order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper time, and the grounds therefore be specified. Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. When a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.47

As a complimentary principle, it is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.48

By failing to timely raise his objection to the admissibility of the photos, petitioner is deemed to have already waived the same. Thus, the photos taken from his Facebook Messenger account are admissible in evidence.

X x x. "

EN BANC

G.R. No. 247348. November 16, 2021

CHRISTIAN CADAJAS Y CABIAS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/nov2021/gr_247348_2021.html

Co-owner vs. Trustee

"x x x

Issue

The central question to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in upholding the RTC's Decision dated February 27, 2012, which dismissed petitioner Logrosa's complaint for partition because of its finding that the latter is not a co-owner and is a mere trustee of the subject properties.

The Court's Ruling

The instant Petition is meritorious.

After a careful review of the records of the instant case, the Court finds that the evidence on record sufficiently substantiates petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of the subject properties.

The Court notes that petitioner Logrosa does not rely merely on his own testimony to prove that he is a co-owner of the subject properties. No one disputes the fact that there are eight certificates of title, i.e., TCT No. T-52508,21 TCT No. T-52509,22 TCT No. T-52510,23 TCT No. T-52511,24 TCT No. T-52512,25 TCT No. T-52513,26 TCT No. T-52514,27 and TCT No. T-52515,28all of which clearly and unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-owners of the subject properties.

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.29 It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application.30 In the instant case, there is no accusation whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa was included as co-owner in the TCTs through means of fraud or bad faith.

Aside from the foregoing, it is also not disputed by any party that a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1987 was executed by all the parties, wherein it clearly states without ambiguity that one of the vendees of the subject properties is petitioner Logrosa. It must be stressed that respondents Sps. Azares do not deny whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa is a co-vendee under the Deed of Absolute Sale. In fact, respondent Cleofe was even a co-signatory of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, evidencing her assent and consent to petitioner Logrosa's status as a co-vendee of the subject properties.

The Court has previously held that a document evidencing a sale transaction, such as a deed of sale, which is duly notarized is considered a public document and therefore enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution.31 Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court likewise state that public documents are prima facie evidence of the fact which gave rise to their execution.

Moreover, as held in Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,32 one's assertion of ownership is further strengthened and buttressed by the fact of possession, i.e., by building and occupying a house on the subject lot, coupled with the lack of opposition of such possession on the part of the other parties.33 In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner Logrosa possesses a portion of the subject property with no opposition by the other parties, aside from respondents Sps. Azares, who disclaimed petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner only after more than two decades since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and only as a mere reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

Hence, with the strong legal presumption created by the eight certificates of title and duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale that petitioner Logrosa is a co-buyer and co-owner of the subject properties, the burden to prove otherwise was shifted to respondents Sps. Azares.

From the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents Sps. Azares have not successfully hurdled this burden.

To controvert the strong legal presumption in favor of petitioner Logrosa's co-ownership over the subject properties, respondents Sps. Azares can only muster the sole testimony of respondent Cesar. A solitary, self-serving testimony cannot successfully overturn petitioner Logrosa's prima facie status as co-owner brought about by the execution of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and the issuance of the certificates of title.

It is the main contention of respondents Sps. Azares that despite the inclusion in the documents of title of petitioner Logrosa and the other parties, i.e., respondents Sps. Torres, Sala, and Baruiz, the latter are only co-owners on paper and that respondents Sps. Azares are the sole buyers of the subject properties. According to respondents Sps. Azares, the sole reason why they included the other parties in the documents of title is "to provide one place for all the parties herein to live near each other for easy access and mutual security."34

First and foremost, respondent Cesar's testimony is self-serving. The self-serving testimony of a party to an instrument cannot be given more weight and reliability than the contents of such instrument, especially if such instrument enjoys presumptive weight.35

Further, the Court finds respondents Sps. Azares' theory perplexing and contrary to ordinary human experience. Assuming arguendo that respondents Sps. Azares are indeed the true sole owners of the subject properties, there was absolutely no need for them to include the other parties in the documents of title if only to allow the latter to stay within the premises of the subject properties.

In other words, if respondents Sps. Azares' mere motivation was to provide one place for all of the parties to live near each other, respondents Sps. Azares could have easily achieved such objective without including the parties in the sale transaction. The inclusion of persons in a deed of sale and a certificate of title is by no means a prerequisite to allow such persons to occupy such property.

Hence, no one in his right mind would include non-buyers or non-owners in a notarized deed of absolute sale and in indefeasible certificates of title if he truly believes that he is the sole owner of the property. Bearing in mind the strong presumption created by public documents such as a notarized instrument and certificates of title, if respondents Sps. Azares really believed that they are the sole owners of the subject properties, one would expect that they would, at the very least, execute another document evidencing their true agreement as a precautionary measure. But no such precautionary measure was employed by respondents Sps. Azares to protect their supposed right as sole owners of the subject properties.

Likewise striking is the nonchalant and unassertive attitude adopted by respondents Sps. Azares in claiming sole ownership of the subject properties. To reiterate, it took respondents Sps. Azares more than two decades from the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and issuance of the certificates of title to assert their sole ownership. Not only that, such assertion was only a reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

Simply stated, the Court is convinced that the actuations and demeanor of respondents Sps. Azares are wholly inconsistent with their contention that they are the sole owners of the subject properties.

With respect to the tax declarations presented by respondents Sps. Azares, jurisprudence holds that tax declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of title which, to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership.36 Hence, in order for respondents Sps. Azares' tax declarations to successfully overturn the strong presumption of petitioner Logrosa's co-ownership, it was incumbent upon respondents Sps. Azares to fortify their position with other supporting evidence. As stated above, respondents Sps. Azares were not able to do so.

Moreover, the Court takes notice of petitioner Logrosa's unrebutted allegation that the tax payments made by respondents Sps. Azares were only made in 2010, which was already after the filing of the Complaint for Partition in 2009. In addition, it is likewise unrebutted by respondents Sps. Azares that respondent Abundio, who testified under oath in open court, paid for the real property taxes covering the subject properties for at least two years. Respondent Abundio was able to submit before the RTC an official receipt of his tax payment; a tax declaration issued in the name of respondents Cleofe, Abundio, and Nelson, and petitioner Logrosa; and Owner's Duplicate Copies of TCT Nos. T-52510 and T-52508 registered in the name of the abovementioned parties.37 This demolishes respondents Sps. Azares' assertion that they exclusively paid the real property taxes covering the subject properties and that their payment of real property taxes is sufficient proof of their sole ownership over the subject properties.

Lastly, both the RTC and CA put much emphasis on respondents Sps. Azares' contention that petitioner Logrosa has no capacity to purchase the subject properties on account of the latter's status as a lowly employee of respondents Sps. Azares.

The Court finds the lower courts' heavy reliance on petitioner Logrosa's supposed incapacity to purchase the subject properties misplaced; it made a mountain out of a molehill.

Assuming for argument's sake that petitioner Logrosa did not contribute in the payment of the purchase price of the subject properties, it does not necessarily mean that he could not become a co-owner of the subject properties who can compel partition.

A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if he/she sets forth in his/her complaint the nature and extent of his title and subsequently proves the same.38 The law does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through gratuity or through onerous consideration. In other words, a person who derived his title and was granted co-ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition.

Respondents Sps. Azares maintain that there was no gratuitous granting of title and co-ownership rights to petitioner Logrosa and that they only intended to designate petitioner Logrosa as a mere trustee of the subject properties. However, to reiterate, this self-serving testimony of respondents Sps. Azares based on their mere say-so cannot stand, vis-a-vis the strong legal presumption created by the certificates of title and the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale that petitioner Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject property.

As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. While implied trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.39

To the contrary, as pointed out by petitioner Logrosa, the testimony of respondent Cesar actually lends credence to petitioner Logrosa's claim that respondent Cesar really intended to designate the former, together with the other respondents, as co-owners of the subject properties.

During the trial, when he was asked why he did not require petitioner Logrosa and the other parties to execute a document acknowledging his status as sole owner of the subject properties, respondent Cesar explained that there was no need to do so because "we previously agreed x x x with each other that whatever they would decide to till the land in that particular area that would be given to them. x x x I have my intention to give that house constructed to them then, I will give that particular land to them."40

With this clear admission against interest on the part of respondents Sps. Azares that there was indeed an intention on their part to make petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents as co-owners of the subject properties, the Court cannot subscribe to the CA's view that there is insufficiency of evidence confirming petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner of the subject properties.

As a parting note, while it is true that the Court has previously held that the mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the registrant may only be a trustee,41 to controvert the legal presumption brought about by the execution and issuance of public documents pointing to the existence of co-ownership, the opposing party must carry and satisfy the burden of proving with clear, convincing and persuasive evidence to repudiate the co-ownership. In this case, the Court finds that respondents Sps. Azares failed to fulfill such burden.

WHEREFORE, premised considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 30,2014 and Resolution dated February 26, 2015 promulgated by the Court of Appeals - Cagayan de Oro City, Special Twenty-First Division and Former Special Twenty-First Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 02878-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2012 promulgated by Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 4026 is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to issue an Order under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court for the partition of the subject properties.

SO ORDERED.

X x x."

G.R. No. 217611, March 27, 2019

ROGELIO LOGROSA, PETITIONER, v. SPOUSES CLEOFE AND CESAR AZARES, SPOUSES ABUNDIO, JR. AND ANTONIETA TORRES, SPOUSES NELSON SALA AND ARLENE ANG, AND SPOUSES BONIFACIO, JR., AND WELHELMINA BARUIZ, RESPONDENTS.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2019marchdecisions.php?id=199

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10660 - AN ACT STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10660

AN ACT STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. Constitution of the Divisions; Quorum. – The Sandiganbayan shall sit in seven (7) divisions of three (3) members each.

"Two (2) members shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary incapacity of a member or a vacancy therein, the Presiding Justice may designate a member of another division to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto."

Section 2. Section 4 of the same decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ’27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads:

"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent and higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.

"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

"Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (P1,000,000.00).

"Subject to the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under this section shall be tried in a judicial region other than where the official holds office.

"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ’27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Section 3. Section 5 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 5. Proceedings, How Conducted; Decision by Majority Vote. – All three (3) members of a division shall deliberate on all matters submitted for judgment, decision, final order, or resolution.

"The concurrence of a majority of the members of a division shall be necessary to render a judgment, decision, or final order, or to resolve interlocutory or incidental motions."

Section 4. Funding and Appropriations. – The amount necessary to carry out the implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as may be needed for its full implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 5. Transitory Provision. – This Act shall apply to all cases pending in the Sandiganbayan over which trial has not begun: Provided, That: (a) Section 2, amending Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, on "Jurisdiction"; and (b) Section 3, amending Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, on "Proceedings, How Conducted; Decision by Majority Vote" shall apply to cases arising from offenses committed after the effectivity of this Act.

Section 6. Separability Clause. – Should any provision of this Act or part hereof be declared unconstitutional, the other provisions or parts not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, orders, and issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker of the House

of Representatives (Sgd.)

FRANKLIN M. DRILON

President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2138 and House Bill No. 5283 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on February 25, 2015.

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary General

House of Representatives (Sgd.) OSCAR G. YABES

Secretary of the Senate

Approved: APR 16 2015

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

President of the Philippines

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11576, July 30, 2021 - AN ACT FURTHER EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980,” AS AMENDED

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11576, July 30, 2021

AN ACT FURTHER EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980,” AS AMENDED

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Section 19. Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

“x x x

“(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

“(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claims exceeds Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00);

“(4) In all matters of probate, both estate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00)’

“x x x

“(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00).”

Section 2. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Section 33. Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

“(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;

“x x x

“(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or any interest therein does not exceed Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) exclusive on interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

“(4) Exclusive original jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime actions where the demand or claim does not exceed Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00).”

Section 3. Delegated Authority of the Supreme Court to Adjust the Jurisdictional Amounts for First and Second Level Courts. – The Supreme Court, unless otherwise provided by law, without prejudice, however, on the part of the Congress to adjust the amounts when the circumstances so warrant, may be adjust the jurisdictional amount for first and second level courts to: (1) reflect the extraordinary supervening inflation or deflation of currency; (2) reflect change in the land valuation; (3) maintain the proportion of caseload between first and second level courts.

Section 4. The provisions of this Act shall apply prospectively to all civil cases filed in the second level courts and first level courts from the date of its effectivity thereof.ℒαwρhi৷

Section 5. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivty of the other provisions thereof.

Section 6. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be considered amended or modified accordingly.

Section 7. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

(SGD.) LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO

Speaker of the House of Representatives (SGD.) VICENTE C. SOTTO III

Senate President

This Act was passed by the Senate of the Philippines as Senate Bill No. 1886 on February 8, 2021, and adopted by the House of Representatives as an amendment to House Bill No. 6589 on May 19, 2021.

(SGD.) MARK LLANDRO L. MENDOZA

Secretary General

House of Representatives (SGD.) MYRA MARIE D. VILLARICA

Secretary of Senate

Approved: JUL 30 2021

(SGD.) RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE

President of the Philippines

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Sunday, April 30, 2023

Calling out power; commander-in-chief powers

"It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis supplied.]

The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]."30 From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.31 However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,32 "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"

Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.

Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: "The executive power shall be vested in the President…." As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: "He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." The provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United States."

EN BANC

G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159103 February 3, 2004

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners,

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR., respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159185 February 3, 2004

REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R. YUMUL-HERMIDA, petitioners,

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159196, February 3, 2004

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner,

SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et al., respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/feb2004/gr_159085_2004.html

Legal standing in relation to judicial power and cases involving constitutional questions

"Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. In Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,22 this Court recognized that:

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise of Congress' emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers' legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny into the President's exercise of martial law powers.

Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit. "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."23

Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:

2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens.

3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same.24 [Emphasis in the original.]

Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected in Lacson v. Perez:

… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[']s right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.25

Even assuming that petitioners are "people's organizations," this status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances, as this Court made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato:26

The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§15-16)

These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.27

That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.28 No such illegal disbursement is alleged.

On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.29 Again, no such injury is alleged in this case.

Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions must fail."

EN BANC

G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159103 February 3, 2004

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners,

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR., respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159185 February 3, 2004

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159196, February 3, 2004

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner,

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/feb2004/gr_159085_2004.html

Moot cases but capable of repetition yet evading review

"Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.16 In addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing of the petitioners to bring suit.17

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual controversies."18 Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case.

Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, "'an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons' assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang."20 Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the President's declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases21 precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration.

To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the President's calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding."

EN BANC

G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159103 February 3, 2004

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners,

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR., respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159185 February 3, 2004

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159196, February 3, 2004

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner,

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/feb2004/gr_159085_2004.html

Commission on Human Rights

"Fortunately, after the historic February 1986 peaceful revolution which saw the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship and the restoration of freedom and democracy in our beloved land, President Corazon C. Aquino immediately moved to restore fundamental democratic structures and processes. One such step, among many, was the creation on March 18, 1986 of the Presidential Committee On Human Rights (PCHR) 21 with Diokno himself as chairman to affirm "the new governments commitment to "uphold and respect the people's civil liberties and human rights,'" and "the United Nations General Assembly's Resolution of 14 December 1984, encouraging all member states to take steps for the establishment or, where they already exist, the strengthening of national institutions for protection of human rights," 22 and was primarily charged with the investigation, among others, of "complaints it may receive, cases known to it or to its members, and such cases as the President may, from time to time assign to it, of unexplained or forced disappearances (extra-judicial killings, salvaging, massacres, torture, hamletting, food blockades) and other violations of human rights, past or present, committed by officers or agents of the national government or persons acting in their place or stead or under their orders, express or implied."

More, the 1987 Constitution which was overwhelmingly ratified on February 2,1987 expressly mandated the creation of the Commission on Human Rights as an independent office 23 in place of a mere Presidential Committee. The Constitution vested the Commission on Human Rights with broader powers than its predecessor committee, such as to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; to exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; to establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; to recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, on their families; to monitor the government's compliance with international treaty, obligations on human rights and grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority. On May 5, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 163 declaring the effectivity of the creation of the Commission On Human Rights as provided for in the 1987 Constitution. This case (as well as all other cases, past and present) may therefore be properly referred to said Commission for a full and thorough investigation and determination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos and of the related grave charges of petitioners against the respondents and the other officers above-named.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to refer this case to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation and appropriate action as may be warranted by its findings, and to furnish the Court with a report of the outcome of its investigation and action taken thereon. This Resolution is immediately executory."

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-59118, March 3, 1988

JUAN DIZON AND SOLEDAD RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. VICENTE EDUARDO AND COL. TEDDY CARIAN, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/mar1988/gr_l_59118_1988.html

Prescription: threat, intimidation vs. fraud.

"On whether the complaint for reconveyance should be dismissed

We agree with the RTC’s and the CA’s rulings that petitioner’s argument on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action is unavailing. When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde.33 The test, therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein. Where the allegations are sufficient but the veracity of the facts is assailed, the motion to dismiss should be denied.34

In their complaint for reconveyance, respondents alleged that the transfer of the three parcels of land from TCAIC to ICCI was facilitated through threat, duress and intimidation employed by certain individuals. On its face, the complaint clearly states a cause of action and raises issues of fact that can be properly settled only after a full-blown trial. On this ground, petitioner’s motion to dismiss must, perforce, be denied.

We do not, however, subscribe to the RTC’s ruling that the action has already prescribed.

It is true that an action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.35 The RTC, however, seemed to have overlooked the fact that the basis of respondents’ complaint for reconveyance is not fraud but threat, duress and intimidation, allegedly employed by Marcos’ cronies upon the relatives of the Montanos while the latter were on self-exile.36 In fact, fraud was neither specifically alleged nor remotely implied in the complaint.

Article 1391 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1391. An action for annulment shall be brought within four years.

This period shall begin: In case of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases.

In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.

And when the action refers to contracts entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons, from the time the guardianship ceases.

In the circumstances prevailing in this case, the threat or intimidation upon respondents is deemed to have ceased only upon the ouster of then President Marcos from power on February 21, 1986. The four-year prescriptive period must, therefore, be reckoned from the said date. Thus, when respondents filed their complaint for reconveyance on September 15, 1989, the period provided for by law had not yet prescribed. Therefore, petitioner’s motion to dismiss should be denied."

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166383, October 16, 2009

ASSOCIATED BANK, Petitioner,

vs. SPOUSES JUSTINIANO S. MONTANO, SR., AND LIGAYA MONTANO and TRES CRUCES AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_166383_2009.html

Affirmative defenses

"On the propriety of the motion to dismiss

Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. – If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.

The rule is based on practicality. Both the parties and the court can conveniently save time and expenses necessarily involved in a case preparation and in a trial at large, when the issues involved in a particular case can otherwise be disposed of in a preliminary hearing.31

Since the rule provides that the "preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed," such hearing shall therefore be conducted in the manner provided in Section 2, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,32 which reads:

SEC. 2. Hearing of motion. – At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the question of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved except those not available at that time. Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of the party presenting the same.

It is, therefore, inconsequential that petitioner had already filed an answer to the complaint prior to its filing of a motion to dismiss. The option of whether to set the case for preliminary hearing after the filing of an answer which raises affirmative defenses, or to file a motion to dismiss raising any of the grounds set forth in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules are procedural options which are not mutually exclusive of each other.

Moreover, as petitioner correctly pointed out, respondents failed to oppose the motion to dismiss despite having been given the opportunity to do so by the RTC. Therefore, any right to contest the same was already waived by them."

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166383, October 16, 2009

ASSOCIATED BANK, Petitioner,

vs. SPOUSES JUSTINIANO S. MONTANO, SR., AND LIGAYA MONTANO and TRES CRUCES AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_166383_2009.html

Friday, March 31, 2023

Cause of action ; elements of.

"7. ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION. — A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential elements are, namely:(1) the existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty on the part of the defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff’s right with consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief."