Thursday, February 29, 2024

Extrajudicial Confession; Admission by Conspirator

 "Accused-appellants must be

acquitted of Murder


In contrast to the above, Antonio's extrajudicial confession as contained in his July 8 Salaysay detailing the abduction and killing of Major Arcega cannot be used to convict accused-appellants in the absence of independent evidence on this charge and on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states:


Section 28. Admission by third-party. - The rights of a third party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.


Expounding on this rule, the Court explained that "[o]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him."48 Thus, as a general rule, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant.49 As an exception, Section 30, Rule 130 of the same Rules allows the admission of a conspirator, provided the conditions therefor are satisfied, viz.:


Section 30. Admission by conspirator. - The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, n1ay be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. (Emphasis supplied)


In this regard, case law states that "in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy."50 Here, aside from Antonio's extrajudicial statements in his July 8 Salaysay, there is a glaring dearth of evidence showing the participation of accused-appellants in a plan or conspiracy to abduct and kill Major Arcega. As such, Antonio's statement in his July 8 Salaysay is binding on him alone; it cannot be admitted against his co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.51


In this light, the Court is constrained to acquit not only herein accused­ appellants, but also their co-accused - except for Antonio who executed the July 8 Salaysay - for the Murder of Major Arcega. This is pursuant to Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:


Section. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -


(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.


While it is true that it was only accused-appellants who successfully perfected their appeal before the Court, it is well to reiterate the rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the entire case out in the open, including those not raised by the parties.52 Considering that, under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment - as in this case - shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory,53 accused-appellants' acquittal for the crime of Murder is likewise applicable to the rest of the accused, save for Antonio, against whom his confession in his July 8 Salaysay shall be solely binding, and Cortez, who had since died.


Finally, and in light of prevailing jurisprudence, Antonio should pay the heirs of Major Arcega the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages for the crime of Murder, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.54"


G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020 


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORES Y CORPUZ, JESUS TIME Y CABESA, GILBERT PACPACO Y DIRECTO, GILBERT RAMIREZ Y DUNEGO, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, ROGELIO ANTONIO Y ABUJUELA, TOMMY CABESA Y VILLEGAS, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED,


ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORESYCORPUZ, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_242696_2020.html






Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide

 "Accused-appellants are guilty

of the special complex crime

of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide


The elements of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, are as follows:(a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his/her liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. In the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought.43


As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, the prosecution had established the existence of the aforementioned elements.Ꮮαwρhi৷ Anent the first and second elements, accused-appellants and their co-accused intended and later on, were able to actually deprive Dr. Andres, Sr. of his liberty when the latter went missing after meeting a group of people in Sta. Lucia Mall on July 2, 1998. Such actual deprivation of Dr. Andres, Sr.'s liberty was confirmed by no less than Galamay who informed Dr. Andres, Jr. of such fact via a phone call. As to the third element, their motive, which is to extort ransom in exchange for Dr. Andres, Sr.'s release was manifest in: (a) Galamay's phone call to Dr. Andres, Jr. in order to demand ransom; (b) Bernardo, Time, Pacpaco, Ramirez, and Cabesa's receipt of the ransom money from Dr. Andres, Jr. on July 4, 1998 at España, Manila as witnessed by the members44 of the PNP­ CIDG; and (c) Cabesa's delivery of the ransom money to Flores, Cortez, and Antonio, who were all caught while counting the same. Finally, the last element is also present as Dr. Andres, Sr. was killed while in detention and his body was found in Mabitac, Laguna.


In this relation, the extrajudicial confession executed by Antonio as embodied in his July 6 Salaysay relative to the commission of the kidnapping of Dr. Andres, Sr. is merely corroborative of the prosecution evidence on this particular charge. To be admissible, a confession must comply with the following requirements: it "must be (a) voluntary; (b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; (c) express; and (d) in writing."45 In this case, not only was the prosecution able to establish that these requirements had been complied with, it was also able to show that the contents of Antonio's July 6 Salaysay merely corroborated independent evidence pointing to accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence showing the complicity of accused-appellants beyond moral certainty, consisting in the positive identification of Bernardo and Galamay by Dr. Andres, Jr., as well as the in flagrante arrest of Flores. Furthermore, Antonio's July 6 Salaysay was executed after his co­ conspirators had been duly identified and arrested. If at all, aside from the corroboration it lent to the prosecution evidence, it additionally provided details that only persons privy to the kidnapping can supply, i.e., the place where Dr. Andres, Sr. was detained and the fact that his vehicle had been burned and abandoned in Norzagaray, Bulacan.46


Therefore, the Court finds no reason to overturn the courts a quo's findings in relation to accused-appellants' (and their co-accused's) commission of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, as there was no showing that the courts a quo overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. It bears pointing out that the trial court - whose findings were affirmed by the CA - was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses by both parties.47"

G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020 


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORES Y CORPUZ, JESUS TIME Y CABESA, GILBERT PACPACO Y DIRECTO, GILBERT RAMIREZ Y DUNEGO, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, ROGELIO ANTONIO Y ABUJUELA, TOMMY CABESA Y VILLEGAS, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED,


ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORESYCORPUZ, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_242696_2020.html




Wednesday, January 31, 2024

Award of attorney's fees denied

"As regards attorney's fees, the Court of Appeals correctly held that none may be awarded to petitioner:


Consequently, the award of attorney's fees must also be deleted. Notably, it was not appellee alone who incurred costs to protect her interest. Appellant, too, spent for legal costs to finally settle the issue pertaining to the validity of his marriage with appellee. In the absence of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish suffered by a person for having been made a party in a civil case is not the kind of anxiety which would warrant the award of moral damages. Appellee's emotional suffering and anxiety are only such as are usually caused to a party hauled into [court] as a party in litigation, but is insufficient justification for the award of moral or exemplary damages.69"


THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html


Withdrawal of appeal before the Supreme Court

"Once a case has been submitted for a court's decision, the petitioning party cannot, at their election, withdraw their appeal.71 The grant or denial of the withdrawal is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.72


The practice of the courts has always been to the effect that once a case or appeal is submitted for decision, its withdrawal should not be at the discretion of the party, but dependent on the assent thereto of the adjudicating authority.


. . . .


. . . What is important is that once the finality of the questioned judgment has been arrested by a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing officer should be given full opportunity to restudy the records and satisfy himself whether justice has been done; and if convinced that it was not done, to revise and correct the judgment as the interest of justice requires, irrespective of whether the defendant will be favored or prejudiced. The public interest demands no less. As the Spanish proverb goes, justice is "no mas pero no menos".73


Petitioner can no longer elect to withdraw her Petition for Review at this late stage in the proceedings. It is merely incidental that, if we had granted petitioner's motion, it would have had the same result as this resolution on the merits."


THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html


Abuse of right; moral damages

 "Moral damages are a form of compensation for the "physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury"50 unjustly sustained by a person.51 They are awarded when: (1) there is a physical, mental or psychological injury clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a wrongful act or omission is factually established; (3) the act or omission is the proximate cause of the injury; and (4) the award of damages is based on any of the cases stated in Article 221952 of the Civil Code.53


This Court has sanctioned the award of moral damages m cases of bigamy based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.54


Article 19 of the Civil Code sets the standards for the exercise of one's rights and performance of duties:


ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.


This provision recognizes that even the exercise of a right may be the source of some illegal act, when done in a manner contrary to the standards it sets, and results in damage to another.55 Meanwhile, Articles 20 and 21 provide for the legal remedy for a violation of Article 19:56


ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.


ARTICLE 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.


For there to be a finding of an abuse of rights under Article 19, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) the right is exercised or the duty is performed in bad faith; and (3) the sole intent of the exercise or performance is to prejudice or injure another.57 It must be shown that the exercise of the right or performance of the duty was done with bad faith. In Dart Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Calogcog: 58


Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.59


In Manuel v. People,60 this Court awarded moral damages to the innocent spouse upon a finding that the bigamous spouse acted deceitfully and fraudulently when he contracted his second marriage:


In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance—that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.1âшphi1


Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.61


There, this Court found that the bigamous spouse's continuous and collective acts of fraud before, during, and after his marriage were willful, deliberate, and malicious, causing injury to the innocent spouse. It was the bigamous spouse's continuing bad faith that disregarded public policy, undermined and subverted the family as a social institution, and went against good morals, and the interest and general welfare of society.62


Thus, the Regional Trial Court was in error when it held that the mere contracting of a second marriage despite the existence of a first marriage is, by itself, a ground for damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 20 or Article 21. As correctly stressed by the Court of Appeals, the bad faith, or deliberate intent to do a wrongful act, of the bigamous spouse must be established:


Here, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately contracted a second marriage despite knowledge of the subsistence of his first marriage. He believed in good faith that the divorce decree given to his first wife was valid and binding in the Philippines because he thought all along that [his] first wife at that time was already an [American] citizen. Thus, he and Mercado, both consenting adults, freely married each other, both believing that the final divorce decree was valid and binding in the Philippines. Indeed, both appellant and Mercado would not have married each other under pain of indictment for bigamy had they known that appellant's first marriage was still in existence, because it later turned out that Mercado was still a Filipino when the divorce decree was issued. So how could appellant be held liable for damages when he was not shown to have acted in bad faith when he married appellee? It has been consistently held that bad faith does not simply mean negligence or bad judgment. It involves a state of mind dominated by ill-will or motive. It implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity. The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. Here, appellee failed to overcome the legal presumption of good faith. Thus, the award of moral damages must be deleted.63


Petitioner has not been able to prove that, at the time she and respondent married, respondent knew that his divorce from his first spouse was invalid. There is no proof that, upon the first spouse's confirmation of her Philippine citizenship at the time she obtained the divorce decree, respondent concealed this knowledge from petitioner or allowed her to continue believing that their marriage was valid. The malice or bad faith necessary to sustain an action based on Article 19 of the Civil Code has not been shown in this case.


Moreover, petitioner has not established that she has sustained an injury in law due to respondent's acts.


A review of the records shows that petitioner had known that there was some sort of anomaly in the dissolution of respondent's first marriage as early as 1992. As the Regional Trial Court found, within four years of petitioner and respondent's marriage, they found out that the divorce decree between respondent and Mantaring may not be valid because of their citizenship.64 Both petitioner and respondent consulted with a lawyer, who advised them to have the first marriage annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity.65 When respondent withdrew his petition for annulment, petitioner pleaded with him to continue the case.66


Petitioner does not dispute any of these findings made by the trial court.67 She knew, or should have known, that there existed some issue regarding respondent's first marriage which might adversely affect the validity of her marriage to him. Yet, she did not initiate any actions of her own to protect her civil status, and appeared complacent with the uncertainty that hovered over the validity of her marriage with respondent.


There being no entitlement to moral damages, no exemplary damages can likewise be awarded to petitioner.68"


THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html


Considering these conflicting conclusions, this Court must now examine the factual findings to resolve whether or not respondent acted in bad faith when he married petitioner despite the subsistence of his first marriage


"In its November 18, 2016 Decision, the Regional Trial Court held that respondent's act of marrying petitioner even though he had an existing first marriage constituted bad faith. The Court of Appeals ruled otherwise because it found that, at the time respondent married petitioner, he believed in good faith that he was validly divorced from his first wife. Further, it found that respondent did not seek to have his second marriage declared null and void only so that he could evade liability in the civil case filed by petitioner.


Considering these conflicting conclusions, this Court must now examine the factual findings to resolve whether or not respondent acted in bad faith when he married petitioner despite the subsistence of his first marriage."


THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html





Sunday, December 31, 2023

Section 5(i)5 in relation to Section 6(f)6 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (VAWC Law). - This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.

 "The Court's Ruling


The Court grants the Petition and acquits Calingasan of the crime charged.


In all criminal cases, the Court has always adhered to the fundamental policy that when the guilt of the accused is not proven with moral certainty, the constitutional presumption of innocence must be upheld, and the exoneration of the accused must be granted as a matter of right.29 Thus, to warrant a finding of guilt for the crime charged, the prosecution must establish, beyond reasonable doubt, each and every element of the crime charged in the information or for any other crime necessarily included therein.30


In the case at bar, upon careful review of the case records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden. 


Calingasan cannot be held liable for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.


Calingasan was charged and convicted by the courts a quo for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, which provides:


SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:


x x x x


(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.


Based on the Information filed against him, Calingasan is accused of willfully denying private complainant and their child of the financial support legally due them, which allegedly caused them mental and emotional anguish, public ridicule and humiliation.31


In the very recent case of Acharon v. People32 (Acharon), the Court en banc clarified that the failure or inability to provide financial support per se is not a criminal act punishable under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. What Section 5(i) penalizes is the act of inflicting psychological violence against women and children by willfully or consciously denying them the financial support legally due to them. The Court ratiocinated as follows:


The Court stresses that Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 uses the phrase "denial of financial support" in defining the criminal act. The word "denial" is defined as "refusal to satisfy a request or desire" or "the act of not allowing someone to do or have something." The foregoing definitions connote willfulness, or an active exertion of effort so that one would not be able to have or do something. This may be contrasted with the word "failure," defined as "the fact of not doing something [which one] should have done," which in turn connotes passivity. From the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature — there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime.


x x x x


It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish, or for her partner to deny financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon her. x x x


"It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children." In prosecutions under Section 5(i), therefore, "[p]sychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator" with denial of financial support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose.


This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.33 (Emphasis and italics in the original)


Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court in Acharon enumerated the elements that need to be proven to hold an accused liable for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, viz.:


(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;


(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;


(3) The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies the woman and/or her child or children financial support that is legally due her and/or her child or children; and


(4) The offender denied the woman and/or her child or children the financial support for the purpose of causing the woman and/or her child or children mental or emotional anguish.34


Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the Court holds that, contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, the prosecution failed to prove the third and fourth elements thereof.


Apart from establishing the relationship of the parties and that Calingasan left home sometime in 1998, not a single evidence was offered by the prosecution to establish that Calingasan deliberately or willfully refused to provide private complainant and their child the financial support legally due them. Also, no proof was adduced showing that Calingasan's supposed failure or refusal to provide financial support caused private complainant and their child mental and emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation.


On the contrary, records of the case evidently showed that Calingasan, for a time, provided private complainant and their child financial support and that his subsequent failure to do so was due to circumstances beyond his control. Calingasan testified under oath and presented documentary evidence showing that he was arrested in Canada and incarcerated for almost six (6) years.35 When he was released from prison, Calingasan tried to look for a permanent job but was not able to find one. He had since then relied upon the support and help of his siblings.36


These pieces of evidence, unrebutted by the prosecution, belie the accusations that (1) Calingasan deliberately denied private complainant and BBB financial support and (2) the denial of financial support was intended to cause private complainant and BBB mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation. Therefore, Calingasan cannot be convicted for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. 


Neither is Calingasan guilty of violating Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.


Similar to Section 5(i), Section 5(e) also involves the denial of financial support legally due the woman and her child, viz.:


SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:


x x x x


(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or her child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:


x x x x


(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support[.]


In the cases of Melgar v. People37 (Melgar) and Reyes v. People38 (Reyes), the Court, applying the variance doctrine, had previously ruled that an accused may be convicted of violating Section 5(e), instead of Section 5(i), as long as the denial or deprivation of financial support by the accused has been established by the prosecution; because the former specifically penalizes the deprivation of financial support by itself, even in the absence of psychological violence.39


However, in Acharon, the Court en banc abandoned its ruling in Melgar and Reyes. The Court clarified that Section 5(e) and Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 penalize two distinct crimes. Section 5(i) punishes the willful infliction of psychological violence upon the woman and her child by denying them the financial support that is legally due them. Section 5(e), on the other hand, penalizes the deprivation of financial support "for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct."40 Thus, while both provisions indeed involve the denial or deprivation of financial support, each of these provisions punishes entirely different acts. As such, the variance doctrine does not apply to convict an accused for the other crime.


Further, the Court reiterated that mere failure or inability to provide financial support is insufficient to warrant a finding of guilt for violation of either provision. There must be both an allegation and proof of the existence of the requisite specific intent penalized under each of these provisions: for Section 5(i), that the denial of financial support was for the purpose of inflicting psychological violence upon the woman and her child; while for Section 5(e), that the deprivation of financial support was for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's actions or decisions.


Therefore, for Calingasan to be held liable for violating Section 5(e), it must be alleged and proved that he deprived private complainant and their child the financial support legally due them, for the purpose of controlling their actions and decisions, which clearly are all wanting in this case. Again, to recall, what the evidence of the prosecution simply proved in this case is that Calingasan failed to provide financial support, and nothing more. This is also insufficient to warrant a guilty verdict for violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 15, 2017 and Resolution dated May 10, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39417 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Cesar M. Calingasan is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.


SO ORDERED."


FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 239313. February 15, 2022 ]

CESAR M. CALINGASAN,* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/feb2022/gr_239313_2022.html





While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

"Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.


The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:


Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:


records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27


In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.


The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.


We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:


While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.


The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:


It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:


x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the


instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.


x x x x


Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.


The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.


Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."


In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30


As correctly stated by the appellate court:


In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the


Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."


x x x x


The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31


The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.


As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:


The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.


In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.


WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.


SO ORDERED."


SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.

TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/gr_173540_2014.html


Friday, December 1, 2023

Good Conduct Time Allowance Law vis-a-vis reclusion perpetua and heinous crimes - Miguel's argument is two-fold: first, he anchors his claim on the assertion that applying the GCTA Law, he has served a total of "thirty-eight (38) years, ten (10) months, and one (1) day"13 already. Second, he posits that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years.14 Having served a total of thirty­eight (38) years, which is eight (8) years more than the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua, Miguel concludes that he has fully served his sentence and his detention no longer holds legal basis.


"Procedural considerations aside, the Court still finds the petition wanting in merit.


Miguel's argument is two-fold: first, he anchors his claim on the assertion that applying the GCTA Law, he has served a total of "thirty-eight (38) years, ten (10) months, and one (1) day"13 already. Second, he posits that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years.14 Having served a total of thirty­eight (38) years, which is eight (8) years more than the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua, Miguel concludes that he has fully served his sentence and his detention no longer holds legal basis.


Miguel's contention is wrong.


On the first point, Miguel assumes that he is entitled to the benefits of the GCTA Law. However, a plain reading of the law would reveal otherwise.


The last paragraph of Section 1 of the GCTA Law reads:


Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (Emphasis supplied)


This disqualification is further echoed in several provisions of the 2019 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 10592 (2019 Revised IRR) which read:


Rule III, Section 3. Who are Disqualified. -The following shall not be entitled to any credit for preventive imprisonment:


a. Recidivists;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law;

d. Habitual Delinquents;

e. Escapees; and

f. PDL charged of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)


Rule IV, Section 1. GCTA During Preventive Imprisonment. - The good conduct of a detained PDL qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment shall entitle him to the deductions described in Section 3 hereunder, as GCTA, from the possible maximum penalty.


The following shall not be entitled to any GCTA during preventive imprisonment:


a. Recidivists;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law;

d. Habitual Delinquents;

e. Escapees; and

f. PDL charged of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)


Rule IV, Section 2. GCTA During Service of Sentence. - The good conduct of a PDL convicted by final judgment in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any local jail shall entitle him to the deductions described in Section 3 hereunder, as GCTA, from the period of his sentence, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10592.


The following shall not be entitled to any GCTA during service of sentence:


a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual Delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL convicted of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)


Rule V, Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following shall not be entitled to TASTM (Time Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring):


a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL charged and convicted of heinous crimes. (Emphasis supplied)


Rule VI, Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following are not qualified to be released under this Rule:


a. Recidivists;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law;

d. Habitual Delinquents;

e. Escapees; and

f. PDL charged of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)


Rule VII, Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following shall not be entitled to STAL (Special Time Allowance for Loyalty):


a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual Delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL charged or convicted of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)


The GCTA Law and the 2019 Revised IRR have made it abundantly clear that persons charged with and/or convicted of heinous crimes are not entitled to the benefits under the law. Thus, this begs the question: which crimes are considered heinous? More specifically, is murder considered a heinous crime for purposes of the application of the GCTA Law?


The 2019 Revised IRR defines "heinous crimes" as follows:


"Heinous Crimes" - crimes which are grievous, odious and hateful to the senses and which, by reason of their inherent and or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, including crimes which are mandatorily punishable by Death under the provisions of RA No. 7659, as amended, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and those crimes specifically declared as such by the Supreme Court[.]


While the definition did not expressly enumerate crimes which are considered heinous, it made reference to "crimes which are mandatorily punishable by Death under the provisions of RA 7659, as amended x x x."


Section 6 of RA 7659,15 otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, states:


Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:


Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:


1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.


2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.


3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, deraihnent or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.


4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.


5. With evident premeditation.


6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."

From the discussion above, it is evident that the crime of Murder is one that is mandatorily punishable by death, in accordance with the Death Penalty Law. Being a such, it falls within the definition of "heinous crimes" in the 2019 Revised IRR and is therefore considered as a heinous crime.


In sum, Murder is considered a heinous crime in so far as the GCTA Law is concerned, and persons charged with and/or convicted of such are disqualified from availing of the benefits of the law.


On this point alone, the petition should already fail. However, Miguel further argues that Article 70 of the RPC caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years only. He is referring to the last paragraph of said provision, which states:


In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended by Com. Act No. 217.)


Miguel is again mistaken.


Plainly, nowhere in the cited provision does it state that perpetual penalties, such as reclusion perpetua, are capped at thirty (30) years. Instead, what it only provides is that in applying the rules laid out in Article 70, such as the three-fold rule, the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty (30) years, thus:


In the case of People v. Mendoza, G.R. L-3271, May 5, 1950, it was held that the accused were guilty of murders and that each of them must be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each of the five murders, although the duration of the aggregate penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In this case, after serving one reclusion perpetua, which is computed at 30 years, the accused will serve 10 years more. All the other penalties will not be served.16 (Emphasis supplied)


In People v. Reyes,17 Article 70 is further explained:


The other applicable reference to reclusion perpetua is found in Article 70 of the Code which, in laying down the rule on successive service of sentences where the culprit has to serve more than three penalties, provides, that 'the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three­fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him,' and '(i)n applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetual) shall be computed at thirty years.'


The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties x x x.18 (Emphasis supplied)


Miguel's position is further negated by the pronouncement in People v. Baguio,19 where the Court similarly held that "[r]eclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon x x x."20


Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, it is evident that the penalty of reclusion perpetua requires imprisonment of at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes only eligible for pardon, and not for release. This is in stark contrast to Miguel's claim that a convict meted with the penalty of reclusion perpetua must serve only thirty (30) years.


To recap, Miguel was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison on January 15, 1994. Therefore, as of August 15, 2021, he has only served a total of twenty-seven (27) years and seven (7) months of his sentence. Hence, having been punished to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, Miguel's continued detention is valid and justified. He has utterly failed to show that he is illegally confined or deprived of his liberty.


Accordingly, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may not be issued and the discharge of Miguel from imprisonment should not be authorized.


WHEREFORE, the Petition is  hereby Dismissed."


SECOND DIVISION

[ UDK-15368, September 15, 2021 ]

GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/sep2021/udk_15368_2021.html


Habeas corpus vis-a-vis hierarchy of courts

 "As to which court may grant the writ, Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:


Section 2. Who may grant the writ. - The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.


From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. However, this does not mean that parties are absolutely free to choose before which court to file their petitions, thus:


[M]ere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary writs.'12


In sum, Miguel should have filed the present petition before the RTC, absent any showing of special and important reasons warranting a direct resort to this Court."


SECOND DIVISION

[ UDK-15368, September 15, 2021 ]

GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/sep2021/udk_15368_2021.html


A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

 "Preliminarily, we wish to point out that Miguel failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.


In Cruz v. Gingoyon,10 the Court aptly explained the principle, thus:


We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ('inferior') courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition." For the guidance of the petitioner, "[t]his Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive." Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases. "However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition." Unwarranted demands upon this Court's attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.11 (Emphasis supplied)"


SECOND DIVISION

[ UDK-15368, September 15, 2021 ]

GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/sep2021/udk_15368_2021.html


Tuesday, October 31, 2023

Transfer of workers; balancing "management prerogative" and "security of tenure of workers": "In the resolution of whether the transfer of the respondents from one area of operation to another was valid, finding a balance between the scope and limitation of the exercise of management prerogative and the employees' right to security of tenure is necessary. We have to weigh and consider, on the one hand, that management has a wide discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the transfer and re-assignment of employees according to the exigencies of the business; and, on the other, that the transfer constitutes constructive dismissal when it is unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee, or involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges, or when the acts of discrimination, insensibility or disdain on the part of the employer become unbearable for the employee, forcing him to forego her employment."

 



"In the resolution of whether the transfer of the respondents from one area of operation to another was valid, finding a balance between the scope and limitation of the exercise of management prerogative and the employees' right to security of tenure is necessary.[32] We have to weigh and consider, on the one hand, that management has a wide discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the transfer and re-assignment of employees according to the exigencies of the business;[33] and, on the other, that the transfer constitutes constructive dismissal when it is unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee, or involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges, or when the acts of discrimination, insensibility or disdain on the part of the employer become unbearable for the employee, forcing him to forego her employment.[34]


In this case of constructive dismissal, the burden of proof lies in the petitioner as the employer to prove that the transfer of the employee from one area of operation to another was for a valid and legitimate ground, like genuine business necessity.[35] We are satisfied that the petitioner duly discharged its burden, and thus established that, contrary to the claim of the respondents that they had been constructively dismissed, their transfer had been an exercise of the petitioner's legitimate management prerogative.


To start with, the resignations of the account managers and the director of sales and marketing in the Manila office brought about the immediate need for their replacements with personnel having commensurate experiences and skills. With the positions held by the resigned sales personnel being undoubtedly crucial to the operations and business of the petitioner, the resignations gave rise to an urgent and genuine business necessity that fully warranted the transfer from the Nasugbu, Batangas office to the main office in Manila of the respondents, undoubtedly the best suited to perform the tasks assigned to the resigned employees because of their being themselves account managers who had recently attended seminars and trainings as such. The transfer could not be validly assailed as a form of constructive dismissal, for, as held in Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Fianza,[36] management had the prerogative to determine the place where the employee is best qualified to serve the interests of the business given the qualifications, training and performance of the affected employee.


Secondly, although the respondents' transfer to Manila might be potentially inconvenient for them because it would entail additional expenses on their part aside from their being forced to be away from their families, it was neither unreasonable nor oppressive. The petitioner rightly points out that the transfer would be without demotion in rank, or without diminution of benefits and salaries. Instead, the transfer would open the way for their eventual career growth, with the corresponding increases in pay. It is noted that their prompt and repeated opposition to the transfer effectively stalled the possibility of any agreement between the parties regarding benefits or salary adjustments.


Thirdly, the respondents did not show by substantial evidence that the petitioner was acting in bad faith or had ill-motive in ordering their transfer. In contrast, the urgency and genuine business necessity justifying the transfer negated bad faith on the part of the petitioner.


Lastly, the respondents, by having voluntarily affixed their signatures on their respective letters of appointment, acceded to the terms and conditions of employment incorporated therein. One of the terms and conditions thus incorporated was the prerogative of management to transfer and re-assign its employees from one job to another "as it may deem necessary or advisable," to wit:

The company reserves the right to transfer you to any assignment from one job to another, or from one department/section to another, as it may deem necessary or advisable.


Having expressly consented to the foregoing, the respondents had no basis for objecting to their transfer. According to Abbot Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[37] the employee who has consented to the company's policy of hiring sales staff willing to be assigned anywhere in the Philippines as demanded by the employer's business has no reason to disobey the transfer order of management. Verily, the right of the employee to security of tenure does not give her a vested right to her position as to deprive management of its authority to transfer or re-assign her where she will be most useful.[38]


In view of the foregoing, the NLRC properly appreciated the evidence and merits of the case in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. As such, the CA gravely erred in declaring that the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.


WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 10, 2011; REINSTATES the decision issued on December 14, 2009 by the National Labor Relations Commission; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.


SO ORDERED."


G.R. No. 197492, January 18, 2017. 

CHATEAU ROYALE SPORTS AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., PETITIONER, VS. RACHELLE G. BALBA AND MARINEL N. CONSTANTE, RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/62724


Torts and Damages: "In order for Rico to maintain an action for the injuries which he claims to have sustained, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which Union Bank owed to him. In other words, there must be a concurrence of injury to Rico and the legal responsibility of the person causing it, i.e. Union Bank.64 "The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury."

"A credit card is a form of credit accommodation granted by the credit card company to the card holder for the latter's use in the purchase of goods and services. The contract between the card company and the credit card holder is a simple loan arrangement. Although the relationship between the card company and the card holder is that of creditor-debtor28 which exists upon the acceptance by the cardholder of the terms of the card membership agreement, We explained in Pantaleon v. American Express International, Inc.29 that this creditor-debtor relationship arises only after the credit card issuer has approved the cardholder's purchase request. In other words, when the cardholder uses his or her credit card to pay for purchases, an offer to enter into loan agreement with the credit card company is made. Only when the card company approves the purchase request that the parties enter into a binding loan agreement in line with Article 1319 of the Civil Code.


The question now, therefore, is whether Union Bank has the obligation to approve all the purchase requests of Rico by virtue of the issuance of the credit card. Consequently, when the bank disapproved Rico's purchase request on November 20, 2005 at Gourdo's Restaurant, is Union Bank liable to pay moral damages allegedly due to the embarrassment and humiliation resulting from the credit card's dishonor?


To reiterate, "the use of a credit card to pay for a purchase is only an offer to the credit card company to enter into a loan agreement with the credit card holder. Before the credit card issuer accepts this offer, no obligation relating to the loan agreement exists between them."30 Thus, Union Bank has no obligation to enter into a loan agreement with Rico when the latter tendered his offer by using his Union Bank Visa credit card to pay for his purchase at Gourdo's Restaurant. Rico, cannot, therefore demand from Union Bank to loan him or to pay for his purchase at Gourdo's Restaurant by virtue of the issued Visa credit card. "A demand presupposes the existence of an obligation between the parties."31


While it is true that with the issuance of the credit card to Rico, Union Bank granted him a credit facility or a pre-approved amount which the card holder may use in his purchase of goods and services, this is not a demandable right which the card holder may hold against the credit card company as if he is entitled to be granted a loan whenever he or she wants to, or that the bank owes him or her money by the mere issuance of a credit card. Hence, Union Bank may or may not approve Rico's purchase requests based on the latter's credit standing, credit card history, and financial capability. Rico cannot demand that Union Bank should pay for his purchase in Gourdo's Restaurant through the use of the Visa credit card as if the bank is obliged to do so. The disapproval of the credit card transaction which allegedly caused him embarrassment and humiliation worthy of moral damages cannot be solely attributed to Union Bank when there is no demandable right to begin with. In the same manner, Rico is not compelled nor obliged to use his Union Bank Visa credit card to pay for any of his purchases.


However, We recognize that when Union Bank issued a Visa credit card to Rico, the parties entered into a contractual relationship governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement which constitute as the law between the parties.32 Hence, in case of breach thereof, moral damages may be recovered if any of the party is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.33 "Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.34 However, a conscious or intentional design need not always be present because negligence may occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith."35 Article 2220 of the Civil Code contemplates gross negligence as bad faith which would justify an award of moral damages.


The Terms and Conditions36 did not expressly state that Union Bank would honor all purchase requests of Rico at all times. Nonetheless, with the issuance of the credit card, Union Bank granted Rico credit card privileges which the latter may use in payment for goods and services. Thus, although the credit card company may disapprove the card holder's credit card transaction, it shall do so justifiably and within the bounds of laws and the credit card membership agreement. Otherwise, it would be futile to procure a credit card without a reasonable expectation that the card company will approve the card holder's purchase requests despite being in good credit standing and abiding by the terms and conditions.


A perusal of the records would show that Union Bank disapproved Rico's use of credit card on November 20, 2005 due to the latter's failure to pay the minimum amount due of his SOA dated October 16, 2005.37 However, Rico countered that he paid all his purchases in the total amount of P347.00, and that he was not liable for the other charges in the SOA dated October 16, 2005.


A further examination of the events that transpired before the disapproval of Rico's credit card transaction on November 20, 2005 would reveal that the cause of the inadvertent late payment charges and interests charged in the SOA dated October 16, 2005 was Rico's use of the credit card to pay for his Tiger Airways airline tickets on June 20, 2005 and June 29, 2005,38 which he allegedly cancelled as he did not want to pursue his travel anymore. As per Rico's letter dated June 30, 200539 addressed to Tiger Airways, he did not want to proceed with his flight to Singapore due to the absence of available seats when he tried to modify or change his return flight to Manila. Hence, even when the said airline tickets were already posted in his SOA dated July 15, 2005,40 Rico insisted that he cancelled the same and demanded Union Bank to refund the amount.41


However, as per Rico's letter dated July 4, 200542 to Tiger Airways, the airline refused to grant his demand to cancel the airline tickets because they were non-refundable. Thus, he stated in his letter that he would not pay his credit card for the allegedly cancelled tickets nor any change fees. In another letter dated July 7, 200543 to Tiger Airways, Rico insisted that he was not liable for any cancellation charges and change fees, and that he was not considering any option of flight change. He reiterated the same stance against Tiger Airways in his letter dated July 12, 2005.44


As a result, Rico did not pay Union Bank for the amount corresponding to the Tiger Airways airline tickets charged to his account. He even demanded from Union Bank to refund or reverse the amount charged in his credit card despite knowledge that the said transaction successfully pushed through and was not yet cancelled by Tiger Airways as per his letters dated July 4, 2005, July 7, 2005, and July 12, 2005. Clearly, he did not want to proceed with his flight but Tiger Airways refused to cancel his non-refundable tickets. The only option for Rico is to request the bank to cancel the transaction on the pretext of cancelled airline tickets.


In Union Bank's letter dated August 13, 200545 to Rico, the bank noted that Rico disputed the Tiger Airways airline tickets transaction posted in his SOA dated July 15, 2005. However, Union Bank advised him to coordinate the cancellation with Tiger Airways so it could facilitate its request of refund or reversal.46 In reply, Rico, in his letter dated August 25, 2005,47 demanded from the bank to reverse the amount of airline tickets or else he would not use the credit card.1a⍵⍴h!1


Nevertheless, Union Bank continued to charge the amount of the airline tickets in his succeeding SOAs, i.e. August 15, 200548 and September 15, 200549 with interest, charges, and/or other fees. Obviously, in the August 15, 2005 and September 15, 2005 SOAs, the cancellation of the airline tickets was not yet resolved which explains why Union Bank continued to charge Rico's credit card account.


However, in SOA dated October 16, 2005,50 Union Bank classified the airline tickets as disputed items but still continued to charge the said amount in Rico's account. Hence, the total amount due on SOA dated October 16, 2005 is P30,376.79, which includes the price of the airline tickets, with a minimum amount due of P500.00.51 Rico, however, insisting that he is not liable to pay the airline tickets as he claimed to have cancelled the same, only paid P347.00, or less than the minimum amount due.52


Thereafter, Union Bank made a credit adjustment on November 7, 200553 so as not to charge Rico with additional charges for the disputed transaction while undergoing the process of reversal or refund, if entitled. Clearly, in Union Bank's letter dated November 29, 2005,54 the disputed airline tickets transactions were not yet resolved but the bank made the necessary credit adjustment to avoid the running of additional charges or interests. The bank clarified that the said credit adjustment is not considered as payment and that Rico still needs to pay the minimum amount due to prevent the revocation of credit card privileges.55


Hence, even with the credit adjustment on November 7, 2005, Rico's transaction on November 20, 2005 was disapproved as he failed to pay the minimum amount due of P500 as billed in his SOA dated October 16, 2005 which was due on November 8, 2005. Finally, the cancellation of the airline tickets was resolved in Rico's favor. Thus, the SOA dated December 15, 2005 showed that Rico had no outstanding obligation to Union Bank. The bank also reversed all interests and charges charged against Rico's credit card account due to his failure to pay the amount of airline tickets.


Granting that the cancellation of the airline ticket was finally resolved in Rico's favor, it must be stressed that at the time of the purported embarrassing and humiliating incident, i.e., November 20, 2005, the said disputed transaction was not yet resolved. Thus, Union Bank had the right to revoke Rico's credit card privileges, and consequently disapprove the transaction in Gourdo's Restaurant. Union Bank further explained that the reversal of the amount of airline tickets was not considered as payment, and thus the bank system automatically put his account on "past due status" which caused the disapproval of Rico's transaction on November 20, 2005. As far as Union Bank is concerned, the disputed items were not yet resolved, and were part of the total outstanding obligation of the card holder. It is quite unfortunate for Rico to fault Union Bank for its failure to refund or reverse the amount of Tiger Airways airline tickets, when it was clear that the incident arose from his own decision to cancel his flight with Tiger Airways and insistence to refund or reverse the same.


Notably, "every credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment."56


When Rico used his credit card to pay for his purchase of Tiger Airways airline tickets, three contracts were created, namely: (a) sales contract between Rico and Tiger Airways; (b) loan agreement between Rico and Union Bank; and (c) the promise to pay between Union Bank and Tiger Airways. When the said transaction was executed, Union Bank's promise to pay Tiger Airways arose. On the other hand, a creditor-debtor relationship was created between Union Bank and Rico, respectively. Thus, Union Bank had the right to demand the payment of the amount of airline tickets against Rico which the bank did so as indicated in its July, August, September, and October 2005 SOAs.


Rico's claim that the said airline tickets were already cancelled was belied by his own admission in his letters dated June 30, 2005,57 July 4, 2005,58 and July 12, 2005,59 to Tiger Airways demanding from the latter to cancel his non­-refundable flights from Manila to Singapore and vice versa. In return, Union Bank in its letter dated August 13, 2005,60 advised Rico to request the cancellation of the airline tickets from Tiger Airways, in order for Union Bank to process the reversal or refund of the amount charged in his account. Clearly, Union Bank cannot be considered to have breached its contract with Rico when the bank loaned him the money to pay for his purchase of airline tickets from Tiger Airways.


Rico, however, retorted in his letter dated August 13, 2005 to Union Bank, that he would not present any proof of cancellation of the said transaction with Tiger Airways as "the latter insists not to honor my cancellation of my flight reservation."61 Patently, Union Bank cannot be considered to have willfully put Rico's account on "past due status" in bad faith, when it was Rico himself who did not want to proceed with the already perfected and binding: (a) sales contract with Tiger Airways, and (b) loan agreement with Union Bank, from the mere fact that Rico used his credit card to pay for that subject purchase online. Consequently, Union Bank cannot just reverse nor refund the amount charged at the mere whim of the credit card holder who did not want to proceed with the flight he himself purchased from Tiger Airways.


Thus, Union Bank cannot be faulted when it continued to charge Rico with the amount of the airline tickets, pending investigation of the said disputed items. Rico knew fully well that the disputed airline tickets were still under the process of investigation by Union Bank, and that the said transactions were charged against his account as per SOA dated October 16, 2005. He also knew that as per SOA dated October 16, 2005, the minimum amount due to be paid is P500.00. As per the Terms and Conditions, in case of payment default, the right to use the credit card shall automatically be revoked which Union Bank did rightly so.


Regardless of the resolution of the cancellation of the airline tickets and the reversal of the interests and/or charges in Rico's favor, it bears stressing that when the alleged embarrassing situation happened on November 20, 2005, Rico was well aware of the pending dispute involving the airline tickets, and his nonpayment of the minimum amount which was due on or before November 8, 2005. Union Bank made no representation that the disputed items would be resolved in Rico's' favor. Also, it bears stressing that Union Bank is a business, and not a charity. It would be absurd to assume that Union Bank would simply accept Rico's representation that the disputed airline tickets were already cancelled, without conducting its own review and investigation, and thereby, open itself to a possible liability to Tiger Airways, when the debtor, Rico, refuses to pay Union Bank and insists on its cancellation.


Apropos, Union Bank cannot be considered grossly negligent in charging the amount of airline tickets against Rico's credit card account in the July to October SOAs, or prior to the final resolution of the dispute. Union Bank did not violate the Terms and Conditions, nor any legal duty, to pay for Rico's purchases using the credit card. Union Bank cannot also be considered grossly negligent when it automatically revoked Rico's credit card account when the latter failed to pay the minimum amount due pending the resolution of the disputed transactions. Insofar as Union Bank is concerned, Rico offered to enter into a loan agreement with Union Bank to pay for his Tiger Airways airline tickets and Union Bank, when it allowed the said transactions, accepted Rico's offer. Subsequently, a contract between Union Bank and Tiger Airways arose, such that, the former is obliged to pay the latter the amount of airline tickets purchased by Rico. In reviewing and investigating the alleged cancelled sales agreement between Rico and Tiger Airways, Union Bank is justified to protect itself as a business for profit.1âшphi1


Based on the foregoing, we find the disapproval of Rico's credit card on November 20, 2005 as justified and done in good faith. Union Bank neither breached its contract with Rico nor acted with willful intent to cause harm when it revoked Rico's credit card privileges when he failed to pay the minimum amount due on his SOA dated October 16, 2005. Nobody can be faulted for Rico's alleged humiliation or embarrassment in Gourdo's Restaurant but himself. Damnum absque injuria – there can be no damage without injury when the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. As held in BPI Express Card v. Court of Appeals:62


We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.


In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.63


In order for Rico to maintain an action for the injuries which he claims to have sustained, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which Union Bank owed to him. In other words, there must be a concurrence of injury to Rico and the legal responsibility of the person causing it, i.e. Union Bank.64 "The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury."65


It is not enough that Rico merely suffered humiliation or embarrassment as a result of Union Bank's disapproval of the credit card transaction on November 20, 2005. "It is also required that a culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code."66


While Rico suffered humiliation or embarrassment from the disapproval of his credit card at Gourdo's Restaurant in front of his two guests, We are constrained to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA that Union Bank was grossly negligent in revoking Rico's credit card privileges. Rico failed to convince Us that Union Bank breached any obligation that would make it answerable for his humiliation or embarrassment.


Hence, as it was Rico's own action, i.e., his resolve to cancel his flight with Tiger Airways, which was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience, We find the award of moral damages by the RTC and the CA clearly unjustified. With the deletion of the award of moral damages, we find no basis for the award of exemplary damages as it can only be awarded if Rico is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages.67 In the same vein, We must delete the award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation as Rico failed to show that he falls under one of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.


WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 28, 2013 Decision and January 21, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96400 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for damages filed by petitioner Rex G. Rico before the Regional Trial Court, Parañaque City, Branch 195 docketed as Civil Case No. 06-0029 against respondent Union Bank of the Philippines, is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."


G.R. No. 210928, February 14, 2022. 

REX G. RICO, PETITIONER, VS. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/feb2022/gr_210928_2022.html


Saturday, September 30, 2023

Insurance; illegitimate children as beneficiaries

 "In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code,19 Eva’s share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.


It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states—


SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.


Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.20 The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.21


Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured,22 the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary,23 or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,24 that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.


In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial court should be upheld. In the same light, the Decision of the CA dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal; the issue of failure to state a cause of action is a question of law and not of fact, there being no findings of fact in the first place.25


WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.


SO ORDERED."


HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA PANGILINAN MARAMAG, Petitioners, vs. EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents. G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009. 


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jun2009/gr_181132_2009.html


Grave oral defamation or slander


"The lone assignment of error (Brief for the Petitioners, p. 91), is as follows:


THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WORDS UTTERED BY THE PETITIONERS IN CONVERSATION WITH EACH OTHER AND WHILE IN THE HEAT OF ANGER CONSTITUTE GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION INSTEAD OF MERELY LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION.


In effect, counsel for petitioners abandoned all the assignments of error in the Court of Appeals, confined himself to only one, and practically admitted that the accused committed the crime charged although of a lesser degree that of slight oral defamation only, instead of grave oral defamation.


There is no dispute regarding the main facts that had given rise to the present case. Appellant-petitioner in this instant appeal, does not deny that the accused, on the occasion in question, uttered the defamatory words alleged in the information. Thus, the sole issue that the Court has to resolve is whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral defamation.


The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the demarcation line, between serious and slight oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]).


To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court adopted the following guidelines:


. . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, '...upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time: ... Balite v. People, Ibid., quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page 494).


Thus, in the same case cited where scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime of estafa, the Court ruled:


The scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The language of the indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim; He 'has sold the union; he 'has swindled the money of the vendees; he 'received bribe money in the amount of P10,000.00 ... and another P6,000.00'; He 'is engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with the capitalists'; He 'has spent the funds of the union for his personal use.'


No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation. They are serious and insulting. No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander. . . .


In another case where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was grave slander:


The language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the complainant. The words were uttered with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice or immorality to another, the consequences of which might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance apparently an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social circles, deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly, it is time for the courts to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of vile and loud slander. (U.S. v. Tolosa, 37 Phil. 166 [1917]).


In a case where the accused, a priest, called the offended party a gangster, in the middle of a sermon, the court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander (People v. Arcand 68 Phil. 601 [1939]). There was no imputation of a crime nor a vice or immorality in said case.


In the instant case, appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered the defamatory words against Atty. Vivencio Ruiz. Among others he called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated by the Court in Balite v. People, supra, "no amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation . . . No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander."


Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held that "where statements concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states cause of action." Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are slanderous per se (Kraushaar v. LaVin, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 [1943]; Mains v. Whiting 49 NW 559 [1891]; Greenburg v. De Salvo, 216 So. 2d 638 [1968]).


In Pollard v. Lyon (91 US 225 [1876]), the court there had occasion to divide oral slander, as a cause of action, into several classes, as follows:


(1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished;


(2) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected with some contagious disease, where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society;


(3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment;


(4) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade; and


(5) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the party special damage."


In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation Balite v. People, supra. In addition, the fact that the offended party is a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se.


Petitioner argues that this Court in People v. Doronila (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 231 [1941]) and People v. Modesto (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 128 [1941]) ruled that defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation (Rono, p. 13).


We disagree.


An examination of the rulings relied upon by petitioner showed that said cases were decided not by this Court but by the respondent court. Suffice it to say that said decisions do not bind this Court.


Nevertheless, the cases adverted to by petitioner would not in any manner help his cause. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, there was no reason for the petitioner to be angry at the offended party who was merely performing his duties as a lawyer in defense of his client. Petitioner's anger was not lawfully caused. (Brief for the Appellee, p. 7). The fact that the defamatory words were uttered by the petitioner without provocation by private respondent and taken seriously by the latter, renders inapplicable the cases relied upon by petitioner.


As a matter of fact, the scurrilous remarks were found by the respondent court to have been uttered in a loud voice, in the presence of at least ten (10) persons, taken seriously by the offended party and without provocation on his part.


WHEREFORE, the petition is Denied for lack of merit and the appealed decision Affirmed in toto.


SO ORDERED."



DANIEL VICTORIO and EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. Nos. L-32836-37, May 3, 1989. 


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/may1989/gr_l32836_37_1989.html