Extrajudicial Confession; Admission by Conspirator

 "Accused-appellants must be

acquitted of Murder

In contrast to the above, Antonio's extrajudicial confession as contained in his July 8 Salaysay detailing the abduction and killing of Major Arcega cannot be used to convict accused-appellants in the absence of independent evidence on this charge and on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 28. Admission by third-party. - The rights of a third party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

Expounding on this rule, the Court explained that "[o]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him."48 Thus, as a general rule, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant.49 As an exception, Section 30, Rule 130 of the same Rules allows the admission of a conspirator, provided the conditions therefor are satisfied, viz.:

Section 30. Admission by conspirator. - The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, n1ay be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. (Emphasis supplied)

In this regard, case law states that "in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy."50 Here, aside from Antonio's extrajudicial statements in his July 8 Salaysay, there is a glaring dearth of evidence showing the participation of accused-appellants in a plan or conspiracy to abduct and kill Major Arcega. As such, Antonio's statement in his July 8 Salaysay is binding on him alone; it cannot be admitted against his co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.51

In this light, the Court is constrained to acquit not only herein accused­ appellants, but also their co-accused - except for Antonio who executed the July 8 Salaysay - for the Murder of Major Arcega. This is pursuant to Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

Section. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

While it is true that it was only accused-appellants who successfully perfected their appeal before the Court, it is well to reiterate the rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the entire case out in the open, including those not raised by the parties.52 Considering that, under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment - as in this case - shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory,53 accused-appellants' acquittal for the crime of Murder is likewise applicable to the rest of the accused, save for Antonio, against whom his confession in his July 8 Salaysay shall be solely binding, and Cortez, who had since died.

Finally, and in light of prevailing jurisprudence, Antonio should pay the heirs of Major Arcega the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages for the crime of Murder, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.54"

G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORES Y CORPUZ, JESUS TIME Y CABESA, GILBERT PACPACO Y DIRECTO, GILBERT RAMIREZ Y DUNEGO, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, ROGELIO ANTONIO Y ABUJUELA, TOMMY CABESA Y VILLEGAS, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED,

ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORESYCORPUZ, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_242696_2020.html

Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide

 "Accused-appellants are guilty

of the special complex crime

of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide

The elements of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, are as follows:(a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his/her liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. In the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought.43

As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, the prosecution had established the existence of the aforementioned elements.Ꮮαwρhi৷ Anent the first and second elements, accused-appellants and their co-accused intended and later on, were able to actually deprive Dr. Andres, Sr. of his liberty when the latter went missing after meeting a group of people in Sta. Lucia Mall on July 2, 1998. Such actual deprivation of Dr. Andres, Sr.'s liberty was confirmed by no less than Galamay who informed Dr. Andres, Jr. of such fact via a phone call. As to the third element, their motive, which is to extort ransom in exchange for Dr. Andres, Sr.'s release was manifest in: (a) Galamay's phone call to Dr. Andres, Jr. in order to demand ransom; (b) Bernardo, Time, Pacpaco, Ramirez, and Cabesa's receipt of the ransom money from Dr. Andres, Jr. on July 4, 1998 at España, Manila as witnessed by the members44 of the PNP­ CIDG; and (c) Cabesa's delivery of the ransom money to Flores, Cortez, and Antonio, who were all caught while counting the same. Finally, the last element is also present as Dr. Andres, Sr. was killed while in detention and his body was found in Mabitac, Laguna.

In this relation, the extrajudicial confession executed by Antonio as embodied in his July 6 Salaysay relative to the commission of the kidnapping of Dr. Andres, Sr. is merely corroborative of the prosecution evidence on this particular charge. To be admissible, a confession must comply with the following requirements: it "must be (a) voluntary; (b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; (c) express; and (d) in writing."45 In this case, not only was the prosecution able to establish that these requirements had been complied with, it was also able to show that the contents of Antonio's July 6 Salaysay merely corroborated independent evidence pointing to accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence showing the complicity of accused-appellants beyond moral certainty, consisting in the positive identification of Bernardo and Galamay by Dr. Andres, Jr., as well as the in flagrante arrest of Flores. Furthermore, Antonio's July 6 Salaysay was executed after his co­ conspirators had been duly identified and arrested. If at all, aside from the corroboration it lent to the prosecution evidence, it additionally provided details that only persons privy to the kidnapping can supply, i.e., the place where Dr. Andres, Sr. was detained and the fact that his vehicle had been burned and abandoned in Norzagaray, Bulacan.46

Therefore, the Court finds no reason to overturn the courts a quo's findings in relation to accused-appellants' (and their co-accused's) commission of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, as there was no showing that the courts a quo overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. It bears pointing out that the trial court - whose findings were affirmed by the CA - was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses by both parties.47"

G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORES Y CORPUZ, JESUS TIME Y CABESA, GILBERT PACPACO Y DIRECTO, GILBERT RAMIREZ Y DUNEGO, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, ROGELIO ANTONIO Y ABUJUELA, TOMMY CABESA Y VILLEGAS, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED,

ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORESYCORPUZ, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_242696_2020.html

Award of attorney's fees denied

"As regards attorney's fees, the Court of Appeals correctly held that none may be awarded to petitioner:

Consequently, the award of attorney's fees must also be deleted. Notably, it was not appellee alone who incurred costs to protect her interest. Appellant, too, spent for legal costs to finally settle the issue pertaining to the validity of his marriage with appellee. In the absence of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish suffered by a person for having been made a party in a civil case is not the kind of anxiety which would warrant the award of moral damages. Appellee's emotional suffering and anxiety are only such as are usually caused to a party hauled into [court] as a party in litigation, but is insufficient justification for the award of moral or exemplary damages.69"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html

Withdrawal of appeal before the Supreme Court

"Once a case has been submitted for a court's decision, the petitioning party cannot, at their election, withdraw their appeal.71 The grant or denial of the withdrawal is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.72

The practice of the courts has always been to the effect that once a case or appeal is submitted for decision, its withdrawal should not be at the discretion of the party, but dependent on the assent thereto of the adjudicating authority.

. . . .

. . . What is important is that once the finality of the questioned judgment has been arrested by a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing officer should be given full opportunity to restudy the records and satisfy himself whether justice has been done; and if convinced that it was not done, to revise and correct the judgment as the interest of justice requires, irrespective of whether the defendant will be favored or prejudiced. The public interest demands no less. As the Spanish proverb goes, justice is "no mas pero no menos".73

Petitioner can no longer elect to withdraw her Petition for Review at this late stage in the proceedings. It is merely incidental that, if we had granted petitioner's motion, it would have had the same result as this resolution on the merits."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html

Abuse of right; moral damages

 "Moral damages are a form of compensation for the "physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury"50 unjustly sustained by a person.51 They are awarded when: (1) there is a physical, mental or psychological injury clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a wrongful act or omission is factually established; (3) the act or omission is the proximate cause of the injury; and (4) the award of damages is based on any of the cases stated in Article 221952 of the Civil Code.53

This Court has sanctioned the award of moral damages m cases of bigamy based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.54

Article 19 of the Civil Code sets the standards for the exercise of one's rights and performance of duties:

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This provision recognizes that even the exercise of a right may be the source of some illegal act, when done in a manner contrary to the standards it sets, and results in damage to another.55 Meanwhile, Articles 20 and 21 provide for the legal remedy for a violation of Article 19:56

ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

ARTICLE 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

For there to be a finding of an abuse of rights under Article 19, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) the right is exercised or the duty is performed in bad faith; and (3) the sole intent of the exercise or performance is to prejudice or injure another.57 It must be shown that the exercise of the right or performance of the duty was done with bad faith. In Dart Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Calogcog: 58

Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.59

In Manuel v. People,60 this Court awarded moral damages to the innocent spouse upon a finding that the bigamous spouse acted deceitfully and fraudulently when he contracted his second marriage:

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance—that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.1âшphi1

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.61

There, this Court found that the bigamous spouse's continuous and collective acts of fraud before, during, and after his marriage were willful, deliberate, and malicious, causing injury to the innocent spouse. It was the bigamous spouse's continuing bad faith that disregarded public policy, undermined and subverted the family as a social institution, and went against good morals, and the interest and general welfare of society.62

Thus, the Regional Trial Court was in error when it held that the mere contracting of a second marriage despite the existence of a first marriage is, by itself, a ground for damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 20 or Article 21. As correctly stressed by the Court of Appeals, the bad faith, or deliberate intent to do a wrongful act, of the bigamous spouse must be established:

Here, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately contracted a second marriage despite knowledge of the subsistence of his first marriage. He believed in good faith that the divorce decree given to his first wife was valid and binding in the Philippines because he thought all along that [his] first wife at that time was already an [American] citizen. Thus, he and Mercado, both consenting adults, freely married each other, both believing that the final divorce decree was valid and binding in the Philippines. Indeed, both appellant and Mercado would not have married each other under pain of indictment for bigamy had they known that appellant's first marriage was still in existence, because it later turned out that Mercado was still a Filipino when the divorce decree was issued. So how could appellant be held liable for damages when he was not shown to have acted in bad faith when he married appellee? It has been consistently held that bad faith does not simply mean negligence or bad judgment. It involves a state of mind dominated by ill-will or motive. It implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity. The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. Here, appellee failed to overcome the legal presumption of good faith. Thus, the award of moral damages must be deleted.63

Petitioner has not been able to prove that, at the time she and respondent married, respondent knew that his divorce from his first spouse was invalid. There is no proof that, upon the first spouse's confirmation of her Philippine citizenship at the time she obtained the divorce decree, respondent concealed this knowledge from petitioner or allowed her to continue believing that their marriage was valid. The malice or bad faith necessary to sustain an action based on Article 19 of the Civil Code has not been shown in this case.

Moreover, petitioner has not established that she has sustained an injury in law due to respondent's acts.

A review of the records shows that petitioner had known that there was some sort of anomaly in the dissolution of respondent's first marriage as early as 1992. As the Regional Trial Court found, within four years of petitioner and respondent's marriage, they found out that the divorce decree between respondent and Mantaring may not be valid because of their citizenship.64 Both petitioner and respondent consulted with a lawyer, who advised them to have the first marriage annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity.65 When respondent withdrew his petition for annulment, petitioner pleaded with him to continue the case.66

Petitioner does not dispute any of these findings made by the trial court.67 She knew, or should have known, that there existed some issue regarding respondent's first marriage which might adversely affect the validity of her marriage to him. Yet, she did not initiate any actions of her own to protect her civil status, and appeared complacent with the uncertainty that hovered over the validity of her marriage with respondent.

There being no entitlement to moral damages, no exemplary damages can likewise be awarded to petitioner.68"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html

Considering these conflicting conclusions, this Court must now examine the factual findings to resolve whether or not respondent acted in bad faith when he married petitioner despite the subsistence of his first marriage

"In its November 18, 2016 Decision, the Regional Trial Court held that respondent's act of marrying petitioner even though he had an existing first marriage constituted bad faith. The Court of Appeals ruled otherwise because it found that, at the time respondent married petitioner, he believed in good faith that he was validly divorced from his first wife. Further, it found that respondent did not seek to have his second marriage declared null and void only so that he could evade liability in the civil case filed by petitioner.

Considering these conflicting conclusions, this Court must now examine the factual findings to resolve whether or not respondent acted in bad faith when he married petitioner despite the subsistence of his first marriage."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html