Thursday, February 27, 2020

Unnecessary "request for admission" - "A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d 752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redundancy."


PRISCILLA SUSAN PO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JULIAN LUSTRE, AND JOSE P. MANANZAN, respondents. G.R. No. L-34341, August 22, 1988. 


“x x x. 

On April 16, 1971, respondent Judge Lustre denied the motion for summary judgment, observing that "the interrogatories ... are nothing but a reiteration of a portion of the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint, which have already been answered and denied by the defendant in his answer" hence, they "need not be answered again if asked in the form of interrogatories." (p. 10, Brief for Respondents, p. 151, Rollo.) 

After the trial court had denied her motion for reconsideration of its order, the petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 00220-R entitled, "Priscilla Susan Po vs. Hon. Julian Lustre, et al.") which the Court of Appeals likewise denied on September 23, 1971 for lack of merit. The pertinent observations of the Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder: 

... With the absolute denial of private respondent in his answer to the complaint, petitioner's subsequent request for admission of the same facts already denied does not serve the purpose of Rule 26 as a mode of discovery. As aptly stated by respondent Judge, Rule 26 contemplates interrogatories that would clarify and tend to show light on the truth or falsity of the allegations of the complaint, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has been alleged in the complaint and unconditionally denied in the answer. Petitioner's request constitutes an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which private respondent should not be subjected to and which the lower court should not countenance as the respondent Judge rightfully did. Respondent Judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction nor has he unlawfully deprived petitioner of any right in concluding that petitioner's request for admission does not fall under Rule 26 and that therefore the same need not be answered by private respondent. The allegations of facts in the complaint remain to have been controverted by the answer of private respondent to the complaint. There being genuine issues between the parties, respondent Judge correctly denied petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Unless it is shown that respondent Judge has committed a palpable grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court will not issue the writs prayed for. (pp. 19-20, Rollo.) 


Nothing daunted, the petitioner appealed to this Court. 

An examination of petitioner's complaint and her request for admission confirms Judge Lustre's finding (which the Court of Appeals upheld) that the "fact" set forth in the request for admission, including the amount of damages claimed, are the same factual allegations set forth in her complaint which the defendant either admitted or denied in his answer. 

A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d 752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redundancy." 

X x x.”

Where "request for admission" [Rule 26] is unncessary - "A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. To this we add that a party should not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint."

CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRISCILA S. AGANA, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, and VIVIEN S. SORIGUEZ, respondents. G.R. No. 117574, January 2, 1997. 


“x x x. 

Does Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court require a party to respond to a Request for Admission of matters raised in his pleadings? Will his failure to place under oath his denials in his response to the request be deemed an admission of the matters sought to be admitted? 

X x x. 

The Request for Admission of petitioner does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As we held in Po v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34341, August 22, 1988, and Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101682, December 14, 1992, Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings. 

A cursory reading of petitioner's Request for Admission clearly shows that it contains the same material averments in his Answer to respondent's Complaint in the trial court. Petitioner merely recopied or reproduced in its Request for Admission its affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleged in its Answer. As we held in Bo v. CA, No. L-34341, August 22, 1988, petitioner's request constitutes an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which the respondent should not be subjected to. In the first place, what the petitioner seeks to be admitted by private respondent is the very subject matter of the complaint. In effect, petitioner would want private respondent to deny her allegations in her verified Complaint and admit the allegations in the Answer of petitioner (Manifestation and Reply to Request for Admission). Plainly, this is illogical if not preposterous. Respondent cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Answer of petitioner just because she failed to have her response to the request placed under oath since these are the very matters she raises in her verified Complaint in the court below. X x x. 

X x x. 

Clearly, therefore, private respondent need not reply to the Request for Admission because her Complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Answer of petitioner which were merely reproduced in the request. In Uy Chao v. De la Rama Steamship, No. L-14495, 29 September 1962, we observed that the purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. 

In the aforesaid cases of Po and Briboneria we held that — 

A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. 

To this we add that a party should not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint. At this point, it is necessary to emphasize what this Court laid down in the same Po and Briboneria cases — 

A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. 

Since the answer of private respondent to the request is no longer required in the instant case, it therefore becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an answer that is not under oath. Even assuming that a response to the request is needed, private respondent had already substantially complied with the requirement of the law when she specifically denied the material allegations of the petitioner in her Manifestation and Reply to the Request for Admission. Although not under oath the reply to the request readily showed that the intent of private respondent was to deny the matters set forth in the Request for Admission. That the reply is not under oath is merely a formal and not a substantive defect. This procedural lapse may be dispensed with if the circumstances call for the dispensing of the rule in the interest of justice. While we commend petitioner's zeal in promoting faithful adherence to the rules of procedure we cannot ignore the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed as to do substantial justice. [Sec. 6, Rule 7, Rules of Court] 

X x x.” 



Summary judgment - "There being genuine issues of fact between the private parties, public respondents correctly denied the motion of petitioner for summary judgment."

CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRISCILA S. AGANA, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, and VIVIEN S. SORIGUEZ, respondents. G.R. No. 117574, January 2, 1997. 


“x x x. 

There being genuine issues of fact between the private parties, public respondents correctly denied the motion of petitioner for summary judgment. Where facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. [Archipelago Builders v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75282, February 19, 1991, 194 SCRA 207, 212, citing the cases of Auman v. Estenzo., No. L-40500, 27 February 1976, 69 SCRA 524; Lorenzo v. Estenzo, No. L-3306, 29 October 1976, 73 SCRA 630; Viajar v. Estenzo, No. L-45321, 30 April 1979, 89 SCRA 684.]. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.18 Verily, there is a need to determine by presentation of evidence if respondent is really liable for the stolen articles and for violating its contract for security services with petitioner. Until these issues are determined no legal compensation can take place between the parties. This factual dispute can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits, a process which need not take long to conclude.19 

X x x.”

30 percent of the country’s courts have no judges while 40 percent of prosecution positions in the Department of Justice are vacant.


"The country’s judicial system is in “chronic crisis” and “unable to serve the vast majority of citizens,” Sen. Francis Pangilinan said yesterday.

In his talk at a forum at the De La Salle University in Manila, Pangilinan explained that close to 30 percent of the country’s courts have no judges while 40 percent of prosecution positions in the Department of Justice are vacant.

No criminal case can be heard without the presence of the public prosecutor, which arguably mean 40 percent cases are not being heard or are being heard so slowly, he said.

He said it takes some five years at the minimum for a case in the first level courts to be adjudicated.

“Tell me: Can a poor afford a lawyer for five years? Conviction rates (for) corruption cases in the country is estimated at less than 30 percent, compared to 80 percent in Hong Kong and close to 90 percent in Japan,” Pangilinan said.

x x x."

See - 

Acquisitive prescription of unregistered land - "...As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction. "


HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING, represented by DELFIN, GIL, EMMA, MANUEL, RACQUEL, ESTER, REMEDIOS and JESSIE, all surnamed PARAYNO, MAXIMA PARAYNO, LEONARDO PARAYNO and FELICISIMA PARAYNO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE BAUZON (deceased), represented by his heirs and co-defendants Luis and Eriberta Bauzon; LUIS BAUZON, ERIBERTA BAUZON (deceased), substituted by her husband PLACIDO ZULUETA, and JOSE PARAYNO, respondents. G.R. No. 121157, July 31, 1997.

“x x x.

We agree with the Court of Appeals. Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.3 Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.4 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.5

The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only by tax declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now transferred to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.6

Even assuming that the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal requisites,7 it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership.8 In Pensader v. Pensader9 we ruled that while the verbal donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession. In Espique v. Espique10 we held —

There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it involves an immovable property and the donation was not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength thereof the done has taken possession of the property adversely and in the concept of owner, or, as this Court well said: "While the verbal donation, under which the defendants and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in question, is not effective as a transfer of title, yet it is a circumstances which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession' (Pensader v. Pensader, 47 Phil. 673, 680). This also an action for partition. It was shown that the donation of the property was made not even in a private document but only verbally. It was also shown that the defendants, through their predecessors-in-interest, were in adverse and continuous possession of the lands for a period of over 30 years. Yet, the court decided the case in favor of defendants on the ground of acquisitive prescription. There is a close parallelism between the facts of this case and the present.

xxx xxx xxx

We do not need to stretch our mind to see that under such allegations plaintiffs intended to convey the idea that defendant has possessed the lands openly, adversely and without interruption from 1916 to 1949 for he is the one who has possessed and reaped the whole benefit thereof. As to the character of the possession held by defendant during that period one cannot also deny that it is in the concept of owner considering that the lands were donated to him by his predecessors-in-interest on the occasion of his marriage even if the same was not embodied in a public instrument. The essential elements constituting acquisitive prescription are therefore present which negative the right of plaintiffs to ask for partition of said properties. On this point we find pertinent the following observation of the trial court; "Any person who claims right of ownership over immovable properties and does not invoke that right but instead tolerated others in possession for thirty years is guilty of laches and negligence and he must suffer the consequence of his acts."



In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.

The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in 1986 when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties and conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60) years have already elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948, more than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.

Again, even if we assume the absence of good faith and just title, the ownership of the two (2) parcels would still appertain to Roque Bauzon. As testified to by Delfin Parayno, one of petitioners, Roque Bauzon and his heirs had been in continuous, adverse and public possession of the property since 1948 up to 1986, or a period of thirty-six (36) years, which is more than the required thirty-year extraordinary prescription.

Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.11 Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition, without specifying the grounds for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice to the other co-owners of the occupant's claim of title in himself in repudiation of the co-ownership. The evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie.12

Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.13 As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.
X x x.”

Chain of custody of evidence - "...unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain."

G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.



“x x x.

Inventory and Chain of
Custody of Evidence


Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuana is still inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police station.18

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.19

Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical inventory, and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia20:

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.

The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination.21 This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.

Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.22

It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He himself admits this.23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being framed for having offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up. However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations.24

Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.25

X x x.”

Where search and seizure of marijuana is valid. - "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant."

See - https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jun2014/gr_203984_2014.html

"x x x.

Search and Seizure of
Marijuana valid


This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s contention that the marijuana in his possession cannot be admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been within the apprehending officers’ "plain view."12

Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

In People v. Valeroso,14 this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of a valid warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.

Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. (Citations omitted.)

In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from him could not be used against him because they were discovered in a room, different from where he was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not be considered as one within his immediate control that he could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against him.15

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.

Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."16 "The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure."17

The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.

x x x."

Appeals in Philippines - SyCip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan - www.lexology.com



See -
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bfe04fc9-6825-4526-b909-0fceb440be34&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email&utm_campaign=Lexology+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed+2020-02-26&utm_term=


"x x x.

Appeals in Philippines

www.lexology.com




Philippine appellate courts may either be regional, for cases originating from municipal, city or regional courts; or national, for cases originating from regional courts or the Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court) and Supreme Court. There are also multiple levels of appellate review, since the Philippines observes the principle of judicial hierarchy.

Regional trial courts exercise both original and appellate jurisdiction. They exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal trial court in cities and municipal circuit trial courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Some regional trial courts are designated as special commercial courts to try to decide cases involving violations of intellectual property rights and of Presidential Decree No. 902-A (or the Securities and Exchange Commission Reorganisation Act), but special commercial courts retain their appellate jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court also exercise both original and appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except for certain cases provided by law. The Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction by way of petition for review on certiorari over judgments, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the anti-graft court (Sandiganbayan), the Court of Tax Appeals, the regional trial court or other courts, whenever authorised by the Philippine Constitution and by law.

The Court of Tax Appeals is an appellate court that exercises jurisdiction over civil and criminal tax cases, including appeals from rulings and assessments of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Customs.

Civil matters

Are there appellate courts that hear only civil matters?

Philippine appellate courts entertain appeals for both civil and criminal cases.

Appeals from administrative tribunals

Are appeals from administrative tribunals handled in the same way as appeals from trial courts?

Generally, appeals from administrative tribunals performing quasi-judicial functions are heard by the Court of Appeals and handled in the same manner as appeals in civil cases from the trial courts, except that appeals from such agencies are lodged through a petition and not a notice of appeal as in regular court cases. However, certain administrative agencies have their own rules governing periods for lodging an appeal and the form of the appellate pleading to be filed. Philippine courts also follow the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, which provides that all administrative remedies must be exhausted first before the courts’ judicial power may be sought (Republic v Transunion Corporation, G R No. 191590, 21 April 2014).

Representation before appellate courts

Is there a separate appellate bar or other requirement for attorneys to be admitted before appellate courts?

There are no additional requirements for Philippine lawyers to engage in appellate practice. A person licensed to practise law in this jurisdiction may engage in any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience (Ulep v Legal Clinic, B M No. 553, 17 June 1993).

Multiple jurisdictions

If separate jurisdictions exist for particular territorial subdivisions or subject matters, explain their main differences as to commercial appeals.

The Philippines has a uniform judicial system. Geographical sub­divisions are only of consideration for purposes of determining the venue of civil and commercial cases. Generally, a regional trial court will have appellate jurisdiction over civil and commercial cases decided by municipal or metropolitan trial courts within its territorial jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have national appellate jurisdiction.

Bringing an appeal

Deadlines

What are the deadlines for filing an appeal in a commercial matter?

In civil and commercial cases, the appeal period is generally within 15 days from notice (ie, official receipt of service) of the award, judgment, final order or resolution to be appealed, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or from notice of the denial of a motion for a new trial or reconsideration duly filed with the court of origin in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency. Certain modes of appeal, however, allow for longer periods, such as petitions for certiorari to appeal interlocutory orders (ie, orders that do not finally resolve or dispose of a case) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which shall be 60 days from notice of the order or resolution.

Procedural steps

What are the key steps a litigant must take to commence an appeal?

For ordinary civil or commercial appeals of final judgments or decisions of municipal or metropolitan trial courts to the regional trial court and final judgments and decisions of regional trial courts to the Court of Appeals, an appeal is made by:
filing a notice of appeal with the court of origin that rendered the judgment or final order appealed from within the applicable appeal period (generally, 15 days from notice of the judgment or decision);
paying, within the same period, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket or appeal and other lawful fees; and
furnishing the adverse party with a copy of the notice of appeal and proof of payment of the appeal or docket fee.

For further appeals from decisions or judgments of the Court of Appeals, the anti-graft court, the Court of Tax Appeals, the regional trial court or other courts to the Supreme Court, an appeal is made by:
filing a verified petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court within 15 days from notice of the decision or judgment;
paying, within the same period, to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court the applicable appeal or docket fee; and
furnishing the lower court concerned and the adverse or opposing party of a copy of the appellate petition. Appellate petitions to the Supreme Court also provide for certain formal requirements that must be complied with.

For interlocutory appeals to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, an appeal is taken by:
filing a verified petition, accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping;
paying the corresponding docket and other lawful fees; and
furnishing the court of origin and the adverse party with a copy of the petition.

Documentation

How is the documentation for appeals prepared?

For ordinary appeals, the clerk of the trial court transmits to the appellate court the original record or the approved record on appeal within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal, together with the proof of payment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees, a certified true copy of the minutes of the proceedings, the order of approval, the certificate of correctness, the original documentary evidence referred to therein, the original and three copies of the transcripts. For interlocutory appeals, the parties are required to attach certified true copies of the decisions or orders being appealed from, and in certain instances, even certified true copies of material records of the case.

Right of appeal

Discretion to grant permission to appeal

In commercial matters, may litigants appeal by right or is appellate review discretionary?

Under Philippine law, an appeal may either be a matter of right or discretionary. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance (Heirs of Arturo Garcia v Municipality of Iba, G R No. 162217, 22 July 2015). Hence, a party to a case that originates from municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts or municipal circuit trial courts may appeal as a matter of right to the regional trial courts, and a party to a case that originates from a regional trial court may appeal as a matter of right to the Court of Appeals.

In contrast, a discretionary appeal may be taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be taken to the Supreme Court or may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion (Heirs of Arturo Garcia v Municipality of Iba, G R No. 162217, 22 July 2015). This would refer to a further appeal from the regional trial court, exercising its appellate jurisdiction, to the Court of Appeals or a further appeal to the Supreme Court.

Judgments subject to appeal

Can litigants appeal any ruling from a trial court, or are they limited to appealing only final judgments?

Generally, only final judgments or orders of a court of law or quasi-judicial body are appealable, or those judgments and orders that leave nothing more for the court or quasi-judicial body to be done.

Interlocutory orders are not appealable until after the judgment’s completion on the merits. However, an interlocutory order may be brought up for review through a special civil action for certiorari if the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Banez, Jr v Concepcion, G R No. 159508, 29 August 2012).

Security and interlocutory matters

Security to appeal

In a typical commercial dispute, must a litigant post a bond or provide security to appeal a trial court decision?

There is no requirement of an appeal bond. An appellant, however, must pay docket and other lawful fees as a jurisdictional requirement.

For indigent litigants, a party may be authorised to litigate his or her action, claim or defence as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for him or herself and his or her family. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes, which the court may order to be supplied.

However, should a litigant include an application for provisional remedy, in proper cases, a bond must be posted in the amount fixed by the court if the application is granted.

Interlocutory appeals

Are there special provisions for interlocutory appeals?

As discussed above, the appellate remedy from an interlocutory order is not an appeal in the ordinary sense but a special civil action for certiorari, and the appellant or petitioner should allege and show that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Injunctions and stays

Are there special rules relating to injunctions or stays, whether entered in the trial court or on appeal?

Yes. The Philippines has special rules covering injunction, both as a provisional remedy and as a main relief. An injunction may be allowed provided the following requisites are present, which must be alleged in an application made under oath:
the existence of a right to be protected; and
the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of the said right (Republic of the Philippines v Cortez, Sr, G R No. 197472, 7 September 2015).

Also, a bond is usually required before the issuance of the injunctive writ. As a provisional remedy, an injunction may be applied at any stage of the proceedings prior to the judgment or final order.

For commercial disputes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission, only the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, and not the trial courts, can issue a restraining order or injunction for a case, dispute or controversy that directly or indirectly interferes with the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission’s powers, duties and responsibilities.

Scope and effect of appellate proceedings

Effect of filing an appeal

If a litigant files an appeal in a commercial dispute, does it stay enforcement of the trial court judgment?

Yes. Filing an appeal stays the enforcement of a trial court judgment. The final judgment or decision of the trial court only becomes final and executory when no motion for reconsideration is filed with the court of origin or no appeal has been filed or perfected or after an appeal duly filed is decided with finality.

On the other hand, interlocutory orders are immediately enforceable and cannot be stayed by a petition for certiorari unless a preliminary injunction is sought to stay the order. However, there are judgments or decisions from administrative or quasi-judicial agencies that are immediately executory unless execution is restrained in the meantime by the appellate court.

In the case of a final arbitral award by virtue of an arbitration agreement provided in a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws, such award is executory after the lapse of 15 days from the parties’ receipt thereof and shall be stayed only by the filing of a bond or the issuance of an injunctive writ by an appellate court.

Scope of appeal

On an appeal from a commercial dispute, may the first-level appellate court consider the facts and law anew, or is its power to review limited?

Generally, first-level appellate courts have the power to consider the facts and law de novo. However, when the appeal reaches the Supreme Court, review is generally limited to questions of law as it is not a trier of facts (Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co Inc v People, G R No. 170618, 20 November 2013). But this rule is subject to certain exceptions, as provided in jurisprudence, taking into account the attendant circumstances (Spouses Sy v China Banking Corporation, G R No. 215954, 1 August 2016).

Further appeals

If a party is dissatisfied with the outcome of the first-level appeal, is further appeal possible?

Yes, there are multiple levels of appellate review. The Philippines observes the principle of judicial hierarchy and such hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals. However, when it reaches the Supreme Court, as mentioned above, the appeal becomes discretionary.

Duration of appellate proceedings

How long do appeals typically take from application to appeal to a final decision?

There is no expected or estimated timeline because period varies from case to case. However, based on experience, appellate proceedings usually take from one to three years from the date of filing of the first appellate pleading to when the appeal is either decided or deemed submitted for decision, depending on the complexity of the case, among other factors.

Submissions and evidence

Submissions process

What is the briefing and argument process like in a typical commercial appeal?

Commercial appeals are generally decided on the basis of the evidence adduced and pleadings filed by the parties at the court of first instance. The appellate pleadings would usually consist of the brief or initiatory petition by the appellant; the brief or comment on the initiatory petition filed by the appellee; and other pleadings or submissions that the appellate court may allow or require, such as memoranda. The Court of Appeals, in certain cases, may also conduct hearings and receive evidence. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court may additionally hear the parties in oral argument on the merits of a case, or on any material incident in connection therewith.

New evidence

Are appeals limited to the evidentiary record that was before the trial court, or can new evidence be introduced on appeal?

Generally, evidence introduced for the first time on appeal is not entertained by the appellate courts, since it is well established in Philippine jurisprudence that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (Calanasan v Spouses Dolorito, G R No. 171937, 25 November 2013).

There are exceptions to the rule that no question may be raised for the first time on appeal. The issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and may be considered by the reviewing court. The said court may also consider an issue not properly raised during trial when there is plain error. Likewise, it may entertain such arguments when there are jurisprudential developments affecting the issues or when the issues raised present a matter of public policy (Del Rosario v Bonga, G R No. 136308, 23 January 2001).

New evidence of wrongdoing

If litigants uncover new evidence of wrongdoing that they believe altered the outcome of a trial court judgment, can they introduce this evidence on appeal?

Under Philippine law, fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which the aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his or her rights, or newly discovered evidence that he or she could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial and that if presented would probably alter the result, are not raised on appeal but are instead causes to move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial.

New legal arguments

May parties raise new legal arguments on appeal?

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule. Stated differently, issues of fact and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower courts will not be considered by the reviewing courts as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (Del Rosario v Bonga, G R No. 136308. 23 January 2001). There are, however, recognised exceptions to this rule (Logronio v Taleseo, G R No. 134602, 6 August 1999).

Costs, settlement and funding

Costs

What are the rules regarding attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal?

There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys’ fees: ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his or her client for the legal services he or she has rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, attorneys’ fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in litigation. The instances where these may be awarded are those enumerated in article 2208 of the Civil Code (Alva v High Capacity Security Force, Inc, G R No. 203328, 8 November 2017). An appellate court may affirm, modify or set aside a trial court’s award of extraordinary attorneys’ fees in the process of appellate review.

Meanwhile, costs shall be awarded in favour of the prevailing party as a matter of course, but the court has the power, for special reasons, to adjudge that either party shall pay the costs of an action or that the same be divided, as may be equitable. Likewise, where an action or appeal is found to be frivolous, double or treble cost may be imposed on the plaintiff or appellant, which shall be paid by his or her attorney, if so ordered by the court. Again, this imposition may be affirmed, modified or set aside on appeal.

Settlement of first instance judgment after appeal lodged

Can parties enter into a settlement agreement to vacate the trial court judgment after an appeal has been taken?

Yes. Parties are allowed to enter into compromise or settlement agreements that cover cases pending trial, on appeal or even those that have already been finally decided. There is no time limitation as to when a compromise or settlement agreement may be entered into (Magbanua v Uy, G R No. 161003. 6 May 2005).

Limits on settlement after commencement of appeal

Are there any limits on settlement once an appeal has been taken?

The filing of an appeal does not limit the parties’ ability to enter into compromise or settlement agreements as long as such agreements are not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. Article 2935 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, however, provides that no compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
the civil status of persons;
validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
any ground for legal separation;
future support;
jurisdiction of courts; or
future legitime.

Third-party funding

May third parties fund appeals?

There are no specific rules in this jurisdiction that govern third-party litigation funders, and a litigant would ordinarily be free to source his or her litigation funds. However, an agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay the expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous (Roxas v Republic Real Estate Corp, G R No. 208205, 1 June 2016). A champertous contract is considered against public policy as it violates the fiduciary relations between the lawyer and his or her client, whose weakness or disadvantage may be exploited by the former (Nocom v Camerino, G R No. 182984, 10 February 2009).

Disclosure of litigation funding

If litigation funding is permitted in an appeal, must funding sources be disclosed to the court or other parties to the litigation?

There are no express rules covering third-party litigation funders in this jurisdiction (see question 25).

Judgments, relief and non-parties

Decisions

Must appellate courts in your country write decisions explaining their rulings? Can the courts designate the precedential effect of their decisions?

Yes. The Philippine Constitution requires that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Further, the Rules of Court also emphasise that every decision or final resolution of the court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based, which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution appealed from.

Only decisions of the Supreme Court are considered as judicial precedents to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land, following the principle of stare decisis.

Non-parties

Will the appellate courts in your country consider submissions from non-parties?

Yes. The Rules of Court provide that experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Supreme Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Relief

What are the ordinary forms of relief that can be rendered by an appellate court in a civil dispute?

The appellate court may affirm, reverse or modify the judgment or final order appealed from and may direct a new trial or further proceedings to be had. Reliefs may include the award of damages, attorneys’ fees, grant of provisional remedies and other relief.

Update and trends

Current developments

Are there any current developments or emerging trends that should be noted?

No updates at this time.

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Dead law; no implementing rules - "Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010"


REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9999

AN ACT PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES


Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010".

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to value the dignity of every human person and guarantee the rights of every individual, particularly those who cannot afford the services of legal counsel.

Furthermore, it is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies and programs that provide adequate social services and improve the quality of life for all.

In addition, the State shall guarantee free legal assistance to the poor and ensure that every person who cannot afford the services of a counsel is provided with a competent and independent counsel preferably of his/her own choice, if upon determination it appears that the party cannot afford the services of a counsel, and that services of a counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and protect of the party.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As provided for in this Act, the term legal services to be performed by a lawyer refers to any activity which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experiences which shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts, including appearance before the administrative and quasi-judicial offices, bodies and tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar services as may be defined by the Supreme Court.

Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a certification from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating that the said legal services to be provided are within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and that the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private counsel.

For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the necessary certification that said legal services were actually undertaken.

The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other accredited association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing the tax deductions as provided for in this Act and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring.

Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the actual free legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by the Supreme Court.

Section 6. Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Campaign. - The DOJ, in cooperation with the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), is hereby mandated to conduct an annual IEC campaign in order to inform the lawyers of the procedures and guidelines in availing tax deductions and inform the general public that a free legal assistance to those who cannot afford counsel is being provided by the State.1avvph!1

Section 7. Reportorial Requirement. - For purposes of determining the effectiveness and social impact of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall submit an annual report to both Houses of Congress indicating therewith the number of parties who benefited from this Act.

The report shall state in detail, among others, the geographic location, demographic characteristics and socioeconomic profile of the beneficiaries of this Act.

Section 8. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). - Within ninety (90) days from the date effectivity of this Act, the BIR shall formulate the necessary revenue regulations for the proper implementation of the tax component as envisioned in this Act.

The Supreme Court shall formulate the necessary implementing rules and regulations with respect to the legal services covered under this Act and the process of accreditation of organizations and/or associations which will provide free legal assistance.

Section 9. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other provisions not affected by such declaration shall remain in full force and effect.

Section 10. Repealing Clause. - Any law, decree, ordinance or administrative circular not consistent with any provision of this Act is hereby amended, repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 11. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.


Terminating the VFA - "An executive action of the President that violates a law, like the VFA, is not valid. The unilateral termination by the President of a law like the VFA, without the concurrence of the Senate, is also not valid. In fact, such unilateral termination of a law is the gravest violation of the law."



See - https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=2483276388443304416#editor/target=post;postID=3908724587529899527



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CROSSCURRENTS

Terminating the VFA


By: Antonio T. Carpio - @inquirerdotnet
Philippine Daily Inquirer / 05:05 AM February 27, 2020


The Senate recently held an inquiry whether the President needs the Senate’s concurrence to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Two theories were advanced why the President, acting alone, can terminate a treaty like the VFA that has been ratified by the Senate.

First, while the Constitution requires the Senate’s concurrence to make a treaty valid, the Constitution is silent on how a treaty is terminated. Second, the President is the Chief Architect of foreign policy. Thus, these theories assert, the President acting alone can terminate a ratified treaty.

While the Constitution prescribes the procedure how a law is enacted, and how a treaty is ratified, the Constitution is silent how a law or treaty is terminated, except that a people’s initiative may “reject” a law passed by Congress. Why?

A fundamental principle in constitutional law is that laws are repealed or amended only by subsequent laws, either expressly, or impliedly due to irreconcilable inconsistency between the prior and later law. This principle is so fundamental that it is not even written in the Constitution.

However, this principle is found in our Civil Code. Article 7 of the Civil Code provides, “Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practices to the contrary.”

It is well-settled that a ratified treaty can expressly amend or repeal a prior law. The amendment or repeal may also be implied when there is an irreconcilable conflict between a prior law and a later treaty, in which case the treaty prevails. Every time the Senate ratifies a tax treaty, the treaty amends the existing National Internal Revenue Code by carving out exemptions from the Code.

A ratified treaty itself may also be amended or repealed, expressly or impliedly, by a later law. A ratified treaty has the same status as a law enacted by Congress in that it can amend a prior law and can be amended by a later law. And just like any other law enacted by Congress, a treaty cannot amend the Constitution.

Clearly, a ratified treaty is a law, but a special one because the President must initiate it and the Senate must ratify it.

The VFA as a law can be repealed or terminated only by another law, either by a law enacted by Congress or by termination of the VFA by the President with the concurrence of the Senate. Since making a treaty into a law requires the joint act of the President and the Senate, terminating the treaty as a law must also require the joint act of the President and the Senate.

The President is described as the Chief Architect of foreign policy. The term Chief Architect, however, is not found in the Constitution. Jurisprudence has coined the term Chief Architect for two reasons.

First, under the Constitution, the President exercises “control” over all executive departments, including the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). This means that the President can instruct the Secretary of Foreign Affairs what to do, and amend or even reverse his decisions. Second, the President exercises the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, subject to concurrence by the Senate.

However, in exercising control over the DFA and its Secretary, the President must still follow existing laws and the Constitution. Article 7 of the Civil Code provides, “executive acts xxx shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or Constitution.” It is basic that any act of the President must not violate the law, otherwise the act is not valid.

An executive action of the President that violates a law, like the VFA, is not valid. The unilateral termination by the President of a law like the VFA, without the concurrence of the Senate, is also not valid. In fact, such unilateral termination of a law is the gravest violation of the law.

Article 7 of the Civil Code lays down the fundamental principle that no one is above the law, not even the President. The law is forever, unless amended or repealed by a subsequent law. If we allow the President to terminate a law like the VFA by his sole action, then we have placed the President above the law.

acarpio@inquirer.com.ph

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