Thursday, March 25, 2021

Award of attorney's fees

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jan2020/gr_201812_2020.html

THIRD THELMA B. SIAN REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO A. SIAN, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES CAESAR A. SOMOSO AND ANITA B. SOMOSO, THE FORMER BEING SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING SON, ANTHONY VOLTAIRE B. SOMOSO, MACARIO M. DE GUZMAN, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF III OF THE REGIONAL COURT OF PANABO, DAVAO, BRANCH 4, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 201812, January 22, 2020

“x x x.

The award of attorney's fees should be deleted as well. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. (Spouses Timado v. Rural Bank of San Jose, Inc., 789 Phil. 453, 460 [2016]).

X x x.”

 

No exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jan2020/gr_201812_2020.html

THIRD THELMA B. SIAN REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO A. SIAN, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES CAESAR A. SOMOSO AND ANITA B. SOMOSO, THE FORMER BEING SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING SON, ANTHONY VOLTAIRE B. SOMOSO, MACARIO M. DE GUZMAN, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF III OF THE REGIONAL COURT OF PANABO, DAVAO, BRANCH 4, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 201812, January 22, 2020

“x x x.

The rule in our jurisdiction is that exemplary damages are awarded in addition to moral damages. (Delos Santos v. Papa, 605 Phil. 472 [2009]). In the case of Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., 464 Phil. 146 (2004), the Court pronounced:

If the court has no proof or evidence upon which the claim for moral damages could be based, such indemnity could not be outrightly awarded. The same holds true with respect to the award of exemplary damages where it must be shown that the party acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. Furthermore, this specie of damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. ( Id. at 150)

X x x.”

The law never intended to impose a penalty on the right to litigate so that the filing of an unfounded suit does not automatically entitle the defendant to moral damages.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jan2020/gr_201812_2020.html

THIRD THELMA B. SIAN REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO A. SIAN, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES CAESAR A. SOMOSO AND ANITA B. SOMOSO, THE FORMER BEING SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING SON, ANTHONY VOLTAIRE B. SOMOSO, MACARIO M. DE GUZMAN, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF III OF THE REGIONAL COURT OF PANABO, DAVAO, BRANCH 4, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 201812, January 22, 2020

“x x x.

When the CA held that petitioner's complaint was frivolous, it was in effect granting the award of moral damage.s on the basis of Article 2219(8) of the Civil Code on malicious prosecution. Traditionally, the term malicious prosecution has been associated with unfounded criminal actions. Jurisprudence has also recognized malicious prosecution to include baseless civil suits intended to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause. (Villanueva-Ong v. Enrile, G.R. No. 212904, November 22, 2017, 846 SCRA 376, 387-386). However, it should be stressed that the filing of an unfounded suit is not a ground for the grant of moral damages. Otherwise, moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff. The law never intended to impose a penalty on the right to litigate so that the filing of an unfounded suit does not automatically entitle the defendant to moral damages. (Delos Santos v. Papa, 605 Phil. 460, 471 [2009])

Besides, as the Court explained above, there was no showing that petitioner flied the case in bad faith or that the action was vexatious and baseless. Accordingly, since respondents are not entitled to moral damages, neither can they be awarded with exemplary damages, so with attorney's fees and the cost of litigation.

X x x.”

Remedies of third-party claimant under Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jan2020/gr_201812_2020.html

THIRD THELMA B. SIAN REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO A. SIAN, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES CAESAR A. SOMOSO AND ANITA B. SOMOSO, THE FORMER BEING SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING SON, ANTHONY VOLTAIRE B. SOMOSO, MACARIO M. DE GUZMAN, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF III OF THE REGIONAL COURT OF PANABO, DAVAO, BRANCH 4, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 201812, January 22, 2020

“x x x.

The remedies of a third-party claimant under Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is further explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado in this wise:

The remedies of a third-party claimant mentioned in Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that is, a summary hearing before the court which authorized the execution, or a "terceria" or third-party claim filed with the sheriff, or an action for damages on the bond posted by the judgment creditor, or an independent revindicatory action, are cumulative remedies and may be resorted to by a third-party claimant independently of or separately from and without need of availing of the others. If he opted to file a proper action to vindicate his claim of ownership, he must institute an action, distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced, with a competent court even before or without filing a claim in the court which issued the writ, the latter not being a condition sine qua non for the former. This proper action would have for its object the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the Sheriff, as well as damages against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the illegal seizure or detention of the property. The validity of the title of the third-party claimant shall be resolved in said action and a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued against the sheriff. (Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDUM, Vol. 1, 1999 Ed., pp. 445-446, citing Sy v. Discaya, 260 Phil. 401 [1990]).

X x x.”

Right to litigate vs. Frivolous action

THIRD THELMA B. SIAN REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO A. SIAN, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES CAESAR A. SOMOSO AND ANITA B. SOMOSO, THE FORMER BEING SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING SON, ANTHONY VOLTAIRE B. SOMOSO, MACARIO M. DE GUZMAN, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF III OF THE REGIONAL COURT OF PANABO, DAVAO, BRANCH 4, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 201812, January 22, 2020.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jan2020/gr_201812_2020.html 

“x x x.

A frivolous action is a groundless lawsuit with little prospect of success. (BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. Sixth Edition, p. 668). It is often brought merely to harass, annoy, and cast groundless suspicions on the integrity and reputation of the defendant. (Prieto v. Corpuz, 539 Phil. 65, 72 [2006]).

When petitioner filed the third-party complaint, she was merely exercising her right to litigate, claiming ownership over the subject property, submitting as evidence the Deed of Sale dated July 26, 1980 and TCT No. T-34705 issued in her name. Being the registered owner of the subject property, she has a remedy under the law to assail the writ of attachment and notice of levy. A third-party claimant or any third person may vindicate his claim to his property wrongfully levied by filing a proper action, which is distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced. Such action would have for its object the recovery of the possession of the property seized by the Sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third-party claim. (Capa v. Court of Appeals, 533 Phil. 691, 702 [2006]).

When the third-party complaint was denied by the RTC, petitioner's remedy was to file an independent reivindicatory action against the judgment creditor - herein respondents. (Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDUM, Vol. 1, 1999 Ed., pp. 443-446). In fact, this was the directive of the RTC when it denied petitioner's third-party complaint. Hence, when petitioner filed the complaint for annulment and cancellation of writ of attachment and notice of levy, injunction, damages and attorney's fees, she did not act in bad faith nor was the complaint frivolous.

X x x,”

Wednesday, March 24, 2021

Guidelines in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant. G.R. No. 131636, March 5, 2003. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/mar2003/gr_131636_2003.html.

“Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the complaint and duly established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the complaint regarding her age was not clearly proved.

In the very recent case of People v. Pruna, G.R. No. 138471, 10 October 2002, we set the guidelines in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:



1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in evidence to prove Cynthia’s age. The statement in the medical certificate showing Cynthia’s age is not proof thereof, since a medical certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover, pursuant to Pruna, Gloria’s testimony regarding Cynthia’s age was insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged to be 16 years old already at the time of the rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was then 18 years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even make a categorical finding on Cynthia’s minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or his failure to object to the testimonial evidence regarding Cynthia’s age could not be taken against him.

It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthia’s minority, Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be convicted of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.”

Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant. G.R. No. 131636, March 5, 2003. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/mar2003/gr_131636_2003.html.


“We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape was committed, i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The exact time or date of the commission of rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. (People v. Matugas, G.R. Nos. 139698-726, 20 February 2002. See also People v. Alba, 305 SCRA 811 [1999]; People v. Montejo, 355 SCRA 210, 226 [2001]) In this case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the credibility of these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the credibility of the witnesses. We have held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility. (People v. Palomar, 278 SCRA 114, 147 [1997]) On the contrary, they may even be considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the material points in the testimonies. What is important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent whole. (People v. Gaspar, 318 SCRA 649, 671 [1999])”

Ulterior motive

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant. G.R. No. 131636, March 5, 2003.

 https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/mar2003/gr_131636_2003.html.

“The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration. Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sister’s virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence. (People v. Ramos, 312 SCRA 137, 148 [1999])”

Leading questions


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant. G.R. No. 131636, March 5, 2003. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/mar2003/gr_131636_2003.html.

“Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like Elven.”

(SEC. 10. Leading and misleading questions. – A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:



When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is a feeble mind, or a deaf-mute. …)

Filial privilege may be invoked or waived

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant. G.R. No. 131636, March 5, 2003. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/mar2003/gr_131636_2003.html.

“As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. ( 2 Florenz Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 583 [7th rev. ed. 1995]) The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only ‘to tell the truth.’”

It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.



See -  https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/mar2003/gr_131636_2003.html


"x x x,

It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien.17 This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored or misconstrued by the court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts.18 We do not find any of these exceptions in the case at bar.

x x x."


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant.
G.R. No. 131636 March 5, 2003

Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.


See -  https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/jul2010/gr_177861_2010.html#rnt3


"x x x.

The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh’s daughter.

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh children’s theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.

But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable and oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:

SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.

Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals6 that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lee’s other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee’s other children were not children of Keh. Thus:

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.7 (Underscoring supplied)

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh children’s action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lee’s other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lee’s other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu’s testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness.

But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine if Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.

Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial court’s duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age.8

2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

x x x."


G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH,

EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.