Tuesday, December 13, 2022

RA 10845, c. 2016, Anti-Agricultural Smuggling Act of 2016.



REPUBLIC ACT No. 10845 - ANTI-AGRICULTURAL SMUGGLING ACT OF 2016..

SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the

“ANTI-AGRICULTURAL SMUGGLING ACT OF 2016”.

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to promote the productivity of the agriculture sector and to protect farmers from unscrupulous traders and importers, who by their illegal importation of agricultural products, especially rice, significantly affect the production, availability of supply and stability of prices, and the food security of the State.

The State shall impose higher sanctions for large-scale smuggling of agricultural products, as a self-preservation measure to shield itself from the manipulative scheme of economic saboteurs, and to protect the livelihood of our farmers and to ensure their economic well-being.

SECTION 3. Large-Scale Agricultural Smuggling as Economic Sabotage. – The crime of large-scale agricultural smuggling as economic sabotage, involving sugar, corn, pork, poultry, garlic, onion, carrots, fish, and cruciferous vegetables, in its raw state, or which have undergone the simple processes of preparation or preservation for the market, with a minimum amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00), or rice, with a minimum amount of ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), as valued by the Bureau of Customs (BOC), is committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Importing or bringing into the Philippines without the required import permit from the regulatory agencies;

(b) Using import permits of persons, natural or juridical, other than those specifically named in the permit;

(c) Using fake, fictitious or fraudulent import permits or shipping documents;

(d) Selling, lending, leasing, assigning, consenting or allowing the use of import permits of corporations, nongovernment organizations, associations, cooperatives, or single proprietorships by other persons;

(e) Misclassification, undervaluation or misdeclaration upon the filing of import entry and revenue declaration with the BOC in order to evade the payment of rightful taxes and duties due to the government;

(f) Organizing or using dummy corporations, nongovernment organizations, associations, cooperatives, or single proprietorships for the purpose of acquiring import permits;

(g) Transporting or storing the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage regardless of quantity; or

(h) Acting as broker of the violating importer.

SECTION 4. Penalties. – (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of twice the fair value of the smuggled agricultural product and the aggregate amount of the taxes, duties and other charges avoided shall be imposed on any person who commits any of the acts enumerated under Section 3 of this Act.

(b) The penalty of imprisonment of not less than seventeen (17) years but not more than twenty (20) years, and a fine of twice the fair value of the smuggled agricultural product and the aggregate amount of the taxes, duties and other charges avoided shall be imposed on the officers of dummy corporations, nongovernment organizations, associations, cooperatives, or single proprietorships who knowingly sell, lend, lease, assign, consent or allow the unauthorized use of their import permits for purposes of smuggling.

(c) The penalty of imprisonment of not less than fourteen (14) years but not more than seventeen (17) years and a fine equal to the fair value of the smuggled agricultural product and the aggregate amount of the taxes, duties and other charges avoided shall be imposed on the following:

(1) The registered owner and its lessee or charterer, in case of lease, of a chartered boat, motorized commercial vessel of more than three (3) gross tonnage, who knowingly transports the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage, regardless of quantity;

(2) The registered owner and its lessee, in case of lease of six (6) or more wheeler trucks, vans and other means of transportation, who knowingly transports the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage, regardless of quantity;

(3) The registered owner and lessee of a warehouse, or any property, who knowingly stores the smuggled agricultural product subject to economic sabotage; or

(4) The registered owner, lessee, president or chief executive officer of the private port, fish port, fish landing sites, resorts, and airports who knowingly allows the agricultural product to be smuggled into the country.

(d) The penalty of imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years but not more than fourteen (14) years and a fine equal to the fair value of the smuggled agricultural product subject to economic sabotage and the aggregate amount of the taxes, duties and other charges avoided shall be imposed on the following:

(1) The registered owner and its lessee or charterer, in case of lease.; of a chartered boat, motorized commercial vessel of three (3) gross tonnage or less, who knowingly transports the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage, regardless of quantity; or

(2) The registered owner and its lessee, in case of lease, of less than six (6) wheeler trucks, vans and other means of transportation, who knowingly transports the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage, regardless of quantity.

In all cases, the smuggled agricultural products shall be confiscated and the property used in agricultural smuggling, consistent with Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code and without prejudice to Section 2531 of the same Code, shall be forfeited in favor of the government.

When the offender is a juridical person, criminal liability shall attach to its president, chief operating officer or manager who consents to or knowingly tolerates the commission of the prohibited crime.

Any person, natural or juridical, found guilty under this Act shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification to engage in any business involving importation.

In applying the abovementioned penalties, if the offender is an alien and the prescribed penalty is not life imprisonment, he/she shall be deported after serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation.

If the offender is a government official or employee, the penalty shall be the maximum as hereinabove prescribed and the offender shall suffer an additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office, to vote and to participate in any public election.

SECTION 5. Presumption of Agricultural Smuggling. – Mere possession of rice or any agricultural product under this Act, which has been the subject of smuggling, entered into the Philippines other than the BOC controlled ports or without the necessary permits shall be prima facie evidence of smuggling.

SECTION 6. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The BOC, in consultation with concerned agencies, shall promulgate the implementing rules and regulations of this Act within thirty (30) days upon its effectivity.

SECTION 7. Prescription of Crimes. – The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.1âwphi1

SECTION 8. Separability Clause. – If any portion of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the portions or provisions which are not affected shall continue to be in full force and effect.

SECTION 9. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, executive issuances, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.

SECTION 10. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Friday, December 9, 2022

Independent central monetary authority



TOPIC: THE "INDEPENDENT CENTRAL MONETARY AUTHORITY" VIS-A-VIS THE PROPOSED MAHARLIKA INVESTMENT FUND ACT (MAHARLIKA SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND, MAHARLIKA INVESTMENT CORPORATION). -

Under Section 20 of Article XII, "National Economy and Patrimony", of the 1987 Constitution, "Congress shall establish an "INDEPENDENT CENTRAL MONETARY AUTHORITY".

That "INDEPENDENT central monetary authority" is the BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP).

The BSP (formerly called the "Central Bank of the Philippines") was created by R.A. No. 7653, c. 1993, entitled "The Central Bank Act". R. A. No. 7653 was later amended in 2018 by R. A. No. 11211 to strengthen the regulatory powers of the BSP as the "INDEPENDENT central monetary authority" mentioned in the 1987 Constitution.

The central monetary authority (BSP) "shall provide POLICY DIRECTION in the areas of MONEY, BANKING, AND CREDIT". It shall have "SUPERVISION over the operations of BANKS and exercise such REGULATORY POWERS as may be provided by LAW OVER THE OPERATIONS OF FINANCE COMPANIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS PERFORMING SIMILAR FUNCTIONS". (Section 20, Article XII, 1987 Constitution).

FURTHER, under Section 21 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, "FOREIGN LOANS may only be incurred in accordance with LAW and the REGULATION OF THE MONETARY AUTHORITY".

FURTHERMORE, under Section 20 of Article VII, "Executive Department", of the 1987 Constitution, "the PRESIDENT may CONTRACT OR GUARANTEE FOREIGN LOANS on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the PRIOR CONCURRENCE OF THE MONETARY BOARD, and subject to such LIMITATIONS as may be provided by LAW".

FINALLY, the MONETARY BOARD is mandated by the 1987 Constitution to regularly submit to Congress a COMPLETE REPORT of its decisions on APPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN LOANS "CONTRACTED OR GUARANTEED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS which would have the EFFECT OF INCREASING THE FOREIGN DEBT".

The statements issued yesterday by the leaders of the Lower House of the Philippine Congress revealed that the "SURPLUS PROFITS OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS" would be used to fund the start-up capital or equity of the proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (Maharlika Investment Corporation).

I humbly submit that if the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas would stand as the SOLE OR MAIN OR MAJOR EQUITY/CAPITAL CONTRIBUTOR of the proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (Maharlika Investment Corporation), SUCH A FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

How can the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be expected to INDEPENDENTLY, HONESTLY AND COMPETENTLY SUPERVISE AND EXAMINE THE OPERATIONS of the proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (Maharlika Investment Corporation) when it is the sole or main or major equity owner, capital contributor or shareholder of the proposed financial institution?

Moreover, how can the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be expected to INDEPENDENTLY, FAIRLY AND REASONABLY PROVIDE "POLICY DIRECTION IN THE AREAS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND CREDIT" when it is a MAJOR PLAYER IN THE PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKET as the sole or main or major equity owner, capital contributor or shareholder of the proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (Maharlika Investment Corporation)?

The CONFLICT OF INTEREST will weaken, if not destroy, the fundamental constitutional principles of TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CHECK AND BALANCE that guide the equitable and Inclusive socio-economic development of a genuine democratic republic.

The aforementioned scenario will produce a fertile ground conducive to UNCHECKED MASSIVE GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION.

An UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATIVE ACT is VOID AB INITIO for being violative of the spirit, intent and express language of the Constitution.

"PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. Public officers and employees must, at all times, BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE , SERVE THEM with UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, INTEGRITY, LOYALTY, and EFFICIENCY; ACT WITH PATRIOTISM AND JUSTICE, and LEAD MODEST LIVES." (Section 1, "Accountability of Public Officers", Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

Please note that the incumbent BSP Governor FELIPE M. MEDALLA a few days ago expressed the same sentiment as stated above (although he meekly added that he would abide by the final decision of Congress on the matter).

Wednesday, December 7, 2022

GSIS Provident Fund is a Trust Fund (Trust vs. Co-ownership)



"TRUST is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.[19] A trust fund refers to money or property set aside as a trust for the benefit of another and held by a trustee.[20] Under the Civil Code, trusts are classified as either express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law.[21]

There is no doubt that respondent intended to establish a trust fund from the employees’ contributions (5% of monthly salary) and its own contributions (45% of each member’s monthly salary and all unremitted Employees Welfare contributions). We cannot accept petitioners’ submission that respondent could not impose terms and conditions on the availment of benefits from the Fund on the ground that members already own respondent’s contributions from the moment such was remitted to their account. Petitioners’ assertion that the Plan was a purely contractual obligation on the part of respondent is likewise mistaken.

Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as “The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997,” mandated respondent to maintain a provident fund subject to rules and regulations it may adopt. Thus:

SECTION 41. Powers and Functions of the GSIS. — The GSIS shall exercise the following powers and functions:

x x x x

(s) to maintain a provident fund, which consists of contributions made by both the GSIS and its officials and employees and their earnings, for the payment of benefits to such officials and employees or their heirs under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe; (Emphasis supplied.)

In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,[22] this Court recognized DBP’s establishment of a trust fund to cover the retirement benefits of certain employees. We noted that as the trustor, DBP vested in the trustees legal title over the Fund as well as control over the investment of the money and assets of the Fund. The Trust Agreement therein also stated that the principal and income must be used to satisfy all of the liabilities to the beneficiary officials and employees under the Gratuity Plan.[23]

Here, petitioners as beneficiaries of the Fund contend that they became co-owners of the entire Fund including respondent’s contributions and its accumulated earnings. On this premise, they demand a proportionate share in the GRF which was deducted from the earnings on respondents’ contributions.

Under the PFRR, however, the GRF is allocated for specific purposes and not intended for distribution to members. Section 8,[24] Article IV thus provides:

Section 8. Earnings. At the beginning of each quarter, the earnings realized by the Fund in the previous quarter just ended shall be credited to the accounts of the members in proportion to the amounts standing to their credit as of the beginning of the same quarter after deducting therefrom twenty per cent (20%) of the proportionate earnings of the System’s contributions, which deduction shall be credited to a General Reserve Fund. Whenever circumstances warrant, however, the Committee may reduce the percentage to be credited to the General Reserve Fund for any given quarter; provided that in no case shall such percentage be lower than five per cent (5%) of the proportionate earnings of the System’s contributions for the quarter. When and as long as the total amount in the General Reserve Fund is equivalent to at least ten per cent (10%) of the total assets of the Fund, the Committee may authorize all the earnings for any given quarter to be credited to the members.

The General Reserve Fund shall be used for the following purposes:

(a) To cover the deficiency, if any, between the amount standing to the credit of a member who dies or is separated from the service due to permanent and total disability, and the amount due him under Article V Section 4[25];

(b) To make up for any investment losses and write-offs of bad debts, in accordance with policies to be promulgated by the Board;

(c) To pay the benefits of separated employees in accordance with Article IV, Section 3[26]; and

(d) For other purposes as may be approved by the Board, provided that such purposes is consistent with Article IV, Section 4[27].

It is clear that while respondent’s monthly contributions are credited to the account of each member, and the same were received by petitioners upon their retirement, they were entitled to only a proportionate share of the earnings thereon. The benefits of retiring members of the Fund are covered by Section 1(b), Article V which states:

(b) Retirement. In the event the separation from the System is due to retirement under existing laws, such as P.D. 1146, R.A. 660 or R.A. 1616, irrespective of the length of membership to the Fund, the retiree shall be entitled to withdraw the entire amount of his contributions to the Fund, as well as the corresponding proportionate share of the accumulated earnings thereon, and in addition, 100% of the System’s contributions, plus the proportionate earnings thereon.

We find nothing illegal or anomalous in the creation of the GRF to address certain contingencies and ensure the Fund’s continuing viability. Petitioners’ right to receive retirement benefits under the Plan was subject to well-defined rules and regulations that were made known to and accepted by them when they applied for membership in the Fund.

Petitioners have the right to demand for an accounting of the Fund including the GRF. Under Section 5,[28] Article VIII of the PFRR, the Committee is required to prepare an annual report showing the income and expenses and the financial condition of the Fund as of the end of each calendar year. Said report shall be submitted to the GSIS Board and shall be available to members. There is, however, no allegation or evidence that the Committee failed to comply with the submission of such annual report, or that such report was not made available to members."


G.R. No. 189827, October 16, 2013

GERSIP ASSOCIATION, INC., LETICIA ALMAZAN, ANGELA NARVAEZ, MARIA B. PINEDA, LETICIA DE MESA AND ALFREDO D. PINEDA, PETITIONERS, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENT.


https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/56303

The funds contributed to the Social Security System (SSS) created by the law are NOT PUBLIC FUNDS, but funds belonging to the members which are MERELY HELD IN TRUST BY THE GOVERNMENT.



"It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.

In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of whether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.

Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, following the rule laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. .

Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture.

There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.

Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people."

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jan1961/gr_l-15045_1961.html

Signing bonus, when not a truly reasonable compensation



"This Court has been very consistent in characterizing the funds being administered by SSS as a trust fund for the welfare and benefit of workers and employees in the private sector.37 In United Christian Missionary v. Social Security Commission38 we were unequivocal in declaring the funds contributed to the Social Security System by compulsion of law as funds belonging to the members which were merely held in trust by the government, and resolutely imposed the duty upon the trustee to desist from any and all acts which would diminish the property rights of owners and beneficiaries of the trust fund. Consistent with this declaration, it would indeed be very reasonable to construe the authority of the SSC to provide for the compensation of SSS personnel in accordance with the established rules governing the remuneration of trustees -

x x x x the modern rule is to give the trustee a reasonable remuneration for his skill and industry x x x x In deciding what is a reasonable compensation for a trustee the court will consider the amount of income and capital received and disbursed, the pay customarily given to agents or servants for similar work, the success or failure of the work of the trustee, any unusual skill which the trustee had and used, the amount of risk and responsibility, the time consumed, the character of the work done (whether routine or of unusual difficulty) and any other factors which prove the worth of the trustee’s services to the cestuis x x x x The court has power to make extraordinary compensation allowances, but will not do so unless the trustee can prove that he has performed work beyond the ordinary duties of his office and has engaged in especially arduous work.39

On the basis of the foregoing pronouncement, we do not find the signing bonus to be a truly reasonable compensation. The gratuity was of course the SSC’s gesture of good will and benevolence for the conclusion of collective negotiations between SSC and ACCESS, as the CNA would itself state, but for what objective? Agitation and propaganda which are so commonly practiced in private sector labor-management relations have no place in the bureaucracy and that only a peaceful collective negotiation which is concluded within a reasonable time must be the standard for interaction in the public sector. This desired conduct among civil servants should not come, we must stress, with a price tag which is what the signing bonus appears to be."

EN BANC, G.R. No. 149240, July 11, 2002

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/jul2002/gr_149240_2002.html

Authority to sue



"We find no legitimate and compelling reason to reverse the COA. To begin with, the instant petition is fatally defective. It was filed in the name of the SSS although no directive from the SSC authorized the instant suit and only the officer-in-charge in behalf of petitioner executed the purported directive. Clearly, this is irregular since under Sec. 4, par. 10, in relation to par. 7,13 RA 1161 as amended by RA 8282 (The Social Security Act of 1997, which was already effective14 when the instant petition was filed), it is the SSC as a collegiate body which has the power to approve, confirm, pass upon or review the action of the SSS to sue in court. Moreover, the appearance of the internal legal staff of the SSS as counsel in the present proceedings is similarly questionable because under both RA 1161 and RA 8282 it is the Department of Justice (DoJ) that has the authority to act as counsel of the SSS.15 It is well settled that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings16 and that such illicit representation produces no legal effect.17 Since nothing in the case at bar shows that the approval or ratification of the SSC has been undertaken in the manner prescribed by law and that the DoJ has not delegated the authority to act as counsel and appear herein, the instant petition must necessarily fail. These procedural deficiencies are serious matters which this Court cannot take lightly and simply ignore since the SSS is in reality confessing judgment to charge expenditure against the trust fund under its custodianship.

In Premium Marble Resources v. Court of Appeals18 we held that no person, not even its officers, could validly sue in behalf of a corporation in the absence of any resolution from the governing body authorizing the filing of such suit. Moreover, where the corporate officer’s power as an agent of the corporation did not derive from such resolution, it would nonetheless be necessary to show a clear source of authority from the charter, the by-laws or the implied acts of the governing body.19 Unfortunately there is no palpable evidence in the records to show that the officer-in-charge could all by himself order the filing of the instant petition without the intervention of the SSC, nor that the legal staff of SSS could act as its counsel and appear therein without the intervention of the DoJ. The power of attorney supposedly authorizing this suit as well as the signature of the legal counsel appearing on the signing page of the instant petition is therefore ineffectual."

EN BANC, G.R. No. 149240, July 11, 2002

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/jul2002/gr_149240_2002.html

SSS funds are workers' trust funds



"THE FUNDS contributed to the SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) are not only IMBUED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST, they are part and parcel of the fruits of the workers’ labors pooled into ONE ENORMOUS TRUST FUND UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM designed to insure against the vicissitudes and hazards of their working lives. In a very real sense, the trust funds are the workers’ property which they could turn to when necessity beckons and are thus more personal to them than the taxes they pay. It is therefore only fair and proper that charges against the trust fund be STRICTLY SCRUTINIZED for every lawful and judicious opportunity to keep it intact and viable in the interest of enhancing the WELFARE OF THEIR TRUE AND ULTIMATE BENEFICIARIES."


EN BANC, G.R. No. 149240, July 11, 2002

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/jul2002/gr_149240_2002.html