Once in a while, the Philippine Supreme Court is constrained to repeat the old doctrine that “an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty”.
This is the concept of JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.
This is so because of the dilatory and unfair tendency of litigants and lawyers to file administrative cases against trial and appellate judges whose decisions they do not agree with, notwithstanding the pendency or availability of regular judicial remedies in the ordinary course of the litigation as contained in the Rules of Court.
In the case of GENARO SANTIAGO III vs. JUSTICE JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR., En Banc, A.M. No. CA-09-47-J [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-121-CA-J], February 13, 2009, which I wish to discuss below for purposes of legal research of the visitors o this blog, the Supreme Court held that the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty…
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of the arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable…The failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render a judge administratively liable. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
The principle of “judicial immunity” insulates judges, and even Justices of superior courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith. To hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice could be infallible in his judgment. It added:
A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. In the words of Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson, “ … it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary. This principle is of universal application and applies to all grades of judicial officers from the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Stressing that appellate courts are collegial in nature, the Supreme Court emphasized that the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate because the questioned decision was not rendered by the respondent in his individual capacity and that it was a product of the consultations and deliberations by the division.
