As I have written in a previous blog, in the case of “IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, etc., En Banc, A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC, February 24, 2009, Per Curiam”, which involved retired Philippine Supreme Court Associate Justice RUBEN REYES, the Philippine Supreme Court held Justice Reyes “liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court” and “FINED P500,000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits”.
Justice Reyes was further “disqualified to hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations”.
Furthermore, Justice Reyes was “directed to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar”.
His staff Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario were “held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and (were) ordered to pay (a) FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively”.
The decision was made immediately final and executory by the Court.
In view of the extraordinary and far-reaching nature and effects of the said case, I wish to digest hereinbelow the salient jurisprudential or doctrinal parts of the aforecited decision of the Supreme Court, for purposes of legal research of the foreign and local visitors of this blog.
The Court made the following doctrinal pronouncements in the area of Legal and Judicial Ethics which the Bench and the Bar should internalize if they were to preserve the sanctity of the rule of law and the administration of justice. Thus:
“x x x.
The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he is answerable.
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite Justice Reyes’s retirement.
Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed if one is later found guilty of the administrative offenses charged, including the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce a respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him/her guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For, what remedy would the people have against a civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his/her last days in office? What would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he/she would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune from all administrative penalties?
If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, a respondent official merits vindication of his/her name and integrity as he leaves the government which he/she served well and faithfully; if guilty, he/she deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
X x x.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that confidential information acquired by justices and judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one whole canon on confidentiality, to wit:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential information acquired by them while employed in the judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or unauthorized sources.
Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers.
The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made public.
SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific individuals by reason of statute, court rule or administrative policy shall be disclosed only by persons authorized to do so.
SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated authority, court personnel shall not disclose confidential information given by litigants, witnesses or attorneys to justices, judges or any other person.
SEC. 4. Former court personnel shall not disclose confidential information acquired by them during their employment in the Judiciary when disclosed by current court personnel of the same information would constitute a breach of confidentiality. Any disclosure in violation of this provisions shall constitute indirect contempt of court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Ineluctably, any release of a copy to the public, or to the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court. It is settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are confidential. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise judicial power.
In Mirasol v. De La Torre, Jr., the Court stated that “[c]ourt documents are confidential documents. They must not be taken out of the court without proper authority and without the necessary safeguards to ensure their confidentiality and integrity.” Thus, the Court found the clerk of court guilty of gross misconduct.
Moreover, the case enunciates that acts of gross misconduct destroy the good image of the judiciary so the Court cannot countenance them nor allow the perpetrators to remain in office. This same pronouncement was reiterated in Betguen v. Masangcay. Though both cases involve indiscretions of clerks of court, it is but logical that a higher standard of care be imposed upon magistrates of the Court.
PAGCOR v. Rilloza, in fact, commands persons who routinely handle confidential matters to be confidential employees. They are thus expected to be more careful than an ordinary employee in their day to day business. They are reposed such trust and confidence that a breach of their duty would mean breach of trust. As applied to the case of Justice Reyes, the breach of duty amounts to breach of public trust as the committee believes that the leak was motivated by self-interest.
The fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged is of no moment. It is settled that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.
In People v. Valenzuela, which deals with the administrative aspect of a case brought on certiorari, the Court dispensed with the conduct of further hearings under the principle of res ipsa loquitur and proceeded to consider critical factors in deducing malice and bad faith on the part of the judge, after it did not accept at face value the judge’s mere denial. In that case, the judge ordered the return of the peso equivalent of the foreign currency to the accused despite its forfeiture as dutiable goods and even after the finding that the accused had nothing to do with the mailing thereof.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr., where the Court took into account glaring circumstances in the proceedings of the case in concluding that the judge acted with bad faith, the judge was similarly found guilty of grave and serious misconduct when he unjustly declared the defendant in default and awarded outrageously exorbitant damages. l
Prudential Bank v. Castro was an administrative case spawned by a party’s complaint, wherein the Court, in light of the surrounding circumstances, found that the judge committed serious and grave misfeasance because the issuance of the orders and ill-conceived summary judgment showed the judge’s partiality to, or confabulation with the plaintiff and its lawyers.
In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano, the Court proceeded in adjudging the attendant circumstances as tainted with bad faith and questionable integrity to call for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers over members of the judiciary. In that case, the Court found the submissions of the judge unacceptable and clearly inadequate to overcome the cumulative effect of the highly questionable actuations– taking cognizance of a claim for damages arising from an attachment, instead of having it litigated in the same action where the writ was issued – as evincing gross ignorance of the law and active bias or partiality.
The Court, in Cruz v. Yaneza, perceived the judge’s persistent pattern of approving bail bonds and issuing release orders beyond its territorial jurisdiction as evincing a modus operandi that flagrantly flaunts fundamental rules.
In De Los Santos v. Magsino, the Court again applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when a judge irregularly approved a bail bond and issued a release order of an accused whose case was pending in another province, in palpable disregard and gross ignorance of the procedural law on bail.
The principle was also applied to discipline court personnel and suspend members of the Bar from the practice of law.
The Court, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Pardo, found the clerk of court guilty of gross discourtesy in the course of official duties when he failed to accord respect for the person and rights of a judge as can be gleaned from a mere reading of his letter to the Executive Judge.
In Sy v. Moncupa, the Court found the evidence against the clerk for malversation of public funds eloquently speaks of her criminal misdeed to justify the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The clerk admitted the shortage in the court funds in her custody and pleaded for time to pay the amount she had failed to account for.
In maintaining an earlier Resolution, the Court, in In re Wenceslao Laureta, also declared that nothing more was needed to be said or proven and the necessity to conduct any further evidentiary hearing was obviated. In that case, the Court found that the letters and charges leveled against the Justices were, of themselves and by themselves, malicious and contemptuous, and undermined the independence of the judiciary.
Meanwhile, in Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda, it was held that it was reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the respondent committed an infringement of ethical standards by his act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in a case and subsequently failing to render such service. The Court found the respondent liable for disloyalty to his client and inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him.
The Court, in Dizon, clarified the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, viz:
In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave error bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an injustice against a hapless party. The facts themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such a character as to give rise to a strong inference that evil intent was present. Such intent, in short, was clearly deducible from what was already of record. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not except or dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.)
The apparent toning down of the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule was further amplified in at least two cases. In Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Villanueva, the Court ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to cases of knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment, and even if the doctrine is appreciable, complainant still has to present proof of malice or bad faith.
Then came Fernandez v. Verzola, where it was held that failure to substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery and mere reliance on conjectures and suppositions cannot sustain an administrative complaint. In dismissing the complaint, the Court rejected as untenable the reasoning that the decision itself is evidence of corruption per doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It upheld the rule that rendering an erroneous or baseless judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to justify the judge’s dismissal from the service.
The supposed tempering of the principle of res ipsa loquitur in Dizon only bolstered and solidified the application of the doctrine in cases not only of gross negligence but of serious misconduct as well, since it speaks of “inference of evil intent.”
As explained in Louis Vuitton, the familiar rule in administrative cases is that the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, and that he cannot be subjected to civil, criminal or administrative liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. The rule adds that the proper remedy is via judicial recourse and not through an administrative action.
It must be pointed out that Louis Vuitton involves gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. In cases of leakage or breach of confidentiality, however, the familiar rule obviously does not apply. While the injured party is the Court itself, there is no judicial remedy available to undo the disclosure. Moreover, the premature disclosure does not spring from the four corners of the assailed decision or resolution nor can it gleaned on the face of the issuance itself. Indeed, one need not dwell on the substance of the decision since that in itself is inherently insufficient. In unearthing the misdeed, it becomes not only desirable but also necessary to trace the attendant circumstances, apparent pattern and critical factors surrounding the entire scenario.
In Macalintal v. Teh, the Court pronounced:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. (Underscoring supplied.)
The same norm equally applies in the breach of the basic and essential rule of confidentiality that, as described in one case, “[a]ll conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation [and c]ourt personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present.
As Dizon declared, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses that absent a credible explanation, it is clearly sound and reasonable to conclude a strong inference of evil intent on the basis of facts duly admitted or shown by the record. In fine, jurisprudence allows the reception of circumstantial evidence to prove not only gross negligence but also serious misconduct.
Justice Reyes is Likewise Liable for Violating his Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Banc, the committee likewise finds Justice Reyes administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he may be disbarred or suspended per Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. It is likewise provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it also infringed on the internal deliberations of the Court and impeded and degraded the administration of justice. The act is rendered all the more pernicious considering that it was committed by no less than a justice of the Supreme Court who was supposed to serve as example to the bench and bar.
That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the investigation started is of no moment. The rule prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against an impeachable officer who is required by the Constitution to be a member of the bar as a qualification in office applies only during his or her tenure and does not create immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other supposed violations. Once the said impeachable officer is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, retirement or permanent disability, the Court may proceed against him or her and impose the corresponding sanctions for misconduct committed during his tenure, pursuant to the Court’s power of administrative supervision over members of the bar. Provided that the requirements of due process are met, the Court may penalize retired members of the Judiciary for misconduct committed during their incumbency. Thus, in Cañada v. Suerte, this Court ordered the disbarment of a retired judge for misconduct committed during his incumbency as a judge.
However, pernicious as Justice Reyes’s infractions may have been, the committee finds the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment unwarranted. In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, the Court takes into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to the Court’s sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar. Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Under the circumstances of this case, the committee finds the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law sufficient and proper.
Liability of Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista
X x x.
