The recent constitutional-law case of WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, et. al. vs. CITY OF MANILA, et. al., En Banc, G.R. No. 122846, En Banc, G.R. No. 122846, January 30, 2009, was described by the Philippine Supreme Court as a “clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality”.
The Court declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Ordinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila, entitled, “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila”.
Let me discuss the decision for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog.
Legislating morality is a recurring penchant of any State in the world. The Philippines -- with its 400-year history in the Spanish convent, so to speak -- is not an exception.
In will be recalled that in City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308, the Court nullified a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area, based on “our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law.”
The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates for such abbreviated stays
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance, which is reproduced in full hereunder:
“SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.”
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. The RTC notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.
The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.
A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.
On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
First, the Court dispensed with the technical issue of the legal sanding of the petitioners (motels).
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). In this jurisdiction, the extancy of “a direct and personal interest” presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.
The general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.
Citing American cases, the Court recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests.
In the case at bar, the business interests of the petitioners were injured by the Ordinance. They relied on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which was threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.
In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. Based on the allegations in the instant petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth, for which reason the Court recognized that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame.
It will be noted that in the 1967 case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306, the Court sustained the constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house, which was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals.
In the 2005 case of City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308, the Court nullified a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area, based on “our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law.” The ordinance was “a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area”.
In the instant case, “there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted”. At its core, this is another case “about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens”.
What is the test of a valid ordinance? For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. (See: City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255, 268-267).
In the instant case, the Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely, “wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day”. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
The Court recognized that the apparent goal of the Ordinance is “to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike”, which, by themselves, are “unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State”. But the Court qualified that “the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement”. Those means must align with the Constitution.
The primary constitutional question that confronted the Court was one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
The judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a “discrete and insular” minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.”
Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny later adopted for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy. It has applied in substantive due process cases as well.
Under the rational basis test, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.
Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those “trivial” yet fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.
In the case at bar, the primary animus behind the ordinance is “the curtailment of sexual behavior”. The City asserts that the subject establishments “have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’”
Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well.
The Court held that “the concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect”.
It stated, further: “We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.”
The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business.
The Court made the following doctrinal pronouncement: “The interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.”
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The exercise of police power is “subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.”
The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court stated that the behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
The Court stressed that Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. “The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.” However well¬-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
