"x x x.
Section 10 of the Rules on Summary Procedure explicitly provides:
SEC.10. Rendition of judgment. – Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
Clearly, respondent Judge Del Rosario failed to decide the aforementioned case within the thirty-day period prescribed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Herein complainant Balajedeong, on behalf of her principal Colago, and the Spouses Odi, parties in Civil Case No. 357, allegedly filed their position papers in June 2003; thus, respondent Judge Del Rosario had thirty days thereafter to render a decision. But the decision was rendered only on 15 June 2006 or almost three years later. Respondent Judge Del Rosario’s act is contrary to the rationale behind the Rules on Summary Procedure which was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases."10 For this reason, respondent Judge Del Rosario should be administratively sanctioned. As held in Sanchez v. Vestil11 :
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitute gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them.
Indeed, we have consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.12
We cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards.13 Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.14
Respondent Judge Del Rosario ascribes the delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. 367 to his failing health, as he was hospitalized several times due to heart ailment. Even if he was stricken by an illness which hampered the due performance of his duties, still it was incumbent upon respondent Judge Del Rosario to inform this Court of his inability to seasonably decide the cases assigned to him. His illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the corresponding decision or resolution within the prescribed period. While we sympathize with his woes, the demands of public service cannot abide by his illness.15 In case of poor health, the Judge concerned needs only to ask this Court for an extension of time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes clear to him that there would be delay in his disposition of his cases.16 We note that respondent Judge Del Rosario made no such request. Also, if his health problems had indeed severely impaired his ability to decide cases, respondent Judge Del Rosario could have retired voluntarily instead of remaining at his post to the detriment of the litigants and the public.
Respondent Judge Del Rosario also presented as an excuse to the delay in deciding Civil Case No. 367 the additional work given to him when he was assigned as Presiding Judge of the 4th MCTC, Barbaza, Antique, where he reported twice a week to conduct trials and preliminary examinations. This will not exonerate him. His failure to decide the case on time cannot be ignored. As we ruled in Española v. Panay,17 if the case load of the judge prevents the disposition of cases within the reglementary periods, again, he should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid or dispel any suspicion that something sinister or corrupt is going on. The records of this administrative matter do not show that any attempt was made by respondent Judge Del Rosario to make such a request. Instead, he preferred to keep the case pending, enshrouding the same in his silence.
Respondent Judge Del Rosario should have known that if his caseload, additional assignments or designations, health reasons or other factors prevented the timely disposition of his pending cases, all he had to do was to simply ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of his cases. The Court, cognizant of the heavy case load of some judges and mindful of the difficulties encountered by them in the disposition thereof, is almost always disposed to grant such requests on meritorious grounds.18 But for all his excuses, respondent Judge Del Rosario failed to file any motion for extension despite the availability of this remedy.
It must be noted also that respondent Judge Del Rosario was already penalized for his first offense involving undue delay in A.M. No. MTJ-96-1091. He should have known better than to simply let the reglementary period pass by again in another case.
All told, we find respondent Judge Del Rosario guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. 367 which, under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, is classified as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceedingP20,000.00.
In the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City,19 the Court
observed the following factors in the determination of the proper penalty for failure to decide a case on time:
We have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within ninety (90) days as gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from service without pay for such. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances- the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, etc. x x x.
As may be gleaned from the case above-quoted, several factors shall be considered in imposing the proper penalty, such as: the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, etc.
In the present case, the delay for which respondent Judge Del Rosario is being found liable pertains to only one case, Civil Case No. 367. There are the mitigating circumstances of his admission of his fault to decide the case on time, and his failing health. While we recognize respondent Judge Del Rosario’s heavy case load and his poor health, such factors cannot exonerate him from his administrative liability. They can only serve to mitigate the imposable penalty.
As heretofore cited, records show that he was previously penalized in A.M. No. MTJ-96-1091,20 and was finedP8,000.00 with warning, for not deciding a criminal case despite the lapse of three years, despite his reason for the inaction being that he personally believed that he could not decide a case which was heard by another judge.
In A.M. No. MTJ-03-1515-MTJ,21 respondent Judge Del Rosario was found administratively liable for his unjustified failure to comment on an administrative complaint against him, and was fined P21,000.00. In A.M. No. MTJ-94-949,22 he was fined P5,000.00 with warning for Gross Misconduct and Negligence for his refusal to comply with the directives of the OCA and of the Commission on Audit.
In the present case, the fine of P30,000.00 recommended by the OCA is, to our mind, too severe. We find the amount of P20,000.00 reasonable under the premises.
As we have often stressed, the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. Thus, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid committing even the slightest infraction of the Rules.23
WHEREFORE, Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario is found guilty of undue delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 367 and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal records. The Court Administrator is directed to furnish all concerned copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED."
