Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Missing records

In the case of HEIRS OF SPOUSES JOSE and CONCEPCION OLORGA, et. al. vs. Judge ROLINDO D. BELDIA, JR., et. al., A.M. No. RTJ-08-2137, February 10, 2009, the respondent retired Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57, was found guilty of simple misconduct. He was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000), to be deducted from his retirement benefits. He was also severely reprimanded for his violation of Canons 1, 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let me digest the case.

In a verified complaint dated April 5, 2006, complainant Ilda Olorga-Cañal, by herself and as representative of the other heirs of spouses Jose and Concepcion Olorga, charged respondents Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. and Atty. Mary Emilie T. Villanueva, former presiding judge and branch clerk of court, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57, with infidelity in the custody of records in connection with Civil Case No. X-82 entitled “Concepcion Olorga, et al. v. Cesar Lopez” for specific performance and damages.

The investigating Court of Appeals justice appointed by the Supreme Court to investigate the complaint recommended to the Supreme Court that the complaint for infidelity in the custody of records be dismissed against both respondents because these records were not in their custody when they were lost. However, he recommended that respondent judge be held liable for his negligence in maintaining his court’s docket book and fined P5,000.

Citing the case of Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, RTC, Branch 24, Manila, A.M. No. 98-3-114-RTC, 22 July 1998, 292 SCRA 694, the Court held that cases which are raffled to a branch belong to that branch unless re-raffled or otherwise transferred to another branch in accordance with established procedure. Judges who are transferred do not take with them cases substantially heard by them and submitted to them for decision unless they are requested to do so by any of the parties and such request is endorsed by the incumbent presiding judge through the OCA:

Basically, a case once raffled to a branch belongs to that branch unless reraffled or otherwise transferred to another branch in accordance with established procedure. When the Presiding Judge of that branch to which a case has been raffled or assigned is transferred to another station, he leaves behind all the cases he tried with the branch to which they belong. He does not take these cases with him even if he tried them and the same were submitted to him for decision. The judge who takes over this branch inherits all these cases and assumes full responsibility for them. He may decide them as they are his cases, unless any of the parties moves that his case be decided by the judge who substantially heard the evidence and before whom the case was submitted for decision. If a party therefore so desires, he may simply address his request or motion to the incumbent Presiding Judge who shall then endorse the request to the [OCA] so that the latter may in turn endorse the matter to the judge who substantially heard the evidence and before whom the case was submitted for decision. This will avoid the "renvoir" of records and the possibility of an irritant between the judges concerned, as one may question the authority of the other to transfer the case to the former. If coursed through the [OCA], the judge who is asked to decide the case is not expected to complain, otherwise, he may be liable for insubordination and his judicial profile may be adversely affected. Upon direction of the Court Administrator, or any of his Deputy Court Administrators acting in his behalf, the judge before whom a particular case was earlier submitted for decision may be compelled to decide the case accordingly.

We take this opportunity to remind trial judges that once they act as presiding judges or otherwise designated as acting/assisting judges in branches other than their own, cases substantially heard by them and submitted to them for decision, unless they are promoted to higher positions in the judicial ladder, may be decided by them wherever they may be if so requested by any of the parties and endorsed by the incumbent Presiding Judges through the [OCA]. The following procedure may be followed: First, the Judge who takes over the branch must immediately make an inventory of the cases submitted for decision left behind by the previous judge (unless the latter has in the meantime been promoted to a higher court). Second, the succeeding judge must then inform the parties that the previous judge who heard the case, at least substantially, and before whom it was submitted for decision, may be required to decide the case. In this event, and upon request of any of the parties, the succeeding judge may request the Court Administrator to formally endorse the case for decision to the judge before whom it was previously submitted for decision. Third, after the judge who previously heard the case is through with his decision, he should send back the records together with his decision to the branch to which the case properly belongs, by registered mail or by personal delivery, whichever is more feasible, for recording and promulgation, with notice of such fact to the Court Administrator.

Since the primary responsibility over a case belongs to the presiding judge of the branch to which it has been raffled or assigned, he may also decide the case to the exclusion of any other judge provided that all the parties agree in writing that the incumbent presiding judge should decide the same, or unless the judge who substantially heard the case and before whom it was submitted for decision has in the meantime died, retired or for any reason has left the service, or has become disabled, disqualified, or otherwise incapacitated to decide the case.

The Presiding Judge who has been transferred to another station cannot, on his own, take with him to his new station any case submitted for decision without first securing formal authority from the Court Administrator. This is to minimize, if not totally avoid, a situation of "case-grabbing." In the same vein, when the Presiding Judge before whom a case was submitted for decision has already retired from the service, the judge assigned to the branch to take over the case submitted for decision must automatically assume the responsibility of deciding the case.


There was no showing that respondent judge was ever ordered by this Court, through the OCA, to decide Civil Case No. X-82. Although there was an allegation that the records of the case were delivered to respondent judge in Bacolod City, there was no proof whatsoever that he indeed instructed someone from Branch 57 to bring the records to him. Much less was there proof that the records were in fact brought to the respondent judge in Bacolod City so that he could decide the case.

Thus, the Court agreed that respondent judge could not be held liable for infidelity in the custody of public documents since there was no evidence that the records were lost while they were in his possession, that he took them with him to Bacolod City or that he destroyed or concealed them. There was only the self-serving affidavit of Juanito and Leticia de Guzman offered by complainants which was not corroborated by independent or more reliable evidence. This did not constitute substantial evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion that respondent judge was responsible for the loss of the case records. In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his or her complaint. Furthermore,

[any] administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent.


Be that as it may, while respondent judge should not be held liable for the loss of the records of Civil Case No. X-82, the Court that the former failed to demonstrate the requisite care and diligence necessary in the performance of his duty as presiding judge, specifically in ensuring that the entries in the court’s docket book were updated. Respondent judge himself admitted that the docket book was filled up “haphazardly.”

Indeed, while it is not the presiding judge who makes the entries in the docket book, still

… the trial judge is expected to adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to bolster the prompt and effective dispatch of business. Proper and efficient court management is the responsibility of the judge. It is incumbent upon judges to devise an efficient recording and filing system in their courts so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.

xxx xxx xxx

Further evidence of Judge Legaspi's inability to implement an efficient recording and filing system is her failure to maintain her courts civil and criminal docket books since 1983. While it may be so that her predecessors had similarly failed to maintain these books, Judge Legaspi has presided over her sala since 1991. Yet, the entries of her docket book are complete only "from 2000 up." In her defense, it appears that her clerks-in-charge have "confessed to the impossibility of completing the docket book and attending to their current work at the same time." Still, it is incumbent on all trial court judges to duly apprise this Court or the OCA of problems they encounter in the day-to-day administration of their court dockets and records, so they may receive appropriate guidance and assistance. After all, the responsibility for an efficient administration of justice lies not only with the trial court judges, but with the judicial system as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)


According to the Court, the respondent judge was therefore negligent in the discharge of his duties. He failed to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance required of his position. Considering his administrative authority over the court’s personnel, he should have directed them to be diligent in the performance of their functions. He neglected to properly supervise them, particularly those in charge of the docket books, resulting in incomplete entries therein. These violated Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:

Rule 3.08. – A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.

Rule 3.09. – A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.


This constituted simple misconduct, defined as a transgression of some established rule of action, an unlawful behavior or negligence committed by a public officer. It is a less serious offense punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.

Respondent judge’s compulsory retirement on October 31, 2006 did not render the present administrative case moot and academic. It did not free him from liability. Complainant filed this case on April 5, 2006, before respondent judge retired from office. As such, the Court retained the authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him. Cessation from office because of retirement does not per se justify the dismissal of an administrative complaint against a judge while still in the service. The P15,000 fine can and shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, this administrative case against respondent as a judge, based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.

Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):

Canon 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the people’s respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers. Respondent judge’s negligence also ran counter to Canon 12 of the CPR which provides:

Canon 12 — A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

For such violation of Canons 1, 11 and 12 of the CPR, the respondent was severely reprimanded.