The rule is long and well settled that, in illegal dismissal cases like the one at bench, the burden of proof is upon the employer to show that the employee’s termination from service is for a just and valid cause.[16] The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not the weakness of that adduced by the employee,[17] in keeping with the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in case of doubt in the evidence presented by them.[18] Often described as more than a mere scintilla,[19] the quantum of proof is substantial evidence which is understood as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.[20] Failure of the employer to discharge the foregoing onus would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.[21]
Denying the charge of illegal dismissal, FI insists that Granfil abandoned his employment after he was transferred from his assignment at the NBS Megamall Branch as a consequence of the latter’s request for his relief.[22] In the same manner that it cannot be said to have discharged the above-discussed burden by merely alleging that it did not dismiss the employee, it has been ruled that an employer cannot expediently escape liability for illegal dismissal by claiming that the former abandoned his work.[23] This applies to FI which adduced no evidence to prove Granfil’s supposed abandonment beyond submitting copies of NBS’ 31 July 2002 request for said employee’s transfer[24] and its 1 August 2002 written acquiescence thereto.[25] While these documents may have buttressed the claim that Granfil was indeed recalled from his assignment, however, we find that the CA correctly discounted their probative value insofar as FI’s theory of abandonment is concerned.
Being a matter of intention, moreover, abandonment cannot be inferred or presumed from equivocal acts.[26] As a just and valid ground for dismissal, it requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment,[27] without any intention of returning.[28] Two elements must concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.[29] The burden of proving abandonment is once again upon the employer[30] who, whether pleading the same as a ground for dismissing an employee or as a mere defense, additionally has the legal duty to observe due process.[31] Settled is the rule that mere absence or failure to report to work is not tantamount to abandonment of work.[32]
Viewed in the light of the foregoing principles, we find that the CA correctly ruled out FI’s position that Granfil had abandoned his employment. Aside from the fact that Bautista, Tenorio, Ballesteros and Dizon did not even execute sworn statements to refute the overt acts of dismissal imputed against them, the record is wholly bereft of any showing that FI required Granfil to report to its main office or, for that matter, to explain his supposed unauthorized absences. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.[33] Even then, FI’s theory of abandonment was likewise negated by Granfil’s filing the complaint for illegal dismissal[34] which evinced his desire to return to work. In vigorously pursuing his action against FI before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, Granfil clearly manifested that he has no intention of relinquishing his employment. In any case, the fact that Granfilprayed for his reinstatement speaks against any intent to sever the employer-employee relationship[35] with FI.
FI next faults the CA for not giving credence to the factual findings of Labor Arbiter Eduardo Carpio which was affirmed in the NLRC’s 20 April 2005 resolution.[36] As may be gleaned from the above disquisition, however, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC clearly erred in directing the dismissal of the complaint by unduly shifting the burden of proving the illegality of his dismissal to Granfil. While administrative findings of fact are, concededly, accorded great respect, and even finality when supported by substantial evidence, nevertheless, when it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, this court had not hesitated to reverse their factual findings.[37] Indeed, said rule does not apply when, as here, it is clear that a palpable mistake was committed by the quasi-judicial tribunal which needs rectification.[38]
