It was held that one of the requisites of a valid contract under Article 1318 of the Civil Code is the consent and the capacity to give consent of the parties to the contract. The legal capacity of the parties is an essential element for the existence of the contract because it is an indispensable condition for the existence of consent. There is no effective consent in law without the capacity to give such consent. In other words, legal consent presupposes capacity. Thus, there is said to be no consent, and consequently, no contract when the agreement is entered into by one in behalf of another who has never given him authorization therefor unless he has by law a right to represent the latter.

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/150179.htm


"x x x.

Anent the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, we find that the same is void ab initio and not merely unenforceable.  InDelos Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[34] which is a case involving the sale of a lot by a person who is neither the owner nor the legal representative, we declared the contract void ab initio.  It was held that one of the requisites of a valid contract under Article 1318 of the Civil Code is the consent and the capacity to give consent of the parties to the contract. The legal capacity of the parties is an essential element for the existence of the contract because it is an indispensable condition for the existence of consent. There is no effective consent in law without the capacity to give such consent. In other words, legal consent presupposes capacity. Thus, there is said to be no consent, and consequently, no contract when the agreement is entered into by one in behalf of another who has never given him authorization therefor unless he has by law a right to represent the latter.[35]

In the case at bar, at the time Felisa executed the deed of extra-judicial partition dividing the share of her deceased sister Honarata between her and the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, she was no longer the owner of the 1/2 undivided portion of Lot No. 653, having previously donated the same to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla who accepted the donation in the same deed.  A donation inter vivos, as in the instant case, is immediately operative and final.[36]  As a mode of acquiring ownership, it results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.

Evidently, Felisa did not possess the capacity to give consent to or execute the deed of partition inasmuch as she was neither the owner nor the authorized representative of respondent Leopoldo to whom she previously transmitted ownership of her undivided share in Lot No. 653.  Considering that she had no legal capacity to give consent to the deed of partition, it follows that there is no consent given to the execution of the deed, and therefore, there is no contract to speak of.  As such, the deed of partition is void ab initio, hence, not susceptible of ratification.

Nevertheless, the nullity of the deed of extra-judicial partition will not affect the validity of the donation inter vivos ceding to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa Almirol in Lot No. 653.  Said lot should therefore be divided as follows: 1/2 shall go to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla by virtue of the deed of donation, while the other half shall be divided equally among the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla including Leopoldo Sevilla, following the rules on intestate succession.

x x x."