SPS. ESMERALDO D. VALLIDO AND ARSENIA M.
VALLIDO, REP. BY ATTY. SERGIO C. SUMAYOD VS. SPS. ELMER PONO AND JULIET PONO,
AND PURIFICACION CERNA-PONO AND SPS. MARIANITO PONO AND ESPERANZA MERO-PONO, G.R. No. 200173, April 15, 2013
(THE LAWYER’S POST).
“x x x.
The core issue in
this case is whether the petitioners are buyers and registrants in good faith.
It is undisputed
that there is a double sale and that the respondents are the first buyers while
the petitioners are the second buyers. The burden of proving good faith lies
with the second buyer (petitioners herein) which is not discharged by simply
invoking the ordinary presumption of good faith.2
After an assiduous
assessment of the evidentiary records, this Court holds that the petitioners
are NOT buyers in good faith as they failed to discharge their burden of proof.
Notably, it is
admitted that Martino is the grandfather of Esmeraldo. As an heir, petitioner
Esmeraldo cannot be considered as a third party to the prior transaction
between Martino and Purificacion. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals,3 it was
written:
The purpose of the registration is to give notice to third persons. And, privies
are not third persons. The vendor’s heirs are his privies. Against them,
failure to register will not vitiate or annul the vendee’s right of ownership
conferred by such unregistered deed of sale.
The non-registration of the deed of sale between Martino and Purificacion
is immaterial as it is binding on the petitioners who are privies.4 Based on
the privity between petitioner Esmeraldo and Martino, the petitioner as a
second buyer is charged with constructive knowledge of prior dispositions or
encumbrances affecting the subject property. The second buyer who has actual or
constructive knowledge of the prior sale cannot be a registrant in good faith.5
Moreover,
although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered
land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled
rule that where there are circumstances which would put a party on guard and
prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as
the presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is expected from the
purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature
of possession of the occupants. As in the common practice in the real estate
industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard that
a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out that the
land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who,
as in this case, is not in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon
the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant’s possessory rights.
The failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence
on his part and would preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a
“purchaser in good faith.”6 It has been held that “the registration
of a later sale must be done in good faith to entitle the registrant to
priority in ownership over the vendee in an earlier sale.”7
There are several
indicia that should have placed the petitioners on guard and prompted them to
investigate or inspect the property being sold to them. First, Martino,
as seller, did not have possession of the subject property. Second,
during the sale on July 4, 1990, Martino did not have the owner’s duplicate
copy of the title. Third, there were existing permanent
improvements on the land. Fourth, the respondents were in
actual possession of the land. These circumstances are too glaring to be
overlooked and should have prompted the petitioners, as prospective buyers,
to investigate or inspect the land. Where the vendor is not in
possession of the property, the prospective vendees are obligated to
investigate the rights of one in possession.8
X x x.
As the
petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith, they cannot lean on the
indefeasibility of their TCT in view of the doctrine that the defense of
indefeasibility of a torrens title does not extend to transferees who take the
certificate of title in bad faith.11 The Court cannot ascribe good faith to
those who have not shown any diligence in protecting their rights.12
Lastly, it is
uncontroverted that the respondents were occupying the land since January 4,
1960 based on the deed of sale between Martino and Purificacion. They have also
made improvements on the land by erecting a house of mixed permanent materials
thereon, which was also admitted by the petitioners.13 The respondents, without a doubt, are possessors in good
faith. Ownership should therefore vest in the respondents because they were
first in possession of the property in good faith.14
X x x.”
