See - G.R. No. 173797
"x x x.
The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem from the effects of the Decision of this Court in People v. Mateo.[16] In Mateo, as quoted by plaintiff-appellee, it was stated that [w]hile the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review.[17] A closer study of Mateo, however, reveals that the inclusion in the foregoing statement of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment was only for the purpose of including these cases within the ambit of the intermediate review of the Court of Appeals: [this] Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases [cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death] review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.[18]
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory review of this Court. In Mateo, these cases were grouped together with death penalty cases because, prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction to directly review reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases alike. The mode of review, however, was different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases were brought before this Court via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed by this Court on automatic review. Thus, the erstwhile Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, provided as follows:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court.The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this Rule.
x x x x
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15) day following the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 June 2004, this Court promptly caused the amendment of the foregoing provisions, but retained the distinction of requiring a notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases and automatically reviewing death penalty cases. Thus, Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (which took effect on 15 October 2004), now provides:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals automatically review the Judgment provided in section 10 of this Rule.
x x x x
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The constitutional provision quoted in Mateo merely gives this Court jurisdiction over such cases:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
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(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.[19]
For a clear understanding of this provision, the full text thereof provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
In this provision, only paragraphs (1) and (2) speak of jurisdiction over cases. However, this Constitutional provision does not enumerate cases involving mandatory review. Indeed, it would almost be silly to claim that this Court is mandatorily required to review all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. Instead, the significance of the enumeration of this Courts jurisdiction in paragraphs (1) and (2) is that while Section 2 of the same Article VIII of the Constitution gives to Congress the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts, it denies to Congress the power to deprive this Court of jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5.[20]
Since the case of accused-appellants is not subject to the mandatory review of this Court, the rule that neither the accused nor the courts can waive a mandatory review is not applicable. Consequently, accused-appellants separate motions to withdraw appeal may be validly granted.
The granting of a Motion to Withdraw Appeal, however, is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.After a case has been submitted to the court for decision, the appellant cannot, at his election, withdraw the appeal.[21] In People v. Casido,[22] we denied the accused-appelants Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal therein:
It is then clear that the conditional pardons separately extended to the accused-appellants were issued during the pendency of their instant appeal.
In the resolution of 31 January 1995 in People vs. Hinlo, this Court categorically declared the practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals to be in clear violation of law.
Earlier, in our resolution of 21 March 1991 in People vs. Sepada, this Court signified in no uncertain terms the necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended.
Having observed that the pronouncements in the aforementioned cases remained unheeded, either through deliberate disregard or erroneous applications of the obiter dictum in Monsanto vs. Factoran or the ruling in People vs. Crisola, this Court, in its resolution of 4 December 1995 in People vs. Salle, explicitly declared:
We now declare that the conviction by final judgment limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
x x x x
This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency of the grantees appeal. (Italics supplied)
It follows then that the conditional pardons granted in this case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal.
In the case at bar, however, we see no reason to deny accused-appellants Motions to Withdraw Appeal. There is no showing that accused-appellants had already applied for parole at the time of the filing of their Motions to Withdraw Appeal. On the contrary, they stated in their motions that they merely intend to apply for the same.
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