Thursday, April 29, 2021

Dying declaration vs. Res gestae - "The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be deemed a dying declaration since they do not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, the same are nonetheless part of the res gestae."


See -  https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/dec2002/gr_147649_2002.html


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS, MARLITO LOBRIGAS (At Large) and TEODORICO MANTE (acquitted), accused. FRANK LOBRIGAS, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 147649, December 17, 2002.


“X x x.

The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be deemed a dying declaration since they do not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, the same are nonetheless part of the res gestae. However, only the declaration made to Castor Guden are admissible in evidence as such.

A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.6 All these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal act, the mauling of the victim, was a startling occurrence. The declarations were made shortly after the mauling incident while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating accused-appellant. The declaration concerns the circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran. However, the declaration made by the victim to his daughter does not satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because they were made a day after the incident and the exciting influence of the startling occurrence was no longer present. Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solarte’s testimony on what her father told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered.

X x x.”