See - G.R. No. 158385 (lawphil.net)
MODESTO PALALI, Petitioner, vs. JULIET
AWISAN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact GREGORIO AWISAN, Respondent. G.R.
No. 158385, February 12, 2010.
“x x x.
As found by the trial court, petitioner
was able to prove his and his predecessors’ actual, open, continuous and
physical possession of the subject property dating at least to the pre-war era
(aside from petitioner’s tax declaration over the subject property).
Petitioner’s witnesses were long time residents of Sitio Camambaey. They lived
on the land, knew their neighbors and were familiar with the terrain. They were
witnesses to the introduction of improvements made by petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest.
From their consistent, unwavering, and
candid testimonies, we find that petitioner’s grandfather Mocnangan occupied
the land during the pre-war era. He planted camote on the property because this
was the staple food at that time. He then gave the subject property to his
daughter Tammam, while he gave a separate one to his son Pacolan Mocnangan. In
the 1960s, Tammam and her husband Palalag cultivated the land, built a cogon
home, and started a family there. Palalag introduced terraces and, together
with his sons, built earth fences around the property. Palalag’s family
initially planted bananas, coffee, and oranges; they later added avocadoes,
persimmons, and pineapples. When Tammam and Palalag died, their son, petitioner
herein, buried them in the subject property and continued cultivating the land.
He also constructed a new home.
On the other hand, respondent relied merely
on her tax declaration, but failed to prove actual possession insofar as the
subject property is concerned. To be sure, respondent attempted to prove
possession of the subject property. Her predecessor-in-interest, Cadwising, had
allegedly introduced improvements like a piggery, poultry, terracing,
plantings, and a barbed wire fence. However, not one of these alleged
improvements was found during the ocular inspection conducted by the trial
court. The absence of all his alleged improvements on the property is
suspicious in light of his assertion that he has a caretaker living near the
subject property for 20 years. Cadwising did not even bother to explain the
absence of the improvements. The trial court’s rejection of Cadwising’s
assertions regarding the introduction of improvements is therefore not
baseless.1avvphi1
Thus, respondent having failed to prove
possession, her claim rests solely on her tax declaration. But tax
declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real
property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.37
Respondent’s tax declaration, therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust
petitioner who has been in possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the
subject property since before the war.
Neither can respondent rely on the
public instruments dealing with the 6.6698-hectare property covered by her tax
declaration. Such public documents merely show the successive transfers of the
property covered by said documents. They do not conclusively prove that the
transferor actually owns the property purportedly being transferred, especially
as far as third parties are concerned. For it may very well be that the
transferor does not actually own the property he has transferred, in which case
he transfers no better right to his transferee. No one can give what he does
not have – nemo dat quod non habet.38 Thus, since respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest Cadwising appeared not to have any right to the subject
property, he transferred no better right to his transferees, including
respondent.
All told, we hold that as between the
petitioner and the respondent, it is the petitioner who has the better claim or
title to the subject property. While the respondent merely relied on her tax
declaration, petitioner was able to prove actual possession of the subject
property coupled with his tax declaration. We have ruled in several cases that
possession, when coupled with a tax declaration, is a weighty evidence of
ownership.39 It certainly is more weighty and preponderant than a tax
declaration alone.
The preponderance of evidence is
therefore clearly in favor of petitioner, particularly considering that, as the
actual possessor under claim of ownership, he enjoys the presumption of
ownership.40 Moreover, settled is the principle that a party seeking to recover
real property must rely on the strength of her case rather than on the weakness
of the defense.41 The burden of proof rests on the party who asserts the
affirmative of an issue. For he who relies upon the existence of a fact should
be called upon to prove that fact. Having failed to discharge her burden to
prove her affirmative allegations, we find that the trial court rightfully
dismissed respondent’s complaint.
X x x.”
