THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL,
petitioner, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY
COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents. G.R. No. 154599, January 21, 2004.
“Third, even granting arguendo that the
present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is
here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason
or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner
or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.
We have held that this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain
cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma:16
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however,
to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor0 will
be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant
of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,17 the
propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our
judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a
halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of
this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended
or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is
not a trier of facts.
Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy
that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.18
Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v.
Aguirre19 is misplaced because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts
rule was not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the
petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the President of
the Philippines, which would have greatly affected all local government units.
We reiterated therein that when an act of the legislative department is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy
becomes the duty of this Court. The same is true when what is seriously alleged
to be unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is coequal with Congress.”
