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Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court regarding several judgments provides as follows:
“SECTION 4. Several judgments. – In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.”
Section 5 of Rule 36, on the other hand, is the provision governing separate judgments.
“SECTION 5. Separate judgments. – When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims….”
A comparison of Section 4 on several judgments with Section 5 on separate judgments shows that in a several judgment there is a plurality of defendants while in a separate judgment there is a plurality of claims or causes of actions.
Would a several judgment be proper if the complaint asserts a common cause of action against the defendants? Logically, the answer should be in the affirmative because if separate causes of action would be required, there would be no practical distinction between a several judgment and a separate one. Moreover, there is nothing in the text of Section 4 that the complaint should not assert a common cause of action.
In Municipality of Orion v. Concha, 50 Phil. 679, 682 (1927), the Court held that a several judgment may be rendered against defendants who are jointly and severally liable. Joint and several liability among the defendants means that a common cause of action was pleaded against them.
Section 4 of Rule 36 was copied almost verbatim from Section 579 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.[1] Decisions of the California courts thus have strong persuasive value. The Supreme Court of California has held that a several judgment may be rendered against one of two joint tort-feasors[2] while allowing the action to proceed against the other (Cole v. Roebling Construction Co., 156 Cal. 443 [105 P. 255]).
However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado wrote that a several judgment is not proper if there is a common cause of action against the defendants and hence a several judgment is not proper in an action against solidary debtors. (FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 375 [7th rev. ed.]). The comment of Justice Regalado was cited by the Supreme Court in De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 216 (2002), where the Court held that a several judgment is not proper where a common cause of action exists against the defendants, as in actions against solidary debtors. A perusal of De Leon, however, shows that this holding of the court was merely an obiter dictum.
In De Leon, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for a sum of money against the spouses Avelino and Estelita. The complaint averred that Estelita had executed a promissory note in favor of the petitioner for a ₱500,000 loan. The spouses filed an answer. Estelita admitted the loan obligation, but Avelino denied liability on the ground that his wife was not the designated administrator and thus had no authority to bind the conjugal partnership and on the ground that his wife contracted the debt without his knowledge and consent.
The petitioner moved for a “partial” judgment on the pleadings against Estelita which was granted. Accordingly, a partial judgment on the pleadings was rendered against Estelita in 1996. Estelita did not appeal from this judgment. The case then proceeded against Avelino who was also adjudged liable in a judgment rendered in 1997. Avelino and Estelita appealed the 1997 judgment.
The issue was whether Estelita’s failure to appeal from the 1996 judgment made it final and executory. The Court first stated that the 1996 judgment against Estelita was not a several judgment because the complaint asserted a common cause of action against the defendants spouses. The court instead termed the judgment as a “partial” judgment. It held that a partial judgment was not a final judgment that was appealable; hence, the fact that Estelita did not appeal therefrom did not make it final and executory. The 1997 judgment was the one which may properly be appealed.
Regardless of whether the Court described the judgment as “partial” or “several,” the fact of the matter is that the action filed by the petitioner was against two defendants and that a judgment was rendered against one of them (Estelita), leaving the action to proceed against the other (Avelino).[3] The semantic ambiguity should not detract from the undeniable fact that the judgment was a several one. If a several judgment involving a common cause of action were not proper, the court should have struck down the 1996 judgment instead of renaming it and tacitly upholding its propriety. That it did not do so meant that the several judgment was validly rendered.
In fine, De Leon impliedly recognizes that a several judgment may be properly rendered even if the complaint asserts a common cause of action against the defendants. It should be stressed that the issue in De Leon was the appealability of the 1996 judgment and not its propriety; the propriety of the judgment was unquestioned. Thus, the Court’s statement that a several judgment is not proper where a common cause of action exists against the defendants was merely obiter.
My view therefore is that a several judgment does not require a plurality of causes of action. In fact, a reading of Section 4 of Rule 36 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 36 shows that a several judgment by its nature has only one cause of action asserted against the several defendants. Otherwise, the judgment would be a separate judgment.
Furthermore, Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court was copied virtually verbatim from Section 579 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. It must therefore be understood as promulgated in our jurisdiction with the construction placed upon it by the Courts of the State of California (see Pando v. Kette, 54 Phil. 683).
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[1] § 579. In an action against several defendants, the Court may, in its discretion, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others, whenever a several judgment is proper.
[2] Joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable.
[3] In American procedural law, a partial judgment is another term for a separate judgment (see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54[b]). Another judgment which may be termed “partial” is one rendered after a partial new trial or reconsideration under Section 8, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
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Source -
https://legisperit.com/2022/11/07/is-a-several-judgment-proper-if-there-is-a-common-cause-of-action-against-the-defendants/
