The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act (Republic Act No. 6981) embodies the State’s commitment to safeguard vital witnesses in the pursuit of justice. Section 14 of the law, titled “Compelled Testimony,” is straightforward: a witness admitted into the program cannot invoke the right against self-incrimination to refuse testimony, but in exchange, is granted immunity from criminal prosecution for matters related to such compelled testimony. Notably, the law is silent on the issue of forfeiture of property or documents that may arise in connection with the testimony.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), however, go further. Section 14 of the IRR explicitly grants witnesses not only immunity from prosecution but also exemption from forfeiture. This is a significant departure from the statute, and its legality must be questioned.
The Doctrine from PNB v. Court of Appeals
In Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 120075, 20 June 1997), the Supreme Court reiterated a settled rule: administrative agencies may not enlarge, restrict, or otherwise modify the substantive rights created by legislation. Their rule-making authority is confined to carrying into effect what the law has laid down. Implementing rules may fill in the procedural details, but they cannot create new rights or immunities not contemplated by Congress.
This principle is not novel. Earlier cases, such as People v. Maceren (G.R. No. L-32166, 18 September 1974), already held that administrative issuances cannot amend the law they purport to implement. The non-delegation doctrine and the principle of separation of powers dictate that only Congress may legislate substantive rights; the Executive’s function is merely to execute.
The Overreach of the IRR
Against this backdrop, the IRR’s grant of “exemption from forfeiture” stands on shaky ground. By introducing a new form of immunity, the IRR effectively alters the balance struck by Congress. Immunity from criminal prosecution is what the statute provides; immunity from forfeiture is what the IRR adds. This is not mere implementation—it is legislation by executive fiat.
Such overreach poses at least three dangers.
First, it threatens the principle of legality. Laws must be clear, and rights must come from Congress. Allowing administrative issuances to extend rights beyond the statute creates uncertainty and undermines the supremacy of the legislative will.
Second, it risks conflict with existing forfeiture laws. Forfeiture is not merely punitive; it is remedial, designed to strip criminals of the fruits of unlawful acts. By immunizing witnesses from forfeiture, the IRR could inadvertently shield illicit property, undermining broader statutory frameworks such as the Anti-Money Laundering Act and the Civil Code.
Third, it encroaches upon legislative prerogative. The Constitution vests in Congress the exclusive power to define the scope of rights and liabilities. When an IRR assumes this power, it trespasses into legislative territory and disturbs the separation of powers.
The Proper Remedy
The protection of witnesses is a compelling state interest. If exemption from forfeiture is truly necessary to encourage witness cooperation, then Congress must amend RA 6981 to say so explicitly. The Department of Justice cannot cure legislative silence through administrative regulation. To allow otherwise is to sanction executive legislation, a practice consistently struck down by the Court.
Conclusion
The IRR of RA 6981, in extending protection to cover exemption from forfeiture, goes beyond its implementing function and veers into unauthorized lawmaking. Applying the doctrine in PNB v. Court of Appeals, reinforced by People v. Maceren and the non-delegation principle, this provision is susceptible to being declared ultra vires.
If the State wishes to broaden witness protection to include exemption from forfeiture, the proper path lies not in administrative fiat but in legislative amendment. Until then, the IRR’s overreach must be viewed with skepticism, for in the delicate balance of powers, the rule of law demands fidelity to statutory text and constitutional design.
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Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, September 24, 2025.
