In 2003, the Supreme Court of the Philippines, with the financial assistance of the United Nations Development Programme, released “The Final Report of the National Survey of Inmates & Institutional Assessment”, the salient findings of which, for legal research purposes, are digested below, as follows:
The survey of inmates is a national study covering representative samples from persons in confinement in national penitentiaries and in provincial, district, city and municipal jails. The survey determines the level of general knowledge of and understanding by inmates of their rights, legal protection and remedies, and the status of their cases. The survey also ascertains the attitudes and perception of inmates towards the justice system and adequacy of information on the operation of the justice system, rights and entitlements, legal remedies, and complaint/redress mechanisms.
The institutional assessment component of the project focuses on the review of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) and Parole and Probation Administration (PPA) which are among the key agencies of the national government involved in the administration and operation of the Philippine Corrections System.
The BJMP, which is under the DILG, directs, supervises and controls district, city and municipal jails nationwide. It is responsible for the safe custody and rehabilitation of inmates who are convicted with short-term prison sentence (i.e., 3 years or less) and those who are awaiting trial or final judgment by the court.
The PPA administers the parole and probation system of the country. It conducts
investigation of inmates applying for parole, probation and executive clemency, and supervises and monitors those who have already been released from incarceration through the different early release schemes.
The demographic data of the inmates from National Capital Region (NCR) are: Mean age is 30; median age is 29; Single; High school – undergraduate; Roman Catholic; Speaks Tagalog at home; Born in the same place where detained or in other Luzon provinces; Employed before detention; Mean duration from the date of arrest until
last hearing of case is 1.1 years.
On knowledge of any agency that helps the poor when they have cases in court and when they cannot afford to pay lawyers for the purpose, the survey indicates that only one out of five inmates in city jails within NCR and the national prisons know that such mechanism exists. Inmates in jails outside NCR likewise know that there are agencies that provide legal assistance. However, those that are in other jails are not aware of any agency which can provide them legal assistance. Only one-fourth of the total number of inmates surveyed knows of any office where one could lodge his complaints against delays in the prosecution of cases in court.
Generally, inmates are aware of certain legal remedies and options that are available to them such as the right to bail, serving of search warrant, right to legal counsel, and presence of laws and rules on the protection of juvenile offenders and women. However, about 53% male and 60% female inmates in the national prisons do not know their right against involuntary admission. A big percentage of inmates indicate that they are not aware of the appropriate procedures to follow upon detention.
According to the survey, the major barriers to equitable access to justice by inmates are: Scarcity of legal services/assistance for prisoners and detainees who lack sufficient income; Complexity of the judicial system, delay in legal proceedings and poor quality of information about legal processes; Lack of knowledge and understanding by inmates of the justice system, which includes widespread distrust and low levels of confidence of the justice system.
There are 1,344 provincial, city, district and municipal prisons and jails situated all over the country.
The agencies involved in the confinement/safekeeping and correction of offenders are the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) for national penitentiaries; Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) for city, municipal and district jails; Philippine National Police (PNP) which directly runs about 61% of the total jail facilities within the jurisdiction of the BJMP; the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) which maintains regional rehabilitation centers for juvenile delinquents; and the Provincial Governments which exercise supervision and control over provincial and sub-provincial jails for offenders convicted with a prison sentence of six months and one day to three years and detainees whose cases are being tried by regional trial courts.
The process of restoration is a component of the Philippine correction and rehabilitation system. It involves the mainstreaming/re-integration of rehabilitated or qualified offenders in the society as productive and law abiding citizens. The Parole and Probation Administration (PPA) is a focal agency in the restoration process as it is primarily tasked to administer the parole and probation system of the country.
The Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) is, on the other hand, authorized by law to grant parole to qualified prisoners, and recommends to the President of the Philippines the grant of executive clemency in the form of reprieve, commutation of sentence, conditional pardon and absolute pardon
The survey identified the following issues on the correction system, focusing on the interventions of the BJMP and PPA: Diffusion of jail management and supervision functions creates inefficiencies in the administration of the corrections system; BJMP’s direction towards centralization and nationalization of all local jails is not consistent with the government policy of deepening devolution, enhancing capacity of the LGUs, and people empowerment; Sharing of responsibilities between BJMP and PNP dilutes accountability and undermines the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs because shared accountability is zero accountability. The BJMP and PNP have no principal-agent relationship; Imbalance or disparity in the custodial force and jail population poses threats to
the security of jails and the community at large; Jail congestion is central to jail operation and management problems as it leads to other problems, including human rights abuses.
The survey identifies the policy implications on the issues on access to justice of inmates are as follows: Need to address judicial process delays and the lack of information on the government’s legal aid program, remedies, rights and entitlements, and legal aid procedures; Need to reaffirm inmates’ rights to information; Need for a comprehensive program to reorient/re-tool and sensitize law enforcers, jail guards, and public lawyers on access justice issues and the basic rights/entitlements of prisoners and detainees; Need to rebuild inmates’ trust and confidence on the justice system.
The development and implementation of an integrated system of correction and rehabilitation involves the following: Establishment and implementation of a strong oversight mechanism to be responsible for the formulation of overall policy framework on correction and rehabilitation of inmates, as well as strict enforcement of national and international standards on prison and jail management and human rights of inmates; Development of a unified and coherent set of policies, standards, rules and procedures on prison and jail management and parole, probation and pardons administration; Highly decentralized operations on correction and rehabilitation with direct delivery of services lodged primarily with LGUs; Strong public-private sector partnership and community involvement in correction and rehabilitation activities.
“Access to justice” refers to the ability of persons from disadvantaged groups to seek and obtain a legal remedy in conformity with relevant international human rights standards. Equal access means that such ability is not limited or constrained by gender, ethnic, political sympathy, religious preference, socio-economic class, age, legal freedom restriction, or physical incapacity. In the Philippines, disadvantaged groups include women, minors, persons with physical/mental impairment, indigenous groups, urban poor, rural poor, prisoners and detainees and minorities. Legal remedies include quasi-judicial and judicial services available to citizens, through public and private justice institutions, to resolve social conflicts.
Poverty, social exclusions and marginalization as the root causes of the country’s peace and order problems. Lawlessness, internal and social conflicts, and criminality impede investments, wealth creation, and productivity, thereby adversely affecting the country’s economic development and growth.
A major strategy to enhance peace and order is to reform the five pillars of the criminal justice system, i.e., courts, prosecution, law enforcement, corrections and the community, while reorienting state and non-state actors on their obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights. There is a need for better coordination and convergence of the five pillars of the criminal justice system. This requires comprehensive, all encompassing and well coordinated reform program that attends to the different components of the system which are handled by various organizational actors.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines, together with other key stakeholders, is
currently implementing the Action Program on Judicial Reform (APJR), 2001-2006, comprising of wide-ranging and comprehensive reform strategies intended to enhance judicial systems and procedures, structure, technology, financial management and fiscal autonomy for the Judiciary. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is pursuing complementary reforms in the “other pillars of justice” under its
jurisdiction. This will involve the strengthening of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), National Prosecution Service (NPS), Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), and the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor), Board of Pardons and Parole, and the Parole & Probation Administration (PPA).
The following concepts may serve as guides:
• EXPRESS LINKAGE TO RIGHTS – The rights-based approach creates normative links to human rights which are universal, indivisible, interdependent
and interrelated. It integrates the norms, standards and principles of the international human rights system into the plans, policies and processes of development. The norms and standards are those contained in the UN Charter,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights conventions/treaties and instruments, subscribed to by the Philippines and embodied in the Constitution and several legislations. The principles include equality and equity, accountability, empowerment and participation.
• ACCOUNTABILITY – Human rights are legally enforceable entitlements of claimholders which must be respected, protected and fulfilled by duty-holders. The rights-based approach intends to raise levels of accountability in the development process by identifying claim-holders (and their entitlements) and corresponding duty-holders (and their obligations). Duty-holders include the full range of relevant actors: individuals, States, local organizations and authorities, private companies, aid donors and international institutions. The rights based approach calls for the development of adequate laws, policies, institutions, administrative procedures and practices, and mechanisms of redress and accountability that can deliver on entitlements, respond to denial and violations, and ensure accountability. They call for the translation of universal standards into
locally determined benchmarks for measuring progress and enhancing accountability. States must have both the political will and the means to ensure the realization of human rights, and they must put in place the necessary legislative, administrative, and institutional mechanisms required to achieve that aim. States are required to take immediate steps for the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, States are bound to respect civil and political rights, to ensure respect for them and to take the necessary steps to put them into effect. The international community is also duty bound to provide effective international cooperation in response to shortages of resources and capacities in developing countries.
• EMPOWERMENT – People as claim-holders are beneficiaries, directors and center of development. The primary objective of the rights-based approach is to give people the power, capacities, capabilities and access needed to change their own lives, improve their own communities and influence their own destinies.
• PARTICIPATION AND ACCESS – The rights-based approach advocates for
active, free and meaningful participation from communities, civil society, minorities, indigenous peoples, women and others. It gives emphasis on accessibility issues, including access to development process, institutions, information and redress or complaints mechanisms.
• NON-DISCRIMINATION AND ATTENTION TO VULNERABLE GROUPS – Nondiscrimination means that that all persons are able to enjoy human rights on an equal basis, and in their totality. It entails fairness, justice and impartiality in the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms. The rights-based approach is
giving particular attention to such issues, particularly in relation to vulnerable groups, such as women, minorities, indigenous peoples and prisoners whose rights often discriminated and threatened. There is a need identify who are most vulnerable in locality, what are their characteristics, and what issues threaten their rights and entitlements, and safeguards that needs to be incorporated in development instruments. Development data need to be disaggregated, as far as
possible, by race, religion, ethnicity, language, sex and other categories of human rights concern.
Access to justice may be effectively achieved through a system of justice that is independent, accessible, efficient, impartial and worthy of public of public trust:
• INDEPENDENCE. Institutional and individual independence of correctional agencies is key in the establishment of truth and dispensation of justice.
• ACCESS. Access means geographical access, affordability of legal services by
the poor, impartial investigation and law enforcement particularly in cases between the poor and the rich or between the politically powerful and one who is not, more speedy provision of services through more efficient and speedy investigation processes, and adequate and preserved evidence.
• SPEED, QUALITY AND IMPARTIALITY. The resolution of a case, which will be
dependent on the establishment of the truth, should be such that the person seeking redress does not incur undue moral and economic loss due to the delay of the litigation process or the quality of the investigation, prosecution and legal services.
• INTEGRITY. Integrity at institutional and individual levels is important in enforcing the law and in establishing facts for appropriate prosecution and resolution of cases. Integrity means being loyal to the rules and procedures that govern the processing of a case and having capacity against undue political influence.
Organization principles define certain universal truths about the functioning of a wellperforming organization. These principles are applied in the conduct of the institutional capacity assessment. They include the following:
• DOING MORE AND BETTER WITH LESS. Within the context of severe resource constraints, effective organizations are able to leverage their limited resources to high impact activities.
• DECENTRALIZATION AND BETTER OVERALL CONTROL OF OPERATIONS. Decentralization improves the efficiency and responsiveness of agencies by bringing down decision-making authority, responsibility, resources and accountability to the field, enabling quick and relevant response to client needs.
• SEAMLESS EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FUNCTIONAL AND PROCESS SYNCHRONIZATION. Functions and operating systems among the five pillars are inextricably related and connected with one another. Trial of cases cannot start if the prosecution is not prepared. Law enforcement agencies cannot provide adequate crime information without data inputs from the courts and the other pillars of justice. The extent and quality of inter- and intra-system integration influences the quality of justice that can be delivered to the litigants.
• INFORMATION-BASED DECISION-MAKING. The role of information and communication systems and technologies in decision making for each of the identified pillars is critical. Also, the capacity to seamlessly integrate operations within and among agencies cannot be made possible without information technology.
• ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC EDUCATION. Accountability is to be answerable for acts or decisions and the consequences thereof. Public accountability cannot happen if the public is not educated on the operations of agencies for which they will be held accountable, if the operating systems of agencies are not capable of clearly pinpointing answerability, if there is no verifiability of information, and if information is not structured to allow for assessment.
• CONTINUING LEARNING AND IMPROVEMENT CAPACITY. Capacity for continuing learning and improvement is the ability to continuously explore new perspectives and operational technologies and methodologies, and to discover new knowledge that will improve institutional and individual capacity to perform agency functions. Capacities for continuing learning and improvement are indicated in the presence of research, planning, and training activities, among others.
Criminal procedures in the Philippines are contained in established rules and regulations governing the operations of the Five Pillars of Justice. The processes involved in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases comprise the following:
• Police Investigation
• Preliminary Investigation
• Issuance of the Prosecutor’s Resolution
• Filing of the Information in Court
• Arrest of the Accused and Posting of Bail
• Arraignment [Plea of Guilty or Not Guilty to the Offense Charged]
• Pre-Trial
• Trial
• Sentencing or Judgment
Correction and rehabilitation. Correction and rehabilitation is the basic reason why offenders are kept in prisons and jails. These involve the implementation of programs or introduction of interventions for offenders in order to better prepare them to become productive members of society upon their release from prisons/jails. Specifically, correction and rehabilitation for inmates include the following:
• Provision of opportunities to develop proper work skills and acquire education and training, which will translate into economic self-sufficiency upon release thereby reducing recidivism;
• Engagement of inmates in meaningful work assignments, particularly in penal farms and other productive labor, thereby helping to defray the tax burden of their incarceration; and
• Provision of counseling, life skills training, and spiritual guidance services to give inmates opportunities to take new directions in their lives.
Restoration. This involves the process of reformation and reintegration of offenders in the society. An inmate may be released upon his acquittal or grant of bail through court decision or upon the expiration of his sentence. The government has also instituted several measures providing for “early release” of offenders, such as (1) release on recognizance; (2) full time credit, particularly of preventive detention; (3) probation; (5) parole (6) pardon and executive clemency. These interventions are also being considered by the government as effective jail decongestion measures.
The Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) is an integral bureau of the DOJ mandated to carry out the institutional rehabilitation program of the government for national
offenders, or those who are sentenced to more than three years of imprisonment,
and to ensure their safe custody. BuCor maintains 7 national penitentiaries with a
total prison population of 25,002. National penitentiaries, having an overall capacity of 19,600 inmates, are congested by 28%. Congestion problem is more glaring in the New Bilibid Prison which maintains 65% of the total prison population.
The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) is mandated to direct,
supervise and control the administration and operation of all district, city and
municipal jails nationwide. Jails differ from national penitentiaries. Jails are facilities located in provinces, cities and municipalities used to confine offenders who receive short-term sentences (in the Philippines, sentence of three years or less) and individuals awaiting trail and final judgment. A district jail is a cluster of small jails, each having a monthly average population of ten or less inmates, and is located within the vicinity of the court. Jail clustering is a strategy which has been adopted by the BJMP to save on administrative and operational expenses.
After twelve years of existence as a separate agency under the DILG, the BJMP still share this responsibility with the Philippine National Police (PNP), which is directly running about 61% of the total jail facilities within the jurisdiction of the BJMP. The involvement of the police in penology and jail management is a temporary arrangement considering the limited capacity of the BJMP. The protracted turn-over of all city and municipal jails to the BJMP creates negative outcomes particularly in the implementation of behavioral modification and rehabilitation programs for inmates, considering that the core competencies required for these programs are inbuilt with the BJMP.
The PPA is a focal agency in the restoration process as it is primarily tasked to
administer the parole and probation system of the country. It performs a dual role: (1) it ensures that only deserving inmates are granted parole, probation and pardon, by providing the approving authorities sufficient and factual information on the qualifications of applicant-inmate; (2) it ensures that inmates who are granted parole, probation or pardon will abide by the terms and conditions stipulated by the approving authorities. The BPP, on the other hand, is specifically authorized by law to grant parole to qualified prisoners. It likewise recommends to the President of the Philippines the grant of executive clemency in the form of reprieve, commutation of sentence, conditional pardon and absolute pardon.
The following major institutional issues in the Philippine corrections systems have
been identified:
* Prisons and jails in the country are generally in bad conditions. The New Bilibid Prisons was constructed in 1935. Since that time, no major renovations have been done on the prison facilities and its administration building. Jails are similarly in dire need of proper maintenance and repair. Furniture, equipment and various facilities in both jails and prisons badly need replacement.
* There are several agencies which are concerned with similar correction and
rehabilitation functions. For example, the DOJ, DILG and DSWD, and the provincial governments have similar mandates relative to the management and supervision of prisons, jails and rehabilitation centers.
* Lack of technology to properly maintain inmates’ records and process documents for their immediate release is a prevailing situation. Limited use of information technology to support investigation and validation of information on inmates with pertinent agencies like the courts, prosecutors’ offices and law enforcement agencies, to back up recommendations for early release of qualified offenders, and/or for providing them with other needed services, impede correction and rehabilitation programs.
* Improving administrative management capacity and resources of agencies involved in the corrections pillar directly impacts on their operations in terms of improved capacity to develop policies, programs, project, and activities for correction and rehabilitation of offenders, address congestion in jails and prisons, and for effective operations management and strategic planning.
* Common to practically all government agencies, this problem may be difficult to
address. But an assessment of the remuneration of personnel involved in the corrections pillar must be taken in the light of severe resource constraints and the
priority that government gives to the peace and order sector as a factor of economic development.
* Inadequate training has been cited as one of the many reasons for inefficiencies and deficiencies in the agencies under the corrections pillar. Specifically, there is need to train correction officers, probation officers, and prisons officers. Inadequate training facilities and equipment is a concomitant issue that adversely affects the conduct of necessary training programs to upgrade and develop the expertise of the key personnel involved in the corrections pillar.
Except for those limitations necessitated by the fact of incarceration, prisoners and detainees retain the human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in national and international human rights instruments. These rights include the following:
• Right to be treated in a humane manner;
• Right to fair trial with adequate and free legal assistance;
• Right to be protected from cruel, inhumane, degrading treatment and
punishment, including sexual violence and other forms of torture;
• Right to be kept in official government civilian prisons and to be protected from
being imprisoned in unofficial places of detention or in military custody;
• Right to appear in public before a legally-constituted court within a short time
after their arrest;
• Right to fair and humane treatment which enables the maintenance of self
respect;
• Right to a prison program which enhances their social and intellectual abilities;
• Right to separate living arrangements in prison in accordance with the categories of gender, age, and reasons for imprisonment;
• Right to be held separately from convicted prisoners;
• Right to be segregated from other prisoners (for political prisoners);
• Right to communicate with their families and to maintain familial relationships;
and
• Right to free legal assistance.
The average length of time spent in prison before a decision is made is estimated at 1.1 years. About 34% of the total respondent-inmates in this type of jail waited for more than one year (up to maximum of 8 years) until the last hearing of their cases is made. Inmates in city jails outside NCR waited for an average of 1.2 years from the date of their incarceration to the last hearing of their case. Of the surveyed inmates, 37.6% spent more than one year (up to maximum of 7 years) in jail until the last hearing of their case is made.
The waiting time from incarceration to the last hearing of cases of inmates in provincial jails is an average of 3.1 years. Of these inmates, 16% spent more than 5 years in jail (up to maximum of 22 years) until the last hearing of their respective cases.
From the date the inmates in national prisons were incarcerated, they spent an average of 3.3 years inside the penitentiaries before they attended the last hearing of their cases. About 71.5% of the inmates were held in prisons for more than one year until the last hearing of their cases.
For inmates in jails outside NCR, the estimated length of time spent from the date of arrest to date of last hearing was computed at a minimum of 4 days to a maximum of 7 years, or an average of 1.3 years. About 40% of the respondent-inmates spent more than one year in jails until the last hearing of their cases.
Inmates in provincial jails, on the other hand, spent an average of 3 years in jail/prison from the time of arrest to the last hearing of their cases. It is important to note that about 16% of the total inmates spent more than 5 years (up to a maximum of 22 years) in provincial jails until the last hearing of their cases.
On inmates’ knowledge on availability of free legal services to poor litigants from any institutions, the survey results reveal that among the inmates in city jails within NCR and those in national prisons, one out of every five knows that such services and agencies that extend help to poor exist. However, there are more inmates in these jails/prisons who do not know any office or agency that could help them on their legal requirements. Inmates in city jails outside NCR and in provincial jails have better knowledge on the existence of any agencies/institutions that provide free legal assistance to the poor. It is quite interesting to know that there is a higher percentage of women inmates in national prisons who are aware that there are several agencies that provide legal aid.
The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) is the government agency that provides free legal services to the poor or disadvantaged groups, to ensure equal protection of the law. Based on the results of the survey, more than 50% of inmates, both male and female, in the city jails outside NCR, in the provincial jails, and in national prisons know of the existence of PAO and its available services. Inmates have learned of such information from the Department of Justice or the courts when they were being arraigned. Co-inmates also provide information on the matter. Around 56% of the inmates (both male and female) from city jails within NCR have reported to have no knowledge about PAO.
The BJMP was created as line bureau of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government by virtue of RA 6975, which took effect on January 2, 1991. It is
mandated to direct, supervise and control the administration and operation of all
district, city and municipal jails nationwide. The forerunner organization of the BJMP was the Office of the Jail Management and Penology (OJMP), a staff unit under the defunct PC/INP. The BJMP has clear and comprehensive statements of objectives in undertaking its legal mandate, which includes the explicit adoption of the norms, standards, and principles captured in the UN conventions/treaties and instruments. These objectives are as follows:
• Improve the living conditions of offenders in accordance with accepted standards
set by the United Nations for the treatment of prisoners and detainees;
• Enhance the rehabilitation and reformation of offenders in preparation for their
eventual reintegration to the mainstream of society upon release; and
• To provide and develop professionalized jail services.
Based on its rules and regulations, the Bureau undertakes the following functions:
• Formulate policies and guidelines on the administration of all district, city and
municipal jails nationwide;
• Formulate and implement policies for the programs of correction, rehabilitation
and treatment of inmates;
• Plan and program funds for the subsistence allowance of inmates; and
• Conduct researches, develop and implement plans and programs for the
improvement of jail services throughout the country.
The BJMP started operation in 1991 with an initial personnel complement of 500 to man all its offices nationwide. As of 2001, the manpower complement of the Bureau has grown to 6,382 personnel. The current workforce is composed of 670 officers, 5,641 non-officers and 71 non-uniformed personnel. Of this number, 85% are performing substantive mission-critical functions while the remainder is handling administrative functions.
2.3.3 Based on the BJMP Rules and Regulations, entry to the jail system is done through a commitment order from the court or any other competent authority consigning a person to a jail for confinement. The following processes are involved in the management of jails:
• Reception, classification and discipline of inmates
• Custody, security and control, including movement and transfer of prisoners and detainees
• Rehabilitation, including the provision of treatment program, health services,
education and training, religious services, guidance and counseling services,
provision for recreation and sports, and implementation of work programs.
Effective jail management begins with a well-planned and orderly reception of inmates, which will provide initial impression of the correctional process. The procedures for the reception of inmates are as follows:
• Preliminaries, which involves ensuring integrity and completeness of inmates
records related to his commitment, and conduct of physical search for contrabands, turn-over of inmates cash and personal property for and other bodily marks;
• Conduct of medical examination and preparation of inmate’s medical record
• Conduct of social case study by a social worker, as basis for the inmate’s
classification and proper segregation
• Provision of jail clothing for convicted inmates (detainees may be allowed to wear civilian clothes)
• Conduct of briefing on jail rules and regulations
• Preparation of prison record which shall be maintained by the Warden
• Assignment of quarter
Each jail has a Classification Board, chaired by the Assistant Warden. The Board is tasked to determine the work assignment, type of supervision and degree of custody and restriction that must be applied to an inmate. Inmates are required to appear before the Classification Board to discuss the rehabilitation program of the jail.
Classification of inmates refers to their grouping according to sentence, gender, age, nationality, health, criminal records, among others.
A Disciplinary Board is organized and maintained by jails to investigate and hear
disciplinary cases involving any inmate who violates jail rules and regulations. The Board is authorized to impose disciplinary punishments ranging from reprimand to solitary confinement. The BJMP Rules and Regulations explicitly prohibit imposition of punishments that would violate the human rights of inmates. Discipline is central to the rehabilitation of offenders while in jails. However, while inmates must abide by institutional rules, they also establish their own rules for themselves, which form part of the so called “prison subculture”. This subculture has its own status structure and hierarchy of authority. In some jails, inmates fear the reprisals for rule violations under this prison subculture than formal administrative rules and punishments. The influence of this subculture is probably the reason why some prohibited acts of inmates are already openly allowed/tolerated in some jails.
The BJMP, PNP, BuCor, DSWD and the provincial governments are involved in the administration of the corrections system. While existing laws, rules and regulations are quite clear in delineating the responsibilities of the agencies concerned, prevailing situations indicate disorganization. There are national prisoners who are continually confined in jails. Youthful offenders are immersed with adult inmates.
Several measures have been proffered to achieve the appropriate synchronization, coordination and convergence of the currently fragmented structure of the corrections system to address existing dysfunctions. A previous measure to address such fragmentation problem was directed under Executive Order No. 324 dated 12April 1996 that created a Review Committee of Corrections System (RCCS). The body was chaired by the DOJ Secretary with the different government agencies concerned with correction activities and representatives from NGOs. RCCS recommended the creation of a Bureau of Correctional Services under the DOJ or the DILG, integrating in such agency all the national penitentiaries, provincial, subprovincial, district, city and municipal jails. The PPA and BPP will be maintained as separate attached agencies of the DOJ. This recommendation of the Committee deviates from an earlier proposal of the correction agencies to create a Department of Corrections, an organizational model for corrections system patterned after those of the United States, England and certain Scandinavian countries. The proposed Department will integrate all correction activities, including parole, pardon and probation. The Committee however argued that the creation of a department runs counter to the government’s streamlining thrust.
An integrated correction system calls for stronger partnership between the national government and local government units. The Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) mandates the implementation of a system of decentralization whereby the local government units are given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources to enable them attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and thus make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Under the Code, the Sangguniang Bayan (legislative body of the municipality), Sangguniang Panlungsod (legislative body of the city), and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (legislative body of the province) are authorized to, among others, enact/approve ordinances that will ensure the efficient and effective delivery of basic services and facilities in their respective areas of jurisdiction. They are mandated under the Code to establish and provide for the maintenance and improvement of jails and detention centers, institute a sound jail management program, and appropriate funds for the subsistence of detainees and convicted prisoners in the municipality, city, and province. At present, LGUs are already extending support to the BJMP in terms of additional budget and subsidies for inmates, transportation support for court hearings, free medical services and medicines, and putting up of livelihood projects. LGUs are also providing additional monetary and non-monetary benefits to jail personnel, initiating the construction, repair and maintenance of jail facilities, donating lots and equipment, and taking on part of the cost of jail operations.
With persisting deficiencies in jail personnel, which complicate problems such as
congestion and lack of equipment, it is easier for inmates to bolt out of jail. There are about 704 escapees from 1997 to 2001. While the BJMP pursues vigorous efforts to recapture escapees, only 61.6% of fugitives are retrieved (Table 4-4). This means that 4 out of 10 inmates who bolted of jail are never recaptured for various reasons. Based on 2002 data, about 92% of escapes occurred while inmates are under custody or within jail facility, while 8% escaped under escort or outside the jail facility. Ironically, one of the most common modality of escape is by “passing through the main gate unnoticed.” Incidence of escapes and the low recovery rate is indicative of BJMP’s poor performance in custody, security and control services.
Jail population in the National Capital Region (NCR) accounts for about 34% of the total inmates in jails nationwide. Based on the July 2002 data of the BJMP, NCR jails, numbering 22 in all, suffer from an average congestion rate of 123% Foremost among these overcrowded jails is the Manila City Jail where congestion rate is estimated at 280%.
Based on BJMP’s records on Manila City Jail, there is an increase of 233% in the
number of inmates who died in year 2002 compared to 2001. During the aforesaid period congestion rate increased from 186% to 218% on the average. There are also inmates who are sick of various ailments, which include psychiatric problems, pulmonary tuberculosis, and skin disorder, among others. BJMP is attributing the increase in mortality rate primarily to jail congestion/overcrowding. Contributing to this is malnutrition due to inadequate and improper food supply to inmates, and insufficiency of budget for the growing health care needs of inmates.
International and national human rights instruments provide guarantees the
fundamental rights of prisoners and detainees. Despite all these guarantees, human rights abuses persist in prisons and jails (CHR, 1993). These include the denial of the rights to counsel and speedy trial, illegal/arbitrary arrest/detention, torture, maltreatment/physical injuries, sexual harassment/abuse against chastity, and deprivation of the right to basic services. More recently, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) has documented 18 cases of torture involving 59 individuals for the year 2002, which will are now added to the 6,340 persons subjected to torture since February 1974 (de Mesa, 2003). In September 2002, The Peoples Recovery, Empowerment and Development Assistance Foundation, Inc. (PREDA), an NGO on human rights promotion and protection, documented cases where juvenile inmates suffer from human rights abuses, such as arbitrary and illegal detention, denial of rights to bail and legal assistance, incarceration together with adult inmates, and physical abuses including torture and inhuman treatment. The Ateneo Human Rights Center (AHRC), in a separate study conducted on children in conflict with the law and the juvenile justice system, suggested that selected incidents of violation of the
rights of some children arrested, investigated and tried before the courts tend to
indicate that there may be more of these incidents in practice occurring at various
stages of the juvenile justice process. The persistence of these human rights abuses highlights a serious discrepancy between the law and its application within the criminal justice system (TFDP, 2003).
Philippine jails and prison are operated and funded through public revenues as
government assumes the primary responsibility of administering the corrections and rehabilitation system. With inmates’ population steadily growing at 9.4% average annual growth rate, pressures on the national coffer and BJMP organizational resources to meet growing service requirements are increasing. BJMP must explore ways to optimize its scarce resources.
A step in the right direction is the clustering of jails. BJMP recently initiated a
restructuring of existing local jails system by doing away with the municipal, city and district jail concept. Instead, the Bureau will construct strategically located district jails. This scheme is expected to result in less overhead cost and optimum use of personnel and resources for the rehabilitation of inmates. BJMP is envisioning cutting down the existing 1,223 district, city and municipal jails, to 229 district jail facilities.
The PPA was created under Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) date July 25, 1987, replacing the then Probation Administration and continuing its functions. The Probation Administration was created under Presidential Decree No. 968 dated July 24, 1976 to promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders through personalized and community-based treatment, provide opportunities for their reformation and reintegration into the community, and prevent the commission of offenses. PPA administers the parole and probation system under PD 968, as amended, and exercises general supervision over all offenders who were released through probation, parole and pardon. The PPA further promotes the correction and rehabilitation of said offenders. PPA undertakes the following functions under its investigation mandate:
• Conduct character investigation of petitioners/applicants for probation referred for evaluation by the courts;
• Conduct studies on the petitioner’s antecedents, mental and physical conditions, character, socio-economic status, criminal records, family and educational background and other aspects of his life;
• Submit to the court a post-sentence investigation report, which will be the basis
for granting or denying probation; and Conduct pre-parole and executive clemency investigation and submission of recommendations to the Board of Pardons and Parole.
3.4.3 PPA undertakes an investigation on the character of an inmate-petitioner for probation, parole or executive clemency, including his antecedents, mental and physical conditions, socio-economic status, criminal records, family and educational background. It prepares a Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) for the purpose, and submits this document with its findings and recommendations to the trial court with regard to a probation request, or to the BPP for consideration on requests for parole and executive clemency. The Board accordingly endorses for the President’s final decision its recommendation on executive clemency.
3.4.4 The investigation of petitions for probation comprises about 90% of the total workload of the agency, with only 10% comprising investigation activities relative to requests for parole and executive clemency. The PPA however experiences annual backlogs in investigation function, as indicated in its performance reports.
3.4.5 One primary operational issue is difficulty in coordination with other pertinent agencies like the courts, the police, barangays, National Bureau of Investigation and the prosecutors’ offices criminal records of inmates have to be verified. In certain field units of these agencies, records are not well maintained. This makes PPA’s work more tedious. The situation calls for an installation of computer-based information system among these agencies.
The following reform implications have been identified for the PPA considering the capacity assessment indicated above:
• Full decentralization of functions (i.e. including those on administrative and
financial services)
• Improvement of the internal monitoring system of PPA
• Strengthening of developmental research activities to provide needed support for the development of strategic plans, policies and programs on clients’
rehabilitation
• Installation of strategic and development planning, budgeting and performance
management system
• Prioritization of expenditures for IT equipment
It may be concluded from the survey conducted that inmates suffer from the following major barriers to equitable access to justice:
• Scarcity of legal services/assistance for prisoners and detainees who lack
sufficient income
• Complexity of the judicial system, delay in legal proceedings and poor quality of
information about legal processes
• Lack of knowledge and understanding by inmates of the justice system, which
includes widespread distrust and low levels of confidence of the justice system
An appropriate correction and rehabilitation program must take into consideration the characteristics of the direct beneficiaries. Based on the survey conducted, a typical inmate is literate, functional and productive as indicated by his educational
attainment and employment before incarceration. It may also be inferred from the
data that a typical inmate is a head of a family and his incarceration deprives that
family a primary source of livelihood, thereby contributing to their poverty.
• The existing education, skills development and training program of the BuCor
and BJMP must be strengthened, expanded if needed and supported by
additional resources to develop further the functional literacy and enhance the
productivity of inmates.
• It is critical to give inmates opportunities to work while inside prisons or jails
through work and livelihood programs. These programs are primarily intended to
give inmates opportunities to earn income for his own support and for his family’s
subsistence.
• The treatment program for inmates must include the provision of adequate food,
health services, medicines and recreation facilities. These are rights accorded to
both prisoners and detainees pursuant to the Minimum Standards on the
Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees.
PAO lawyers are already saddled by heavy caseloads. While part of the
responsibilities of PAO is to visit prisons and jails, the survey indicates that inmate’s are not aware of its existence. The provision of free legal aid is a constitutionally guaranteed right accorded to poor litigants, including prisoners and detainees.
Moreover, the high cost of litigation has been identified as a major barrier in
accessing justice by the disadvantaged. It is therefore necessary for PAO to intensify it legal counseling interventions for inmates. To augment its existing capacity, PAO may partner with civil society organization and alternative law groups to fill these gaps in legal aid provision.
Inmates who would like to complain about prison/jail conditions and other concerns do not know where to lodge their complaints. The BuCor and BJMP, as well as the provincial jails must see to it that mechanisms are installed and implemented on receiving and addressing inmates concerns/complaints. The Philippine Congress may also explore the possibility of passing a legislation that would provide for an Ombudsman in prisons and jails, who will serve an advocate of prisoners and detainees’ rights.
Inmates must be properly informed of legal remedies available to him during his incarceration. Based on findings of the survey, effective modalities in informing
inmates of their rights are either lacking or inefficient. In the case of BuCor, an
inmate is briefed about prison rules and regulation and his fundamental rights upon entry to the penitentiaries. This is the primary task carried out by the Reception and Diagnostic Center. Similarly, jail officials are required to provide sufficient information to inmates on legal remedies available to him upon entry to a jail facility. These legal remedies may include right to bail, right against self-incrimination, right to counsel, opportunities for release on recognizance, parole, probation and pardon, and other similar rights and privileges.
The most common of the internal capacity problems of these agencies are the
following:
• Lack of information technology systems and expertise
Lack of technology to properly maintain inmates’ records and process documents
for their immediate release is a prevailing situation. Limited use of information
technology to support investigation and validation of information on inmates with
pertinent agencies like the courts, prosecutors’ offices and law enforcement
agencies, to back up recommendations for early release of qualified offenders,
and/or for providing them with other needed services, impede correction and
rehabilitation programs.
• Unattractive compensation, emoluments and benefits
Common to practically all government agencies, this problem may be difficult to
address. But an assessment of the remuneration of personnel involved in the
corrections pillar must be taken in the light of severe resource constraints and the
priority that government gives to the peace and order sector as a factor of
economic development.
• Inadequate training
Inadequate training has been cited as one of the many reasons for inefficiencies
and deficiencies in the agencies under the corrections pillar. Specifically, there is
need to train correction officers, probation officers, and prisons officers.
Inadequate training facilities and equipment is a concomitant issue that adversely
affects the conduct of necessary training programs to upgrade and develop the
expertise of the key personnel involved in the corrections pillar.
• Outdated, outmoded and dilapidated correctional facilities
Prisons and jails in the country are generally in bad conditions. Prisons and jails
are in dire need of proper maintenance and repair. Furniture, equipment and
various facilities in both jails and prisons badly need replacement.
An oversight mechanism to formulate national policies and standards on correction and rehabilitation and monitor implementation of programs and performance of agencies involved in the pillar is necessary. The arrangement would require the identification of proper organizational placement and roles of agencies and institutions concerned; definition of the interventions to be done at the oversight level, and those at the operating or local level; delineation of functions based on appropriate horizontal and vertical compartmentalization criteria; and development of clear and effective inter-agency coordinative mechanisms and operating processes.
Digested by:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Tuesday, September 9, 2008
Monday, September 8, 2008
Transformation
The article below by Atty. Ana Patricia del Castillo, which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on September 7, 2008, will inspire the readers, especially law students and bar examinees. It describes the transformation of her character and philosophy as a person, after failing her first Bar Exams and passing it the second time around. She died last June 2008. Here it is, verbatim:
Accidental lawyer finds true path to her soul
By Anna Patricia R. del Castillo
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 01:55:00 09/07/2008
(The author took the bar exams for the second time in September 2007. She wrote this article right after she took her oath last April. But the Inquirer timed its publication for the bar exams taken during the four Sundays in September (the first one starts today). We are running the article with the 2008 bar examinees in mind and in memory of the lawyer who excitedly found the road less taken. Atty. Del Castillo died on June 21.)
MANILA, Philippines—In the Philippines, when you say you’re a lawyer, people react in different ways. You sometimes get respect or deference, sometimes a bit of awe. There are of course those who treat you with suspicion, or even hate. Remember that most popular of all Shakespearean quotations? “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” (Henry VI, Part II, Act IV)
What’s all this about being a lawyer anyway? Is it your entrance ticket into a world of men bound by rules, codes, laws and statutes? In real life, lawyering means entering into a vast network that includes business, entertainment, technology, environment and practically everything else. A lawyer must become that proverbial jack-of-all-trades. Except that a lawyer must be master of one thing. He or she must know “the rules” or “the laws” that bind us together as a community, as an organization, as a society.
This is a tough job requiring years of preparation. First, as a law student, when you have to read and comprehend a multitude of laws and cases, and then learn to analyze them. After law school, you must learn to apply them to the real world, the world outside the law school library or the study room.
But first, you must pass the bar exams. The bar is the one test that you must pass to join that elite club of people who append “Attorney” to their names. It’s a test the republic requires to ensure that an officer of the court we call a “lawyer” or an “attorney” has indeed studied the law for years, and is capable of representing the interest of other people usually referred to as “clients.”
Like a doctor, the lawyer holds lives and livelihoods in his hands. You can’t let just anyone do this kind of work without first testing him to find out whether or not he really knows what he is doing. Thus we have the bar, a series of gruelling tests taken during the four successive Sundays of September.
A typical bar Sunday consists of a seven-hour exam with a two-hour break for lunch. You are made to answer mostly essay-type questions, although multiple-choice questions may also be included.
One can’t take the bar exams without first going to law school. To get into law school, you are required to have finished an undergraduate course; that serves as your pre-law course. Your undergraduate degree must have the prescribed units in the social sciences, languages, philosophy, among others. After that comes the four years in an accredited law school and then the law diploma. Then you prepare for the bar. Other eligibility requirements include certifications attesting to one’s good moral character, and of not having been charged or convicted of any crime.
Armed with the required degrees and other eligibility requirements, you then embark on an unimaginable number of hours of reading and preparing for the test itself. If you are not dedicated to the law, or at least interested in it, passing the bar might be one big and difficult hurdle.
That is what happened to me.
I studied law with apathy and nonchalance. In college, I acted as if it was not the beginning of my real “life” as an adult, or that it would spell out my future. Of course, I know better now. But in those days, I was just into partying, partying and partying.
The only reason I took up law was because both my parents are lawyers. I took up political science in college as a pre-law course. I had a little interest in the law in the beginning, but the path towards fulfilling my dreams through being a lawyer was not that clear.
In hindsight, I see now that to go into law, you need a well-defined, clear-cut desire to do so. You have to want it passionately. Eight years ago there weren’t any interactive websites where you could research and choose your course from any educational institution. As I found out, there isn’t enough time and there aren’t enough resources in the world to help you find that perfect course. After college, I took up law in one of the finest law schools there is, the one where my parents also obtained their law degrees.
A born crammer
My basic attitude didn’t really change that much in law school. I went out a lot hanging out with friends on so-called “gimmicks.” But of course, I had to work hard, working myself to death during exam time. I also had to put it together, just enough to make it through the “roasts” (or those “massacre recitations”).
Six months after graduation from law school, I took the bar. Being a born crammer, I knew I had to be serious and work like crazy all those six short months. I asked around and the usual schedule was to read at least a hundred pages a day, which meant at least 10 hours of reading and listening to review lectures daily. I did all these. But when the bar results came out, my name wasn’t on the list. I was devastated.
People who cram and get by start to think that they’re smarter than others. I was one of them. When I flunked the bar, I realized I wasn’t that smart after all. Working yourself to death for six months wasn’t enough. I realized I had wasted eight years of my life.
Flunking the bar made me see there was no clear path in my life. My future suddenly became hazy and uncertain, and I seemed to be starting anew on an uncharted path. I was faced with many questions. Should I continue studying and take the bar again? Should I just begin a new career path, a whole new life where I would be in charge?
I began to understand the meaning of failure and hardship and of destiny—the role that we play in our own lives, and the role of God in it. God gives us all the freedom we want, but there’s also responsibility that goes with it. If I did take the road to a new career path, the older, wiser and tougher me knew I would be faced with many new challenges and possibilities of failure as well. It was a scary thought, but it was also exciting.
Allergic to failure
However, I couldn’t resist a second try at the bar exams. First of all, I had all this knowledge and facts swimming around my head from taking the bar exams. Second, I knew that being allowed to take the bar again would be some sort of blessing. I already had the advantage over the others since I would have studied twice, thrice, or even four or five times more than those taking it for the first time. Third and most important of all, I was “allergic” to failure, and I knew I had to redeem myself by passing the second time around. So I took the bar again.
I studied like mad. The rest of the world faded away, and there was just me and my books. Officially, I wasn’t a crammer anymore since I had studied most of this stuff the first time around. I tried to understand every book I read, and prayed hard that I would remember what I read and retain the knowledge. Somewhere along the way, I began to find myself.
One day, while studying till the wee hours, I suddenly began to cry. It was self-pity, and the realization that I had never worked so hard in my life. Studying for the bar is the toughest thing a person can do because it takes over your whole life and requires all your concentration, energy and patience. It makes you forego any other desire for months, deny yourself all pastimes, hobbies and recreation, and abandon all meaningful relationships. It requires everything that you can give, and more.
When I say I found myself, I mean, it was as if I went around the world, across the universe, and found myself back home, with myself, with my soul. It was the inner me that could not be defined by my likes or dislikes, or those cliché definitions of the meaning of love that one reads in a Hallmark greeting card on Valentine’s Day.
That almost superhuman effort of preparing for the bar exams the second time around made me find my real self. Despite the fact that I had almost no interaction with other people for months, this me that I found was the me-alone, and also the me-in-relation to others. A philosopher might call it “the existential me.”
‘Forever me’
When I found myself, there was no turning back, no return slips for defective goods, “no return, no exchange.” I found the “forever-me.”
D-Day finally came. Since I didn’t pass the first time, my confidence was shaky and my composure precarious. I held it together and answered fast and concisely, wrote legibly, and prayed as I never prayed before in my entire life.
After the exams, it was difficult to determine whether I would pass or not. The bar is like that—so uncertain, so many possible answers, and only one correct answer. I waited six long months. Finally, the results were released. My classmates and friends found out before I did. It was moving how they seemed more ecstatic and more excited than I was.
If passing the first time was like one long congratulatory party, passing the second time was a big sigh of relief. It is reclaiming your confidence, trusting yourself again, and finally, believing that all this was meant to happen. It meant getting on the right path again and finding your friends and loved ones still there. It’s finding your life again waiting for you.
One with my soul
Everyone says later that it was meant to happen. But do I really believe that? It does mean that I had a lot more to learn before getting to where I am now. All the reasons and the confluence of events, all the whys and wherefores of Robert Frost’s road less taken would eventually reveal itself in time.
For me, I guess I had to grow up and be one with my soul, that almost mythical rite of passage we thought we only read in great literature, but which is part of everyone’s life. What happened to that teenage girl who only thought about what to wear and which party to go to? She realized that life is all about choices. Now it’s which book to read, how to schedule her activities for the day. Still the same giggly immature girl, but now in her 20s, and somehow different in many respects.
x x x.
Accidental lawyer finds true path to her soul
By Anna Patricia R. del Castillo
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 01:55:00 09/07/2008
(The author took the bar exams for the second time in September 2007. She wrote this article right after she took her oath last April. But the Inquirer timed its publication for the bar exams taken during the four Sundays in September (the first one starts today). We are running the article with the 2008 bar examinees in mind and in memory of the lawyer who excitedly found the road less taken. Atty. Del Castillo died on June 21.)
MANILA, Philippines—In the Philippines, when you say you’re a lawyer, people react in different ways. You sometimes get respect or deference, sometimes a bit of awe. There are of course those who treat you with suspicion, or even hate. Remember that most popular of all Shakespearean quotations? “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” (Henry VI, Part II, Act IV)
What’s all this about being a lawyer anyway? Is it your entrance ticket into a world of men bound by rules, codes, laws and statutes? In real life, lawyering means entering into a vast network that includes business, entertainment, technology, environment and practically everything else. A lawyer must become that proverbial jack-of-all-trades. Except that a lawyer must be master of one thing. He or she must know “the rules” or “the laws” that bind us together as a community, as an organization, as a society.
This is a tough job requiring years of preparation. First, as a law student, when you have to read and comprehend a multitude of laws and cases, and then learn to analyze them. After law school, you must learn to apply them to the real world, the world outside the law school library or the study room.
But first, you must pass the bar exams. The bar is the one test that you must pass to join that elite club of people who append “Attorney” to their names. It’s a test the republic requires to ensure that an officer of the court we call a “lawyer” or an “attorney” has indeed studied the law for years, and is capable of representing the interest of other people usually referred to as “clients.”
Like a doctor, the lawyer holds lives and livelihoods in his hands. You can’t let just anyone do this kind of work without first testing him to find out whether or not he really knows what he is doing. Thus we have the bar, a series of gruelling tests taken during the four successive Sundays of September.
A typical bar Sunday consists of a seven-hour exam with a two-hour break for lunch. You are made to answer mostly essay-type questions, although multiple-choice questions may also be included.
One can’t take the bar exams without first going to law school. To get into law school, you are required to have finished an undergraduate course; that serves as your pre-law course. Your undergraduate degree must have the prescribed units in the social sciences, languages, philosophy, among others. After that comes the four years in an accredited law school and then the law diploma. Then you prepare for the bar. Other eligibility requirements include certifications attesting to one’s good moral character, and of not having been charged or convicted of any crime.
Armed with the required degrees and other eligibility requirements, you then embark on an unimaginable number of hours of reading and preparing for the test itself. If you are not dedicated to the law, or at least interested in it, passing the bar might be one big and difficult hurdle.
That is what happened to me.
I studied law with apathy and nonchalance. In college, I acted as if it was not the beginning of my real “life” as an adult, or that it would spell out my future. Of course, I know better now. But in those days, I was just into partying, partying and partying.
The only reason I took up law was because both my parents are lawyers. I took up political science in college as a pre-law course. I had a little interest in the law in the beginning, but the path towards fulfilling my dreams through being a lawyer was not that clear.
In hindsight, I see now that to go into law, you need a well-defined, clear-cut desire to do so. You have to want it passionately. Eight years ago there weren’t any interactive websites where you could research and choose your course from any educational institution. As I found out, there isn’t enough time and there aren’t enough resources in the world to help you find that perfect course. After college, I took up law in one of the finest law schools there is, the one where my parents also obtained their law degrees.
A born crammer
My basic attitude didn’t really change that much in law school. I went out a lot hanging out with friends on so-called “gimmicks.” But of course, I had to work hard, working myself to death during exam time. I also had to put it together, just enough to make it through the “roasts” (or those “massacre recitations”).
Six months after graduation from law school, I took the bar. Being a born crammer, I knew I had to be serious and work like crazy all those six short months. I asked around and the usual schedule was to read at least a hundred pages a day, which meant at least 10 hours of reading and listening to review lectures daily. I did all these. But when the bar results came out, my name wasn’t on the list. I was devastated.
People who cram and get by start to think that they’re smarter than others. I was one of them. When I flunked the bar, I realized I wasn’t that smart after all. Working yourself to death for six months wasn’t enough. I realized I had wasted eight years of my life.
Flunking the bar made me see there was no clear path in my life. My future suddenly became hazy and uncertain, and I seemed to be starting anew on an uncharted path. I was faced with many questions. Should I continue studying and take the bar again? Should I just begin a new career path, a whole new life where I would be in charge?
I began to understand the meaning of failure and hardship and of destiny—the role that we play in our own lives, and the role of God in it. God gives us all the freedom we want, but there’s also responsibility that goes with it. If I did take the road to a new career path, the older, wiser and tougher me knew I would be faced with many new challenges and possibilities of failure as well. It was a scary thought, but it was also exciting.
Allergic to failure
However, I couldn’t resist a second try at the bar exams. First of all, I had all this knowledge and facts swimming around my head from taking the bar exams. Second, I knew that being allowed to take the bar again would be some sort of blessing. I already had the advantage over the others since I would have studied twice, thrice, or even four or five times more than those taking it for the first time. Third and most important of all, I was “allergic” to failure, and I knew I had to redeem myself by passing the second time around. So I took the bar again.
I studied like mad. The rest of the world faded away, and there was just me and my books. Officially, I wasn’t a crammer anymore since I had studied most of this stuff the first time around. I tried to understand every book I read, and prayed hard that I would remember what I read and retain the knowledge. Somewhere along the way, I began to find myself.
One day, while studying till the wee hours, I suddenly began to cry. It was self-pity, and the realization that I had never worked so hard in my life. Studying for the bar is the toughest thing a person can do because it takes over your whole life and requires all your concentration, energy and patience. It makes you forego any other desire for months, deny yourself all pastimes, hobbies and recreation, and abandon all meaningful relationships. It requires everything that you can give, and more.
When I say I found myself, I mean, it was as if I went around the world, across the universe, and found myself back home, with myself, with my soul. It was the inner me that could not be defined by my likes or dislikes, or those cliché definitions of the meaning of love that one reads in a Hallmark greeting card on Valentine’s Day.
That almost superhuman effort of preparing for the bar exams the second time around made me find my real self. Despite the fact that I had almost no interaction with other people for months, this me that I found was the me-alone, and also the me-in-relation to others. A philosopher might call it “the existential me.”
‘Forever me’
When I found myself, there was no turning back, no return slips for defective goods, “no return, no exchange.” I found the “forever-me.”
D-Day finally came. Since I didn’t pass the first time, my confidence was shaky and my composure precarious. I held it together and answered fast and concisely, wrote legibly, and prayed as I never prayed before in my entire life.
After the exams, it was difficult to determine whether I would pass or not. The bar is like that—so uncertain, so many possible answers, and only one correct answer. I waited six long months. Finally, the results were released. My classmates and friends found out before I did. It was moving how they seemed more ecstatic and more excited than I was.
If passing the first time was like one long congratulatory party, passing the second time was a big sigh of relief. It is reclaiming your confidence, trusting yourself again, and finally, believing that all this was meant to happen. It meant getting on the right path again and finding your friends and loved ones still there. It’s finding your life again waiting for you.
One with my soul
Everyone says later that it was meant to happen. But do I really believe that? It does mean that I had a lot more to learn before getting to where I am now. All the reasons and the confluence of events, all the whys and wherefores of Robert Frost’s road less taken would eventually reveal itself in time.
For me, I guess I had to grow up and be one with my soul, that almost mythical rite of passage we thought we only read in great literature, but which is part of everyone’s life. What happened to that teenage girl who only thought about what to wear and which party to go to? She realized that life is all about choices. Now it’s which book to read, how to schedule her activities for the day. Still the same giggly immature girl, but now in her 20s, and somehow different in many respects.
x x x.
Saturday, September 6, 2008
Speedy trial
In the fairly recent case of JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO vs. Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (Branch 13), Manila, G.R. No. 164953, February 13, 2006, the Philippine Supreme Court once again upheld the universal doctrine of SPEEDY TRIAL by asserting that vexatious, oppressive, unjustified and capricious delays in the arraignment violates the constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy case disposition, particularly when the accused is detained. Under such circumstances, MANDAMUS is a proper remedy for relief from prolonged detention. Thus:
X x x.
Main Issue:
Right to Speedy Trial
Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of the charges against them. [33] The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process. [34] Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial.
On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondent’s failure to act expeditiously on his arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen postponements that resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1998”), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused.
On the other hand, respondent counters that there were no capricious and oppressive delays that would justify a dismissal of the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General points to the participation of petitioner himself in the protracted proceedings, such as his filing of a Motion for Preliminary Investigation and his counsel’s absence from one of the scheduled hearings. [35]
Speedy Trial Construed
The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How. [36] It was held in that case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays were allowed by law and excluded from the computation of the time within which trial must commence. The Court ruled that those exclusions should “reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of ‘speedy trial’ is a ‘relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.’” [37] It held further that courts must strive to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals.
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They must contend with the realities of everyday life. Thus, a sensible assessment of their conduct must consider several factors, rather than a mere mathematical calculation of periods that have elapsed between stages. Jurisprudence has set forth the following guidelines:
“x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.” [38]
Reasonable Postponements
It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the seemingly endless postponements of the arraignment. He asserted his right to speedy trial twice, but was denied by respondent in both instances. Considering that petitioner has been under detention since December 2002, we need not belabor the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a result of the delayed arraignment.
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound, such as the retirement of Judge Arranz [39] and the manifestation of petitioner that the latter would be filing a Motion for Preliminary Investigation. [40] Those matters were manifestly not intended to delay the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.
The delay caused by Judge Arranz’s retirement may be deemed a normal part of the ordinary conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground was the right of the accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. [41] Verily, petitioner’s request for a preliminary investigation before arraignment was well-advised, in view of the rule that failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the right. [42] Thus, it has been held that though the conduct of a preliminary investigation may hold back the progress of a case, such investigation is necessary so that the defendant’s right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency. [43]
Unjustified Delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them far from being reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes for the delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition.
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation of the right of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years [44] elapsed from the filing of the Information against him until the filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of the court’s business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the court.
In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information to the conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can be done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that the court a quo could not complete such a simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay became all the more oppressive and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the accused was being curtailed for the entire duration.
Postponement Due to
Absence of Counsel
It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6, 2003, was postponed by the trial court due to the absence of the counsel of petitioner. [45] The latter sought to proceed with the arraignment by requesting the assistance of the public defender as counsel de oficio, but the request was denied on the flimsy ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We find no legal basis for the trial court’s action.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendant’s counsel de parte is not prohibited, [46] not even by the Constitution, [47] especially when the accused themselves request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused have no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment. [48] People v. Serzo [49] held thus:
“x x x [A]n accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state's and the offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.” [50]
Like other personal rights, the right to a counsel de parte is waivable, so long as 1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made. [51]
Applying these principles, it would have been more prudent for respondent judge to have appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment only. This course of action became more compelling in the instant case when petitioner himself requested the appointment. [52] To be sure, he would not have been prejudiced by that action, provided there was a proper observance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 8 of this rule, before proceeding with the arraignment, the court is mandated to give the appointed counsel de oficio reasonable time to consult with the accused as to the latter’s plea. [53]
Clearly, respondent judge’s postponement of the arraignment on August 6, 2003, had no substantial basis. Thus, the postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioner’s counsel, became unreasonable and ultimately attributable to respondent’s inflexibility as regards contingencies.
Responsibility of Judges
in Minimizing Delay
The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring the accused to court. No less than four court settings, [54] spanning seven months, were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance was caused, in different instances, by the failure of the court personnel to issue the produce order on time and by the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although respondent judge was justified in deferring the arraignment until the accused was presented, [55] the problem could have been easily averted by efficient court management.
In his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised his clerk of court to ensure a timely service of the produce order on the wardens of the Manila City Jail. Judges must keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their immediate supervision, who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice. Judges who set the pace for greater efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt their personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the performance of official duties. For certain, leniency in the administrative supervision of court personnel must be avoided. [56]
We stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more diligence and efficiency in the performance of their judicial duties to avoid loss of faith and confidence in the administration of justice. Rule 3.09 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to “organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business x x x.” Additionally, Section 5(d) of Rule 135 confers upon every court the power to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons who in any manner are connected with a case before it.
Respondent did not exercise his prerogatives in administering speedy justice. Instead, he was content with issuing reminders [57] that miserably failed to resolve the problem expeditiously. We can only conclude from the distinct circumstances of the case that he failed to assert actively his authority to expedite the proceedings.
Instead of being proactive and steering the course of the proceedings with deliberate dispatch, respondent tended to be passive and reactive by allowing the pace of the proceedings to be dictated by the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the jail wardens. Judges should be more deliberate in their actions and, within the bounds of law, make full use of their authority to expedite proceedings while continuing to respect the rights of parties to ventilate their respective causes fully.
Indeed, judges are required to dispose of the court’s business expeditiously, in accordance with Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote:
“A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required period.”
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to act promptly on their cases. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. [58]
In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of petitioner, the sought for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.
X x x.
Main Issue:
Right to Speedy Trial
Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of the charges against them. [33] The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process. [34] Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial.
On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondent’s failure to act expeditiously on his arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen postponements that resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1998”), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused.
On the other hand, respondent counters that there were no capricious and oppressive delays that would justify a dismissal of the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General points to the participation of petitioner himself in the protracted proceedings, such as his filing of a Motion for Preliminary Investigation and his counsel’s absence from one of the scheduled hearings. [35]
Speedy Trial Construed
The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How. [36] It was held in that case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays were allowed by law and excluded from the computation of the time within which trial must commence. The Court ruled that those exclusions should “reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of ‘speedy trial’ is a ‘relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.’” [37] It held further that courts must strive to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals.
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They must contend with the realities of everyday life. Thus, a sensible assessment of their conduct must consider several factors, rather than a mere mathematical calculation of periods that have elapsed between stages. Jurisprudence has set forth the following guidelines:
“x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.” [38]
Reasonable Postponements
It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the seemingly endless postponements of the arraignment. He asserted his right to speedy trial twice, but was denied by respondent in both instances. Considering that petitioner has been under detention since December 2002, we need not belabor the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a result of the delayed arraignment.
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound, such as the retirement of Judge Arranz [39] and the manifestation of petitioner that the latter would be filing a Motion for Preliminary Investigation. [40] Those matters were manifestly not intended to delay the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.
The delay caused by Judge Arranz’s retirement may be deemed a normal part of the ordinary conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground was the right of the accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. [41] Verily, petitioner’s request for a preliminary investigation before arraignment was well-advised, in view of the rule that failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the right. [42] Thus, it has been held that though the conduct of a preliminary investigation may hold back the progress of a case, such investigation is necessary so that the defendant’s right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency. [43]
Unjustified Delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them far from being reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes for the delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition.
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation of the right of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years [44] elapsed from the filing of the Information against him until the filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of the court’s business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the court.
In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information to the conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can be done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that the court a quo could not complete such a simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay became all the more oppressive and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the accused was being curtailed for the entire duration.
Postponement Due to
Absence of Counsel
It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6, 2003, was postponed by the trial court due to the absence of the counsel of petitioner. [45] The latter sought to proceed with the arraignment by requesting the assistance of the public defender as counsel de oficio, but the request was denied on the flimsy ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We find no legal basis for the trial court’s action.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendant’s counsel de parte is not prohibited, [46] not even by the Constitution, [47] especially when the accused themselves request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused have no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment. [48] People v. Serzo [49] held thus:
“x x x [A]n accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state's and the offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.” [50]
Like other personal rights, the right to a counsel de parte is waivable, so long as 1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made. [51]
Applying these principles, it would have been more prudent for respondent judge to have appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment only. This course of action became more compelling in the instant case when petitioner himself requested the appointment. [52] To be sure, he would not have been prejudiced by that action, provided there was a proper observance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 8 of this rule, before proceeding with the arraignment, the court is mandated to give the appointed counsel de oficio reasonable time to consult with the accused as to the latter’s plea. [53]
Clearly, respondent judge’s postponement of the arraignment on August 6, 2003, had no substantial basis. Thus, the postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioner’s counsel, became unreasonable and ultimately attributable to respondent’s inflexibility as regards contingencies.
Responsibility of Judges
in Minimizing Delay
The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring the accused to court. No less than four court settings, [54] spanning seven months, were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance was caused, in different instances, by the failure of the court personnel to issue the produce order on time and by the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although respondent judge was justified in deferring the arraignment until the accused was presented, [55] the problem could have been easily averted by efficient court management.
In his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised his clerk of court to ensure a timely service of the produce order on the wardens of the Manila City Jail. Judges must keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their immediate supervision, who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice. Judges who set the pace for greater efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt their personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the performance of official duties. For certain, leniency in the administrative supervision of court personnel must be avoided. [56]
We stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more diligence and efficiency in the performance of their judicial duties to avoid loss of faith and confidence in the administration of justice. Rule 3.09 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to “organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business x x x.” Additionally, Section 5(d) of Rule 135 confers upon every court the power to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons who in any manner are connected with a case before it.
Respondent did not exercise his prerogatives in administering speedy justice. Instead, he was content with issuing reminders [57] that miserably failed to resolve the problem expeditiously. We can only conclude from the distinct circumstances of the case that he failed to assert actively his authority to expedite the proceedings.
Instead of being proactive and steering the course of the proceedings with deliberate dispatch, respondent tended to be passive and reactive by allowing the pace of the proceedings to be dictated by the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the jail wardens. Judges should be more deliberate in their actions and, within the bounds of law, make full use of their authority to expedite proceedings while continuing to respect the rights of parties to ventilate their respective causes fully.
Indeed, judges are required to dispose of the court’s business expeditiously, in accordance with Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote:
“A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required period.”
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to act promptly on their cases. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. [58]
In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of petitioner, the sought for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.
Bail in extradition cases
In the fairly recent case of EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA – BRANCH 17, GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, and DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, G.R. No. 157977, February 27, 2006, the Philippine Supreme Court upheld the right of an extradite to due process of law in the matter of the cancellation of his bail bond.
Citing an earlier case, the Court held that although a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest, the said rule does not apply to the matter of cancellation of a bail that had been issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk.
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail.
The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that he is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release. Thus:
x x x.
The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on March 12, 2001 by the Government of the United States of America (US government) through the Department of Justice (DOJ) against the petitioners.
X x x.
The issue of prior notice and hearing in extradition cases is not new. In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, [11] by a vote of nine to six, we initially ruled that notice and hearing should be afforded the extraditee even when a possible extradition is still being evaluated. [12] The Court, deliberating on a motion for reconsideration also by a vote of nine to six, qualified and declared that prospective extraditees are entitled to notice and hearing only when the case is filed in court and not during the process of evaluation. [13]
In the later case of Purganan, eight justices concurred that a possible extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest while six others dissented.
Now, we are confronted with the question of whether a prospective extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before the cancellation of his or her bail.
The issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned. He is now in the USA facing the charges against him. But co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez is here and stands on a different footing. We agree that her bail should be restored.
In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, [14] because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest. But this is for cases pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. [15] On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. [16] If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, and with the trial court’s knowledge that in this case, co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in her sixties, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued.
We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. [17]
The trial court’s immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary to our ruling in Purganan, and it had misread and misapplied our directive therein.
Now, was the order to issue warrant of arrest against petitioners and to cancel the bail of extraditees a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court?
Grave abuse of discretion is capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. [18] In our view, the cancellation of co-petitioner’s bail, without prior notice and hearing, could be considered a violation of co-petitioner’s right to due process tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Finally, considering that remanding the case to the court a quo will only delay the final resolution of the case as in all probability it would only end up with us again, [19] we will decide if Imelda’s bail was validly cancelled.
In Purganan, we held also that the grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity. [20]
Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled. Based on the record, we find that, absent prior notice and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Orders dated May 7, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17 in Case No. 01-190375 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, as far as petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ is concerned. We hereby (1) declare IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ entitled to bail, (2) order her cancelled bail restored, and (3) order the warrant for her arrest revoked.
SO ORDERED.
Citing an earlier case, the Court held that although a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest, the said rule does not apply to the matter of cancellation of a bail that had been issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk.
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail.
The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that he is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release. Thus:
x x x.
The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on March 12, 2001 by the Government of the United States of America (US government) through the Department of Justice (DOJ) against the petitioners.
X x x.
The issue of prior notice and hearing in extradition cases is not new. In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, [11] by a vote of nine to six, we initially ruled that notice and hearing should be afforded the extraditee even when a possible extradition is still being evaluated. [12] The Court, deliberating on a motion for reconsideration also by a vote of nine to six, qualified and declared that prospective extraditees are entitled to notice and hearing only when the case is filed in court and not during the process of evaluation. [13]
In the later case of Purganan, eight justices concurred that a possible extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest while six others dissented.
Now, we are confronted with the question of whether a prospective extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before the cancellation of his or her bail.
The issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned. He is now in the USA facing the charges against him. But co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez is here and stands on a different footing. We agree that her bail should be restored.
In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, [14] because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest. But this is for cases pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. [15] On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. [16] If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, and with the trial court’s knowledge that in this case, co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in her sixties, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued.
We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. [17]
The trial court’s immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary to our ruling in Purganan, and it had misread and misapplied our directive therein.
Now, was the order to issue warrant of arrest against petitioners and to cancel the bail of extraditees a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court?
Grave abuse of discretion is capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. [18] In our view, the cancellation of co-petitioner’s bail, without prior notice and hearing, could be considered a violation of co-petitioner’s right to due process tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Finally, considering that remanding the case to the court a quo will only delay the final resolution of the case as in all probability it would only end up with us again, [19] we will decide if Imelda’s bail was validly cancelled.
In Purganan, we held also that the grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity. [20]
Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled. Based on the record, we find that, absent prior notice and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Orders dated May 7, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17 in Case No. 01-190375 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, as far as petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ is concerned. We hereby (1) declare IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ entitled to bail, (2) order her cancelled bail restored, and (3) order the warrant for her arrest revoked.
SO ORDERED.
Friday, September 5, 2008
Delicadeza
In the case of ANTONIA J. GUTANG, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 124760, July 8, 1998, the Philippine Supreme Court upheld the unwritten doctrine of delicadeza when it held, inter alia, that a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation but when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination and that he should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. Thus:
X x x.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges.� No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
As correctly pointed out by the public respondent Court of Appeals, the resolution of this case would hinge on the proper interpretation and application of the second paragraph of the above-mentioned provision.
While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just and valid reasons. 6 The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preference or predelictions are many and varied. 7
Thus, in the case at bar, the question is whether there were just and valid reasons for respondent Judge Marino dela Cruz to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.
Petitioners contend that there are none. They argue that since respondent judge found the motion for inhibition to be without factual nor legal basis, unjustified and unfounded, as stated in the assailed order, there was no just and valid reason for him to inhibit voluntarily. It is thus contended that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion for inhibition and at the same time voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. Petitioners also question the wisdom and legal soundness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, contending that it was an error of law for the appellate court to deny the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the above-named petitioners.
We are not convinced.
In the questioned orders, 8 respondent Judge Marino dela Cruz, Jr. invoked the ruling of this Court in the case of Pimentel v. Salanga, to wit:
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, if not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or to withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend on a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from setting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.
While not expressly stated, respondent judge nevertheless did have a just and valid reason for voluntarily inhibiting himself. In the questioned order, it was evident that he thought it more prudent to inhibit himself than to have any decision, order or resolution he would make on the incidents of the case be put under a cloud of distrust and skepticism. In this sense, he would no longer be effective in dispensing justice to the parties to the litigation.
Taking the cue from the Pimentel case, the respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr. properly took heed of this Court's advice, to wit:
. . . But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . . .
Truly, the presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case. When circumstances appear that will induce doubt as to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
While we admire and commend petitioners for their scholarly examination and analysis of the cases 11 cited by public respondent, We take this occasion to remind petitioner that the cases merely showed instances when the court decided one way or another in tackling the issue of whether or not there were just and valid grounds for inhibition.
In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar circumstances. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.
As such, mandamus would not lie to compel respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to proceed with hearing the case since the grant or denial of the motion to inhibit involves the exercise of discretion. The right or duty to exercise this discretion has been imposed on him by the Rules of Court with regard to any matter brought before him. Furthermore, petitioners have no vested right to the issuance of the motion to inhibit given its discretionary nature.
With regard to the prayer for "the issuance of an order enjoining respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar of Branch 35 of the same court from further acting in Civil Case No. R-82-5792," respondent: Court put the matter to rest in this manner:
We now proceed to the question of whether co-respondent Judge Ramon Makasiar, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the same Court, to whom said case was re-raffled as a result of the voluntary inhibition of Judge dela Cruz, Jr. may be enjoined or prohibited from further acting in said case. Since the voluntary inhibition of Judge dela Cruz, Jr. was valid, Civil Case No. R-82-5792 must of necessity be re-assigned by raffle to another judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for disposition. Supreme Court Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974, provides:
IV. Re-assignment of Cases of Disqualified Judges. � In any case where the Judge concerned is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself, the records shall be returned to the Executive Judge and the case shall be included in the regular raffle for re-assignment. Another case, similar in category to the one re-assigned, shall be assigned by raffle to the disqualified or inhibiting Judge to replace the case so removed from his court.
The petition alleges that pursuant to the order of inhibition dated July 26,1995, the Civil Case No. R-82-57920 was re-raffled and fell on Branch 35 presided by respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar. Be that as it may, and considering that the case was validly re-raffled pursuant to the aforecited Circular No. 7, respondent Judge Ramon P Makasiar may proceed to take cognizance of the case and may not be enjoined by the writ of prohibition prayed for by the petitioner.
x x x.
X x x.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges.� No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
As correctly pointed out by the public respondent Court of Appeals, the resolution of this case would hinge on the proper interpretation and application of the second paragraph of the above-mentioned provision.
While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just and valid reasons. 6 The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preference or predelictions are many and varied. 7
Thus, in the case at bar, the question is whether there were just and valid reasons for respondent Judge Marino dela Cruz to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.
Petitioners contend that there are none. They argue that since respondent judge found the motion for inhibition to be without factual nor legal basis, unjustified and unfounded, as stated in the assailed order, there was no just and valid reason for him to inhibit voluntarily. It is thus contended that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion for inhibition and at the same time voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. Petitioners also question the wisdom and legal soundness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, contending that it was an error of law for the appellate court to deny the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the above-named petitioners.
We are not convinced.
In the questioned orders, 8 respondent Judge Marino dela Cruz, Jr. invoked the ruling of this Court in the case of Pimentel v. Salanga, to wit:
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, if not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or to withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend on a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from setting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.
While not expressly stated, respondent judge nevertheless did have a just and valid reason for voluntarily inhibiting himself. In the questioned order, it was evident that he thought it more prudent to inhibit himself than to have any decision, order or resolution he would make on the incidents of the case be put under a cloud of distrust and skepticism. In this sense, he would no longer be effective in dispensing justice to the parties to the litigation.
Taking the cue from the Pimentel case, the respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr. properly took heed of this Court's advice, to wit:
. . . But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . . .
Truly, the presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case. When circumstances appear that will induce doubt as to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
While we admire and commend petitioners for their scholarly examination and analysis of the cases 11 cited by public respondent, We take this occasion to remind petitioner that the cases merely showed instances when the court decided one way or another in tackling the issue of whether or not there were just and valid grounds for inhibition.
In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar circumstances. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.
As such, mandamus would not lie to compel respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to proceed with hearing the case since the grant or denial of the motion to inhibit involves the exercise of discretion. The right or duty to exercise this discretion has been imposed on him by the Rules of Court with regard to any matter brought before him. Furthermore, petitioners have no vested right to the issuance of the motion to inhibit given its discretionary nature.
With regard to the prayer for "the issuance of an order enjoining respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar of Branch 35 of the same court from further acting in Civil Case No. R-82-5792," respondent: Court put the matter to rest in this manner:
We now proceed to the question of whether co-respondent Judge Ramon Makasiar, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the same Court, to whom said case was re-raffled as a result of the voluntary inhibition of Judge dela Cruz, Jr. may be enjoined or prohibited from further acting in said case. Since the voluntary inhibition of Judge dela Cruz, Jr. was valid, Civil Case No. R-82-5792 must of necessity be re-assigned by raffle to another judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for disposition. Supreme Court Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974, provides:
IV. Re-assignment of Cases of Disqualified Judges. � In any case where the Judge concerned is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself, the records shall be returned to the Executive Judge and the case shall be included in the regular raffle for re-assignment. Another case, similar in category to the one re-assigned, shall be assigned by raffle to the disqualified or inhibiting Judge to replace the case so removed from his court.
The petition alleges that pursuant to the order of inhibition dated July 26,1995, the Civil Case No. R-82-57920 was re-raffled and fell on Branch 35 presided by respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar. Be that as it may, and considering that the case was validly re-raffled pursuant to the aforecited Circular No. 7, respondent Judge Ramon P Makasiar may proceed to take cognizance of the case and may not be enjoined by the writ of prohibition prayed for by the petitioner.
x x x.
Inhibition
Considering the tendency of Filipino trial lawyers to file motions for inhibition of judges who have denied their incidental prayers or against whom they have filed certiorari petitions, perhaps it is wise to reiterate the holding of the Philippine Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents, G.R. No. 129120, July 2, 1999, which stated, inter alia, that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough; that there should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality; that bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice; and that bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge‘s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice . Thus:
"X x x.
In a string of cases decided by this Court we said that while bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, sec.1, par. 2, the rudimentary rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge‘s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.
In our more recent decisions, we reiterated parameters that mere suspicion that a judge was partial to a party is not enough; that there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge; that there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and that to be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.
The belief of the prosecution that Pacificador will be acquitted by Judge Duremdes for the same reasons he granted bail, has no basis and unduly imputes bias. An erroneous ruling on the grant of bail does not constitute evidence of bias. Aptly stated by respondent court, the erroneous order issued by the judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case militating against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias and partiality.
To disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegation and perception of bias from tenor and the language of a judge alone is insufficient to show prejudgment. Neither can the perception that the pleadings of the parties have become personal and loaded with insulting innuendoes be the basis for inhibition. Allowing inhibition for these reasons would open the flood gates to forum-shopping. Unless, there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the case and his bias is shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always commence from the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.
X x x."
"X x x.
In a string of cases decided by this Court we said that while bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, sec.1, par. 2, the rudimentary rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge‘s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.
In our more recent decisions, we reiterated parameters that mere suspicion that a judge was partial to a party is not enough; that there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge; that there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and that to be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.
The belief of the prosecution that Pacificador will be acquitted by Judge Duremdes for the same reasons he granted bail, has no basis and unduly imputes bias. An erroneous ruling on the grant of bail does not constitute evidence of bias. Aptly stated by respondent court, the erroneous order issued by the judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case militating against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias and partiality.
To disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegation and perception of bias from tenor and the language of a judge alone is insufficient to show prejudgment. Neither can the perception that the pleadings of the parties have become personal and loaded with insulting innuendoes be the basis for inhibition. Allowing inhibition for these reasons would open the flood gates to forum-shopping. Unless, there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the case and his bias is shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always commence from the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.
X x x."
Bar exams (Sept. 2008)
In a recent report issued by the Philippine Supreme Court, it was revealed that a record 6,533 law graduates were set to take the 2008 Bar examinations to be held on all four Sundays of September 2008 at the De La Salle University, Manila. (see www.supremecourt.gov.ph).
The 2008 Committee on Bar Examinations is chaired by Justice Dante O. Tinga.
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa said of the total 6,560 petitions to take the Bar exams, 11 had been denied. Sixteen Bar candidates have also withdrawn, reducing the number of Bar examinees to 6,533 as of press time.
Atty. Layusa added that the Supreme Court has tasked more than 1,440 personnel to help ensure the successful conduct of the exams.
This year’s examinees will use 95 rooms, five conference rooms, and Central Plaza, and 57 additional classrooms, including six theater-type rooms of the DLSU Taft campus.
SC Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura was also introduced during the said briefing as the Chairperson of the 2009 Committee on the Bar Examinations.
In a related development, the Court has adopted guidelines for all concerned regarding their conduct and activities within the perimeter of the venue of the Bar exams (“Perimeter Area”).
Stressing that the Bar examinations are in the nature of a court proceeding, the Court enjoins all examinees and all other persons within the Perimeter Area “to observe the same conduct and decorum as they would attend a court hearing or when within the immediate vicinity thereof.”
The 2005 Bar exams marked the first time that the “five-strike” rule was implemented. The “five-strike” rule limits to five the maximum number of times a candidate may take what is reputed to be the most grueling government-administered test.
Last year, 5,626 examinees took the 2007 Bar exams. Of the total, 1,289 examinees, or 22.91 percent, passed.
The first Bar exams were held in 1901, with 13 examinees.
The Court conducts the Bar examinations pursuant to Article VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution which provides that it shall have the power to promulgate rules governing the admission to the practice of law.
The Rules of Court provide that “a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examination successfully if he has obtained a general average of 75% in all subjects without falling below 50% in any subject.” In determining the average, subjects in the examinations are given the following relative weights: Political and International Law, 15%; Labor and Social Legislation, 10%; Civil Law, 15%; Taxation, 10%; Mercantile Law, 15%; Criminal Law, 10%; Remedial Law, 20%; and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5%, for a total of 100%.
The 2008 Committee on Bar Examinations is chaired by Justice Dante O. Tinga.
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa said of the total 6,560 petitions to take the Bar exams, 11 had been denied. Sixteen Bar candidates have also withdrawn, reducing the number of Bar examinees to 6,533 as of press time.
Atty. Layusa added that the Supreme Court has tasked more than 1,440 personnel to help ensure the successful conduct of the exams.
This year’s examinees will use 95 rooms, five conference rooms, and Central Plaza, and 57 additional classrooms, including six theater-type rooms of the DLSU Taft campus.
SC Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura was also introduced during the said briefing as the Chairperson of the 2009 Committee on the Bar Examinations.
In a related development, the Court has adopted guidelines for all concerned regarding their conduct and activities within the perimeter of the venue of the Bar exams (“Perimeter Area”).
Stressing that the Bar examinations are in the nature of a court proceeding, the Court enjoins all examinees and all other persons within the Perimeter Area “to observe the same conduct and decorum as they would attend a court hearing or when within the immediate vicinity thereof.”
The 2005 Bar exams marked the first time that the “five-strike” rule was implemented. The “five-strike” rule limits to five the maximum number of times a candidate may take what is reputed to be the most grueling government-administered test.
Last year, 5,626 examinees took the 2007 Bar exams. Of the total, 1,289 examinees, or 22.91 percent, passed.
The first Bar exams were held in 1901, with 13 examinees.
The Court conducts the Bar examinations pursuant to Article VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution which provides that it shall have the power to promulgate rules governing the admission to the practice of law.
The Rules of Court provide that “a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examination successfully if he has obtained a general average of 75% in all subjects without falling below 50% in any subject.” In determining the average, subjects in the examinations are given the following relative weights: Political and International Law, 15%; Labor and Social Legislation, 10%; Civil Law, 15%; Taxation, 10%; Mercantile Law, 15%; Criminal Law, 10%; Remedial Law, 20%; and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5%, for a total of 100%.
Hall of Justice
In a report dated August 28, 2008 of the Executive Judge of Las Pinas City, Hon. Leopoldo Baraquia, addressed to me, he acknowledged receipt of my letter dated August 5,2008, re: the infrastructural needs of the local justice system of Las Pinas City. He thanked me for my support on the matter in my capacity as a local Bar leader and as the founder of the Las Pinas City Bar Association.
Judge Baraquia reported that the Hall of Justice of Las Piñas City had undergone a major change or renovation particularly its infrastructural aspect which was made possible through the support of the City Mayor Hon. Vergel A. Aguilar and the City Council as envisioned by our Congresswoman Cynthia Villar and with the initial funding provided by Sen. Manny Villar.
He added that in the past, the Hall of Justice Building was occupied and shared by the Courts with the Las Piñas Police Department and the City Jail located at the ground floor of the Hall of Justice. Now, as part of its renovation process, the ground floor of the Hall of Justice is occupied by the Regional Trial Court of Branches 197, 275, 200 and 201.
According to Judge Baraquia, the ongoing construction of the annex building of the Hall of Justice was in full blast and that by the end of the year it will be ready for occupancy by the other courts. He added that renovation of the 2nd and 3rd floor of the Main Hall of Justice will give way to the transfer of the City Fiscal’s Office. However, he regretted to say the toilets of the present Main Hall of Justice for the males and females urgently needed major repairs in order that it would look presentable to the public.
Judge Baraquia reported that the Hall of Justice of Las Piñas City had undergone a major change or renovation particularly its infrastructural aspect which was made possible through the support of the City Mayor Hon. Vergel A. Aguilar and the City Council as envisioned by our Congresswoman Cynthia Villar and with the initial funding provided by Sen. Manny Villar.
He added that in the past, the Hall of Justice Building was occupied and shared by the Courts with the Las Piñas Police Department and the City Jail located at the ground floor of the Hall of Justice. Now, as part of its renovation process, the ground floor of the Hall of Justice is occupied by the Regional Trial Court of Branches 197, 275, 200 and 201.
According to Judge Baraquia, the ongoing construction of the annex building of the Hall of Justice was in full blast and that by the end of the year it will be ready for occupancy by the other courts. He added that renovation of the 2nd and 3rd floor of the Main Hall of Justice will give way to the transfer of the City Fiscal’s Office. However, he regretted to say the toilets of the present Main Hall of Justice for the males and females urgently needed major repairs in order that it would look presentable to the public.
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Extrajudicial killing (Pepe Manegdeg)
LAS PINAS CITY BAR ASSOCIATION[1].
Unit 15, Star
Tel/Fax: 8725443, 8742539
Email: lcmlaw@gmail.com,
Website: http://groups.msn.com/laspinascitybarassociation
Personal Delivery
Gen. AVELINO I. RAZON JR.
Chief
Philippine National Police
RE : Mr. Jose “Pepe” R. Manegdeg III
Mabuhay:
Enclosed are copies of (a) the recent email we received from Mrs. Dom-An Macagne Manegdeg, widow of Mr. Jose “Pepe” R. Manegdeg III, who was a victim of extrajudicial killing in 2005 and (b) the previous letter dated
In behalf of our Bar Association, we respectfully urge your good Office to take all necessary and effective actions to bring the murderer of Mr. Manegdeg to justice.
Further, we humbly request that his widow, whose address appears in the attached documents, be informed by your good Office of the current status of the investigation thereon at the earliest time possible, copy furnished our office, for her peace of mind.
Have a blessed and liberated day. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.
Founder and Board Consultant
Past VP, IBP PPLM Chapter
Prof. of Law, FEU (ret.)
Cc:
Mrs. Dom-An Macagne Manegdeg
Kasiyana Peace and Healing
Initiatives
Sagada 2619,
| hide details |
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Kasiyana Peace and Healing Initiatives
Sagada 2619,
Cordillera Administrative Region
Northern
* kasiyanaphi@yahoo.com ( +639185117430
August 30, 2008
Gen Avelino I Razon, Jr
Chief
Philippine National Police
Attn:
Director
PNP Human Rights Affairs
Dear Sir/Madam:
Gentle breeze from the music of the bamboo nose flute…
May I please follow up the progress of the investigations and reinvestigations regarding the case of the extrajudicial killing of my husband Jose Pepe Riveral Manegdeg III and the continued harassment of his family.
Attached are copies of my earlier appeals to Task Force Usig and the Philippine National Police. Also copies of the resolutions on the case by the local prosecutor’s office and the Commission on Human Rights Region I.
I believe the people on the ground have done their job sincerely. It is however a continuing tragedy that the process of unraveling the truth is of such complexity.
Also attached is a copy of the special report of Nolcom AFP.
Even I, Pepe’s widow never claimed monopoly of knowledge of how my husband lived his life. One thing is certain though… he was a man of gentleness and compassion. One who did not really judge people by their positions of power or religious and political associations. A truth experienced not only by his family but also his colleagues and the people with whom he has interacted with of various political convictions.
I continue to seek dialogues and grow with rays of hope that someday truth will be revealed by those who have plotted and sanctioned such crime. I do not have resources nor power to prove their guilt. Before divine, humane and cosmic laws, may they answer for their acts in due time.
For me, peace work and conflict transformation is doomed for as long as truth becomes confused with one lie after the other. For just as the assassins were made to believe that my husband deserved to be executed, there will be no end to justifying such murder.
Truth will come, I shall wait in patience with my children and all those who thirst for such enlightenment. I know that people who cherish human dignity and liberty will act. Thank you very much.
May God continually bless you in your tireless efforts.
Sincerely,
Endorsed by:
Loreta Ann P. Rosales
[1] LPBA motto: “INJUSTICE ANYWHERE IS A THREAT TO JUSTICE EVERYWHERE.”, based on a speech of the great human rights advocate and Nobel Peace Prize winner Martin Luther King Jr.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)