To give meaning to the legislative intent of RA 9344, the promotion of the welfare of a CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW should extend even to one who has EXCEEDED THE AGE LIMIT OF TWENTY-ONE (21) YEARS, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender COMMITTED THE OFFENSE WHEN HE/SHE WAS STILL OF TENDER AGE. - 2009 REVISED RULE ON CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.

"Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years of age who committed a crime and was found guilty, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence even if such child has reached 18 years or more at the time of judgment. Thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and alter considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

Notwithstanding, the RTC did not apply the law saying that the benefits of a suspended sentence shall not apply to appellant Allain because he is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua making reference to Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,65 Rule, on Juveniles in Conflict with the law.

We do not agree.

In People v. Sarcia,66 we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA No. 8344 even if the minor therein was convicted of reclusion perpetua and we ratiocinated as follows:

The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.

Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. x x x67

In fact, the Court En Banc promulgated on November 24, 2009, the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which echoed such legislative intent.68

Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time the judgment of conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No. 9344, to wit:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to Section 38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40 is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the application of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law.

In People v. Jacinto,69 we ruled:

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section 48 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility.70

Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility pursuant to Section 51 of RA No. 9344."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Computation of PENALTY for RAPE where the accused is a MINOR. - CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW. - Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006. - AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. - DISCERNMENT Defined.

"Under Article 266-B, in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, when rape is committed by 2 or more persons, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both appellants notwithstanding that appellant Allain was only 17 years old, a minor, at the time of the commission of the crime on July 16, 1998. His birth certificate59 showed that he was born on December 19, 1980. The RTC did not consider such minority saying that the penalty imposed upon the two accused is reclusion perpetua which is a single indivisible penalty; and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the said penalty should be applied and imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of minority.

We beg to differ.

To begin with; on May 20, 2006, Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, took effect, RA No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application, as held in People v. Sarcia,60 which stated:

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.

Hence, RA No. 9344 should be considered in determining the imposable penalty on appellant Allain even if the crime was committed seven years earlier. Section 6 of RA No. 9344 provides:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) yours but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

In Madali, et al. v. People,61 we held that discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.

In this case, it was established that appellant Allain acted with discernment as shown by his act of covering AAA's mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting and conspired with appellant Vergel in raping AAA.

As the crime of rape was committed by two persons, the penalty imposable under Article 266 (B) of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. Since no aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable. Appellant Allain was only 17 years old when he committed the crime; he is, therefore, entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.

Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e., from reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.63 To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its medium period. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full range of prision mayor.64"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

DNA TEST is not essential, while there exists other evidence pinning down appellants as the perpetrators.

"Appellants' claim that a DNA test on the spermatozoa found on AAA's vagina should have been submitted for DNA testing to know whether the sperm indeed came from both appellants or from AAA's boyfriend.

It has already been established that appellants were the ones who raped AAA. The DNA test is not essential, while there exists other evidence pinning down appellants as the perpetrators.58 Moreover, if the prosecution had not conducted such DNA test, appellants should have moved for such test during the trial to prove their innocence.

All told, we find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Entries in a POLICE BLOTTER, although regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are NOT CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF THE TRUTH OF SUCH ENTRIES, for these are often incomplete and inaccurate.

"Appellants' contention that if AAA was positive as to their identification as the perpetrators of the crime charged, why were there two other names included in the police blotter, is also unmeritorious.

The same police blotter stated a notation that:

Progress Report on Rape Alarm (Entry Nr. 98-257). As per sworn statement of offended party AAA that the alleged suspects were Allain Ancajas and Vergel Ancajas and she refused (sic) the other suspects.55

The inclusion of the two additional names was cured by the sworn statement of AAA and her categorical declaration56 in open, court that appellants were the perpetrators of the crime charged and no other. It is well entrenched that entries in a police blotter, although regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries, for these are often incomplete and inaccurate. These, therefore, should not be given undue significance or probative value as to the facts stated therein.57"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

People react differently to emotional stress and no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a RAPE VICTIM following her defilement.

"Appellants' argument that AAA's conduct after the alleged sexual assault, i.e., washing her bloodied panty and maong pants, and washing her private part, are not the normal behavior of a woman who had just been raped deserves scant consideration.

It is not accurate to say that there is a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims.53 On the contrary, people react differently to emotional stress and no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement.54 What is notable in the records was the fact that after she had regained consciousness at 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, she immediately went back to her employers' house and narrated to them what appellants had done to her, later reported the rape incident to the police and underwent a physical examination of her private parts. Her actions indeed showed her desire to obtain justice for what appellants did to her."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

For ALIBI to prosper, it does not suffice to prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown that there was PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY for him to have been at the scene of the crime.

"We find that the RTC correctly rejected appellants' defense of denial and alibi. AAA positively identified appellants as the persons who raped her. She knew them as they were neighbors since childhood. Denial fails in the light of AAA's positive declaration.

Appellants' alibi is also unavailing. For alibi to prosper, it does not suffice to prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown that there was physical impossibility for him to have been at the scene of the crime.51 Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.52 Appellant Allain testified that at around 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. of July 16, 1998, he was at Kit's house, which was located around 100 meters away from their own house. On the other hand, appellant Vergel testified that he passed by Kit's house at past 8:00 p.m. and saw Allain thereat. Notably, appellant Allain testified that AAA's house is also 100 meters away from their house. Thus, it would show that Kit's house is also in the same vicinity where the crime was committed. Hence, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is CONSPIRACY when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it.

"We find the presence of conspiracy in this case between the appellants. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.49

The prosecution had established that appellants held AAA's hands, and when she tried to shout, appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in the abdomen which caused her to lose consciousness. It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective which were present in this case.50"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants' guilt for the crime of RAPE. - The Crime of Rape Defined. - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

"Appellants claim that based on AAA's testimony, the element of carnal knowledge was not established since she claimed to be unconscious, hence, she would not know the act allegedly done to her; that she only believed that they had carnal knowledge of her because she felt pain on her vagina. They claim that there were inconsistencies in her testimony and that her conduct after the alleged rape negate the commission thereof.

The issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants' guilt for the crime of rape.

Article 266-A38 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements of the crime of rape as follows:

Art. 266-A- Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

The prosecution must prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, (2) that the same was accomplished under any of the above-enumerated circumstances. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testily with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.39 Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the victim's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted of the crime.40

Appellants' claim that rape was not was established as AAA had been unconscious during its alleged commission is not persuasive.

While it is true that there was no direct evidence to establish that appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA as the latter was unconscious, however, proof of the commission of the crime need not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt.41 Indeed, the Court had affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence.42

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (3) and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.43 A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.44

Here, AAA was on her way to her parents' house when appellants, her neighbors since childhood, appeared and held her hands. She struggled and shouted but appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting, while appellant Vergel punched her in the stomach which caused her to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain all over her body and her vagina. She found her bra, bloodied parity and maong pants beside her. She went back to her employers' house and told them that appellants raped her. AAA's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Jabat's declaration that the lacerations in AAA's perineum and hymen were due to the insertion of a foreign object or the male organ and the presence of spermatozoa signified recent sexual intercourse. It is well settled that when the victim's testimony is corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisites of carnal knowledge.45 The lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.46

We find no error committed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in giving credence to AAA's testimony. In fact, it was put down in record that AAA was crying while she was testifying before the trial court.47 It has been held in several cases that the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain the victim feels when she recounts the detail of her traumatic experience.48"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com