We beg to differ.
To begin with; on May 20, 2006, Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, took effect, RA No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application, as held in People v. Sarcia,60 which stated:
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.
Hence, RA No. 9344 should be considered in determining the imposable penalty on appellant Allain even if the crime was committed seven years earlier. Section 6 of RA No. 9344 provides:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) yours but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
In Madali, et al. v. People,61 we held that discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
In this case, it was established that appellant Allain acted with discernment as shown by his act of covering AAA's mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting and conspired with appellant Vergel in raping AAA.
As the crime of rape was committed by two persons, the penalty imposable under Article 266 (B) of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. Since no aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable. Appellant Allain was only 17 years old when he committed the crime; he is, therefore, entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.
Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e., from reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.63 To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its medium period. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full range of prision mayor.64"
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com
