I have written in my past blogs about the internal politics in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Even so-called “brothers” in the Sigma Rho Fraternity of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines which has monopolized the political reins of the IBP since the 1970s have their own internal political squabbles and bloody power plays, showing the depth of the political disease of “factionalism” inside the IBP.
The controversial consolidated cases of ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, etc., En Banc and Per Curiam, A.C. No. 6697, Bar Matter No. 1227, and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, July 25, 2006 is a very good example of the divisive political factionalism (and survival of the fittest) inside the IBP.
The only difference was that in the above consolidated cases, there was a new intervening variable, i.e., R.A. No. 9227, the law which increased the special allowances of judges and justices.
Atty. De Vera in principle felt that it was unconstitutional.
The law led to the drastic increase in the court fees charged by the courts under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) likewise increased it own administrative fees imposed on all criminal complaints filed with the local DOJ offices. (To seek criminal justice, one must pay filing fees!).
These abrupt increases led to huge sufferings on the part of Filipino litigants. Up to the now, it is a big issue even among trial lawyers.
(At any rate, to mitigate the sufferings of litigants, Rule 3 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court contain provisions which exempt indigent litigants from the huge and painful legal fees imposed by the Court).
Going back to R.A. 9227, at first, the IBP Board agreed with Atty. De Vera. The board filed a petition in the Supreme Court contesting its constitutionality.
Later, for some unknown and mysterious reasons (which Atty. De Vera felt should have been explained to the IBP general membership), the board withdrew the petition.
Atty. De Vera, who was a co-petitioner in the petition, did not withdraw as a petitioner.
During a national convention of lawyers in Baguio City in 2006, many lawyers questioned the withdrawal made by the IBP Board. The board alleged that Atty. De Vera was the mastermind behind the heated questions raised by the general membership on the plenary floor.
A few weeks later, the board removed him as a Regional Governor and as the incumbent Executive Vice President. Under the “automatic assumption rule”, he was supposed to be the next national president of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
The Supreme Court suspended him for two years from the Roll of Attorneys based on another ground, i.e., alleged dishonesty committed in another jurisdiction (California) a few years back.
Having been suspended, he was disqualified to continue as an IBP officer. He thus lost the presidency for the term 2005-2007.
Meanwhile, I think the 5-year period stipulated in R.A. 9227 within which the increased special allowances of judges and justice should be paid (from increased court fees), has already expired. The issue was mooted, if I am not mistaken.
As far as I can recall, I have not come across any decision of the Court resolving the merits of the De Ver petition questioning the constitutionality of the said special law.
It appears that on January 25, 2005, the Court had terminated the case. It appears further that in a Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc in re: G.R. No. 165108, April 19, 2005, entitled Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., the Court denied the “Manifestation and Motion to Give Due Course to the Petition and to Resolve It on Its Merits by Ruling on the Constitutionality of R.A. 9227 and Its Implementing Guidelines, dated 21 March 2005” filed by counsel for petitioners Leonard S. De Vera, Carlos L. Valdez, Jr., Dante G. llaya and Immanuel I. Sodusta, considering that in the resolution of 25 January 2005, this case was already considered closed and terminated.
It appears furthermore that in an earlier Resolution dated March 1, 2005, it resolved that considering that in the resolution of 25 January 2005, the withdrawal of the petition was granted and this case was considered closed and terminated, the Court simply noted without action the (a) Opposition to the Withdrawal of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer to Rule on the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227 and Its Implementing Issuances), dated 8 February 2005 filed by petitioners Leonard S. De Vera, Carlos L. Valdez, Jr., Dante G. Ilaya and Immanuel I. Sodusta, all Members of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, assisted by their counsel; and (b) Manifestation dated 8 February 2005 filed by petitioner Immanuel I. Sodusta in relation to the aforesaid Opposition, stating that he was not withdrawing his standing as individual petitioner.
Any way, the judges and justices were truly glad and happy their special allowances were not touched and revoked.
Meanwhile, Atty. De Vera suffered in silence while serving his two-year suspension period.
(At present, he is busy with his anti-corruption and anti-violence advocacy in cooperation with leading law and justice non-governmental organizations in Metro Manila). He has not involved himself in IBP activities since then.
I may be wrong, but up to now, I truly feel that the IBP Board and the Supreme Court did not treat Atty. De Vera with fairness and that some kind of high-level politics and prejudice had tainted the actions of the IBP Board and the Supreme Court.
At any rate, let me digest the salient parts of the abovecited consolidated cases for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog.
In A.C. No. 6697, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds: (a) respondent’s alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and (b) respondent’s alleged violation of the so-called “rotation rule” enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country’s most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called “rotation rule” provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondent’s transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
In Bar Matter No. 1227, Atty. de Vera requested the Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President.
In A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, in a letter, dated May 19, 2005, furnished the Court with the IBP’s Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as “Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. – Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108.” The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Board’s Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter where he strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process.
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Vera’s removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board. Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar’s election. IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar’s election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court. Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention’s Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Court’s Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
After hearing the parties, the Court resolved, in AC No. 6697, that under Section 19, Article II of the IBP By-Laws, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice. It is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time. The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. Under this section, a lawyer who wishes to move to another chapter must do so not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco, Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996, the Court declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Court’s administrative powers.
In subsequent decisions of the Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrative Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that while double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already answered for.
Likewise, in the case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), the Court held that applied the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again. This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.”
In the instant case, the Court held that contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, “In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election” and promulgated on 11 December 2003 did not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.
According to the Court, in order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants’ cause of action was Atty. de Vera’s alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Vera’s alleged violation of lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera’s suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties’ rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Court’s statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years.
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
Atty. de Vera was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
The Court held that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction may result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines if the acts giving rise to his suspension are the same grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. The judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the unethical acts of a lawyer. (Sec. 48, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
The Court stated that under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The said rule also provides that the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated; that the judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.
In the case of Atty. De Vera, an administrative case was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.
Atty. de Vera insisted that the foregoing facts did not prove that he misappropriated his client’s funds as the latter’s father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he “expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.”
The Court held that the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client’s funds is highly unethical, citing Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION; that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client; that a lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
In the instant case, the Court held that it was “admitted” (in the judicial pleadings filed) by Atty. de Vera that he had “used” his client’s money for personal use and that such an constituted more than substantial evidence of malpractice. The Court added that Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence “which he himself supplied”.
The Court rejected the claim of Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latter’s son and that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California, on the ground that they were self-serving statements and that it could not find anywhere in the records any proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he “expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.” As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis “expected de Vera might use the money for a few days” was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client’s funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client’s funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.
Complainant further insisted that Atty. de Vera’s transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan Del Sur IBP Chapter was a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stressed that Atty. de Vera was not a resident of Agusan Del Sur nor did he hold office therein.
As to the rotation or chapter-shopping-related issue raised by the complainant in Adm. Case No. 6052, the Court held that Atty. de Vera’s act of transferring to another IBP Chapter was not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same was allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera’s right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he was guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule – will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer’s Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.
In Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC, the Court addressed the issue of whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005; and whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and could consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
Under Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, should the Board of Governors determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, it may, by resolution of the Majority of its remaining members, declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied “very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases” like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.
The Court agreed with the IBP Board when it argued that since its members were present during the plenary session of the controversial national convention of lawyers in Baguio City, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera’s actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.
The Court stated that due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with “judicial process” for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing is not essential to due process of law.
It added that the right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual hearing always essential especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court – all witnessed Atty. de Vera’s actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
The Court added that it was undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it was patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera’s expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera). The Court cited Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws which provides that any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase “remaining members” refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still added up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.
The Court held that Atty. de Vera’s removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary. It stated that the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, was diluted if the conflicts were brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, did not and could not speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP’s prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.
The Court stated that the IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter’s actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board was not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it could not effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice.
The Court held that when a member of a governing body could not accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his heart’s content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well. Under Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera’s removal from the Board of Governors automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP (who is the automatic president in the following term).
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, and Section 11 (Vacancies), Section 44 (Removal of members), Section 47 (National officers), Section 48 (other officers), and Section 49 (Terms of Office) of the By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that “[t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term.” The phrase “for the next succeeding term” necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the Court held that the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
The Court did not give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws. According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
Clarifying the meaning of the rotation rule, the Court held that In Bar Matter 491 it held that it was “the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors”. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is “merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency”. Thus, the “rotation rule” pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the “automatic succession rule” pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency was but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera’s removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 – in this case, Governor Salazar – who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase “as much as practicable” to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.
In fine, the Court ruled as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
Friday, May 8, 2009
Thursday, May 7, 2009
IBP concerns
In the resolution of the Philippine Supreme Court in re: BAR MATTER No. 1547 (RE: LETTER OF ATTY. JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, IBP, CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESSING CONCERNS OF THE IBP), February 7, 2006, it was reported that in a Letter dated January 24, 2006, Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, the National President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at that time, raised the following concerns of the IBP:
(1) Retirement Plan for Legal Aid Clerks - The IBP proposes to set up a retirement plan for its legal aid clerks to be taken from the legal aid subsidy given by the Court. To cushion its financial impact on the finances of the IBP, it shall take effect five years from approval and be limited to two personnel per year. The retirement plan shall likewise be registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to make it tax free.
(2) Subsidy for the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) - The CBD obtains its funds from the legal aid subsidy given by the Court. For the past five years, however, the average operational expenses of the CBD amounted to about P5 million. In order not to prejudice the IBP's legal aid activities, the IBP appeals that a subsidy be given to the CBD.
(3) IBP as Formal Party in Bar Discipline Cases - In two bar discipline cases appealed to the Court, the IBP claimed that its side was not heard because it was not made a formal party. To ensure that the IBP is given the opportunity to present its side, the IBP suggests that it be made a formal party in all appeals or petitions for review in bar discipline cases brought before the Court.
(4) Lifting of Suspension Order - Most courts require lawyers who have been suspended from the practice of law and who have served out their suspension to submit a certification from the Court that their suspension has been lifted. However, the IBP explained that the delay in securing the certification has the effect of extending the suspension. It requests that judges of the lower courts be directed to allow lawyers whose suspension period has already lapsed to practice before their courts upon proof of such fact without need of a formal certification from the Court.
(5) Resolution of the IBP Leadership Issue - Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz has been holding over the position of IBP National President for almost seven months. He will also be leaving soon for his masteral studies at the Harvard University. So as not to prejudice the next IBP President who will have a limited period to accomplish his projects for the IBP, the IBP requests the Court to resolve the leadership issue.
(6) New Rules on Notaries Public - A number of lawyers with pending bar discipline cases have complained on the refusal of judges to renew their notarial commissions unless they obtain a clearance from the Office of the Bar Confidant. It is the lawyers’ position that they should be presumed innocent until the cases are resolved against them and that they should be allowed to continue their notarial work in the meantime. The IBP requests the Court to clarify this matter.
(7) Payment of Delinquent IBP Dues - While membership in the IBP is mandatory, about 55% of the members do not pay their IBP dues. A great number of these members are public prosecutors, lawyers in the government service and even judges.
The IBP therefore requests that a circular addressed to the judges, prosecutors and all lawyers in the public service be issued by the Court enjoining them to comply with their IBP obligations. This will improve the collection of dues, augment lBP's finances, and make IBP less dependent on the Court subsidy for its legal aid program.
The Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM) made the following recommendations, which the Court duly noted and approved:
(1) To approve the IBP retirement plan subject to the submission of an actuarial study;
(2) To approve the subsidy for the Commission on Bar Discipline subject to the submission of a proposed budget;
(3) To advise the Clerk of Court to make the IBP a formal party in all appeals or petitions for review in bar discipline cases brought before the Court;
(4) To require the Office of the Bar Confidant to comment and recommend a resolution to the issue on lifting of suspension order for referral to the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court;
(5) To require Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz to advise the Court when he would be leaving for his masteral studies at the Harvard University;
(6) To refer the matter on renewal of notarial commissions of lawyers to the
Sub-Committee on Revision of Rules Governing Notaries Public; and
(7) To direct Atty. Edna E. Diño to inquire from the Office of the Court Administrator why the IBP dues of judges are not being paid and to submit her report to the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters.
I wonder what has happened to this matter since 2006.
As far as I know, except for Item No. 5 above (re: Atty. Leonard de Vera’s aborted IBP presidency), no new resolutions or circulars have been issued by the Court on the abovementioned concerns. If there are such actions, the IBP national office and local IBP chapters have not issued formal circulars thereon for the information of its members.
I feel that the Court and the IBP must jointly act swiftly on the unresolved issues and concerns to continue to strengthen the Philippine Bar.
(1) Retirement Plan for Legal Aid Clerks - The IBP proposes to set up a retirement plan for its legal aid clerks to be taken from the legal aid subsidy given by the Court. To cushion its financial impact on the finances of the IBP, it shall take effect five years from approval and be limited to two personnel per year. The retirement plan shall likewise be registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to make it tax free.
(2) Subsidy for the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) - The CBD obtains its funds from the legal aid subsidy given by the Court. For the past five years, however, the average operational expenses of the CBD amounted to about P5 million. In order not to prejudice the IBP's legal aid activities, the IBP appeals that a subsidy be given to the CBD.
(3) IBP as Formal Party in Bar Discipline Cases - In two bar discipline cases appealed to the Court, the IBP claimed that its side was not heard because it was not made a formal party. To ensure that the IBP is given the opportunity to present its side, the IBP suggests that it be made a formal party in all appeals or petitions for review in bar discipline cases brought before the Court.
(4) Lifting of Suspension Order - Most courts require lawyers who have been suspended from the practice of law and who have served out their suspension to submit a certification from the Court that their suspension has been lifted. However, the IBP explained that the delay in securing the certification has the effect of extending the suspension. It requests that judges of the lower courts be directed to allow lawyers whose suspension period has already lapsed to practice before their courts upon proof of such fact without need of a formal certification from the Court.
(5) Resolution of the IBP Leadership Issue - Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz has been holding over the position of IBP National President for almost seven months. He will also be leaving soon for his masteral studies at the Harvard University. So as not to prejudice the next IBP President who will have a limited period to accomplish his projects for the IBP, the IBP requests the Court to resolve the leadership issue.
(6) New Rules on Notaries Public - A number of lawyers with pending bar discipline cases have complained on the refusal of judges to renew their notarial commissions unless they obtain a clearance from the Office of the Bar Confidant. It is the lawyers’ position that they should be presumed innocent until the cases are resolved against them and that they should be allowed to continue their notarial work in the meantime. The IBP requests the Court to clarify this matter.
(7) Payment of Delinquent IBP Dues - While membership in the IBP is mandatory, about 55% of the members do not pay their IBP dues. A great number of these members are public prosecutors, lawyers in the government service and even judges.
The IBP therefore requests that a circular addressed to the judges, prosecutors and all lawyers in the public service be issued by the Court enjoining them to comply with their IBP obligations. This will improve the collection of dues, augment lBP's finances, and make IBP less dependent on the Court subsidy for its legal aid program.
The Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM) made the following recommendations, which the Court duly noted and approved:
(1) To approve the IBP retirement plan subject to the submission of an actuarial study;
(2) To approve the subsidy for the Commission on Bar Discipline subject to the submission of a proposed budget;
(3) To advise the Clerk of Court to make the IBP a formal party in all appeals or petitions for review in bar discipline cases brought before the Court;
(4) To require the Office of the Bar Confidant to comment and recommend a resolution to the issue on lifting of suspension order for referral to the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court;
(5) To require Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz to advise the Court when he would be leaving for his masteral studies at the Harvard University;
(6) To refer the matter on renewal of notarial commissions of lawyers to the
Sub-Committee on Revision of Rules Governing Notaries Public; and
(7) To direct Atty. Edna E. Diño to inquire from the Office of the Court Administrator why the IBP dues of judges are not being paid and to submit her report to the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters.
I wonder what has happened to this matter since 2006.
As far as I know, except for Item No. 5 above (re: Atty. Leonard de Vera’s aborted IBP presidency), no new resolutions or circulars have been issued by the Court on the abovementioned concerns. If there are such actions, the IBP national office and local IBP chapters have not issued formal circulars thereon for the information of its members.
I feel that the Court and the IBP must jointly act swiftly on the unresolved issues and concerns to continue to strengthen the Philippine Bar.
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
Unwritten rule
There is an unwritten rule among pragmatic trial lawyers: “Do not antagonize your trial judge. Adjust to his idiosyncrasies and peculiarities, no matter how odd and irritating they may be. Save your case from retaliation and absolute defeat.”
I admit that as a trial lawyer, whose personal principle is to be patient and calm under all circumstances inside the court room, no matter how trying and difficult they made be, I, too, am guilty of such a “safe attitude” once in a while. For I believe that there is no point in needlessly arguing with the ego-inflated judge who is trying your case and in the process incurring his ire when you can equally and more effectively achieve your professional objective of prosecuting or defending your client’s cause without unnecessary, futile and costly “court room bloodshed”, so to speak.
At any rate, I am proud of the bravery of the Baguio lawyers, led by their chapter president, Atty. Cesar G. Oracion, because they had united to declare, by their courageous and professional deeds, that they were proud and unique exceptions to the abovementioned unwritten rule of pragmatic trial lawyers.
In the case of THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE IBP BAGUIO-BENGUET CHAPTER, CESAR G. ORACION, PRESIDENT vs. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch III, Baguio City, En Banc, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691. January 16, 2004, the Philippine Supreme Court suspended the respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Baguio City, for a period of one (1) year effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the acts subject matter of the said administrative case shall be dealt with more severely, for gross ignorance of the law, gross violation of constitutional rights of the accused, arrogance, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, oppression and graft and corruption.
Parenthetically, I wonder what had happened to the subsequent professional dealings and relationships of the guilty judge and the complaining trial lawyers whose new cases, by unfortunate luck, were raffled to the sala of the guilty judge for adjudication (after the expiration of his suspension period). I am quite sure the guilty judge had a very hard time controlling his humiliated heart and mind from committing acts of vengeance and retaliation against the complaining lawyers. Judges are human beings, too, with their own weaknesses and frailties.
At any rate, let me quote the doctrinal portions of the aforecited decision for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog. Thus:
X x x.
On Gross Ignorance of the Law
The respondent judge’s ignorance of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is palpable. In People vs. Dumez, et al. (Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R up to 15779-R), the respondent judge sentenced the accused who were found guilty of theft to suffer imprisonment “from seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum of prision mayor for each case.” The penalty imposed by the respondent judge was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law which prescribes that the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalty for theft is prision mayor, the minimum of the penalty imposable on the accused should have been within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower to prision mayor.
A perusal of the other decisions rendered by the respondent judge shows that his erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalties was committed in not just one or two instances. Rather, as correctly raised by the complainants, the respondent judge had repeatedly misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in at least seventeen (17) other cases x x x,
X x x,
The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the imposition of penalties in crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code is a basic precept. The respondent judge’s repeated misapplication thereof in quite a number of criminal cases he had rendered constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As this Court has consistently ruled, “a judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.” Indeed, judges are duty bound to have more than a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.” It bears stressing that –
. . . Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law.
The respondent judge has utterly failed to live up to the standard of competence required of him. His erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law committed not just once or twice but in at least seventeen (17) instances is a compelling evidence of his gross ignorance of the law.
On Gross Violation of
the Constitutional Rights
of the Accused
In People vs. Ceferino Baniqued (Criminal Case No. 13949-R) for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the prosecution filed a motion for preventive suspension and the accused filed his opposition thereto. In his Order of August 18, 1998, the respondent judge submitted the said motion for resolution. However, it took the respondent judge more than one (1) year to resolve the same. As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, the delay in resolving this motion constituted violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
In Surla vs. Dimla (Civil Case No. 3322-R), the respondent judge resolved an unopposed motion for reconsideration after almost four (4) months. Again, this contravened the mandate of the Constitution that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases.”
Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:
Rule 1.02. – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 enjoins that:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from dates of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so . . .
Further, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 reads:
6.1. All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts . . .
Conformably with the foregoing mandate, this Court has pronounced –
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end – to promote the ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible representation of the law and justice. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
The unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the motions submitted for his resolution clearly constituted a violation of the parties’ constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases.
On Arrogant, Oppressive
and Improper Conduct and
Violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct
As correctly enumerated by the Investigating Justice, the following incidents establish the respondent judge’s arrogant and oppressive conduct:
a. Arrogance
When he tried to limit the cross examination by Atty. Fernando Manapat Jr., who was representing the accused in People vs. Andrada, of the prosecution witness to ten (10) minutes with an advice of not repeating questions that were already asked during the direct examination;
b. Arrogance and Oppression
Atty. J[o]ris Karl B. Dacaw[i], a young lawyer, who became the beneficiary of respondent’s arrogance and oppressive conduct on 11 March 1999. On said date, Atty. Dacaw[i], as plaintiff’s lawyer, moved for the cancellation of the hearing of the case entitled “Alejo Cabre[r]os vs. Susie Edralin” alleging although his witness Alejo Cabre[r]os was present, said witness however was not feeling well. This simple manifestation caught the ire of respondent judge who instantaneously ordered Alejo Cabre[r]os to stand and told him not to pay his lawyer his attorneys fees because he did not do anything for that day;
c. Oppression and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
1. Atty. Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez, while appearing as counsel de oficio for Liwayway Cruz in Criminal Case No. 7304-R, for estafa last 29 July 1999, was extremely embarrassed when he was ordered by respondent judge to stand in behalf of accused, who was then absent despite due notice, and face the Clerk of Court during the reading of the full text of the decision when said case was called for promulgation. Accordingly, Atty. Agranzamendez asked respondent judge to allow him to take his seat as there were several people inside the courtroom who, being unmindful of the rules might think that he was the accused. But his pleas, however, got respondent mad, for instead of allowing him to sit down, respondent instead banged his gavel and told Atty. Agranzamendez not to argue with the court and to stand straight as he leaned over avoid the glances of the Clerk of Court.
2. Evidence on hand also reveals respondent’s casual disregard of procedural rules, that is, when he promulgated a decision that has yet to be released as shown in the case of People vs. Malapit, et al., docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 15320-R, 15323-R, 15[327]-R and 15571-R and in People vs. Cas, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15306-R.
The behavior of the respondent judge towards Atty. Mandapat, i.e. berating the latter in his cross-examination for repeating the questions already asked during the direct examination, betrayed his impatience in the conduct of the hearing. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of behavior incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.
The respondent’s statement to the client that Atty. Dacawi did not deserve to be paid as he did not do anything during the trial was uncalled for. Further, his act of requiring Atty. Agranzamendez to take the place of the accused during the reading of the decision at the promulgation thereof was improper. These actuations of the respondent judge cannot be countenanced as they clearly violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Rule 3.04. – A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Apropos, this Court has held:
. . . A judge should be courteous both in his conduct and in his language especially to those appearing before him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients, and the public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and remember always that courtesy begets courtesy. Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives no reason for reproach.
Clearly, the respondent judge has failed to observe courtesy and civility to the lawyers as well as to the litigants who appeared before him.
Finally, the Court frowns upon the highly irregular practice of the respondent judge of promulgating a decision, copies of which were not then ready for release to the parties. Consequently, Atty. Lagdao of the PAO, who represented the accused, filed the notices of appeal stating as follows:
In the Malapit case:
. . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the Supreme Court decision of the honorable Court promulgated on 18 September 1999, copies of which the honorable Court has yet to release despite the fact that the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal is about to expire. . .
In the Cas case:
. . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the court of appeals the decision of the honorable Court promulgated on 22 June 1999, a copy of which the Honorable Court has yet to release.. .
What is even more reprehensible were the respondent judge’s directives to Atty. Lagdao to delete the phrase “copies of which the Honorable Court has yet to release” from the notices of appeal otherwise he (the respondent judge) would not act thereon. This conduct of the respondent judge was utterly unbecoming a magistrate and violated the following canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 1 - A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
Rule 1.01. – A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Rule 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
Rule 3.01. - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
On Graft and Corruption
While the Investigating Justice absolved, for insufficiency of evidence, the respondent judge of the charge of graft and corruption in connection with the appointment of Mr. Gula as driver, nonetheless, she found the respondent judge guilty of impropriety. As found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent judge’s recommendation of Mr. Gula to be his driver “despite the latter’s lack of driver’s license and inability to drive not only casts doubt in his integrity but also his honesty as a judge.” Indeed, the personal behavior of the judge, not only while in the performance of his duties but also outside the court must be beyond reproach for he is the visible representation of the law and of justice.
The Court also notes that this is not the respondent’s first administrative case. In Gacayan vs. Pamintuan, the Court found him guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service. Despite the fact that the accused already filed a Demurer to Evidence, the respondent, without resolving the same and in blatant disregard for the rules of criminal procedure, still called witnesses who were not listed in the information as well as those who had already testified to appear before him, resulting in the re-opening of the case with respect to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. When the accused filed a motion for inhibition and a motion to suspend further proceedings, the respondent judge denied the same. He was also seen conferring with the witnesses for the prosecution, and later set the case for hearing without notice to the counsel of the accused. The respondent was meted a fine of P10,000 and sternly warned that a repetition of similar transgressions would be dealt with more severely.
Considering all the foregoing, we find that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year is appropriate.
X x x,
I admit that as a trial lawyer, whose personal principle is to be patient and calm under all circumstances inside the court room, no matter how trying and difficult they made be, I, too, am guilty of such a “safe attitude” once in a while. For I believe that there is no point in needlessly arguing with the ego-inflated judge who is trying your case and in the process incurring his ire when you can equally and more effectively achieve your professional objective of prosecuting or defending your client’s cause without unnecessary, futile and costly “court room bloodshed”, so to speak.
At any rate, I am proud of the bravery of the Baguio lawyers, led by their chapter president, Atty. Cesar G. Oracion, because they had united to declare, by their courageous and professional deeds, that they were proud and unique exceptions to the abovementioned unwritten rule of pragmatic trial lawyers.
In the case of THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE IBP BAGUIO-BENGUET CHAPTER, CESAR G. ORACION, PRESIDENT vs. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch III, Baguio City, En Banc, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691. January 16, 2004, the Philippine Supreme Court suspended the respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Baguio City, for a period of one (1) year effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the acts subject matter of the said administrative case shall be dealt with more severely, for gross ignorance of the law, gross violation of constitutional rights of the accused, arrogance, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, oppression and graft and corruption.
Parenthetically, I wonder what had happened to the subsequent professional dealings and relationships of the guilty judge and the complaining trial lawyers whose new cases, by unfortunate luck, were raffled to the sala of the guilty judge for adjudication (after the expiration of his suspension period). I am quite sure the guilty judge had a very hard time controlling his humiliated heart and mind from committing acts of vengeance and retaliation against the complaining lawyers. Judges are human beings, too, with their own weaknesses and frailties.
At any rate, let me quote the doctrinal portions of the aforecited decision for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog. Thus:
X x x.
On Gross Ignorance of the Law
The respondent judge’s ignorance of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is palpable. In People vs. Dumez, et al. (Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R up to 15779-R), the respondent judge sentenced the accused who were found guilty of theft to suffer imprisonment “from seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum of prision mayor for each case.” The penalty imposed by the respondent judge was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law which prescribes that the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalty for theft is prision mayor, the minimum of the penalty imposable on the accused should have been within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower to prision mayor.
A perusal of the other decisions rendered by the respondent judge shows that his erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalties was committed in not just one or two instances. Rather, as correctly raised by the complainants, the respondent judge had repeatedly misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in at least seventeen (17) other cases x x x,
X x x,
The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the imposition of penalties in crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code is a basic precept. The respondent judge’s repeated misapplication thereof in quite a number of criminal cases he had rendered constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As this Court has consistently ruled, “a judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.” Indeed, judges are duty bound to have more than a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.” It bears stressing that –
. . . Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law.
The respondent judge has utterly failed to live up to the standard of competence required of him. His erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law committed not just once or twice but in at least seventeen (17) instances is a compelling evidence of his gross ignorance of the law.
On Gross Violation of
the Constitutional Rights
of the Accused
In People vs. Ceferino Baniqued (Criminal Case No. 13949-R) for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the prosecution filed a motion for preventive suspension and the accused filed his opposition thereto. In his Order of August 18, 1998, the respondent judge submitted the said motion for resolution. However, it took the respondent judge more than one (1) year to resolve the same. As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, the delay in resolving this motion constituted violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
In Surla vs. Dimla (Civil Case No. 3322-R), the respondent judge resolved an unopposed motion for reconsideration after almost four (4) months. Again, this contravened the mandate of the Constitution that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases.”
Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:
Rule 1.02. – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 enjoins that:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from dates of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so . . .
Further, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 reads:
6.1. All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts . . .
Conformably with the foregoing mandate, this Court has pronounced –
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end – to promote the ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible representation of the law and justice. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
The unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the motions submitted for his resolution clearly constituted a violation of the parties’ constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases.
On Arrogant, Oppressive
and Improper Conduct and
Violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct
As correctly enumerated by the Investigating Justice, the following incidents establish the respondent judge’s arrogant and oppressive conduct:
a. Arrogance
When he tried to limit the cross examination by Atty. Fernando Manapat Jr., who was representing the accused in People vs. Andrada, of the prosecution witness to ten (10) minutes with an advice of not repeating questions that were already asked during the direct examination;
b. Arrogance and Oppression
Atty. J[o]ris Karl B. Dacaw[i], a young lawyer, who became the beneficiary of respondent’s arrogance and oppressive conduct on 11 March 1999. On said date, Atty. Dacaw[i], as plaintiff’s lawyer, moved for the cancellation of the hearing of the case entitled “Alejo Cabre[r]os vs. Susie Edralin” alleging although his witness Alejo Cabre[r]os was present, said witness however was not feeling well. This simple manifestation caught the ire of respondent judge who instantaneously ordered Alejo Cabre[r]os to stand and told him not to pay his lawyer his attorneys fees because he did not do anything for that day;
c. Oppression and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
1. Atty. Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez, while appearing as counsel de oficio for Liwayway Cruz in Criminal Case No. 7304-R, for estafa last 29 July 1999, was extremely embarrassed when he was ordered by respondent judge to stand in behalf of accused, who was then absent despite due notice, and face the Clerk of Court during the reading of the full text of the decision when said case was called for promulgation. Accordingly, Atty. Agranzamendez asked respondent judge to allow him to take his seat as there were several people inside the courtroom who, being unmindful of the rules might think that he was the accused. But his pleas, however, got respondent mad, for instead of allowing him to sit down, respondent instead banged his gavel and told Atty. Agranzamendez not to argue with the court and to stand straight as he leaned over avoid the glances of the Clerk of Court.
2. Evidence on hand also reveals respondent’s casual disregard of procedural rules, that is, when he promulgated a decision that has yet to be released as shown in the case of People vs. Malapit, et al., docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 15320-R, 15323-R, 15[327]-R and 15571-R and in People vs. Cas, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15306-R.
The behavior of the respondent judge towards Atty. Mandapat, i.e. berating the latter in his cross-examination for repeating the questions already asked during the direct examination, betrayed his impatience in the conduct of the hearing. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of behavior incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.
The respondent’s statement to the client that Atty. Dacawi did not deserve to be paid as he did not do anything during the trial was uncalled for. Further, his act of requiring Atty. Agranzamendez to take the place of the accused during the reading of the decision at the promulgation thereof was improper. These actuations of the respondent judge cannot be countenanced as they clearly violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Rule 3.04. – A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Apropos, this Court has held:
. . . A judge should be courteous both in his conduct and in his language especially to those appearing before him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients, and the public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and remember always that courtesy begets courtesy. Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives no reason for reproach.
Clearly, the respondent judge has failed to observe courtesy and civility to the lawyers as well as to the litigants who appeared before him.
Finally, the Court frowns upon the highly irregular practice of the respondent judge of promulgating a decision, copies of which were not then ready for release to the parties. Consequently, Atty. Lagdao of the PAO, who represented the accused, filed the notices of appeal stating as follows:
In the Malapit case:
. . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the Supreme Court decision of the honorable Court promulgated on 18 September 1999, copies of which the honorable Court has yet to release despite the fact that the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal is about to expire. . .
In the Cas case:
. . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the court of appeals the decision of the honorable Court promulgated on 22 June 1999, a copy of which the Honorable Court has yet to release.. .
What is even more reprehensible were the respondent judge’s directives to Atty. Lagdao to delete the phrase “copies of which the Honorable Court has yet to release” from the notices of appeal otherwise he (the respondent judge) would not act thereon. This conduct of the respondent judge was utterly unbecoming a magistrate and violated the following canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 1 - A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
Rule 1.01. – A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Rule 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
Rule 3.01. - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
On Graft and Corruption
While the Investigating Justice absolved, for insufficiency of evidence, the respondent judge of the charge of graft and corruption in connection with the appointment of Mr. Gula as driver, nonetheless, she found the respondent judge guilty of impropriety. As found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent judge’s recommendation of Mr. Gula to be his driver “despite the latter’s lack of driver’s license and inability to drive not only casts doubt in his integrity but also his honesty as a judge.” Indeed, the personal behavior of the judge, not only while in the performance of his duties but also outside the court must be beyond reproach for he is the visible representation of the law and of justice.
The Court also notes that this is not the respondent’s first administrative case. In Gacayan vs. Pamintuan, the Court found him guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service. Despite the fact that the accused already filed a Demurer to Evidence, the respondent, without resolving the same and in blatant disregard for the rules of criminal procedure, still called witnesses who were not listed in the information as well as those who had already testified to appear before him, resulting in the re-opening of the case with respect to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. When the accused filed a motion for inhibition and a motion to suspend further proceedings, the respondent judge denied the same. He was also seen conferring with the witnesses for the prosecution, and later set the case for hearing without notice to the counsel of the accused. The respondent was meted a fine of P10,000 and sternly warned that a repetition of similar transgressions would be dealt with more severely.
Considering all the foregoing, we find that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year is appropriate.
X x x,
Vigilant court workers
Whenever I read decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court showing the vigilance and moral courage of ordinary (underpaid and overworked) court personnel in exposing and opposing the corrupt and abusive behavior of egocentric, deluded and selfish judges, I regain and salvage my sagging faith in our much-maligned justice system. The system is not hopeless.
In the case of CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE RTC OF DAGUPAN CITY vs. JUDGE ERNA FALLORAN-ALIPOSA, En Banc & Per Curiam, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1446. March 9, 2000, the Court dismissed the respondent Judge Erna Falloran-Aliposa (a law professor in law schools in the City of Manila and Dagupan City, Pangasinan) from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality for various acts of gross dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Let me quote the salient parts of the said decision for purposes of legal research of the visitors of this blog. Thus:
X x x.
In a Resolution dated June 22, 1999 the Court En Banc x x x referred the matter to Appellate Court Associate Justice Marina Buzon for investigation. X x x.
The Investigating Justice, acting accordingly, conducted the investigation and thereafter submitted her report and recommendation. In her Report dated January 12, 2000, Justice Buzon stated that:
In their memorandum, complainants confined their discussion on the alleged corrupt practices of respondent in demanding money from Leo Tandoc in connection with the case of his brother and from Atty. Mario Cera after the ex-parte presentation of evidence and who likewise gave P500.00 for the snacks of judges during the dialogue with the Chief Justice, as well as respondent’s claim that the telephone calls of her son, Jason, were official in order to be able to charge the same against the funds of the city government.
1.....Leo Tandoc testified that on August 3, 1993, respondent demanded P5,000.00 from him in order that his brother, Orlando, a detention prisoner, would not stay longer in jail, and that he gave the money to respondent the following day. It appears that a demurrer to evidence was filed by the counsel of Orlando Tandoc, who was prosecuted for theft, in view of the insufficiency of the evidence against him. In an order dated August 3, 1998, respondent dismissed the case against Orlando Tandoc on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution was insufficient to sustain a conviction. However, said Order did not contain a directive to the Jail Warden to release Orlando Tandoc from detention, unless he is being held for another lawful cause. Upon clarificatory questions by the undersigned Investigator, respondent admitted that she does not state in the order granting demurrer to evidence that the accused, who is a detention prisoner, be released unless held in confinement for another lawful cause, and that the defense counsel has to file a motion for the release of the accused. It is elementary that upon acquittal of a detention prisoner or the dismissal of the case against him by way of demurrer to evidence, he is entitled to be released from detention in connection with said particular case, considering that there is no more reason to deprive him of his liberty. A judge need not wait for a motion to be filed by the defense counsel praying for the release of the detention prisoner, especially considering that an order granting demurrer to evidence is not promulgated in open court and it might take some time before the defense counsel could receive a copy thereof through the mails. Notwithstanding a judgment of acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case, the Jail Warden will not release a detention prisoner without an order of release from the court which ordered the latter's detention. In view thereof, the order directing the release from detention of an accused upon his acquittal or dismissal of the case against him is usually included in the dispositive portion of the decision or order, a copy of which is furnished the Jail Warden.
The admission by respondent that it is not her policy to incorporate in the order granting demurrer to evidence and dismissing the case against the accused, who is a detention prisoner, that the latter be released unless held for another lawful cause, and that she only issued the order of release upon the filing of a motion to that effect does not speak well of respondent who has been a judge since 1992 and is also a professor handling Criminal Law Review. The fact that respondent delayed the issuance of the order of release of Orlando Tandoc supports the claim of Leo Tandoc that she demanded money from him, which he was forced to give, in order that his brother, Orlando, would not stay longer in jail.
X x x,
2. Atty. Mario Cera affirmed that on March 25, 1999, he was approached by Gloria Ydia who told him that she was instructed by respondent to solicit money for the snacks for the dialogue of RTC Judges of Region I. He gave P500.00 to Gloria Ydia and the latter entered the chambers of respondent. Gloria Ydia testified that she handed to respondent the P500.00 given to her by Atty. Cera and that she likewise approached Attys. Albino Gonzales and Fernando Cabrera and informed them that she was asked by respondent to solicit money from lawyers for the snacks of judges from Region I who would attend the dialogue with the Chief justice on March 26, 1999, after which said lawyers proceeded to the chambers of respondent. Attys. Gonzales and Cabrera did not testify to refute said allegations to Gloria Ydia. Thus, the affidavit of Atty. Gonzales denying that he gave something for the dialogue with the Chief Justice was denied admission as evidence for being hearsay.
Atty. Cera further stated that after he presented evidence ex-parte before respondent in her chambers in the case of Rural Bank of San Jacinto, Inc. vs. Armando Chan, respondent told him to give her P1,500.00, which he did, and that the stenographer did not demand anything from him and he thought that the amount of P1,500.00, included the fees for the transcript of stenographic notes.
X x x.
The acts of respondent in demanding and receiving money from Leo Tandoc as a condition for the release from detention of his brother, Orlando, although the case against the latter had already been dismissed, and also from Atty. Cera after the reception of the latter's evidence ex-parte constitute serious misconduct in office. A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice quickly, which erodes the respect for law and the courts.
Furthermore, the undersigned has noted irregularities in the proceedings in the following cases involving ex-parte presentation of evidence, as borne out by the records brought by complainants, to wit:
a) Civil Case No. 97-01545-D
On August 5, 1998, respondent rendered, a decision wherein it is stated that at the ex-parte hearing, plaintiff's witness testified and identified the promissory note, chattel mortgage and demand letter, marked as Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", respectively. However, the formal offer of exhibits was received by the court only on August 18, 1998 and the documents attached thereto do not appear to have been marked as Exhibits "A", "B" and "C".
b) Civil Case No. 97-01963-D
The decision is dated August 11, 1998 whereas the formal offer of exhibits was received by the court only on August 18, 1998, without any exhibit attached thereto.
c) Civil Case No. 95-02306-D
The decision is dated September 14, 1998 whereas the offer of evidence was received by the court only on September 16, 1998 with only the promissory, note, allegedly marked. as Exhibit "A", attached thereto but the same was not so marked.
d) Civil Case No. 97-02012-D
The decision is dated August 10, 1998 whereas the formal offer of exhibits was received by the court only on August 18, 1998 without any exhibits attached thereto.
e) Civil Case No. 98-02205
The documents attached to the formal offer of exhibits do not bear any exhibit marking.
f) Civil Case No. 98-02177-D
The presentation of ex-parte evidence was originally set on July 29, 1998 but was reset to July 31, 1998 and thereafter to August 12, 1998 but the formal offer of exhibits is dated July 30, 1998, although it was received by the court only on August 18, 1998, without any exhibit attached thereto.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. In Civil Cases Nos. 97-01545-D, 97-01963-D, 98-02306-D and 97-02012-D, respondent rendered judgment even before the evidence allegedly presented during the ex-parte proceedings were formally offered. Inasmuch as respondent required the plaintiff to present evidence, she should have waited for the formal offer of said evidence before rendering judgment.
Moreover, respondent admitted that she conducted the ex-parte presentation of evidence inside her chambers with only the plaintiff's representative and counsel present and without the attendance of any member of her staff; that she merely jotted down in a yellow pad the manifestations made by counsel and that she asked plaintiff's representative to show the documents in support of the complaint. Respondent did not testify that she marked the documents shown by plaintiff's representative, which probably explains why the documents attached to the formal offer of exhibits filed in some of the cases do not bear any marking.
Respondent apparently had forgotten that she was presiding in a court of record where the attendance of the court interpreter and stenographer in all proceedings is required. Under the Manual for Clerks of Court, the interpreter has the duty to attend all court hearings, administer oath to witnesses, mark all exhibits introduced in evidence, prepare and sign all minutes of session, maintain and keep in custody a record book of cases calendared for hearing; while the stenographer is charged with taking stenographic notes on all matters that transpire during court hearings and transcribing them. One can only surmise what transpired inside the chambers of respondent during the ex-parte presentation of evidence which she did not want her interpreter and stenographer to witness. Respondent argued that there was no need for a stenographer during the ex-parte presentation of evidence because there were only three or four statements made by counsel, which she jotted down in a yellow pad, and that her stenographers were demanding P500.00 for a single-paged transcript of stenographic notes. Respondent did not explain, however, why she did not ask her interpreter to attend the hearing for the purpose of administering oath to plaintiff's witness and marking the exhibits to be introduced in evidence. Consequently, the documents allegedly introduced in evidence in said proceeding were not marked. In Contreras vs. Solis, it was stressed that the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. He has the avowed duty of promoting confidence in the judicial system. Any act which would give the appearance of impropriety is in itself reprehensible. This is the price which must be paid by one who joins the judiciary. Such practice of respondent in conducting ex-parte presentation of evidence inside her chambers, without the attendance of her interpreter and stenographer, is not only improper but also gives rise to questions on her integrity.
X x x.
However, the undersigned does not believe that complainants were motivated by ill-will against respondent for being strict with them and for disciplining them. Thus, Ever Mejia explained that she wants respondent to be removed from Branch 41, not because the latter was strict and had reprimanded her, but because she cannot stand respondent's practices, she pities the litigants who cannot obtain justice and she wants to help cleanse the judiciary. Besides, complainants cannot be sure that if respondent is removed from their Branch, the latter's replacement will not be as strict with them. In the case of Gloria Ydia, she had the courage to testify against respondent despite her awareness that the latter was imputing immoral, illegal and corrupt practices against her, as detailed in the Answer. In fact, respondent subsequently filed an administrative case against Gloria Ydia and Judge Deodoro Sison for grave misconduct and immorality.
Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, mere preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges against a judge. As thus shown by the evidence, respondent has failed to measure up to the exacting standards of conduct and integrity expected of members of the judiciary, as embodied in the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
"CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
As held in office of the Court Administrator vs. Barron:
"Respondent judge tainted the image of the Judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all times unsullied and, worthy 'of the people's trust. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. Respondent judge does not deserve to remain in the Judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the service."
X x x.
The Court fully agrees with Justice Buzon in her Report and thus adopts her recommendations. This Court "[h]as repeatedly stressed that a judge is the visible representation of the law and the embodiment of the people's sense of justice and that, accordingly, he should constantly keep away from any act of impropriety, not only in the performance of his official duties but also his everyday actuations. No other position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than perhaps a seat in the judiciary. A judge must be the first to abide by the law and to weave an example for the others to follow." A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. As more emphatically stated in Atty. Lauro Gacayan, et al. v. Hon. Fernando Vil Pamintuan:
...the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa that the (p)eople’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
‘CANON 2 -- A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
X x x.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides that: `[A] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also his everyday life should be beyond reproach.' Thus, the Court in taking the respondent to task in Sarah .B. Vedana v. Judge Eudarlo B. Valencia, minced no words when it said:
...his being a public official, holding a position in the Judiciary specifically entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice, breached Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandate respectively, that `a judge should avoid impropriety in all activities', and that `a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach.’ These most exacting standards of decorum are demanded from the magistrates if only, in the language of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the code of Judicial conduct, to ‘promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.’
The spirit and philosophy underlying these Canons is best expressed in Castillo v. Calanog thus:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of even a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his judicial juties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat with on the Bench. Within the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of government, especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities in which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench from the unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar’s wife, should be above suspicion.
This admonition applies with even more stringence to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges, like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiment of the people’s sense of justice. Verily –
The courts exist to promote justice; accordingly, the judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of his official duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. He is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository [of] power, but a judge under the sanction of Law.
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds that exhortation that "[T]he administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This should not come to pass."
The evidence before us is a sad testament to respondent’s utter disregard of such a mission as well as an appalling demonstration of gross abuse and misuse of judicial prerogatives. Restating what has been said earlier, a member of the Judiciary is commanded by law to exhibit the highest degree of moral certitude and is bound by the highest standards of honesty and integrity. Life, liberty, and property are defined and molded as judges perform their sworn tasks to uphold the law and to administer justice. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who can not meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This court has been watchful of dishonest judges and will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
X x x.
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
lcmlaw@gmail.com
In the case of CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE RTC OF DAGUPAN CITY vs. JUDGE ERNA FALLORAN-ALIPOSA, En Banc & Per Curiam, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1446. March 9, 2000, the Court dismissed the respondent Judge Erna Falloran-Aliposa (a law professor in law schools in the City of Manila and Dagupan City, Pangasinan) from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality for various acts of gross dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Let me quote the salient parts of the said decision for purposes of legal research of the visitors of this blog. Thus:
X x x.
In a Resolution dated June 22, 1999 the Court En Banc x x x referred the matter to Appellate Court Associate Justice Marina Buzon for investigation. X x x.
The Investigating Justice, acting accordingly, conducted the investigation and thereafter submitted her report and recommendation. In her Report dated January 12, 2000, Justice Buzon stated that:
In their memorandum, complainants confined their discussion on the alleged corrupt practices of respondent in demanding money from Leo Tandoc in connection with the case of his brother and from Atty. Mario Cera after the ex-parte presentation of evidence and who likewise gave P500.00 for the snacks of judges during the dialogue with the Chief Justice, as well as respondent’s claim that the telephone calls of her son, Jason, were official in order to be able to charge the same against the funds of the city government.
1.....Leo Tandoc testified that on August 3, 1993, respondent demanded P5,000.00 from him in order that his brother, Orlando, a detention prisoner, would not stay longer in jail, and that he gave the money to respondent the following day. It appears that a demurrer to evidence was filed by the counsel of Orlando Tandoc, who was prosecuted for theft, in view of the insufficiency of the evidence against him. In an order dated August 3, 1998, respondent dismissed the case against Orlando Tandoc on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution was insufficient to sustain a conviction. However, said Order did not contain a directive to the Jail Warden to release Orlando Tandoc from detention, unless he is being held for another lawful cause. Upon clarificatory questions by the undersigned Investigator, respondent admitted that she does not state in the order granting demurrer to evidence that the accused, who is a detention prisoner, be released unless held in confinement for another lawful cause, and that the defense counsel has to file a motion for the release of the accused. It is elementary that upon acquittal of a detention prisoner or the dismissal of the case against him by way of demurrer to evidence, he is entitled to be released from detention in connection with said particular case, considering that there is no more reason to deprive him of his liberty. A judge need not wait for a motion to be filed by the defense counsel praying for the release of the detention prisoner, especially considering that an order granting demurrer to evidence is not promulgated in open court and it might take some time before the defense counsel could receive a copy thereof through the mails. Notwithstanding a judgment of acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case, the Jail Warden will not release a detention prisoner without an order of release from the court which ordered the latter's detention. In view thereof, the order directing the release from detention of an accused upon his acquittal or dismissal of the case against him is usually included in the dispositive portion of the decision or order, a copy of which is furnished the Jail Warden.
The admission by respondent that it is not her policy to incorporate in the order granting demurrer to evidence and dismissing the case against the accused, who is a detention prisoner, that the latter be released unless held for another lawful cause, and that she only issued the order of release upon the filing of a motion to that effect does not speak well of respondent who has been a judge since 1992 and is also a professor handling Criminal Law Review. The fact that respondent delayed the issuance of the order of release of Orlando Tandoc supports the claim of Leo Tandoc that she demanded money from him, which he was forced to give, in order that his brother, Orlando, would not stay longer in jail.
X x x,
2. Atty. Mario Cera affirmed that on March 25, 1999, he was approached by Gloria Ydia who told him that she was instructed by respondent to solicit money for the snacks for the dialogue of RTC Judges of Region I. He gave P500.00 to Gloria Ydia and the latter entered the chambers of respondent. Gloria Ydia testified that she handed to respondent the P500.00 given to her by Atty. Cera and that she likewise approached Attys. Albino Gonzales and Fernando Cabrera and informed them that she was asked by respondent to solicit money from lawyers for the snacks of judges from Region I who would attend the dialogue with the Chief justice on March 26, 1999, after which said lawyers proceeded to the chambers of respondent. Attys. Gonzales and Cabrera did not testify to refute said allegations to Gloria Ydia. Thus, the affidavit of Atty. Gonzales denying that he gave something for the dialogue with the Chief Justice was denied admission as evidence for being hearsay.
Atty. Cera further stated that after he presented evidence ex-parte before respondent in her chambers in the case of Rural Bank of San Jacinto, Inc. vs. Armando Chan, respondent told him to give her P1,500.00, which he did, and that the stenographer did not demand anything from him and he thought that the amount of P1,500.00, included the fees for the transcript of stenographic notes.
X x x.
The acts of respondent in demanding and receiving money from Leo Tandoc as a condition for the release from detention of his brother, Orlando, although the case against the latter had already been dismissed, and also from Atty. Cera after the reception of the latter's evidence ex-parte constitute serious misconduct in office. A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice quickly, which erodes the respect for law and the courts.
Furthermore, the undersigned has noted irregularities in the proceedings in the following cases involving ex-parte presentation of evidence, as borne out by the records brought by complainants, to wit:
a) Civil Case No. 97-01545-D
On August 5, 1998, respondent rendered, a decision wherein it is stated that at the ex-parte hearing, plaintiff's witness testified and identified the promissory note, chattel mortgage and demand letter, marked as Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", respectively. However, the formal offer of exhibits was received by the court only on August 18, 1998 and the documents attached thereto do not appear to have been marked as Exhibits "A", "B" and "C".
b) Civil Case No. 97-01963-D
The decision is dated August 11, 1998 whereas the formal offer of exhibits was received by the court only on August 18, 1998, without any exhibit attached thereto.
c) Civil Case No. 95-02306-D
The decision is dated September 14, 1998 whereas the offer of evidence was received by the court only on September 16, 1998 with only the promissory, note, allegedly marked. as Exhibit "A", attached thereto but the same was not so marked.
d) Civil Case No. 97-02012-D
The decision is dated August 10, 1998 whereas the formal offer of exhibits was received by the court only on August 18, 1998 without any exhibits attached thereto.
e) Civil Case No. 98-02205
The documents attached to the formal offer of exhibits do not bear any exhibit marking.
f) Civil Case No. 98-02177-D
The presentation of ex-parte evidence was originally set on July 29, 1998 but was reset to July 31, 1998 and thereafter to August 12, 1998 but the formal offer of exhibits is dated July 30, 1998, although it was received by the court only on August 18, 1998, without any exhibit attached thereto.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. In Civil Cases Nos. 97-01545-D, 97-01963-D, 98-02306-D and 97-02012-D, respondent rendered judgment even before the evidence allegedly presented during the ex-parte proceedings were formally offered. Inasmuch as respondent required the plaintiff to present evidence, she should have waited for the formal offer of said evidence before rendering judgment.
Moreover, respondent admitted that she conducted the ex-parte presentation of evidence inside her chambers with only the plaintiff's representative and counsel present and without the attendance of any member of her staff; that she merely jotted down in a yellow pad the manifestations made by counsel and that she asked plaintiff's representative to show the documents in support of the complaint. Respondent did not testify that she marked the documents shown by plaintiff's representative, which probably explains why the documents attached to the formal offer of exhibits filed in some of the cases do not bear any marking.
Respondent apparently had forgotten that she was presiding in a court of record where the attendance of the court interpreter and stenographer in all proceedings is required. Under the Manual for Clerks of Court, the interpreter has the duty to attend all court hearings, administer oath to witnesses, mark all exhibits introduced in evidence, prepare and sign all minutes of session, maintain and keep in custody a record book of cases calendared for hearing; while the stenographer is charged with taking stenographic notes on all matters that transpire during court hearings and transcribing them. One can only surmise what transpired inside the chambers of respondent during the ex-parte presentation of evidence which she did not want her interpreter and stenographer to witness. Respondent argued that there was no need for a stenographer during the ex-parte presentation of evidence because there were only three or four statements made by counsel, which she jotted down in a yellow pad, and that her stenographers were demanding P500.00 for a single-paged transcript of stenographic notes. Respondent did not explain, however, why she did not ask her interpreter to attend the hearing for the purpose of administering oath to plaintiff's witness and marking the exhibits to be introduced in evidence. Consequently, the documents allegedly introduced in evidence in said proceeding were not marked. In Contreras vs. Solis, it was stressed that the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. He has the avowed duty of promoting confidence in the judicial system. Any act which would give the appearance of impropriety is in itself reprehensible. This is the price which must be paid by one who joins the judiciary. Such practice of respondent in conducting ex-parte presentation of evidence inside her chambers, without the attendance of her interpreter and stenographer, is not only improper but also gives rise to questions on her integrity.
X x x.
However, the undersigned does not believe that complainants were motivated by ill-will against respondent for being strict with them and for disciplining them. Thus, Ever Mejia explained that she wants respondent to be removed from Branch 41, not because the latter was strict and had reprimanded her, but because she cannot stand respondent's practices, she pities the litigants who cannot obtain justice and she wants to help cleanse the judiciary. Besides, complainants cannot be sure that if respondent is removed from their Branch, the latter's replacement will not be as strict with them. In the case of Gloria Ydia, she had the courage to testify against respondent despite her awareness that the latter was imputing immoral, illegal and corrupt practices against her, as detailed in the Answer. In fact, respondent subsequently filed an administrative case against Gloria Ydia and Judge Deodoro Sison for grave misconduct and immorality.
Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, mere preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges against a judge. As thus shown by the evidence, respondent has failed to measure up to the exacting standards of conduct and integrity expected of members of the judiciary, as embodied in the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
"CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
As held in office of the Court Administrator vs. Barron:
"Respondent judge tainted the image of the Judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all times unsullied and, worthy 'of the people's trust. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. Respondent judge does not deserve to remain in the Judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the service."
X x x.
The Court fully agrees with Justice Buzon in her Report and thus adopts her recommendations. This Court "[h]as repeatedly stressed that a judge is the visible representation of the law and the embodiment of the people's sense of justice and that, accordingly, he should constantly keep away from any act of impropriety, not only in the performance of his official duties but also his everyday actuations. No other position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than perhaps a seat in the judiciary. A judge must be the first to abide by the law and to weave an example for the others to follow." A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. As more emphatically stated in Atty. Lauro Gacayan, et al. v. Hon. Fernando Vil Pamintuan:
...the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa that the (p)eople’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
‘CANON 2 -- A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
X x x.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides that: `[A] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also his everyday life should be beyond reproach.' Thus, the Court in taking the respondent to task in Sarah .B. Vedana v. Judge Eudarlo B. Valencia, minced no words when it said:
...his being a public official, holding a position in the Judiciary specifically entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice, breached Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandate respectively, that `a judge should avoid impropriety in all activities', and that `a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach.’ These most exacting standards of decorum are demanded from the magistrates if only, in the language of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the code of Judicial conduct, to ‘promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.’
The spirit and philosophy underlying these Canons is best expressed in Castillo v. Calanog thus:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of even a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his judicial juties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat with on the Bench. Within the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of government, especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities in which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench from the unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar’s wife, should be above suspicion.
This admonition applies with even more stringence to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges, like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiment of the people’s sense of justice. Verily –
The courts exist to promote justice; accordingly, the judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of his official duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. He is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository [of] power, but a judge under the sanction of Law.
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds that exhortation that "[T]he administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This should not come to pass."
The evidence before us is a sad testament to respondent’s utter disregard of such a mission as well as an appalling demonstration of gross abuse and misuse of judicial prerogatives. Restating what has been said earlier, a member of the Judiciary is commanded by law to exhibit the highest degree of moral certitude and is bound by the highest standards of honesty and integrity. Life, liberty, and property are defined and molded as judges perform their sworn tasks to uphold the law and to administer justice. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who can not meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This court has been watchful of dishonest judges and will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
X x x.
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
lcmlaw@gmail.com
Monday, May 4, 2009
Dead law partners
The bad habit of some big law firms of using the prominent names of their deceased partners, for law firm marketing purposes, was ended by the Philippine Supreme Court in the old case of PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME, etc., et. al., En Banc, July 30, 1979, where the Court “advised” the petitioners to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names, i.e., "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes". Those names may, however, “be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such”.
We should note the important pronouncements of the Court in the said case.
Art. 1815 of the Civil Code (partnership) provides that every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners. Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability.
In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner.
Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. "
Neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, the same does not apply in the instant case.
The article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers.
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, since the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115).
On the other hand, a professional partnership the reputation of which depends on the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset.
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy.
A partnership for the practice of law is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property." Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is “in the nature of a privilege or franchise”. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust."
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active members.
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one.
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."
We should note the important pronouncements of the Court in the said case.
Art. 1815 of the Civil Code (partnership) provides that every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners. Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability.
In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner.
Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. "
Neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, the same does not apply in the instant case.
The article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers.
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, since the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115).
On the other hand, a professional partnership the reputation of which depends on the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset.
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy.
A partnership for the practice of law is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property." Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is “in the nature of a privilege or franchise”. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust."
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active members.
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one.
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."
Vigilance of FEU law students
As a law alumnus of the Institute of Law of Far Eastern University (FEU), Manila, I feel proud for the vigilance of FEU law students who initiated B.M. 1217, January 18, 2005 (Rolando O. Eco, et al. vs. John L. Choa.), where the Philippine Supreme Court held the respondent John L. Choa in contempt of court and fined him Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), with imprisonment until full payment, for misrepresenting himself as an “Atty.” in his social and business dealings.
Let me digest the said decision.
At issue was the alleged unauthorized and contumacious use by respondent John L. Choa of the title "Atty." without having actually been admitted to the Philippine bar.
The complainants were students of the Far Eastern University (FEU) Institute of Law who learned that respondent has been holding himself out as a lawyer for many years without obtaining a license from the Supreme Court to practice law. Complainants likewise alleged that respondent has been advertising the name of his supposed law firm, Choa Montilla Albeza & Associates Law Offices, with himself as senior partner. As President of the Printing Industries Association of the Philippines (PIAP), respondent was also misrepresenting himself as a full-fledged lawyer by signing the official documents of the PIAP as "Atty. John L. Choa."
Putting up a lame and ridiculous excuse, in his Comment, the respondent admitted the use of "Atty." although he was not a member of the bar. He explained that he did so in good faith, believing that the title is synonymous with the word "lawyer," hence, "he could use said title." He stated that he never engaged in the practice of law and the firm he was connected with never practiced law. Now that he realized that the word "attorney" has a technical and legal meaning, reserved only for those who are licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law, respondent has informed the Court that he is voluntarily desisting from using the title since the filing of this complaint.
Respondent, although a law graduate of the FEU Institute of Law, never took the bar. He had no right to use the title "Atty." which others have earned through rigorous and serious effort. Likewise, he had no right to represent himself as a law practitioner with a law firm under his name.
The Court held that the respondent's defense that he used the title "Atty." in good faith did not exonerate him from liability. Respondent should know that a mere law graduate was not entitled to use the title "Atty." and practice law unless and until he passes the bar and meets the requirements of the Rules of Court. Lastly, his voluntary desistance from using the title did not mitigate his liability either. Falsely claiming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes contempt of court. (See Rule 138 in relation to Rule 71, Rules of Court)
Let me digest the said decision.
At issue was the alleged unauthorized and contumacious use by respondent John L. Choa of the title "Atty." without having actually been admitted to the Philippine bar.
The complainants were students of the Far Eastern University (FEU) Institute of Law who learned that respondent has been holding himself out as a lawyer for many years without obtaining a license from the Supreme Court to practice law. Complainants likewise alleged that respondent has been advertising the name of his supposed law firm, Choa Montilla Albeza & Associates Law Offices, with himself as senior partner. As President of the Printing Industries Association of the Philippines (PIAP), respondent was also misrepresenting himself as a full-fledged lawyer by signing the official documents of the PIAP as "Atty. John L. Choa."
Putting up a lame and ridiculous excuse, in his Comment, the respondent admitted the use of "Atty." although he was not a member of the bar. He explained that he did so in good faith, believing that the title is synonymous with the word "lawyer," hence, "he could use said title." He stated that he never engaged in the practice of law and the firm he was connected with never practiced law. Now that he realized that the word "attorney" has a technical and legal meaning, reserved only for those who are licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law, respondent has informed the Court that he is voluntarily desisting from using the title since the filing of this complaint.
Respondent, although a law graduate of the FEU Institute of Law, never took the bar. He had no right to use the title "Atty." which others have earned through rigorous and serious effort. Likewise, he had no right to represent himself as a law practitioner with a law firm under his name.
The Court held that the respondent's defense that he used the title "Atty." in good faith did not exonerate him from liability. Respondent should know that a mere law graduate was not entitled to use the title "Atty." and practice law unless and until he passes the bar and meets the requirements of the Rules of Court. Lastly, his voluntary desistance from using the title did not mitigate his liability either. Falsely claiming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes contempt of court. (See Rule 138 in relation to Rule 71, Rules of Court)
LGU allowances for judges: morality vs. pragmatism.
It is now the policy of the Supreme Court to impliedly encourage local government units to institutionalize the methodology and mechanism for the grant of additional allowances to local judges, citing the Local Government Code of 1991 as its legal basis, notwithstanding the negative comments of some sectors questioning the morality of such an arrangement because it tends to undermine the independence of the judiciary.
The Court has to be pragmatic. The judiciary is not receiving enough money from the national budget. My recollection is that the annual funds for the judiciary is only about one percent (1%) of the national budget. Until such time that the Constitution is amended to give flesh to the constitutional doctrine of “judicial autonomy”, the Court has to swallow its pride and sense of nobility, and in dignified manner, “beg” from the local governments for the additional allowances of local judges.
A recent news item from the Philippine Supreme Court website (judiciary.gov.ph) reported that the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and the Cebu City local government had signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) last March binding the city to contribute PhP1M for the establishment of the Local Government Unit-Judiciary Equalization Fund (LGU-JEF) (a beautiful euphemism)"to equalize the allocation or dispensation of allowances to judiciary members which local government units (LGUs) may allocate in their budgets".
The LGU-JEF will be "exclusively administered and managed by the High Court", which shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the orderly administration and management and equitable distribution of the LGU-JEF.
The Cebu City government has committed to contribute annually to the LGU-JEF to replenish the PhP1M.
The Cebu City government’s contribution is pursuant to Art. III, sec. 458 (1)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which allows the local government to, when its finances allow, “provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the city.”
The grant of such allowances by LGUs to judges has been upheld by the Court in its decision in GR No. 125350, Dadole v. COA, December 3, 2002.
May I cite excerpts from the case of DADOLE, et al. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, GR 125350 EN BANC, December 3, 2002:
X x x.
On the other hand, the yearly appropriation ordinance providing for additional allowances to judges is allowed by Section 458, par. (a)(1)[xi], of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that:
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the city; (italics supplied)
X x x.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
X x x.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
X x x.
Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional allowances of the judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA presented were the amounts expended, the locally generated revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA received each year. Aside from these items, no data or figures were presented to show that Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just because Mandaue City’s locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the city’s own revenues.
Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue City’s appropriation ordinances, in accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327 of RA 7160 which provide that:
Section 326. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area. The Department of Budget and Management shall review ordinances authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations of provinces, highly-urbanized cities, independent component cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the immediately succeeding Section.
Section 327. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Component Cities and Municipalities.- The sangguninang panlalawigan shall review the ordinance authorizing annual or supplemental appropriations of component cities and municipalities in the same manner and within the same period prescribed for the review of other ordinances.
If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies of such ordinance, the sangguniang panlalawigan takes no action thereon, the same shall be deemed to have been reviewed in accordance with law and shall continue to be in full force and effect. (emphasis supplied)
Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue City and allowed the 90-day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the said ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the said city.
X x x.
The Court has to be pragmatic. The judiciary is not receiving enough money from the national budget. My recollection is that the annual funds for the judiciary is only about one percent (1%) of the national budget. Until such time that the Constitution is amended to give flesh to the constitutional doctrine of “judicial autonomy”, the Court has to swallow its pride and sense of nobility, and in dignified manner, “beg” from the local governments for the additional allowances of local judges.
A recent news item from the Philippine Supreme Court website (judiciary.gov.ph) reported that the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and the Cebu City local government had signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) last March binding the city to contribute PhP1M for the establishment of the Local Government Unit-Judiciary Equalization Fund (LGU-JEF) (a beautiful euphemism)"to equalize the allocation or dispensation of allowances to judiciary members which local government units (LGUs) may allocate in their budgets".
The LGU-JEF will be "exclusively administered and managed by the High Court", which shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the orderly administration and management and equitable distribution of the LGU-JEF.
The Cebu City government has committed to contribute annually to the LGU-JEF to replenish the PhP1M.
The Cebu City government’s contribution is pursuant to Art. III, sec. 458 (1)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which allows the local government to, when its finances allow, “provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the city.”
The grant of such allowances by LGUs to judges has been upheld by the Court in its decision in GR No. 125350, Dadole v. COA, December 3, 2002.
May I cite excerpts from the case of DADOLE, et al. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, GR 125350 EN BANC, December 3, 2002:
X x x.
On the other hand, the yearly appropriation ordinance providing for additional allowances to judges is allowed by Section 458, par. (a)(1)[xi], of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that:
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the city; (italics supplied)
X x x.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
X x x.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
X x x.
Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional allowances of the judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA presented were the amounts expended, the locally generated revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA received each year. Aside from these items, no data or figures were presented to show that Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just because Mandaue City’s locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the city’s own revenues.
Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue City’s appropriation ordinances, in accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327 of RA 7160 which provide that:
Section 326. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area. The Department of Budget and Management shall review ordinances authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations of provinces, highly-urbanized cities, independent component cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the immediately succeeding Section.
Section 327. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Component Cities and Municipalities.- The sangguninang panlalawigan shall review the ordinance authorizing annual or supplemental appropriations of component cities and municipalities in the same manner and within the same period prescribed for the review of other ordinances.
If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies of such ordinance, the sangguniang panlalawigan takes no action thereon, the same shall be deemed to have been reviewed in accordance with law and shall continue to be in full force and effect. (emphasis supplied)
Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue City and allowed the 90-day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the said ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the said city.
X x x.
Update on IBP reforms: my advocacy.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
BAR MATTER NO.1696
Re: Letter of Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Campaign to Introduce Certain Amendment
To Rule 139-A
MANIFESTATION
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), thru the undersigned counsel, respectfully manifests that the proposals of Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., subject of the above-captioned Bar Matter, were included as part of the agenda of the regular meeting of the Board of Governors held last March 26, 2009 in Bacolod City. (Attached is a copy of the said agenda of the Board of Governors’ meeting held last March 26, 2009).
However, due to lack of time, the matter was merely noted by the members of the Board. The matter, however, will be included in the agenda of the next Board Meeting which has been set for May 15, 2009 in Manila.
Respectfully submitted.
Pasig City for Manila, April 17, 2009.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
IBP Building
#15 Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas Center
Pasig City
PACIFICO A. AGABIN
General Counsel
Roll of Attorney No. 16609/06/07/61
IBP Lifetime Member No. 251
PTR No. 1576217/01/12/09/Makati
MCLE Exempt
c/o Agabin Versola Hermoso Law Office
26/F Pacific star Building
Gil Puyat Ave., cor. Makati Avenue
Makati City
RODOLFO G. URBIZTONDO
Deputy General Counsel &
Chief Staff
Roll No. 20531/1965
IBP Lifetime Roll No. 02921/Pangasinan Chapter
PTR No. 1149148/1-6-09
MCLE Compliance II- 0015625
Copy furnished:
By personal service:
Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant
Supreme Court
Manila
By registered mail:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Laserna Cueva-Mercader & Associates Law Offices
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City
Atty. Antonio Manzano
Chairman, Las Pinas City Bar Association
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City
EXPLANATION
The undersigned counsel respectfully manifests that the forgoing compliance is being served by registered mail due to time constraint and distance between the places of service.
PACIFICO A. AGABIN
**************************************************************************************
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Dona Julia Vargas Avenue
Ortigas Center, Pasig City
REGULAR MEETING
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
March 26, 2009 – 3:00 P.M.
Bacolod Pavillon Hotel & Resort, Bacolod City
A G E N D A
I. Fellowship
II. Opening Prayers
III. Signing of the National Anthem/IBP March
IV. Call to Order
V. Proof of Notice/Quorum
VI. Approval of Minutes No. XVIII-03-2009 of the Regular Meeting held on 20 February 2009 (See pages 01 to 08 of Folder)
VII. President’s Report
VII.1. Report of the President’s activities (See page 09 of Folder)
VII.2. National Convention of Lawyers
VIII. Report of the Executive Vice President & Southern Luzon Governor
IX. Report of the Board of Governors
IX.1. Northern Luzon
IX.2. Central Luzon
IX.3. Greater Manila
IX.4. Bicolandia
IX.5. Eastern Visayas
IX.6. Western Visayas
IX.7. Eastern Mindanao
IX.8. Western Mindanao
X. Treasurer’s Report (For distribution)
XI. Legal Aid Report
XII. Executive Director’s Report
XIII. Other Matters
XIII.1. Bar Matter 1696 – Re: Letter of Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr., re Campaign to Introduce Certain Amendment to Rule 139-A (See pages 10 to 13 of Folder)
XIII.2. Bar Matter No. 2012 – Re: Proposed Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers (See pages 14 to 16 of Folder)
XIII.3. Election Protest – Re: In the Matter of Protest on the election of Officers of IBP Manila Chapter 1 (See pages 17 to 33 of Folder)
XIII.4. Resolution No. 2009-03 of the IBP of Misamis Occidental Chapter – Re: Resolution informing the IBP National of the Notarial Commission granted to incumbent register of deeds Atty. Eduardo Daral of Misamis Occidental and requesting for proper representation with the Land Registration Authority (See pages 34 of Folder)
XIII.5. Resolution confirming the official signatories of the IBP in transactions with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (See pages 35 to 36 of Folder)
XIII.6. Engineering and architectural plans of Rizal Chapter (See pages 37 to 38 of Folder)
XIII.7. Authority for Cebu and Cebu City Chapters to file an ejectment case against concessionaire of leased area in the IBP Cebu Building.
XIII.8. Verified petition for retirement from membership in the IBP of Atty. Mario C. Martinez, member of IBP PPLM Chapter. Atty. Martinez is 78 years of age and fully paid up to CY 2009. (See pages 39 to 47 of Folder)
XIII.9. Verified petition for retirement from membership in the IBP of Atty. Manuel M. Garcia, member of IBP Makati Chapter. Atty. Garcia is 76 years of age and fully paid up to CY 2009. (See pages 39 to 47 of Folder)
XIV. Adjournment
SUPREME COURT
Manila
BAR MATTER NO.1696
Re: Letter of Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Campaign to Introduce Certain Amendment
To Rule 139-A
MANIFESTATION
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), thru the undersigned counsel, respectfully manifests that the proposals of Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., subject of the above-captioned Bar Matter, were included as part of the agenda of the regular meeting of the Board of Governors held last March 26, 2009 in Bacolod City. (Attached is a copy of the said agenda of the Board of Governors’ meeting held last March 26, 2009).
However, due to lack of time, the matter was merely noted by the members of the Board. The matter, however, will be included in the agenda of the next Board Meeting which has been set for May 15, 2009 in Manila.
Respectfully submitted.
Pasig City for Manila, April 17, 2009.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
IBP Building
#15 Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas Center
Pasig City
PACIFICO A. AGABIN
General Counsel
Roll of Attorney No. 16609/06/07/61
IBP Lifetime Member No. 251
PTR No. 1576217/01/12/09/Makati
MCLE Exempt
c/o Agabin Versola Hermoso Law Office
26/F Pacific star Building
Gil Puyat Ave., cor. Makati Avenue
Makati City
RODOLFO G. URBIZTONDO
Deputy General Counsel &
Chief Staff
Roll No. 20531/1965
IBP Lifetime Roll No. 02921/Pangasinan Chapter
PTR No. 1149148/1-6-09
MCLE Compliance II- 0015625
Copy furnished:
By personal service:
Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant
Supreme Court
Manila
By registered mail:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Laserna Cueva-Mercader & Associates Law Offices
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City
Atty. Antonio Manzano
Chairman, Las Pinas City Bar Association
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City
EXPLANATION
The undersigned counsel respectfully manifests that the forgoing compliance is being served by registered mail due to time constraint and distance between the places of service.
PACIFICO A. AGABIN
**************************************************************************************
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Dona Julia Vargas Avenue
Ortigas Center, Pasig City
REGULAR MEETING
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
March 26, 2009 – 3:00 P.M.
Bacolod Pavillon Hotel & Resort, Bacolod City
A G E N D A
I. Fellowship
II. Opening Prayers
III. Signing of the National Anthem/IBP March
IV. Call to Order
V. Proof of Notice/Quorum
VI. Approval of Minutes No. XVIII-03-2009 of the Regular Meeting held on 20 February 2009 (See pages 01 to 08 of Folder)
VII. President’s Report
VII.1. Report of the President’s activities (See page 09 of Folder)
VII.2. National Convention of Lawyers
VIII. Report of the Executive Vice President & Southern Luzon Governor
IX. Report of the Board of Governors
IX.1. Northern Luzon
IX.2. Central Luzon
IX.3. Greater Manila
IX.4. Bicolandia
IX.5. Eastern Visayas
IX.6. Western Visayas
IX.7. Eastern Mindanao
IX.8. Western Mindanao
X. Treasurer’s Report (For distribution)
XI. Legal Aid Report
XII. Executive Director’s Report
XIII. Other Matters
XIII.1. Bar Matter 1696 – Re: Letter of Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr., re Campaign to Introduce Certain Amendment to Rule 139-A (See pages 10 to 13 of Folder)
XIII.2. Bar Matter No. 2012 – Re: Proposed Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers (See pages 14 to 16 of Folder)
XIII.3. Election Protest – Re: In the Matter of Protest on the election of Officers of IBP Manila Chapter 1 (See pages 17 to 33 of Folder)
XIII.4. Resolution No. 2009-03 of the IBP of Misamis Occidental Chapter – Re: Resolution informing the IBP National of the Notarial Commission granted to incumbent register of deeds Atty. Eduardo Daral of Misamis Occidental and requesting for proper representation with the Land Registration Authority (See pages 34 of Folder)
XIII.5. Resolution confirming the official signatories of the IBP in transactions with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (See pages 35 to 36 of Folder)
XIII.6. Engineering and architectural plans of Rizal Chapter (See pages 37 to 38 of Folder)
XIII.7. Authority for Cebu and Cebu City Chapters to file an ejectment case against concessionaire of leased area in the IBP Cebu Building.
XIII.8. Verified petition for retirement from membership in the IBP of Atty. Mario C. Martinez, member of IBP PPLM Chapter. Atty. Martinez is 78 years of age and fully paid up to CY 2009. (See pages 39 to 47 of Folder)
XIII.9. Verified petition for retirement from membership in the IBP of Atty. Manuel M. Garcia, member of IBP Makati Chapter. Atty. Garcia is 76 years of age and fully paid up to CY 2009. (See pages 39 to 47 of Folder)
XIV. Adjournment
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)