Project employees; notice of termination not needed when project is completed

G.R. No. 169170


D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs.
ANTONIO GOBRES, MAGELLAN DALISAY,
GODOFREDO PARAGSA, EMILIO ALETA and GENEROSO MELO,
G.R. No. 169170
August 8, 2010


D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:





Petitioner contends that the award of nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00 to each respondent is unwarranted under Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which states, “If the termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof, no prior notice is required.”[16]



Petitioner also contends that Agabon v. NLRC is not applicable to this case. The termination therein was for just cause due to abandonment of work, while in this case, respondents were terminated due to the completion of the phases of work.



In support of its argument, petitioner cited Cioco, Jr. v. C.E. Construction Corporation,[17] which held:



x x x More importantly, Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that no prior notice of termination is required if the termination is brought about by completion of the contract or phase thereof for which the worker has been engaged. This is because completion of the work or project automatically terminates the employment, in which case, the employer is, under the law, only obliged to render a report to the DOLE on the termination of the employment.[18]





The petition is meritorious.



Respondents were found to be project employees by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. Their unanimous finding that respondents are project employees is binding on the Court. It must also be pointed out that respondents have not appealed from such finding by the Court of Appeals. It is only the petitioner that appealed from the decision of the Court of Appeals.



The main issue is whether or not respondents, as project employees, are entitled to nominal damages for lack of advance notice of their dismissal.



A project employee is defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code as one whose “employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.”[19]



In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals all found that respondents, as project employees, were validly terminated due to the completion of the phases of work for which their services were engaged. However, the Court of Appeals held that respondents were entitled to nominal damages, because petitioner failed to give them advance notice of their termination. The appellate court cited the case of Agabon v. NLRC as basis for the award of nominal damages.



The Court holds that Agabon v. NLRC is not applicable to this case, because it involved the dismissal of regular employees for abandonment of work, which is a just cause for dismissal under Article 282 of the Labor Code.[20] Although the dismissal was for a cause, the employer therein was required to observe the standard of due process for termination of employment based on just causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which procedural due process requirements are enumerated in Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI[21] of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.[22] Since the employer therein failed to comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the Court ordered the employer to pay the employees involved nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for failure to observe procedural due process.



Unlike in Agabon, respondents, in this case, were not terminated for just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Dismissal based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee.[23] Instead, respondents were terminated due to the completion of the phases of work for which their services were engaged.



As project employees, respondents’ termination is governed by Section 1 (c) and Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII (Termination of Employment), Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.



Section 1 (c), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code states:



Section 1. Security of tenure. — (a) In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just or authorized causes as provided by law, and subject to the requirements of due process.



x x x x



(c) In cases of project employment or employment covered by legitimate contracting or sub-contracting arrangements, no employee shall be dismissed prior to the completion of the project or phase thereof for which the employee was engaged, or prior to the expiration of the contract between the principal and contractor, unless the dismissal is for just or authorized cause subject to the requirements of due process or prior notice, or is brought about by the completion of the phase of the project or contract for which the employee was engaged.[24]





Records show that respondents were dismissed after the expiration of their respective project employment contracts, and due to the completion of the phases of work respondents were engaged for. Hence, the cited provision’s requirements of due process or prior notice when an employee is dismissed for just or authorized cause (under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code) prior to the completion of the project or phase thereof for which the employee was engaged do not apply to this case.



Further, Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:



Section 2. Standard of due process: requirements of notice. — In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed.



1. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:



(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;



(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and



(c) A written notice [of] termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstance, grounds have been established to justify his termination.



In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee’s last known address.



II. For termination of employment as based on authorized causes defined in Article 283 of the Code, the requirements of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service of a written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the Department at least thirty (30) days before the effectivity of the termination, specifying the ground or grounds for termination.



III. If the termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof, no prior notice is required. If the termination is brought about by the failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in the case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.[25]





In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals all found that respondents were validly terminated due to the completion of the phases of work for which respondents’ services were engaged. The above rule clearly states, “If the termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof, no prior notice is required.” Cioco, Jr. v. C.E. Construction Corporation[26] explained that this is because completion of the work or project automatically terminates the employment, in which case, the employer is, under the law, only obliged to render a report to the DOLE on the termination of the employment.



Hence, prior or advance notice of termination is not part of procedural due process if the termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof for which the employee was engaged. Petitioner, therefore, did not violate any requirement of procedural due process by failing to give respondents advance notice of their termination; thus, there is no basis for the payment of nominal damages.



In sum, absent the requirement of prior notice of termination when the termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof for which the worker was hired, respondents are not entitled to nominal damages for lack of advance notice of their termination.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70708, dated March 9, 2005, insofar as it upholds the validity of the dismissal of respondents is AFFIRMED, but the award of nominal damages to respondents is DELETED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 2, 2005, is SET ASIDE.



No costs.


SO ORDERED.

Builder in good faith; how Civil Code provision implemented

LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY BRIONES vs.
JOSE MACABAGDAL, FE D. MACABAGDAL and
VERGON REALTY INVESTMENTS CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 150666
August 3, 2010


However, the conclusiveness of the factual findings notwithstanding, we find that the trial court nonetheless erred in outrightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith.

When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code governs. Said article provides,

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (Emphasis ours.)

The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code provide,

ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.

Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the subject land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.

In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao, this case must be remanded to the RTC which shall conduct the appropriate proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvement and of the land, as well as the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of the lease if the parties so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the Civil Code.

X x x.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48109 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages in favor of respondent-spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal and the award of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Vergon Realty Investments Corporation are DELETED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, for further proceedings consistent with the proper application of Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, as follows:

1. The trial court shall determine:

a. the present fair price of the respondent-spouses’ lot;

b. the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of their house;

c. the increase in value (“plus value”) which the said lot may have acquired by reason thereof; and

d. whether the value of said land is considerably more than that of the house built thereon.

2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:

a. The trial court shall grant the respondent-spouses a period of fifteen (15) days within which to exercise their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, whether to appropriate the house as their own by paying to petitioners either the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of the house, or the increase in value (“plus value”) which the said lot may have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of said land. The amounts to be respectively paid by the respondent-spouses and petitioners, in accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other party and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to receive it;

b. The trial court shall further order that if the respondent-spouses exercises the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial court, the value of the land is considerably more than that of the house, petitioners shall give written notice of such rejection to the respondent-spouses and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the respondent-spouses’ option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease, payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time since petitioners have occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease. Petitioners shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the house. Upon expiration of the two (2)-year period, or upon default by petitioners in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, the respondent-spouses shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover their land, and to have the house removed by petitioners or at the latter’s expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by petitioners to the Court for payment to the respondent-spouses, and such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the Court.

c. In any event, petitioners shall pay the respondent-spouses reasonable compensation for the occupancy of the respondent-spouses’ land for the period counted from the year petitioners occupied the subject area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph;

d. The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its Decision shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Indispensable party

What is the legal effect of failure to implead an indispensable party?

Answer:

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, “parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.” If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is “precisely ‘when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.” The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.


Source:

NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA KEIHIN (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU)
and HELEN VALENZUELA vs. KEIHIN PHILIPPINES CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 171115, August 9, 2010


It is clear that petitioners failed to include the name of the dismissed employee Helen Valenzuela in the caption of their petition for certiorari filed with the CA as well as in the body of the said petition. Instead, they only indicated the name of the labor union Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA) as the party acting on behalf of Helen. As a result, the CA rightly dismissed the petition based on a formal defect.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, “parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.” If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is “precisely ‘when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.” The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.

At any rate, we are aware that it is the policy of courts to encourage full adjudication of the merits of an appeal. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds, especially an appeal by a worker who was terminated and whose livelihood depends on the speedy disposition of her case, is frowned upon. Thus, while we affirm the CA’s dismissal of the petition for certiorari, we shall still discuss the substantive aspect of the case and go into the merits.

Dismissed for stealing a packing tape

NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA KEIHIN NLMK-OLALIA-KMU) and
HELEN VALENZUELA vs. KEIHIN PHILIPPINES CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 171115, August 9, 2010



The petitioners argue that serious misconduct under existing law and jurisprudence could not be attributed to Helen because she was not motivated by malicious intent. According to petitioners, during the routine inspection and even before the guard opened Helen’s bag, she readily admitted that the bag contained a packing tape. Petitioners claim that the mental attitude of Helen negates depravity, willful or wrongful intent and, thus, she cannot be held guilty of serious misconduct. Rather, it was a mere error of judgment on the part of Helen. Furthermore, it was Helen’s honest belief that the tape she took was of no use or value and that she did not hide the same.

Thus, the issue boils down to whether, in taking the packing tape for her own personal use, Helen committed serious misconduct, which is a just cause for her dismissal from service.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination. It provides:

ARTICLE 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.


Misconduct is defined as “the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.” For serious misconduct to justify dismissal under the law, “(a) it must be serious, (b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.”

In the case at bar, Helen took the packing tape with the thought that she could use it for her own personal purposes. When Helen was asked to explain in writing why she took the tape, she stated, “Kumuha po ako ng isang packing tape na gagamitin ko sa paglilipat ng gamit ko sa bago kong lilipatang bahay.” In other words, by her own admission, there was intent on her part to benefit herself when she attempted to bring home the packing tape in question.

It is noteworthy that prior to this incident, there had been several cases of theft and vandalism involving both respondent company’s property and personal belongings of other employees. In order to address this issue of losses, respondent company issued two memoranda implementing an intensive inspection procedure and reminding all employees that those who will be caught stealing and performing acts of vandalism will be dealt with in accordance with the company’s Code of Conduct. Despite these reminders, Helen took the packing tape and was caught during the routine inspection. All these circumstances point to the conclusion that it was not just an error of judgment on the part of Helen, but a deliberate act of theft of company property.

In the case of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa involving an employee who was caught by the security guards of the company during a routine inspection with possession of company property, we held that:
There is no gainsaying that theft committed by an employee constitutes a valid reason for his dismissal by the employer. Although as a rule this Court leans over backwards to help workers and employees continue with their employment or to mitigate the penalties imposed on them, acts of dishonesty in the handling of company property are a different matter.


We hold that Helen is guilty of serious misconduct in her act of taking the packing tape.

The petitioners also argue that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh and disproportionate to the offense committed since the value of the thing taken is very minimal. Petitioners cite the case of Caltex Refinery Employees Association v. National Labor Relations Commission where Arnelio M. Clarete (Clarete) was found to have willfully breached the trust and confidence reposed in him by taking a bottle of lighter fluid. In said case, we refrained from imposing the supreme penalty of dismissal since the employee had no violations “in his eight years of service and the value of the lighter fluid x x x is very minimal compared to his salary x x x.”


After a closer study of both cases, we are convinced that the case of Caltex is different from the case at hand. Although both Clarete and Helen had no prior violations, the former had a clean record of eight years with his employer. On the other hand, Helen was not even on her second year of service with Keihin when the incident of theft occurred. And what further distinguishes the instant case from Caltex is that respondent company was dealing with several cases of theft, vandalism, and loss of company and employees’ property when the incident involving Helen transpired.

US SC case (2011): free speech v. privacy; who wins?

FindLaw | Cases and Codes

See - http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/09-751.html

SNYDER v. PHELPS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 09-751. Argued October 6, 2010--Decided March 2, 2011

For the past 20 years, the congregation of the Westboro Baptist Church has picketed military funerals to communicate its belief that God hates the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America's military. The church's picketing has also condemned the Catholic Church for scandals involving its clergy. Fred Phelps, who founded the church, and six Westboro Baptist parishioners (all relatives of Phelps) traveled to Maryland to picket the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq in the line of duty. The picketing took place on public land approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held, in accordance with guidance from local law enforcement officers. The picketers peacefully displayed their signs--stating, e.g., "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Fags Doom Nations," "America is Doomed," "Priests Rape Boys," and "You're Going to Hell"--for about 30 minutes before the funeral began. Matthew Snyder's father (Snyder), petitioner here, saw the tops of the picketers' signs when driving to the funeral, but did not learn what was written on the signs until watching a news broadcast later that night.

Snyder filed a diversity action against Phelps, his daughters--who participated in the picketing--and the church (collectively Westboro) alleging, as relevant here, state tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. A jury held Westboro liable for millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Westboro challenged the verdict as grossly excessive and sought judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the First Amendment fully protected its speech. The District Court reduced the punitive damages award, but left the verdict otherwise intact. The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Westboro's statements were entitled to First Amendment protection because those statements were on matters of public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.

Held: The First Amendment shields Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case. Pp. 5-15.

(a) The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 50-51. Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. "[S]peech on public issues occupies the ' "highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values" ' and is entitled to special protection." Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 145. Although the boundaries of what constitutes speech on matters of public concern are not well defined, this Court has said that speech is of public concern when it can "be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community," id., at 146, or when it "is a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public," San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 83-84. A statement's arguably "inappropriate or controversial character ... is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 387. Pp. 5-7.

To determine whether speech is of public or private concern, this Court must independently examine the " 'content, form, and context,' " of the speech " 'as revealed by the whole record.' " Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 761. In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all aspects of the speech. Pp. 7-8.

The "content" of Westboro's signs plainly relates to public, rather than private, matters. The placards highlighted issues of public import--the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of the Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy--and Westboro conveyed its views on those issues in a manner designed to reach as broad a public audience as possible. Even if a few of the signs were viewed as containing messages related to a particular individual, that would not change the fact that the dominant theme of Westboro's demonstration spoke to broader public issues. P. 8.

The "context" of the speech--its connection with Matthew Snyder's funeral--cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro's speech. The signs reflected Westboro's condemnation of much in modern society, and it cannot be argued that Westboro's use of speech on public issues was in any way contrived to insulate a personal attack on Snyder from liability. Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that the picketing did not represent Westboro's honestly held beliefs on public issues. Westboro may have chosen the picket location to increase publicity for its views, and its speech may have been particularly hurtful to Snyder. That does not mean that its speech should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection under the circumstances of this case. Pp. 8-10.

That said, " '[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.' " Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 479. Westboro's choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Government's regulatory reach--it is "subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293. The facts here are quite different, however, both with respect to the activity being regulated and the means of restricting those activities, from the few limited situations where the Court has concluded that the location of targeted picketing can be properly regulated under provisions deemed content neutral. Frisby, supra, at 477; Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 768, distinguished. Maryland now has a law restricting funeral picketing but that law was not in effect at the time of these events, so this Court has no occasion to consider whether that law is a "reasonable time, place, or manner restrictio[n]" under the standards announced by this Court. Clark, supra, at 293. Pp. 10-12.

The "special protection" afforded to what Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was "outrageous" for purposes of applying the state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. That would pose too great a danger that the jury would punish Westboro for its views on matters of public concern. For all these reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside. Pp. 12-13.

(b) Snyder also may not recover for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. He argues that he was a member of a captive audience at his son's funeral, but the captive audience doctrine--which has been applied sparingly, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 736-738; Frisby, supra, at 484-485--should not be expanded to the circumstances here. Westboro stayed well away from the memorial service, Snyder could see no more than the tops of the picketers' signs, and there is no indication that the picketing interfered with the funeral service itself. Pp. 13-14.

(c) Because the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion--the allegedly unlawful activity Westboro conspired to accomplish--Snyder also cannot recover for civil conspiracy based on those torts. P. 14.

(d) Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. It did not disrupt Mathew Snyder's funeral, and its choice to picket at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech. Because this Nation has chosen to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that public debate is not stifled, Westboro must be shielded from tort liability for its picketing in this case. Pp. 14-15.

580 F. 3d 206, affirmed.

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

ALBERT SNYDER, PETITIONER v. FRED W.
PHELPS, SR., et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit

[March 2, 2011]

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.

A jury held members of the Westboro Baptist Church liable for millions of dollars in damages for picketing near a soldier's funeral service. The picket signs reflected the church's view that the United States is overly tolerant of sin and that God kills American soldiers as punishment. The question presented is whether the First Amendment shields the church members from tort liability for their speech in this case.

I

A

Fred Phelps founded the Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas, in 1955. The church's congregation believes that God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America's military. The church frequently communicates its views by picketing, often at military funerals. In the more than 20 years that the members of Westboro Baptist have publicized their message, they have picketed nearly 600 funerals. Brief for Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae 7, n. 14.

Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in Iraq in the line of duty. Lance Corporal Snyder's father selected the Catholic church in the Snyders' hometown of Westminster, Maryland, as the site for his son's funeral. Local newspapers provided notice of the time and location of the service.

Phelps became aware of Matthew Snyder's funeral and decided to travel to Maryland with six other Westboro Baptist parishioners (two of his daughters and four of
his grandchildren) to picket. On the day of the memorial service, the Westboro congregation members picketed on public land adjacent to public streets near the Maryland State House, the United States Naval Academy, and Matthew Snyder's funeral. The Westboro picketers carried signs that were largely the same at all three locations. They stated, for instance: "God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11," "America is Doomed," "Don't Pray for the USA," "Thank God for IEDs," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Pope in Hell," "Priests Rape Boys," "God Hates Fags," "You're Going to Hell," and "God Hates You."

The church had notified the authorities in advance of its intent to picket at the time of the funeral, and the picketers complied with police instructions in staging their demonstration. The picketing took place within a 10- by 25-foot plot of public land adjacent to a public street, behind a temporary fence. App. to Brief for Appellants
in No. 08-1026 (CA4), pp. 2282-2285 (hereinafter App.). That plot was approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held. Several buildings separated the picket site from the church. Id., at 3758. The Westboro picketers displayed their signs for about 30 minutes before the funeral began and sang hymns and recited Bible verses. None of the picketers entered church property or went to the cemetery. They did not yell or use profanity, and there was no violence associated with the picketing. Id., at 2168, 2371, 2286, 2293.

The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of the picket site. Although Snyder testified that he could see the tops of the picket signs as he drove to the funeral, he did not see what was written on the signs until later that night, while watching a news broadcast covering the event. Id., at 2084-2086.1

B

Snyder filed suit against Phelps, Phelps's daughters, and the Westboro Baptist Church (collectively Westboro or the church) in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland under that court's diversity jurisdiction. Snyder alleged five state tort law claims: defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. Westboro moved for summary judgment contending, in part, that the church's speech was insulated from liability by the First Amendment. See 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (Md. 2008).

The District Court awarded Westboro summary judgment on Snyder's claims for defamation and publicity given to private life, concluding that Snyder could not prove the necessary elements of those torts. Id., at 572-573. A trial was held on the remaining claims. At trial, Snyder described the severity of his emotional injuries. He testified that he is unable to separate the thought of his dead son from his thoughts of Westboro's picketing, and that he often becomes tearful, angry, and physically ill when he thinks about it. Id., at 588-589. Expert witnesses testified that Snyder's emotional anguish had resulted in severe depression and had exacerbated pre-existing health conditions.

A jury found for Snyder on the intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy claims, and held Westboro liable for $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages. Westboro filed several post-trial motions, including a motion contending that the jury verdict was grossly excessive and a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law on all claims on First Amendment grounds. The District Court remitted the punitive damages award to $2.1 million, but left the jury verdict otherwise intact. Id., at 597.

In the Court of Appeals, Westboro's primary argument was that the church was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the First Amendment fully protected Westboro's speech. The Court of Appeals agreed. 580 F. 3d 206, 221 (CA4 2009). The court reviewed the picket signs and concluded that Westboro's statements were entitled to First Amendment protection because those statements were on matters of public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric. Id., at 222-224.2

We granted certiorari. 559 U. S. ___ (2010).

II

To succeed on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Maryland, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. See Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 565-566, 380 A. 2d 611, 614 (1977). The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment--"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech"--can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 50-51 (1988).3

Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. "[S]peech on 'matters of public concern' ... is 'at the heart of the First Amendment's protection.' " Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 758-759 (1985) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 776 (1978)). The First Amendment reflects "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). That is because "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Accordingly, "speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection." Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 145 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).

" '[N]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment importance,' " however, and where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous. Hustler, supra, at 56 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at 758); see Connick, supra, at 145-147. That is because restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns
as limiting speech on matters of public interest: "[T]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas"; and the "threat of liability" does not pose the risk of "a reaction of self-censorship" on matters of public import. Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at 760 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We noted a short time ago, in considering whether public employee speech addressed a matter of public concern, that "the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined." San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam). Although that remains true today, we have articulated some guiding principles, principles that accord broad protection to speech to ensure that courts themselves do not become inadvertent censors.

Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can "be fairly considered as relating to any matter of politi-
cal, social, or other concern to the community," Connick, supra, at 146, or when it "is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public," San Diego, supra, at 83-84. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469,
492-494 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 387-
388 (1967). The arguably "inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 387 (1987).

Our opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, on the other hand, provides an example of speech of only private concern. In that case we held, as a general matter, that information about a particular individual's credit report "concerns no public issue." 472 U. S., at 762. The content of the report, we explained, "was speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience." Ibid. That was confirmed by the fact that the particular report was sent to only five subscribers to the reporting service, who were bound not to disseminate it further. Ibid. To cite another example, we concluded in San Diego v. Roe that, in the context of a government employer regulating the speech of its employees, videos of an employee engaging in sexually explicit acts did not address a public concern; the videos "did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the [employing agency's] functioning or operation." 543 U. S., at 84.

Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern requires us to examine the " 'content, form, and context' " of that speech, " 'as revealed by the whole record.' " Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at 761 (quoting Connick, supra, at 147-148). As in other First Amendment cases, the court is obligated "to 'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.' " Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting New York Times, supra, at 284-286). In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.

The "content" of Westboro's signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than matters of "purely private concern." Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at 759. The placards read "God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11," "America is Doomed," "Don't Pray for the USA," "Thank God for IEDs," "Fag Troops," "Semper Fi Fags," "God Hates Fags," "Maryland Taliban," "Fags Doom Nations," "Not Blessed Just Cursed," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Pope in Hell," "Priests Rape Boys," "You're Going to Hell," and "God Hates You." App. 3781-3787. While these messages may fall short of
refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight--the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy--are matters of public import. The signs certainly convey Westboro's position on those issues, in a manner designed, unlike the private speech in Dun & Bradstreet, to reach as broad a public audience as possible. And even if a few of the signs--such as "You're Going to Hell" and "God Hates You"--were viewed as containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro's demonstration spoke to broader public issues.

Apart from the content of Westboro's signs, Snyder contends that the "context" of the speech--its connection with his son's funeral--makes the speech a matter of private rather than public concern. The fact that Westboro spoke in connection with a funeral, however, cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro's speech. Westboro's signs, displayed on public land next to a public street, reflect the fact that the church finds much to condemn in modern society. Its speech is "fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern," Connick, 461 U. S., at 146, and the funeral setting does not alter that conclusion.

Snyder argues that the church members in fact mounted a personal attack on Snyder and his family, and then attempted to "immunize their conduct by claiming that they were actually protesting the United States' tolerance of homosexuality or the supposed evils of the Catholic Church." Reply Brief for Petitioner 10. We are not concerned in this case that Westboro's speech on public matters was in any way contrived to insulate speech on a private matter from liability. Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that Westboro's picketing
did not represent its "honestly believed" views on public issues. Garrison, 379 U. S., at 73. There was no pre-existing relationship or conflict between Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboro's speech on public matters was intended to mask an attack on Snyder over a private matter. Contrast Connick, supra, at 153 (finding public employee speech a matter of private concern when it was "no coincidence that [the speech] followed upon the heels of [a] transfer notice" affecting the employee).

Snyder goes on to argue that Westboro's speech should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection "not only because of the words" but also because the church members exploited the funeral "as a platform to bring their message to a broader audience." Brief for Petitioner 44, 40. There is no doubt that Westboro chose to stage its picketing at the Naval Academy, the Maryland State House, and Matthew Snyder's funeral to increase publicity for its views and because of the relation between those sites and its views--in the case of the military funeral, because Westboro believes that God is killing American soldiers as punishment for the Nation's sinful policies.

Westboro's choice to convey its views in conjunction with Matthew Snyder's funeral made the expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially to Matthew's father. The record makes clear that the applicable legal term--"emotional distress"--fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro's choice added to Mr. Snyder's already incalculable grief. But Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a public place adjacent to a public street. Such space occupies a "special position in terms of First Amendment protection." United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 180 (1983). "[W]e have repeatedly referred to public streets as the archetype of a traditional public forum," noting that " '[t]ime out of mind' public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly and debate." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 480 (1988).4

That said, "[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times." Id., at 479 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 799 (1985)). Westboro's choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Government's regulatory reach--it is "subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions" that are consistent with the standards announced in this Court's precedents. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984). Maryland now has a law imposing restrictions on funeral picketing, Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §10-205 (Lexis Supp. 2010), as do 43 other States and the Federal Government. See Brief for American Legion as Amicus Curiae 18-19, n. 2 (listing statutes). To the extent these laws are content neutral, they raise very different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this case. Maryland's law, however, was not in effect at the time of the events at issue here, so we have no occasion to consider how it might apply to facts such as those before us, or whether it or other similar regulations are constitutional.5

We have identified a few limited situations where the location of targeted picketing can be regulated under provisions that the Court has determined to be content neutral. In Frisby, for example, we upheld a ban on such picketing "before or about" a particular residence, 487 U. S., at 477. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., we approved an injunction requiring a buffer zone between protesters and an abortion clinic entrance. 512 U. S. 753, 768 (1994). The facts here are obviously quite different, both with respect to the activity being regulated and the means of restricting those activities.

Simply put, the church members had the right to be where they were. Westboro alerted local authorities to its funeral protest and fully complied with police guidance on where the picketing could be staged. The picketing was conducted under police supervision some 1,000 feet from the church, out of the sight of those at the church. The protest was not unruly; there was no shouting, profanity, or violence.

The record confirms that any distress occasioned by Westboro's picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing at the very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs that said "God Bless America" and "God Loves You," would not have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages.

Given that Westboro's speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to "special protection" under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989). Indeed, "the point of all speech protection ... is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful." Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 574 (1995).

The jury here was instructed that it could hold Westboro liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a finding that Westboro's picketing was "outrageous." "Outrageousness," however, is a highly malleable standard with "an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression." Hustler, 485 U. S., at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). In a case such as this, a jury is "unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of [the] speech," posing "a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of ... 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasan[t]' " expression. Bose Corp., 466 U. S., at 510 (quoting New York Times, 376 U. S., at 270). Such a risk is unacceptable; "in public debate [we] must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 322 (1988) (some internal quotation marks omitted). What Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to "special protection" under the First Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous.

For all these reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside.

III

The jury also found Westboro liable for the state law torts of intrusion upon seclusion and civil conspiracy. The Court of Appeals did not examine these torts independently of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort. Instead, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court wholesale, holding that the judgment wrongly "attache[d] tort liability to constitutionally protected speech." 580 F. 3d, at 226.

Snyder argues that even assuming Westboro's speech
is entitled to First Amendment protection generally, the church is not immunized from liability for intrusion upon seclusion because Snyder was a member of a captive audience at his son's funeral. Brief for Petitioner 45-46. We do not agree. In most circumstances, "the Constitution does not permit the government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, ... the burden normally falls upon the viewer to avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes." Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 210-211 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, "[t]he ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is ... dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21 (1971).

As a general matter, we have applied the captive audience doctrine only sparingly to protect unwilling listeners from protected speech. For example, we have upheld a statute allowing a homeowner to restrict the delivery of offensive mail to his home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 736-738 (1970), and an ordinance prohibiting picketing "before or about" any individual's residence, Frisby, 487 U. S., at 484-485.

Here, Westboro stayed well away from the memorial service. Snyder could see no more than the tops of the signs when driving to the funeral. And there is no indication that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service itself. We decline to expand the captive audience doctrine to the circumstances presented here.

Because we find that the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion--the alleged unlawful activity Westboro conspired to accomplish--we must likewise hold that Snyder cannot recover for civil conspiracy based on those torts.

IV

Our holding today is narrow. We are required in First Amendment cases to carefully review the record, and the reach of our opinion here is limited by the particular facts before us. As we have noted, "the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and [state law] rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case." Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524, 533 (1989).

Westboro believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about Westboro. Westboro's funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its con-tribution to public discourse may be negligible. But
Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. The speech was indeed planned to coincide with Matthew Snyder's funeral, but did not itself disrupt that funeral, and Westboro's choice to conduct its picketing at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech.

Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and--as it did here--inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course--to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

ALBERT SNYDER, PETITIONER v. FRED W.
PHELPS, Sr., et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit

[March 2, 2011]

Justice Breyer, concurring.

I agree with the Court and join its opinion. That opinion restricts its analysis here to the matter raised in the petition for certiorari, namely, Westboro's picketing activity. The opinion does not examine in depth the effect of television broadcasting. Nor does it say anything about Internet postings. The Court holds that the First Amendment protects the picketing that occurred here, primarily because the picketing addressed matters of "public concern."

While I agree with the Court's conclusion that the picketing addressed matters of public concern, I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point. A State can sometimes regulate picketing, even picketing on matters of public concern. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474 (1988). Moreover, suppose that A were physically to assault B, knowing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide A with an opportunity to transmit to the public his views on a matter of public concern. The constitutionally protected nature of the end would not shield A's use of unlawful, unprotected means. And in some circumstances the use of certain words as means would be similarly unprotected. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words").

The dissent recognizes that the means used here consist of speech. But it points out that the speech, like an assault, seriously harmed a private individual. Indeed, the state tort of "intentional infliction of emotional distress" forbids only conduct that produces distress "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it," and which itself is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Post, at 2-3 (opinion of Alito, J.) (quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567, 571, 380 A. 2d 611, 614, 616 (1977); internal quotation marks omitted). The dissent requires us to ask whether our holding unreasonably limits liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress--to the point where A (in order to draw attention to his views on a public matter) might launch a verbal assault upon B, a private person, publicly revealing the most intimate details of B's private life, while knowing that the revelation will cause B severe emotional harm. Does our decision leave the State powerless to protect the individual against invasions of, e.g., personal privacy, even in the most horrendous of such circumstances?

As I understand the Court's opinion, it does not hold or imply that the State is always powerless to provide private individuals with necessary protection. Rather, the Court has reviewed the underlying facts in detail, as will sometimes prove necessary where First Amendment values and state-protected (say, privacy-related) interests seriously conflict. Cf. Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524, 533 (1989); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984). That review makes clear that Westboro's means of communicating its views consisted of picketing in a place where picketing was lawful and in compliance with all police directions. The picketing could not be seen or heard from the funeral ceremony itself. And Snyder testified that he saw no more than the tops of the picketers' signs as he drove to the funeral. To uphold the application of state law in these circumstances would punish Westboro for seeking to communicate its views on matters of public concern without proportionately advancing the State's interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm. Consequently, the First Amendment protects Westboro. As I read the Court's opinion, it holds no more.

ALBERT SNYDER, PETITIONER v. FRED W.
PHELPS, Sr., et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit

[March 2, 2011]

Justice Alito, dissenting.

Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.

Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure. He is simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed in Iraq. Mr. Snyder wanted what is surely the right of any parent who experiences such an incalculable loss: to bury his son in peace. But respondents, members of the Westboro Baptist Church, deprived him of that elementary right. They first issued a press release and thus turned Matthew's funeral into a tumultuous media event. They then appeared at the church, approached as closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a time of acute emotional vulnerability. As a result, Albert Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury.1 The Court now holds that the First Amendment protected respondents' right to brutalize Mr. Snyder. I cannot agree.

I

Respondents and other members of their church have strong opinions on certain moral, religious, and political issues, and the First Amendment ensures that they have almost limitless opportunities to express their views. They may write and distribute books, articles, and other texts; they may create and disseminate video and audio recordings; they may circulate petitions; they may speak to individuals and groups in public forums and in any private venue that wishes to accommodate them; they may picket peacefully in countless locations; they may appear on television and speak on the radio; they may post messages on the Internet and send out e-mails. And they may express their views in terms that are "uninhibited," "vehement," and "caustic." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964).

It does not follow, however, that they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public debate. To protect against such injury, "most if not all jurisdictions" permit recovery in tort for the intentional infliction of emotional distress (or IIED). Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 53 (1988).

This is a very narrow tort with requirements that "are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §12, p. 61 (5th ed. 1984). To recover, a plaintiff must show that the conduct at issue caused harm that was truly severe. See Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 653, 584 A. 2d 69, 75 (1991) ("[R]ecovery will be meted out sparingly, its balm reserved for those wounds that are truly severe and incapable of healing themselves" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 571, 380 A. 2d 611, 616 (1977) (the distress must be " 'so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it' " (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, Comment j (1963-1964))).

A plaintiff must also establish that the defendant's conduct was " 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' " Id., at 567, 380 A. 2d, at 614 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, Comment d).

Although the elements of the IIED tort are difficult to meet, respondents long ago abandoned any effort to show that those tough standards were not satisfied here. On appeal, they chose not to contest the sufficiency of the evidence. See 580 F. 3d 206, 216 (CA4 2009). They did not dispute that Mr. Snyder suffered " 'wounds that are truly severe and incapable of healing themselves.' " Figueiredo-Torres, supra, at 653, 584 A. 2d, at 75. Nor did they dispute that their speech was " 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' " Harris, supra, at 567, 380 A. 2d, at 614. Instead, they maintained that the First Amendment gave them a license to engage in such conduct. They are wrong.

II

It is well established that a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress can be satisfied by speech. Indeed, what has been described as "[t]he leading case" recognizing this tort involved speech. Prosser and Keeton, supra, §12, at 60 (citing Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, illustration 1. And although this Court has not decided the question, I think it is clear that the First Amendment does not entirely preclude liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress by means of speech.

This Court has recognized that words may "by their very utterance inflict injury" and that the First Amendment does not shield utterances that form "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 (1940) ("[P]ersonal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution"). When grave injury is intentionally inflicted by means of an attack like the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not interfere with recovery.

III

In this case, respondents brutally attacked Matthew Snyder, and this attack, which was almost certain to inflict injury, was central to respondents' well-practiced strategy for attracting public attention.

On the morning of Matthew Snyder's funeral, respondents could have chosen to stage their protest at countless locations. They could have picketed the United States Capitol, the White House, the Supreme Court, the Pentagon, or any of the more than 5,600 military recruiting stations in this country. They could have returned to the Maryland State House or the United States Naval Academy, where they had been the day before. They could have selected any public road where pedestrians are allowed. (There are more than 4,000,000 miles of public roads in the United States.2) They could have staged their protest in a public park. (There are more than 20,000 public parks in this country.3) They could have chosen any Catholic church where no funeral was taking place. (There are nearly 19,000 Catholic churches in the United States.4) But of course, a small group picketing at any of these locations would have probably gone unnoticed.

The Westboro Baptist Church, however, has devised a strategy that remedies this problem. As the Court notes, church members have protested at nearly 600 military funerals. Ante, at 1. They have also picketed the funerals of police officers,5 firefighters,6 and the victims of natural disasters,7 accidents,8 and shocking crimes.9 And in advance of these protests, they issue press releases to ensure that their protests will attract public attention.10

This strategy works because it is expected that respondents' verbal assaults will wound the family and friends of the deceased and because the media is irresistibly drawn to the sight of persons who are visibly in grief. The more outrageous the funeral protest, the more publicity the Westboro Baptist Church is able to obtain. Thus, when the church recently announced its intention to picket the funeral of a 9-year-old girl killed in the shooting spree in Tucson--proclaiming that she was "better off dead"11--their announcement was national news,12 and the church was able to obtain free air time on the radio in exchange for canceling its protest.13 Similarly, in 2006, the church got air time on a talk radio show in exchange for canceling its threatened protest at the funeral of five Amish girls killed by a crazed gunman.14

In this case, respondents implemented the Westboro Baptist Church's publicity-seeking strategy. Their press release stated that they were going "to picket the funeral of Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder" because "God Almighty killed Lance Cpl. Snyder. He died in shame, not honor--for a fag nation cursed by God ... . Now in Hell--sine die." Supp. App. in No. 08-1026 (CA4), p. 158a. This announcement guaranteed that Matthew's funeral would be transformed into a raucous media event and began the wounding process. It is well known that anticipation may heighten the effect of a painful event.

On the day of the funeral, respondents, true to their word, displayed placards that conveyed the message promised in their press release. Signs stating "God Hates You" and "Thank God for Dead Soldiers" reiterated the message that God had caused Matthew's death in retribution for his sins. App. to Brief for Appellants in No. 08-1026 (CA4), pp. 3787, 3788 (hereinafter App.). Others, stating "You're Going to Hell" and "Not Blessed Just Cursed," conveyed the message that Matthew was "in Hell--sine die." Id., at 3783.

Even if those who attended the funeral were not alerted in advance about respondents' intentions, the meaning of these signs would not have been missed. Since respondents chose to stage their protest at Matthew Snyder's funeral and not at any of the other countless available venues, a reasonable person would have assumed that there was a connection between the messages on the placards and the deceased. Moreover, since a church funeral is an event that naturally brings to mind thoughts about the afterlife, some of respondents' signs--e.g., "God Hates You," "Not Blessed Just Cursed," and "You're Going to Hell"--would have likely been interpreted as referring to God's judgment of the deceased.

Other signs would most naturally have been understood as suggesting--falsely--that Matthew was gay. Homosexuality was the theme of many of the signs. There were signs reading "God Hates Fags," "Semper Fi Fags," "Fags Doom Nations," and "Fag Troops." Id., at 3781-3787. Another placard depicted two men engaging in anal intercourse. A reasonable bystander seeing those signs would have likely concluded that they were meant to suggest that the deceased was a homosexual.

After the funeral, the Westboro picketers reaffirmed the meaning of their protest. They posted an online account entitled "The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder. The Visit of Westboro Baptist Church to Help the Inhabitants of Maryland Connect the Dots!" Id., at 3788.15 Belying any suggestion that they had simply made general comments about homosexuality, the Catholic Church, and the United States military, the "epic" addressed the Snyder family directly:

"God blessed you, Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, with a resource and his name was Matthew. He was an arrow in your quiver! In thanks to God for the comfort the child could bring you, you had a DUTY to prepare that child to serve the LORD his GOD--PERIOD! You did JUST THE OPPOSITE--you raised him for the devil.

.     .     .     .     .

"Albert and Julie RIPPED that body apart and taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery. They taught him how to support the largest pedophile machine in the history of the entire world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity. Every dime they gave the Roman Catholic monster they condemned their own souls. They also, in supporting satanic Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an idolater.

.     .     .     .     .

"Then after all that they sent him to fight for the United States of Sodom, a filthy country that is in lock step with his evil, wicked, and sinful manner of life, putting him in the cross hairs of a God that is so mad He has smoke coming from his nostrils and fire from his mouth! How dumb was that?" Id., at 3791.

In light of this evidence, it is abundantly clear that respondents, going far beyond commentary on matters of public concern, specifically attacked Matthew Snyder because (1) he was a Catholic and (2) he was a member of the United States military. Both Matthew and petitioner were private figures,16 and this attack was not speech on a matter of public concern. While commentary on the Catholic Church or the United States military constitutes speech on matters of public concern, speech regarding Matthew Snyder's purely private conduct does not.

Justice Breyer provides an apt analogy to a case in which the First Amendment would permit recovery in tort for a verbal attack:

"[S]uppose that A were physically to assault B, knowing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide A with an opportunity to transmit to the public his views on a matter of public concern. The constitutionally protected nature of the end would not shield A's use of unlawful, unprotected means. And in some circumstances the use of certain words as means would be similarly unprotected." Ante, at 1 (concurring opinion).

This captures what respondents did in this case. Indeed, this is the strategy that they have routinely employed--and that they will now continue to employ--inflicting severe and lasting emotional injury on an ever growing list of innocent victims.

IV

The Court concludes that respondents' speech was protected by the First Amendment for essentially three reasons, but none is sound.

First--and most important--the Court finds that "the overall thrust and dominant theme of [their] demonstration spoke to" broad public issues. Ante, at 8. As I have attempted to show, this portrayal is quite inaccurate; respondents' attack on Matthew was of central importance. But in any event, I fail to see why actionable speech should be immunized simply because it is interspersed with speech that is protected. The First Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that are interspersed with nondefamatory statements on matters of public concern, and there is no good reason why respondents' attack on Matthew Snyder and his family should be treated differently.

Second, the Court suggests that respondents' personal attack on Matthew Snyder is entitled to First Amendment protection because it was not motivated by a private grudge, see ante, at 9, but I see no basis for the strange distinction that the Court appears to draw. Respondents' motivation--"to increase publicity for its views," ibid.--did not transform their statements attacking the character
of a private figure into statements that made a contribution to debate on matters of public concern. Nor did their publicity-seeking motivation soften the sting of their attack. And as far as culpability is concerned, one might well think that wounding statements uttered in the heat of a private feud are less, not more, blameworthy than similar statements made as part of a cold and calculated strategy to slash a stranger as a means of attracting public attention.

Third, the Court finds it significant that respondents' protest occurred on a public street, but this fact alone should not be enough to preclude IIED liability. To be sure, statements made on a public street may be less likely to satisfy the elements of the IIED tort than statements made on private property, but there is no reason why a public street in close proximity to the scene of a funeral should be regarded as a free-fire zone in which otherwise actionable verbal attacks are shielded from liability. If the First Amendment permits the States to protect their residents from the harm inflicted by such attacks--and the Court does not hold otherwise--then the location of the tort should not be dispositive. A physical assault may occur without trespassing; it is no defense that the perpetrator had "the right to be where [he was]." See ante, at 11. And the same should be true with respect to unprotected speech. Neither classic "fighting words" nor defamatory statements are immunized when they occur in a public place, and there is no good reason to treat a verbal assault based on the conduct or character of a private figure like Matthew Snyder any differently.

One final comment about the opinion of the Court is in order. The Court suggests that the wounds inflicted by vicious verbal assaults at funerals will be prevented or at least mitigated in the future by new laws that restrict picketing within a specified distance of a funeral. See ante, at 10-11. It is apparent, however, that the enactment of these laws is no substitute for the protection provided by the established IIED tort; according to the Court, the verbal attacks that severely wounded petitioner in this case complied with the new Maryland law regulating funeral picketing. See ante, at 11, n. 5. And there is absolutely nothing to suggest that Congress and the state legislatures, in enacting these laws, intended them to displace the protection provided by the well-established IIED tort.

The real significance of these new laws is not that they obviate the need for IIED protection. Rather, their enactment dramatically illustrates the fundamental point that funerals are unique events at which special protection against emotional assaults is in order. At funerals, the emotional well-being of bereaved relatives is particularly vulnerable. See National Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U. S. 157, 168 (2004). Exploitation of a funeral for the purpose of attracting public attention "intrud[es] upon their ... grief," ibid., and may permanently stain their memories of the final moments before a loved one is laid to rest. Allowing family members to have a few hours of peace without harassment does not undermine public debate. I would therefore hold that, in this setting, the First Amendment permits a private figure to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of private concern.

V

In reversing the District Court judgment in favor of petitioner, the Court of Appeals relied on several grounds not discussed in the opinion of this Court or in the separate opinion supporting affirmance. I now turn briefly to those issues.

First, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred by allowing the jury to decide whether respondents' speech was " 'directed specifically at the Snyder family.' " 580 F. 3d, at 221. It is not clear whether the Court of Appeals thought that this was a question for the trial judge alone or a question on which the judge had to make a preliminary ruling before sending it to the jury. In either event, however, the submission of this question to the jury was not reversible error because, as explained above, it is clear that respondents' statements targeted the Snyders.

Second, the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge went astray in allowing the jury to decide whether respondents' speech was so " 'offensive and shocking as to not be entitled to First Amendment protection.' " Ibid. This instruction also did respondents no harm. Because their speech did not relate to a matter of public concern, it was not protected from liability by the First Amendment, and the only question for the jury was whether the elements of the IIED tort were met.

Third, the Court of Appeals appears to have concluded that the First Amendment does not permit an IIED plaintiff to recover for speech that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. See id., at 222. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on two of our cases--Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U. S. 1 (1990), and Hustler, 485 U. S. 46--but neither supports the broad proposition that the Court of Appeals adopted.

Milkovich was a defamation case, and falsity is an element of defamation. Nothing in Milkovich even hints that the First Amendment requires that this defamation element be engrafted onto the IIED tort.

Hustler did involve an IIED claim, but the plaintiff there was a public figure, and the Court did not suggest that its holding would also apply in a case involving a private figure. Nor did the Court suggest that its holding applied across the board to all types of IIED claims. Instead, the holding was limited to "publications such as the one here at issue," namely, a caricature in a magazine. 485 U. S., at 56. Unless a caricature of a public figure can reasonably be interpreted as stating facts that may be proved to be wrong, the caricature does not have the same potential to wound as a personal verbal assault on a vulnerable private figure.

Because I cannot agree either with the holding of this Court or the other grounds on which the Court of Appeals relied, I would reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings.17

VI

Respondents' outrageous conduct caused petitioner great injury, and the Court now compounds that injury by depriving petitioner of a judgment that acknowledges the wrong he suffered.

In order to have a society in which public issues can be openly and vigorously debated, it is not necessary to allow the brutalization of innocent victims like petitioner. I therefore respectfully dissent.


FOOTNOTES

Footnote 1

A few weeks after the funeral, one of the picketers posted a message on Westboro's Web site discussing the picketing and containing religiously oriented denunciations of the Snyders, interspersed among lengthy Bible quotations. Snyder discovered the posting, referred to by the parties as the "epic," during an Internet search for his son's name. The epic is not properly before us and does not factor in our analysis. Although the epic was submitted to the jury and discussed in the courts below, Snyder never mentioned it in his petition for certiorari. See Pet. for Cert. i ("Snyder's claim arose out of Phelps' intentional acts at Snyder's son's funeral" (emphasis added)); this Court's Rule 14.1(g) (petition must contain statement "setting out the facts material to consideration of the question presented"). Nor did Snyder respond to the statement in the opposition to certiorari that "[t]hough the epic was asserted as a basis for the claims at trial, the petition ... appears to be addressing only claims based on the picketing." Brief in Opposition 9. Snyder devoted only one paragraph in the argument section of his opening merits brief to the epic. Given the foregoing and the fact that an Internet posting may raise distinct issues in this context, we decline to consider the epic in deciding this case. See Ontario v. Quon, 560 U. S. ___, ___ - ___ (2010) (slip op., at 10-12).

Footnote 2

One judge concurred in the judgment on the ground that Snyder had failed to introduce sufficient evidence at trial to support a jury verdict on any of his tort claims. 580 F. 3d, at 227 (opinion of Shedd, J.). The Court of Appeals majority determined that the picketers had "voluntarily waived" any such contention on appeal. Id., at 216. Like the court below, we proceed on the unexamined premise that respondents' speech was tortious.

Footnote 3

The dissent attempts to draw parallels between this case and hy-pothetical cases involving defamation or fighting words. Post, at 10-11 (opinion of Alito, J.). But, as the court below noted, there is "no suggestion that the speech at issue falls within one of the categorical exclusions from First Amendment protection, such as those for obscenity or 'fighting words.' " 580 F. 3d, at 218, n. 12; see United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. ___ , ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5).

Footnote 4

The dissent is wrong to suggest that the Court considers a public street "a free-fire zone in which otherwise actionable verbal attacks are shielded from liability." Post, at 10-11. The fact that Westboro conducted its picketing adjacent to a public street does not insulate the speech from liability, but instead heightens concerns that what is at issue is an effort to communicate to the public the church's views on matters of public concern. That is why our precedents so clearly recognize the special significance of this traditional public forum.

Footnote 5

The Maryland law prohibits picketing within 100 feet of a funeral service or funeral procession; Westboro's picketing would have complied with that restriction.

FOOTNOTES

Footnote 1

See 580 F. 3d 206, 213-214, 216 (CA4 2009).

Footnote 2

See Dept. of Transp., Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics 2008, Table HM-12M, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/
statistics/2008/hm12m.cfm (all Internet materials as visited Feb. 25, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court's case file).

Footnote 3

See Trust for Public Land, 2010 City Park Facts, http://
www.tpl.org/content_documents/CityParkFacts_2010.pdf.

Footnote 4

See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Information Project, http://www.usccb.org/comm/cip.shtml#toc4.

Footnote 5

See http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110124_St-Petersburg-FL-
Dead-Police.pdf.

Footnote 6

See http: //www.godhatesfags.com / fliers/20110120_Dead-Volunteer-Firefighter-Connecting_the_Dots-Baltimore-MD.pdf.

Footnote 7

See http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110104_Newburg-and-Rolla-MO-Tornado-Connecting-the-Dots.pdf.

Footnote 8

See http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20101218_Wichita-KS-Two-Dead-Wichita-Bikers.pdf.

Footnote 9

See http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110129_Tampa-FL-God-Sent-Military-Mom-Shooter-to-Kill-Kids.pdf.

Footnote 10

See nn. 5-9, supra.

Footnote 11

See http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110109_AZ-Shooter-Connecting-the-Dots-Day-2.pdf.

Footnote 12

See, e.g., Stanglin, Anti-Gay Church Group Plans to Picket Tucson Funerals, USA Today, Jan. 10, 2011, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
ondeadline / post / 2011/01/anti-gay-church-group-plans-to-picket-tucston-
funerals/1; Mohanani, Group to Picket 9-Year-Old Tucson Victim's Funeral, Palm Beach Post, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/
news/nation/group-to-picket-9-year-old-tucson-victims-1177921.html; Mehta & Santa Cruz, Tucson Rallies to Protect Girl's Family from Protesters, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 11, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/
2011/jan/11/nation/la-na-funeral-protest-20110112; Medrano, Funeral Protest: Arizona Rallies to Foil Westboro Baptist Church, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/
0111/Funeral-protest-Arizona-rallies-to-foil-Westboro-Baptist-Church.

Footnote 13

See Santa Cruz & Mehta, Westboro Church Agrees Not to Take Protest to Shooting Victims' Funerals, Los Angeles Times, Jan.
13, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/13/nation/la-na-funeral-protest-20110113; http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110112_AZ-Shooter-Mike-Gallagher-Radio-Exchange.pdf.

Footnote 14

See Steinberg, Air Time Instead of Funeral Protest, N. Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2006, p. A14.

Footnote 15

The Court refuses to consider the epic because it was not discussed in Snyder's petition for certiorari. Ante, at 3, n. 1. The epic, however, is not a distinct claim but a piece of evidence that the jury considered in imposing liability for the claims now before this Court. The protest and the epic are parts of a single course of conduct that the jury found to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. See 580 F. 3d,
at 225 ("[T]he Epic cannot be divorced from the general context of
the funeral protest"). The Court's strange insistence that the epic "is not properly before us," ante, at 3, n. 1, means that the Court has not actually made "an independent examination of the whole record," ante, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Court's refusal to consider the epic contrasts sharply with its willingness to take notice of Westboro's protest activities at other times and locations. See ante,
at 9.

Footnote 16

See 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (Md. 2008).

Footnote 17

The Court affirms the decision of the Fourth Circuit with respect to petitioner's claim of intrusion upon seclusion on a ground not addressed by the Fourth Circuit. I would not reach out to decide that issue but would instead leave it for the Fourth Circuit to decide on remand. I would likewise allow the Fourth Circuit on remand to decide whether the judgment on the claim of civil conspiracy can survive in light of the ultimate disposition of the IIED and intrusion upon seclusion claims.

US supports war crimes tribunal for first time - INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos

US supports war crimes tribunal for first time - INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos


See - http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20110302-323075/US-supports-war-crimes-tribunal-for-first-time

US supports war crimes tribunal for first time
Associated Press
Phil. Daily Inquirer
First Posted 13:53:00 03/02/2011



Note:

The USA has refused to ratify the ROME STATUTE establishing the INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) since the time of Pres. G.W. Bush. In the present case of LIBYA, the USA leads the UN SECURITY COUNCIL in invoking the powers and jurisdiction of the ICC, provided, its military personnel remain to be IMMUNE from ICC jurisdiction. This is a case of hybrid and discriminatory ESTOPPEL and selective political amnesia. Read the news below. Click the link above. - Atty. M. J. Laserna Jr.


UNITED NATIONS – The UN resolution imposing tough sanctions against Libya marked the first time that the United States has given its support to the International Criminal Court and signified a remarkable turnaround, though it includes a key exemption demanded by the Obama administration.

The resolution adopted unanimously by the Security Council on Saturday refers the actions of Moammar Gadhafi's regime since February 15 to the court's prosecutor who must decide whether there is enough evidence of alleged crimes against humanity to warrant a full investigation. Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo is required to deliver an initial report to the council in two months.

"It's a historic vote by the United States government because it's the first time in a Security Council resolution the United States has voted affirmatively on the side of the International Criminal Court," said Richard Dicker, head of the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch. "That's a positive step."

But the United States insisted on including a provision in the resolution to protect Americans from investigation or prosecution by the International Criminal Court, known as the ICC. It requires that any citizen of a country that hasn't joined the ICC be investigated or prosecuted in his home country – not by the ICC – for any alleged actions stemming from operations in Libya authorized by the Security Council.

Dicker called this "carve-out" for nationals from countries that aren't parties to the ICC "troubling" though limited since it only deals with the current situation in Libya.

"If, for example, there is a no-fly zone established by the council, and the U.S. dropped bombs and accidentally killed 100 Libyan school children, that U.S. airman or those who ordered the attack would be subject to the jurisdiction exclusively of a U.S. court – not the ICC," Dicker told the Associated Press on Tuesday.

The International Criminal Court, which began operating in 2002, was established after a long campaign to ensure that those responsible for the most heinous crimes could be brought to justice. Under the Rome treaty that established the tribunal, the court can step in only when countries are unwilling or unable to dispense justice themselves for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.

Currently, 114 countries have ratified the Rome statute and are parties to the statute. Libya is not a party to the ICC and therefore the Security Council stepped in to refer Gadhafi's deadly crackdown on anti-government protesters to the tribunal.

Liechtenstein's UN Ambassador Christian Wenaweser, president of the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC, told a press conference Tuesday that the U.S. support for the court and its sponsorship of the resolution was "an important development."

Former US President Bill Clinton signed the Rome treaty on Dec. 31, 2000, but President George W. Bush renounced the signature, citing fears that Americans would be unfairly prosecuted for political reasons.

"We have seen for several months that certainly the U.S. is looking for a more positive engagement with the ICC," Wenaweser said. "The US is participating again in the work of the Assembly of States Parties very actively. So there have been changes before, but certainly this is a very important step – while I don't think this will lead to ratification anytime soon."

He called the exception barring investigation or prosecution of citizens from non-ICC countries a "very, very narrow provision."

US Ambassador Susan Rice agreed, telling reporters Tuesday "we have thought it important that if we were going to for the first time affirmatively support such a resolution to make sure that it was clear the limitations as to who jurisdiction applied to."

She said criticism "that somehow this provides a pass for mercenaries I think is completely misplaced."

"I don't think the International Criminal Court is going to spend its time and effort on foot soldiers that have been paid small amounts of money by Gadhafi," she said. "They're going to focus on the big fish."

France's UN Ambassador Gerard Araud told reporters after the vote that including the exception in the resolution "was a red line for the United States."

"It was a deal breaker," he said. "This is the reason why we accepted this unanimously."

Wenaweser and Jordan's UN ambassador, Prince Zeid al Hussein, who is leading the search to replace Ocampo whose term expires in June 2012, agreed that the council's referral of Libya was good for the court and will hopefully lead to new ratifications.

"Privately many ambassadors, ministers, will concede that eventually their countries will probably become state parties," Zeid told reporters Tuesday. "It's only a matter of time as to when."

"The court hasn't died because there are too many cruel people around the world willing to commit atrocities and so long as that's the case, unfortunately and sadly, tragically, there is a need for a court like this. For the foreseeable next few decades at least, we will continue to have these sorts of events, and the public will demand that governments be responsive."