Sunday, March 6, 2011

Nominal damages based on breach of contract

G.R. No. 190601


Note:


In the case below, the suing guests of a big hotel initially won before the trial court but later lost before the appellate court and the Supreme Court. The issue was damages based on breach of contract. The SC awarded a very small sum of 50,000 Pesos by way of nominal damages in favor of the plaintiffs, notwithstanding the inadequate service rendered by the hotel waiters and their supervisors and the inconvenience faced by the guests. The grounds cited by the SC were the unexpected number of additional guests and the failure of the plaintiffs to inform the hotel in advance of such increase in number. The fine prints of the contract of adhesion prevailed as is usually the case when big corporations are sued in court. I do not totally agree with the common-sense aspect of the SC decision. I am nonetheless reproducing it in full for legal research purpose in re: tort and damages in relation to contractual breach.




SPOUSES LUIGI M. GUANIO and
ANNA HERNANDEZ-GUANIO,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 190601
- versus -
Present:
CARPIO MORALES,
Chairperson, J.,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL and RESORT, INC., also doing
business under the name of
Promulgated:
SHANGRI-LA HOTEL MANILA,
Respondent.
February 7, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.

For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio (petitioners) booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati (the hotel).
Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled an initial food tasting. Petitioners claim that they requested the hotel to prepare for seven persons ─ the two of them, their respective parents, and the wedding coordinator. At the scheduled food tasting, however, respondent prepared for only six.
Petitioners initially chose a set menu which included black cod, king prawns and angel hair pasta with wild mushroom sauce for the main course which cost P1,000.00 per person. They were, however, given an option in which salmon, instead of king prawns, would be in the menu at P950.00 per person. They in fact partook of the salmon.

Three days before the event, a final food tasting took place. Petitioners aver that the salmon served was half the size of what they were served during the initial food tasting; and when queried about it, the hotel quoted a much higher price (P1,200.00) for the size that was initially served to them. The parties eventually agreed on a final price ─ P1,150 per person.
A day before the event or on July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and forged their contract.[1]

Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondent’s representatives, Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales Manager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they would; their guests complained of the delay in the service of the dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were unavailable; the hotel’s waiters were rude and unapologetic when confronted about the delay; and despite Alvarez’s promise that there would be no charge for the extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight, they were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for the three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day.
Petitioners further claim that they brought wine and liquor in accordance with their open bar arrangement, but these were not served to the guests who were forced to pay for their drinks.
Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. (respondent) and received an apologetic reply from Krister Svensson, the hotel’s Executive Assistant Manager in charge of Food and Beverage. They nevertheless filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

In its Answer, respondent claimed that petitioners requested a combination of king prawns and salmon, hence, the price was increased to P1,200.00 per person, but discounted at P1,150.00; that contrary to petitioners’ claim, Marquez and Alvarez were present during the event, albeit they were not permanently stationed thereat as there were three other hotel functions; that while there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was occasioned by the sudden increase of guests to 470 from the guaranteed expected minimum number of guests of 350 to a maximum of 380, as stated in the Banquet Event Order (BEO);[2] and that Isaac Albacea, Banquet Service Director, in fact relayed the delay in the service of the meals to petitioner Luigi’s father, Gil Guanio.
 
Respecting the belated service of meals to some guests, respondent attributed it to the insistence of petitioners’ wedding coordinator that certain guests be served first.
On Svensson’s letter, respondent, denying it as an admission of liability, claimed that it was meant to maintain goodwill to its customers.
By Decision of August 17, 2006, Branch 148 of the Makati RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, disposing as follows:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the following:

1) The amount of P350,000.00 by way of actual damages;
2) The amount of P250,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3) The amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4) The amount of P100,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees.
With costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.[3]
 
In finding for petitioners, the trial court relied heavily on the letter of Svensson which is partly quoted below:

Upon receiving your comments on our service rendered during your reception here with us, we are in fact, very distressed. Right from minor issues pappadums served in the soup instead of the creutons, lack of valet parkers, hard rolls being too hard till a major one – slow service, rude and arrogant waiters, we have disappointed you in all means.

Indeed, we feel as strongly as you do that the services you received wereunacceptable and definitely not up to our standards. We understand that it is our job to provide excellent service and in this instance, we have fallen short of your expectations. We ask you please to accept our profound apologies for causing such discomfort and annoyance. [4] (underscoring supplied)
 
The trial court observed that from “the tenor of the letter . . . the defendant[-herein respondent] admits that the services the plaintiff[-herein petitioners] received were unacceptable and definitely not up to their standards.”[5]
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 27, 2009,[6] reversed the trial court’s decision, it holding that the proximate cause of petitioners’ injury was an unexpected increase in their guests:

x x x Hence, the alleged damage or injury brought about by the confusion, inconvenience and disarray during the wedding reception may not be attributed to defendant-appellant Shangri-la.
We find that the said proximate cause, which is entirely attributable to plaintiffs-appellants, set the chain of events which resulted in the alleged inconveniences, to the plaintiffs-appellants. Given the circumstances that obtained, only the Sps. Guanio may bear whatever consequential damages that they may have allegedly suffered.[7] (underscoring supplied)
 
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of November 19, 2009, the present petition for review was filed.
 
The Court finds that since petitioners’ complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of proximate cause finds no application to it:

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract. x x x The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.[8] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
RCPI v. Verchez, et al. [9] enlightens:
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include his “expectation interest,” which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, or his “reliance interest,” which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made; or his “restitution interest,” which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make RECOMPENSE to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability. (emphasis and underscoring in the original; capitalization supplied)
The pertinent provisions of the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract between the parties read:

4.3 The ENGAGER shall be billed in accordance with the prescribed rate for the minimum guaranteed number of persons contracted for, regardless of under attendance or non-appearance of the expected number of guests, except where the ENGAGER cancels the Function in accordance with its Letter of Confirmation with the HOTEL. Should the attendance exceed the minimum guaranteed attendance, the ENGAGER shall also be billed at the actual rate per cover in excess of the minimum guaranteed attendance.
x x x x
4.5. The ENGAGER must inform the HOTEL at least forty eight (48) hours before the scheduled date and time of the Function of any change in the minimum guaranteed covers. In the absence of such notice, paragraph 4.3 shall apply in the event of under attendance. In case the actual number of attendees exceed the minimum guaranteed number by ten percent (10%), the HOTEL shall not in any way be held liable for any damage or inconvenience which may be caused thereby. The ENGAGER shall also undertake to advise the guests of the situation and take positive steps to remedy the same.[10] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract. It is also defined as the [f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract.[11]

The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to inform respondent of the change in the expected number of guests. The observation is reflected in the records of the case. Petitioners’ failure to discharge such obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted paragraph 4.5 of the parties’ contract provide, respondent from liability for “any damage or inconvenience” occasioned thereby.
As for petitioners’ claim that respondent departed from its verbal agreement with petitioners, the same fails, given that the written contract which the parties entered into the day before the event, being the law between them.
Respecting the letter of Svensson on which the trial court heavily relied as admission of respondent’s liability but which the appellate court brushed aside, the Court finds the appellate court’s stance in order. It is not uncommon in the hotel industry to receive comments, criticisms or feedback on the service it delivers. It is also customary for hotel management to try to smooth ruffled feathers to preserve goodwill among its clientele.

Kalalo v. Luz holds:[12]

Statements which are not estoppels nor judicial admissions have no quality of conclusiveness, and an opponent whose admissions have been offered against him may offer any evidence which serves as an explanation for his former assertion of what he now denies as a fact.

Respondent’s Catering Director, Bea Marquez, explained the hotel’s procedure on receiving and processing complaints, viz:

ATTY. CALMA:
Q You mentioned that the letter indicates an acknowledgement of the concern and that there was-the first letter there was an acknowledgment of the concern and an apology, not necessarily indicating that such or admitting fault?
A Yes.
Q Is this the letter that you are referring to?
If I may, Your Honor, that was the letter dated August 4, 2001, previously marked as plaintiff’s exhibits, Your Honor. What is the procedure of the hotel with respect to customer concern?
A Upon receipt of the concern from the guest or client, we acknowledge receipt of such concern, and as part of procedure in service industry particularly Makati Shangri-la we apologize for whatever inconvenience but at the same time saying, that of course, we would go through certain investigation and get back to them for the feedback with whatever concern they may have.
Q Your Honor, I just like at this point mark the exhibits, Your Honor, the letter dated August 4, 2001 identified by the witness, Your Honor, to be marked as Exhibit 14 and the signature of Mr. Krister Svensson be marked as Exhibit 14-A.[13]
x x x x
Q In your opinion, you just mentioned that there is a procedure that the hotel follows with respect to the complaint, in your opinion was this procedure followed in this particular concern?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q What makes you say that this procedure was followed?
A As I mentioned earlier, we proved that we did acknowledge the concern of the client in this case and we did emphatize from the client and apologized, and at the same time got back to them in whatever investigation we have.
Q You said that you apologized, what did you apologize for?
A Well, first of all it is a standard that we apologize, right? Being in the service industry, it is a practice that we apologize if there is any inconvenience, so the purpose for apologizing is mainly to show empathy and to ensure the client that we are hearing them out and that we will do a better investigation and it is not in any way that we are admitting any fault.[14] (underscoring supplied)

To the Court, the foregoing explanation of the hotel’s Banquet Director overcomes any presumption of admission of breach which Svensson’s letter might have conveyed.
The exculpatory clause notwithstanding, the Court notes that respondent could have managed the “situation” better, it being held in high esteem in the hotel and service industry. Given respondent’s vast experience, it is safe to presume that this is not its first encounter with booked events exceeding the guaranteed cover. It is not audacious to expect that certain measures have been placed in case this predicament crops up. That regardless of these measures, respondent still received complaints as in the present case, does not amuse.
Respondent admitted that three hotel functions coincided with petitioners’ reception. To the Court, the delay in service might have been avoided or minimized if respondent exercised prescience in scheduling events. No less than quality service should be delivered especially in events which possibility of repetition is close to nil. Petitioners are not expected to get married twice in their lifetimes.
In the present petition, under considerations of equity, the Court deems it just to award the amount of P50,000.00 by way of nominal damages to petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were subjected to during to the event.[15] The Court recognizes that every person is entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.[16] Respondent’s lack of prudence is an affront to this right.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 28, 2009 is PARTIALLY REVERSED. Respondent is, in light of the foregoing discussion, ORDERED to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to petitioners by way of nominal damages.
SO ORDERED.

Change of name viz. correction of entries in birth certificate; proper procedures

G.R. No. 189476


This is the latest SC decision on Rule 103 in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. All family law practitioners should read its doctrinal pronouncements clarifying the proper jurisdictional and technical procedures for a petition for change of name in relation to a petition for correction of entries in a birth certificate.



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

- versus -
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO
(A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG),


G.R. No. 189476
February 2, 2011


D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:




Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth[1] shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.



Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled “IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG.”



In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique “does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.”[2] Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college[3] showing that he carried the surname “Coseteng,” and the birth certificate of his child where “Coseteng” appears as his surname.[4] In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name “JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.”[5]



On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,[6] respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[7]



The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008.[8] And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).



No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte.[9]





By Decision of January 8, 2009,[10] the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:



1. Delete the entry “March 26, 1972” in Item 24 for “DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES” [in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];



2. Correct the entry “MAGPAYO” in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to “COSETENG”;



3. Delete the entry “COSETENG” in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and



4. Delete the entry “Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr.” in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)





The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,[11] hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.



The Republic assails the decision in this wise:



I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME…INVOLVES THE CHANGE OF [RESPONDENT’S] CIVIL STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS…



II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENT’S FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.[12] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)







The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.[13]



The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of marriage and the name of respondent’s father from the entries in respondent’s birth certificate,[14] the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord with respondent’s prayer reading:



WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court issue an order allowing the change of name of petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court order the Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records.



Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises.[15] (underscoring supplied)



Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing.[16]



The petition is impressed with merit.



A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.[17] Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.



The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines.[18] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.



The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.



Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[19] categorically holds that “changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .”



Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:



SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.



x x x x



SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.



SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)





Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and “all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby” should be made parties to the proceeding.



As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.







Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote[20] in support of his claim that his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.



Republic v. Belmonte,[21] illuminates, however:



The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)





Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.



Republic v. Labrador[22] mandates that “a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.” It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.



Labayo-Rowe[23] highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as “married” on “1953 Bulan” are erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said birth certificate.



The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and accordingly directed the local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her children’s birth certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status in Victoria’s birth certificate from “married” to “single” and the date and place of marriage to “no marriage.”



On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial court’s order directing the change of Emperatriz’ civil status and the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the following observations:



x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.



The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from “legitimate” to “illegitimate.” Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules “shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.” If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.[24] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)







As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:



SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.







SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)





A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different “potential oppositors.” The first notice is that given to the “persons named in the petition” and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of “potential oppositors”) within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).



This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals.[25] In that case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion “Gustilo,” Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughter’s real father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a “CONSTANCIA” wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial court granted the petition.



After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change of June’s family name to Gustilo.



Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial court’s Order as Mary Joy was, by Barco’s claim, also fathered by Gustilo.



The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-intervention.



On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in Nadina’s petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:



Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.



x x x x



The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x x.[26] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)





Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,[27] Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor children. Carlito and his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to “Filipino,” instead of “Chinese,” and the deletion of the word “married” opposite the phrase “Date of marriage of parents” because their parents ─ Juan and Epifania ─ were not married. And Carlito requested the correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his wife’s date of marriage to reflect the actual date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from Maribel to “Marivel.”



The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was not married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos’ petition.



The trial court granted the petition.



On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and the trial court’s judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted that the affected parties were already notified of the proceedings in the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the Khos’ petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their father.



What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified through publication.



IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.



WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.



SO ORDERED.

Foreign divorce decree; how recognized and recorded in the Philippines.

G.R. No. 186571

Summary:

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.



GERBERT R. CORPUZ
versus
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,

G.R. No. 186571
August 11, 2010

D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:





x x x.




THE PETITION



From the RTC’s ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]



Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,[14] both support Gerbert’s position.



Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.



THE COURT’S RULING



The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse



The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.



The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]



Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:



Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.



Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.



Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:



To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]





As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.”[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.



Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26]



Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.





The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction



We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:



SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:



(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and



(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.



In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.



To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27]



The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.”[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.



In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.



The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.



We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]



In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.



Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree



As a matter of “housekeeping” concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.



Article 407 of the Civil Code states that “[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.” The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting “all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.”[35]



A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:



Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:



(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.



x x x x



Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:



(1) Birth and death register;



(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.



(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.





But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.



Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.



Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.



Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.



We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.



WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.



SO ORDERED.

Foreign judgment/decree of divorce; how recognized in PH.





GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010. 



"x x x.

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5] 

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6] 

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.


This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to “avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.”[11] 

x x x.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. 

x x x.

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18] 

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. 


Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.”[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. 

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26] 

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision. 

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.


In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27] 

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.”[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. 

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. 

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides. 

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of “housekeeping” concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done. 

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that “[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.” The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting “all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.”[35] 

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

x x x x

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.


But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. 

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. 

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

x x x."


Footnotes"

[1] Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
[2] Id. at 3-20.
[3] Id. at 27.
[4] Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.
[5] Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.
[6] Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:

It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.

[7] Supra note 1.
[8] Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.
[9] Rollo, p. 31.
[10] G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.
[11] Id. at 121.
[12] Gerbert’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.
[13] Supra note 2.
[14] Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
[15] The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.
[16] The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code. 
[17] Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
[18] Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with the Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.
[19] Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
[20] G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[21] G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
[22] Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
[23] Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
[24] The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
[25] See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

x x x x

Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

[26] Parenthetically, we add that an alien’s legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a declaration of authority to remarry.

[27] Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.

[28] Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
[29] Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
[30] Rollo, pp. 38-41.
[31] The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the Canadian court. The full text of the court’s judgment was not included.
[32] Literally means “a thing adjudged,” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.
[33] See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

[34] On the face of the marriage certificate, the word “DIVORCED” was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.
[35] Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
[36] Rollo, pp. 47-50.
[37] Id. at 51.
[38] Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[39] Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[40] Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[41] When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.

Drug tests of workers; procedural rules.

G.R. No. 172589



JEFFREY NACAGUE vs.
SULPICIO LINES, INC.,
G.R. No. 172589
August 8, 2010


D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:




The Issue



Nacague raises the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that his termination from employment was valid.



The Ruling of the Court



The petition is meritorious.



Nacague maintains that the S.M. Lazo Clinic drug test was not credible because Sulpicio Lines failed to show that S.M. Lazo Clinic is an authorized drug testing center. Nacague also alleges that the urine samples were gathered carelessly without proper labels to identify their owners and that S.M. Lazo Clinic did not ask Nacague if he was taking any medication that might alter the results of the drug test. Nacague adds that Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) and the Department of Labor and Employment Order No. 53-03 (Department Order No. 53-03) require two drug tests — a screening test and a confirmatory test. Nacague maintains that, since only a screening test was conducted, he was illegally dismissed based on an incomplete drug test. Nacague argues that Sulpicio Lines failed to discharge its burden of proving that the termination of his employment was legal.



On the other hand, Sulpicio Lines questions the belated attempt of Nacague to question the credibility of S.M. Lazo Clinic. Sulpicio Lines also argues that since Nacague knew that the residue of the drug would no longer be detectable in his body after five days, Nacague underwent another drug test with the Chong Hua Hospital. Sulpicio Lines insists that the most accurate drug test is the random drug test conducted by S.M. Lazo Clinic and that the test with Chong Hua Hospital was a “planned” test.



Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just causes or for authorized causes. Furthermore, under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.



Contrary to Sulpicio Lines’ allegation, Nacague was already questioning the credibility of S.M. Lazo Clinic as early as the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. In fact, the Labor Arbiter declared that the S.M. Lazo Clinic drug test result was doubtful since it is not under the supervision of the Dangerous Drug Board.



The NLRC and the Court of Appeals ruled that Sulpicio Lines validly terminated Nacague’s employment because he was found guilty of using illegal drugs which constitutes serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. However, we find that Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the lack of accreditation of S.M. Lazo Clinic made its drug test results doubtful.



Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165 provides that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers. Moreover, Section 36 also prescribes that drug testing shall consist of both the screening test and the confirmatory test. Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165 reads:



SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of test results. The DOH shall take steps in setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited drug testing centers to further reduce the cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x (Emphasis supplied)




Department Order No. 53-03 further provides:



Drug Testing Program for Officers and Employees



· Drug testing shall conform with the procedures as prescribed by the Department of Health (DOH) (www.doh.gov.ph). Only drug testing centers accredited by the DOH shall be utilized. A list of accredited centers may be accessed through the OSHC website (www.oshc.dole.gov.ph).



· Drug testing shall consist of both the screening test and the confirmatory test; the latter to be carried out should the screening test turn positive. The employee concerned must be informed of the test results whether positive or negative. (Emphasis supplied)







In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, we explained:



As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the tests shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.





The law is clear that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers. In this case, Sulpicio Lines failed to prove that S.M. Lazo Clinic is an accredited drug testing center. Sulpicio Lines did not even deny Nacague’s allegation that S.M. Lazo Clinic was not accredited. Also, only a screening test was conducted to determine if Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not confirm the positive result of the screening test with a confirmatory test. Sulpicio Lines failed to indubitably prove that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs amounting to serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that it had a valid and legal cause for terminating Nacague’s employment. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.



We agree with the Labor Arbiter that Nacague’s reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations between Nacague and Sulpicio Lines and that Nacague should instead be granted separation pay.



x x x.