In the case of SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B. RAFOLS vs. ATTY. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., En Banc, A.C. No. 4973, March 15, 2010, the respondent lawyer was DISBARRED by the Supreme Court for gross misconduct in connivance with an equally dishonest trial judge. The Court stressed the basic doctrine:
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
– Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002, 384 SCRA 1.
The salient parts of the Decision are quoted in full below, thus:
X x x.
Ruling of the Court
X x x.
I
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which governs the disbarment and suspension of attorneys, provides:
Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers constitute malpractice.
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty.[1] As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.[2]
Here, the complainants successfully overcame the respondent’s presumed innocence and the presumed regularity in the performance of his duties as an attorney of the complainants. The evidence against him was substantial, and was not contradicted.
To begin with, the respondent’s denial of knowledge of the transaction between the complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not only implausible, but also unsubstantiated. It was the respondent himself who had introduced the complainants to the judge. His act of introducing the complainants to the judge strongly implied that the respondent was aware of the illegal purpose of the judge in wanting to talk with the respondent’s clients. Thus, we unqualifiedly accept the aptness of the following evaluation made in the OBC’s Report and Recommendation, viz:
xxx Being the Officer of the Court, he must have known that meeting litigants outside the court is something beyond the bounds of the rule and that it can never be justified by any reason. He must have known the purpose of Judge Dizon in requesting him to meet the complainants-litigants outside the chamber of Judge Dizon. By his overt act in arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and complainants- litigants in the Coffee Shop of the East Royal Hotel, it is crystal clear that he must have allowed himself and consented to Judge Dizon’s desire to ask money from the complainants-litigants for a favorable decision of their case which was pending before the sala of Judge Dizon.[3]
Secondly, the respondent’s insistence that he did not see the complainants’ act of handing the money to the judge is unbelievable. In his comment, the respondent even admitted having himself received the P80,000.00 from the complainants, and having kept P30,000.00 of that amount pursuant to the instruction of the judge as a token of the friendship between him and the judge.[4] The admission proved that the respondent had known all along of the illegal transaction between the judge and the complainants, and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the money to the judge.
Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the complainants had given the money to the judge as a loan, far from softening our strong impression of the respondent’s liability, confirmed his awareness of the gross impropriety of the transaction. Being the complainants’ attorney in the civil case being heard before the judge, the respondent could not but know that for the judge to borrow money from his clients was highly irregular and outrightly unethical. If he was innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed, he should have desisted from having any part in the transaction. Yet, he did not, which rendered his explanation unbelievable. Compounding the unworthiness of his explanation was his admission of having retained P30,000.00 of the “borrowed” money upon the judge’s instruction.
And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the respondent’s act of requesting the NBI Regional Office in Davao City to investigate was an afterthought on his part. We agree with the OBC, for the respondent obviously acted in order to anticipate the complainants’ moves against him and the judge. To be sure, the respondent sensed that the complainants would not simply forgive and forget the mulcting they had suffered at the hands of the judge and their own attorney from the time that the complainants assured him that they were no longer interested to get back their money despite their being very angry at the judge’s greed.
Overall, the respondent’ denials were worthless and unavailing in the face of the uncontradicted evidence showing that he had not only personally arranged the meeting between Manuel and Judge Dizon, Jr., but had also communicated to the complainants the judge’s illegal reason for the meeting. It is axiomatic that any denial, to be accepted as a viable defense in any proceeding, must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. This need derives from the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and self-serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to overcome the testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters.[5]
II
The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.[6] The attorney is a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people’s faith and confidence in the legal system are ensured.[7] Thus, he must conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all times.[8] Any violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition on the attorney of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.[9]
Specifically, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct.[10] Corollary to this injunction is the rule that an attorney shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.[11]
The respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law Profession, which demanded of him as an attorney the absolute abdication of any personal advantage that conflicted in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his clients. For monetary gain, he disregarded the vow to “delay no man for money or malice” and to “conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients” that he made when he took the Lawyer’s Oath.[12] He also disobeyed the explicit command to him as an attorney “to accept no compensation in connection with his client’s business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval.”[13] He conveniently ignored that the relation between him and his clients was highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character.[14]
Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, which is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.”[15] Any gross misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private capacity shows him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.[16]
The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were conspirators against the former’s own clients, whom he was sworn to protect and to serve with utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for the Court to make in this administrative case. And, being conspirators, they both deserve the highest penalty. The disbarment of the respondent is in order, because such sanction is on par with the dismissal of Judge Dizon, Jr.
X x x.
[1] Arma v. Montevilla, A.C. No. 4829, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 1.
[2] Id.
[3] Rollo, pp. 247-248.
[4] Id., p. 189.
[5] Rafols, Jr. v. Dizon, A.M. RTJ-98-1426, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 92; Orfila v. Arellano, A.M. Nos. P-06-2110 and P-03-1692, February 23, 2006, 482 SCRA 280; Mabini v. Raga, A.M. No. P-06-2150, June 21, 2006, 491 SCRA 525; Re: (1) Lost Checks Issued to the Late Roderick Roy P. Melliza, Former Clerk II, MCTC, Zaragga, Iloilo and (2) Dropping from the Rolls of Ms. Esther T. Andres; A.M. No. 2005-26-SC, November 22, 2006; 507 SCRA 478.
[6] Dumadag v. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 513.
[7] Cham v. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 1..
[8] Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
[9] Cham v. Paita-Moya, supra at Note 25.
[10] Rule 1.01, which states:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
[11] Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[12] In the Lawyer’s Oath, the attorney declares that:
x x x I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
[13] Rule 138, Section 20 (e), Rules of Court.
[14] Barnachea v. Quiocho, A.C. No. 5925, March 11, 2003, 399 SCRA 1.
[15] Whitson v. Atienza, A.C. No. 5535, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 10.
[16] Id.
