Venue and jurisdiction in criminal cases - G.R. No. 192565

G.R. No. 192565

"x x x.

The Court’s Ruling

          We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

         

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case.  The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.[12] Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.[13]   

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a)    Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:  

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.  In other words, the venue of action  and  of  jurisdiction  are  deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

x x x."

moot and academic; mooted by supervening events - G.R. No. 193978

G.R. No. 193978

"x x x.

D.   The petition has been mooted

     by supervening events.

          Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already been rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act.

With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.  The pertinent provisions read:

Section 5. Creation of the Governance Commission for Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations. — There is hereby created an advisory, monitoring, and oversight body with authority to formulate, implement and coordinate policies to be known as the Governance Commission for Government-Owned or-Controlled Corporations, hereinafter referred to as the GCG, which shall be attached to the Office of the President.  The GCG shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x x

            h) Conduct compensation studies, develop and recommend to the President a competitive compensation and remuneration system which shall attract and retain talent, at the same time allowing the GOCC to be financially sound and sustainable;

x x x x

            Section 8.  Coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System. — The GCG, after conducting a compensation study, shall develop a Compensation and Position Classification System which shall apply to all officers and employees of the GOCCs whether under the Salary Standardization Law or exempt therefrom and shall consist of classes of positions grouped into such categories as the GCG may determine, subject to approval of the President.

            Section 9.  Position Titles and Salary Grades. — All positions in the Positions Classification System, as determined by the GCG and as approved by the President, shall be allocated to their proper position titles and salary grades in accordance with an Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System, which shall be prepared by the GCG and approved by the President.

x x x x

            [N]o GOCC shall be exempt from the coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System developed by the GCG under this Act.

As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law.   This means that, the President can now reissue an EO containing these same provisions without any legal constraints.

A moot case is “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.”[42]  “[A]n action is considered ‘moot’ when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x x x.  Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its] determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events.”[43]

This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered the President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs.  For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise.  Any further discussion of the constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149.  In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., “the Court normally [will not] entertain a petition touching on an  issue  that  has become  moot  because x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a ‘flesh and blood’ case for the Court to resolve.”[44]   

 x x x."

Defective jurat in verification is not fatal defect - G.R. No. 193978

G.R. No. 193978

"x x x.

C.    The petition has a defective

      jurat.

The respondents claim that the petition should be dismissed for failing to comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the party or the counsel representing him to sign the pleading and indicate an address that should not be a post office box.  The petition also allegedly violated the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2001, requiring counsels to indicate in their pleadings their Roll of Attorneys Number, their PTR Number and their IBP Official Receipt or Lifetime Member Number; otherwise, the pleadings would be considered unsigned and dismissible.  Bar Matter No. 1922 likewise states that a counsel should note down his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption in the pleading, but the petitioner had failed to do so.[40]

We do not see any violation of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as the petition bears the petitioner’s signature and office address. The present suit was brought before this Court by the petitioner himself as a party litigant and not through counsel. Therefore, the requirements under the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2001 and Bar Matter No. 1922 do not apply.  In Bar Matter No. 1132, April 1, 2003, we clarified that a party who is not a lawyer is not precluded from signing his own pleadings as this is allowed by the Rules of Court; the purpose of requiring a counsel to indicate his IBP Number and PTR Number is merely to protect the public from bogus lawyers.  A similar construction should be given to Bar Matter No. 1922, which requires lawyers to indicate their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; otherwise, the provision that allows parties to sign their own pleadings will be negated.

However, the point raised by the respondents regarding the petitioner’s defective jurat is correct.  Indeed, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, dated February 19, 2008, calls for a current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual as competent evidence of identity.  Nevertheless, we hasten to clarify that the defective jurat in the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect, as we held in In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v. Sehwani, Incorporated.[41]  The verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may waive. 

 x x x."

"Locus standi" strictly construed - G.R. No. 193978

G.R. No. 193978

"x x x.

B.   Petitioner lacks locus standi.

“Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.  The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”[24]  This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[25] 

Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a constitutional question” when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[26]

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant apresent substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."[27]  

To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he “stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation.”[28] The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.

The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies.[29]  The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection.  Section 9 of EO 7 reads:

            Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances, Incentives and Other Benefits. –Moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries, and the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentives and other benefits, except salary adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010, are hereby imposed until specifically authorized by the President. [emphasis ours]

          In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy.   In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies.  To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. 

           It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not something that just anybody with some grievance or pain may assert.  It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the court’s time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another department of government.  If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional adjudication.[30]  The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle.  Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation of the case; more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciary’s overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government, such as the President, and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very essence of representative democracies.[31]

          Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued.  This supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora,[32] “as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry.”[33]  Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case.  The Court made a similar ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo[34] and held that the petitioners therein, who are national officers of the IBP, have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.[35]     

We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot “infuse” or give the petitioner locus standiunder the transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine.  In Velarde v. Social Justice Society,[36] we held that even if the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.[37]  In other words, giving due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not merit the Court’s liberality.  As we emphasized in Lozano v. Nograles,[38] “while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of ‘personal injury’ to the broader ‘transcendental importance’ doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused.”[39] 

Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed the present case as a representative of PhilHealth.  In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative. 

x x x."

Declaratory relief is proper remedy to question acts which are not judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. - G.R. No. 193978

G.R. No. 193978

"x x x.

Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts.  Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7:

            Section 1.  Who may file petition.  Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphases ours.)

Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila[16] is a case in point.[17]  In Liga, we dismissed the petition for certiorari to set aside an EO issued by a City Mayor and insisted that a petition for declaratory relief should have been filed with the RTC.  We painstakingly ruled:

After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for certiorari.

First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives.  A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1.  Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur:  (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting [to] lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order.  It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 5.  The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1)           Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, andhabeas corpus.

(2)        Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a)   All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).

As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.[18]

Likewise, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti Terrorism Council,[19] we similarly dismissed the petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9372, otherwise known as the “Human Security Act of 2007,” since the respondents therein (members of the Anti-Terrorism Council) did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

x x x."

Motion to reduce appeal bond in labor cases - G.R. No. 196830

G.R. No. 196830

"x x x.

KJ Commercial’s filing of a motion to reduce bond and delayed posting of theP2,562,930 surety bond did not render the Labor Arbiter’s 30 October 2008 Decision final and executory. The Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows the filing of a motion to reduce bond subject to two conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground, and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. Section 6 of Article VI states:

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.

The mere filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.

The filing of a motion to reduce bond and compliance with the two conditions stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. In McBurnie v. Ganzon,¹⁹the Court held:

x x x [T]he bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.²⁰

The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce bond,²¹and it may rule on the motion beyond the 10-day period within which to perfect an appeal. Obviously, at the time of the filing of the motion to reduce bond and posting of a bond in a reasonable amount, there is no assurance whether the appellant’s motion is indeed based on “meritorious ground” and whether the bond he or she posted is of a “reasonable amount.” Thus, the appellant always runs the risk of failing to perfect an appeal.

Section 2, Article I of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC states that, “These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of labor disputes.” In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to reduce bond, the appellant must be allowed to wait for the ruling of the NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-day period to perfect an appeal. If the NLRC grants the motion and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the motion, the appellant may still file a motion for reconsideration as provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the Rules. If the NLRC grants the motion for reconsideration and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the motion, then the decision of the labor arbiter becomes final and executory.

In the present case, KJ Commercial filed a motion to reduce bond and posted aP50,000 cash bond. When the NLRC denied its motion, KJ Commercial filed a motion for reconsideration and posted the full P2,562,930 surety bond. The NLRC then granted the motion for reconsideration.

In any case, the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court may relax the rule. In Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. v. Bautista,²² the Court held:

Jurisprudence tells us that in labor cases, an appeal from a decision involving a monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The Court, however, has relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional circumstances in order to resolve controversies on their merits. These circumstances include: (1) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved.²³

In Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC,²⁴ the Court held:

The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory. TheLabor Code provides:

ART. 223. Appeal. — Decisions, awards or orders of the LaborArbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decision involving a monetary award in labor cases may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.” The lawmakers intended the posting of the bond to be an indispensable requirement to perfect an employer’s appeal.

However, in a number of cases, this Court has relaxed this requirement in order to bring about the immediate and appropriate resolution of controversies on the merits. Some of these cases include: “(a) counsel’s reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter that the aggrieved party may appeal within ten (10) working days; (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision; and (d) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved.”

In Quiambao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court ruled that a relaxation of the appeal bond requirement could be justified by substantial compliance with the rule.

In Globe General Services and Security Agency vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court observed that the NLRC, in actual practice, allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of the appellant and on meritorious grounds; hence, petitioners in that case should have filed a motion to reduce the bond within the reglementary period for appeal.

That is the exact situation in the case at bar. Here, petitioner claims to have received the labor arbiter’s Decision on April 6, 1993. On April 16, 1993, it filed, together with its memorandum on appeal and notice of appeal, a motion to reduce the appeal bond accompanied by a surety bond for fifty thousand pesos issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. Ignoring petitioner’s motion (to reduce bond), Respondent Commission rendered its assailed Resolution dismissing the appeal due to the late filing of the appeal bond.

The solicitor general argues for the affirmation of the assailed Resolution for thesole reason that the appeal bond, even if it was filed on time, was defective, as it was not in an amount “equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.” The Court disagrees.

We hold that petitioner’s motion to reduce the bond is a substantial compliance with the Labor Code. This holding is consistent with the norm that letter-perfectrules must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice.²⁵

In Ong v. Court of Appeals,²⁶ the Court held that the bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. The Court held that, “While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond.”²⁷

In the present case, KJ Commercial showed willingness to post a partial bond. In fact, it posted a P50,000 cash bond. In Ong, the Court held that, “Petitioner in the said case substantially complied with the rules by posting a partial surety bond of fifty thousand pesos issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. while his motion to reduce appeal bond was pending before the NLRC.”²⁸

Aside from posting a partial bond, KJ Commercial immediately posted the full amount of the bond when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the NLRC’s 9 March 2009 Decision. In Dr. Postigo v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.,²⁹ the Court held:

x x x [T]he respondent immediately submitted a supersedeas bond with its motion for reconsideration of the NLRC resolution dismissing its appeal. In Ongv. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the aggrieved party may file the appeal bond within the ten-day reglementary period following the receipt of the resolution of the NLRC to forestall the finality of such resolution. Hence, while the appeal of a decision involving a monetary award in labor cases may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond and the posting of the bond is an indispensable requirement to perfect such an appeal, a relaxation of the appeal bond requirement could be justified by substantial compliance with the rule.³⁰

 x x x."

Supreme Court junks petition vs President Noynoy Aquino's Executive Order 7 | Sun.Star

Supreme Court junks petition vs President Noynoy Aquino's Executive Order 7 | Sun.Star

"x x x.

THE Supreme Court has dismissed a petition questioning the constitutionality of President Benigno Aquino III’s Executive Order 7, which bars the release of bonuses and allowances to the board of directors of government-owned-and-controlled-corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions.

In a 19-page en banc resolution penned by Associate Justice Arturo Brion, the Court unanimously ruled to dismiss the petition filed by lawyer Jelbert Galicto, an employee of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), seeking to declare null and void the moratorium on the increase in salary, incentives and other forms of compensation of all GOCCs and GFI employees.

EO 7, which took effect September 25, 2010, provided the framework for a fixed compensation and position classification for GOCCs and GFIs. It likewise created a Task Force to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI officers and employees and ordered a moratorium on the increases in their salaries.

The SC ruled that any discussion on the constitutionality of EO 7 is “moot on its face” in light of the enactment of Republic Act 10149, or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, which amended the provisions in the charters of the GOCCs and GFIs empowering their boards of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system and instead expressly authorizing the President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

With its mootness, the Court ruled that there is no longer any actual controversy between adverse parties.

“For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion on its constitutionality serves no useful purpose. All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as well as its patent formal and procedural infirmities, we no longer see any reason for the Court to resolve the other issues raised in the petition,” the Court said.

As the issuance of EO 7 was not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or mandatory act, the SC said the proper remedy is not a petition for certiorari and prohibition but one of declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

The High Court also said that petitioner lacked locus standi or a personal and substantial interest such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of EO 7’s implementation. It said that Galicto “has no vested right to salary increases and therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.”

The SC said the petitioner cannot be considered to have filed his petition as a PhilHealth representative as he failed to present a Board Resolution or Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth authorizing him as such.

In his separate opinion, Chief Justice Renato Corona claimed that Section 56 of the General Provisions of RA 10147 acknowledges the President’s power to approve or disapprove "any grant of or increase in salaries, allowances, and other fringe benefits with respect to all RA 6758-exempt GOCCs and GFIs."

"There is nothing there which limits or constricts the power of the President as Chief Executive to prescribe such policies, parameters and guidelines which in his discretion would best serve public interest by regulating the compensation and position classification system of these entities," said Corona.

Without any showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, Corona said the Court must recognize in the President, as Chief Executive, the power and duty to protect and promote public interest through rationalization of the compensation and position classification system in executive departments, bureaus, offices, and agencies including GOCCs and GFIs. (JCV/Sunnex)

x x x."

OPINION: Judges must also be respectful - InterAksyon.com

OPINION: Judges must also be respectful - InterAksyon.com

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In the case of Juan dela Cruz vs. Carretas (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043), the Supreme Court , through Justice Renato Corona, castigated and penalized a judge for his arrogant treatment of lawyers and litigants. The ruling is enlightening, thus:

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities

A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the law, dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. Besides having the requisite learning in the law, he must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. In this connection, he should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court. A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides:

SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. (emphasis supplied)

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.

Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. A judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words, snide remarks or sarcastic comments. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

No matter how incompetent a lawyer may be to the thinking of a judge, he or she has no right to ridicule, embarrass or condescend upon this lawyer. The judge may reprimand, but he or she must do so civilly for, after all, he or she is not king or queen in the courtroom but a public servant.

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Vitaliano Aguirre, the lawyer who dared cross Sen. Miriam Santiago, no stranger to controversy - InterAksyon.com

Vitaliano Aguirre, the lawyer who dared cross Sen. Miriam Santiago, no stranger to controversy - InterAksyon.com

Click the link above to read the article.

Atty. Vitaliano "Boy" Aguirre, new hero of the courageous Philippine Bar against senatorial abuse and insanity. A proud son of Quezon province.

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"Kung nakasakit ang actuations ko po, I really did it purposely because totoo naman po na shrill ang voice, nasasaktan ang tenga ko," Aguirre said. "Dapat po lamang na kahit ang senador ay judges at kami’y hamak na prosecutors, ang pinaka-importante sa isang tao eh respeto. If you demand respect dapat respetuhin mo rin ang abugadong ito sapagkat ang human dignity walang kapalit."

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