Consolidation of cases; where proper and where improper - G.R. No. 193065

G.R. No. 193065

"x x x.

           

         

Consolidation of actions involving a common question of law or fact is expressly authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:

            SECTION 1.  Consolidati0n. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

Consolidation of cases is also allowed under Section 3, Rule III of the 2009 IRCA, to wit:

Consolidation of Cases. – When related cases are assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated and assigned to one Justice.

(a) Upon motion of a party with notice to the other party/ies, or at the instance of the Justice to whom any of the related cases is assigned, upon notice to the parties, consolidation shall ensue when the cases involve the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law.

(b) Consolidated cases shall pertain to the Justice –

(1) To whom the case with the lowest docket number is assigned, if they are of the same kind;

(2) To whom the criminal case with the lowest number is assigned, if two or more of the cases are criminal and the others are civil or special;

(3) To whom the criminal case is assigned and the other are civil or special; and

(4) To whom the civil case is assigned, or to whom the civil case with the lowest docket number is assigned, if the cases involved are civil and special.

(c) Notice of the consolidation and replacement shall be given to the Raffle Staff and the Judicial Records Division. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

         

As can be gleaned from the aforequoted provision, for consolidation to be proper, the cases sought to be consolidated must be related.

          Similarly, jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation. In the recent case of Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.,[20] the Court held that “it is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. In other words, consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.”

          In the present case, there is no sufficient justification to order the consolidation inasmuch as the Deutsche Bank AG Petition has no relation whatsoever to the Vitarich Petition.  To recall, the Deutsche Bank AG Petition is an appeal on certiorari from the Order dated October 28, 2009 of the RTC Batangas in Sp. Proc. No. 06-7993.  Vitarich case, on the other hand, is an appeal on certiorari and mandamus from the Order dated January 19, 2009 of the RTC Bulacan in Civil Case No. 592-M-2006.

          The fact that Deutsche Bank AG is a party to both cases does not make the proceedings intimately related.  There is no factual relation between the two proceedings.  SteelCorp proceedings originated from SteelCorp’s rehabilitation proceedings which have nothing to do with the Vitarich proceeding that originated from Vitarich’s rehabilitation proceeding. 

Neither are there interconnected transactions, nor identical subject matter in the Deutsche Bank AG and Vitarich petitions.   The former involved issue resulting from the assignment of credits of RCBC to Deutsche Bank AG whereas in the latter, the issue arose from the assignment of the receivables of various creditors of Vitarich to several corporations and special purpose vehicles (SPVs).

Verily, the two petitions having no factual relationship with and no interconnected transactions on the same subject matter, they cannot be deemed “related cases.”  As such, the necessity to consolidate does not become imperative.  The order of consolidation by the CA on the sole ground that the cases involved a common question of law was, therefore, not in order.

It bears noting that the CA cited the cases of Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.,[21] Benguet Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[22] and Active Wood Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals[23] as jurisprudential basis of its order to consolidate.  Its reliance on the said cases was misplaced as the factual milieus therein were not in all fours with the case at bench.  The ruling in these cases, in fact, bolstered Deutsche Bank AG’s position that for consolidation to be warranted the cases sought to be consolidated must not only involve related issues but also the same parties and closely related subject matters.

          The CA cannot rely on the case of Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc., to support its ruling that consolidation is proper when the cases involve the resolution of a common question of law or fact.  In the said case, a joint trial of the two cases was justified because both arose out of, or an incident of, the same Dealership Agreement.  Thus, the Court upheld the consolidation in this wise: 

          Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was put in question, it would be more practical and convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their consequences. The issues in both civil cases pertain to the respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well as liability arising from it must be resolved in the judicial forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of the two cases then becomes imperative to a complete, comprehensive and consistent determination of all these related issues.

Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed.[24] (underscoring supplied)

          In the case of Benguet Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, where it was written that “the rationale for consolidation is to have all cases intimately related acted upon by one Court/Division to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered.”[25] A scrutiny of the ruling in Benguetreveals that the case pending in the 9^th Division was merely an offshoot of the decision rendered in the 10^th Division.  Faulting the CA 9th Division with grave abuse of discretion in denying Benguet's Motion to Transfer Case No. CA-G.R. SP No. 12964 to the 10th Division, the Court held, thus:

2. The matter elevated to the 9th Division, namely, the implementation of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Break-open Order issued by the Trial Court on 29 September 1987 in favor of BENGUET in the Reconveyance Case (Civil Case No. 5815) was a consequence of the very Decision rendered by the 10th Division. It was, therefore, properly within its competence being intimately related to the very issues raised and resolved by said Division.

3. The rationale for consolidation is to have all cases intimately related acted upon by one Court Division to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions in cases involving the same facts and common questions of law. The cases before the 10th Division and the 9th Division of the Court of Appeals are two (2) such intimately and substantially related cases. Consolidation being called for it cannot be justifiably argued, as private respondents do, that BENGUET is estopped from pleading for such consolidation. To deny the transfer could lead to further protracted litigations to the detriment of the efficient and effective determination of actions and proceedings.[26](underscoring supplied)

Hence, consolidation of cases is proper when there is a real need to forestall the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered in the cases.[27]  In the case under consideration, considering that Deutsche Bank AG and Vitarich cases are not related, the risk of conflicting decisions is a remote probability.

          Lastly, in Active Wood Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court sustained the consolidation of the civil case filed by Active Wood against State Investment House and the latter’s petition for a writ of possession in the land registration case as they involved the same parties and the same subject matter – Active Wood’s two parcels of land, thus: 

The consolidation of cases becomes mandatory because it involves the same parties and the same subject matter which is the same parcel of land. Such consolidation is desirable to avoid confusion and unnecessary costs and expenses with the multiplicity of suits.[28]  xxx (underscoring supplied)

Further, the Court finds merit in Deutsche Bank AG’s contention that the consolidation of the subject cases will defeat the purpose of consolidation. 

It is well recognized that the purpose of the rule on consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits; to guard against oppression and abuse; to prevent delays; to clear congested dockets; and to simplify the work of the trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.[29] It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which would otherwise require a single judgment.[30]

          Under the circumstances, the consolidation of the Deutsche Bank AG Petition with the Vitarich Petition does not appear to be a prudent move as it serves none of the purposes cited above.  On the contrary and as correctly pointed out by Deutsche Bank AG, it will only complicate the resolution of the cases as the CA would have to consider the different factual antecedents of both the Deutsche Bank AG and Vitarich petitions. 

Moreover, the question of law that the Vitarich proceedings allegedly shares with the SteelCorp Proceedings – whether Vitarich’s creditors could be compelled to disclose the sums paid for the assigned Vitarich loans - has long been finally resolved and has already become the law of the case among the parties in the Vitarich rehabilitation proceedings.  Thus, the consolidation would unduly prejudice the banks and would lead to complications, delay or restriction on the right of the banks to the immediate dismissal of the Vitarich proceedings. 

          Furthermore, the consolidation will only subject the parties to added expense and unjust vexation.  The number of parties will substantially increase so as the cost of furnishing the parties with pleadings, thereby defeating the very rationale behind consolidation.

         

Relevant is the case of Republic of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangrobang,[31] where the Court disallowed the consolidation of an ejectment case and a case for eminent domain because the consolidation thereof would complicate procedural requirements and delay the resolution of the cases which raised dissimilar issues.  The Court held that fairness and due process might be hampered rather than helped if the cases were consolidated.

         

Likewise, in Philippine National Bank v. Tyan Ming Development,Inc.[32] the non-consolidation of PNB’s petition for a writ of possession and GOTESCO’s complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceeding was upheldfor defeating the very purpose of consolidation, thus:

The record shows that PNB’s petition was filed on May 26, 2006, and remains pending after three (3) years, despite the summary nature of the petition. Obviously, the consolidation only delayed the issuance of the desired writ of possession. Further, it prejudiced PNB’s right to take immediate possession of the property and gave GOTESCO undue advantage, for GOTESCO continues to possess the property during the pendency of the consolidated cases, despite the fact that title to the property is no longer in its name.

It should be stressed that GOTESCO was well aware of the expiration of the period to redeem the property. Yet, it did not exercise its right of redemption. There was not even an attempt to redeem the property. Instead, it filed a case for annulment of foreclosure, specific performance, and damages and prayed for a writ of injunction to prevent PNB from consolidating its title. GOTESCO’s maneuvering, however, failed, as the CA and this Court refused to issue the desired writ of injunction.

Cognizant that the next logical step would be for PNB to seek the delivery of possession of the property, GOTESCO now tries to delay the issuance of writ of possession. It is clear that the motion for consolidation was filed merely to frustrate PNB’s right to immediate possession of the property. It is a transparent ploy to delay, if not to prevent, PNB from taking possession of the property it acquired at a public auction ten (10) years ago. This we cannot tolerate.

xxx

In De Vera v. Agloro, this Court upheld the denial by the RTC of a motion for consolidation of a petition for issuance of a writ of possession with a civil action, as it would prejudice the right of one of the parties, viz.:

It bears stressing that consolidation is aimed to obtain justice with the least expense and vexation to the litigants. The object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delays and save the litigants unnecessary acts and expense. Consolidation should be denied when prejudice would result to any of the parties or would cause complications, delay, prejudice, cut off, or restrict the rights of a party.[33] (underscoring supplied)

    

          In the recent case of Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils.,[34] the Court, in the same manner ruled against the consolidation of the proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession with that for the declaration of nullity of a foreclosure sale on the ground that it would run counter to the purpose of consolidation:

            In this case, title to the litigated property had already been consolidated in the name of respondent, making the issuance of a writ of possession a matter of right. Consequently, the consolidation of the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the proceedings for nullification of foreclosure would be highly improper. Otherwise, not only will the very purpose of consolidation (which is to avoid unnecessary delay) be defeated but the procedural matter of consolidation will also adversely affect the substantive right of possession as an incident of ownership.[35]

          Indeed, the consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion.[36] Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[37]  

          In this particular case, however, the exercise of such discretion by the CA in ordering the consolidation of the Deutsche Bank AG Petition and the Vitarich Petition was less than judicious considering that the two cases were not intimately and substantially related.

          Lest it be misunderstood, the CA may prescribe reasonable rules governing assignment of cases with similar questions of law or facts to one justice. In case of consolidation, however, it may be effected only if the said cases are related. Needless to state, assignment is different from consolidation.

 x x x."

President's appointment power - G.R. No. 196271

G.R. No. 196271

"x x x.

President’s authority to appoint OICs

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend to positions held by elective officials.

The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature.[25] Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:

            Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:

            (3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.  [emphasis ours]

          The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments, as made evident in the following exchange:

            MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after “captain” and x x x delete “and all” and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.

            MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.[26]

          The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

The second group of officials the President can appoint are “all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.”[27]The second sentence acts as the “catch-all provision” for the President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature.[28] The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment. 

Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s appointment power should be strictly construed and must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.[29] Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.

The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution,[30] which merely grants the President the power of supervision over autonomous regions.

This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s appointment power. There is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

          The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.”[31] This is distinguished from the power of control or “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.”[32]

The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The provision states:

            Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

 x x x."

The act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.- G.R. No. 196271

G.R. No. 196271

"x x x.

Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already established that the supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[15] is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.

          The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained inDuarte v. Dade:[16]

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]

Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum.[17] In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.[18]

We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he stated: “Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress’ amendatory powers. One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the Constitution.”[19]

 x x x ."

Synchronization of ARMM elections constitutional - G.R. No. 196271

G.R. No. 196271

"x x x.

Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections

The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of theTransitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:

            Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.

            The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

            Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

            Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

                        x x x  x

            Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

            The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the discussions of the Constitutional Commission:

            MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: “THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE 1992.”

            This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.

            THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.

            MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: “THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992.”

            I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years.

            So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and another six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.

            THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?

            MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

            THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

            MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

            During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved — the first national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election every three years.

            So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections every three years which was already approved by the body.

            Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

            x x x x

            MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and Vice-President in 1992.

            MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

            MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials with the election of the President?

            MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.

            MR. GUINGONA. Yes.

            MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the municipal officials.[5](emphases and underscoring ours)

The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly – there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.

We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,[6] where we unequivocally stated that “the Constitution has mandated synchronized national and local elections."[7] Despite the length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have failed to convince us to deviate from this established ruling. 

Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.

That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static.[8]

To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled “Local Government,” clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article, which provides:

            Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 

The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the “national government” and the “local governments,” and does not make a distinction between the “local government” and the “regional government,” is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.

The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local elections.

In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, “that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.”[9]Applying this principle to determine the scope of “local elections,” we refer to the meaning of the word “local,” as understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, “local”refers to something “that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.”  Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.

To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.  When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.[10]

 x x x."

Perjury; history of; proper venue to file Information - G.R. No. 192565

G.R. No. 192565

"x x x.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

          The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies.  The first is false testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC).  Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter. 

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their respective arguments.  The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect.[21]  Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case.  Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect.[22]

The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information chargingperjury through the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Cañet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58[23] for the procedural aspect.  

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as    the judgment against him is reversed.

         

This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392[24] and 5393[25] of the Revised Statutes of the United States.[26]  Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.[27]

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was committed. 

As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.[28] The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the presentation was the act that consummated the crime. 

The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code.  To quote these authors:[30]

Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code.  Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657.  In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury.  Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes.  The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit.  The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony “are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697” on perjury. [italics ours]  

With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, ormake an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making afalse affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath. 

As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC – essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed.  By implication, the proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.

In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding.  This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits).  Understandably, the venue should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information.  

The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities “where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner’s duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue.”[31] To the Court, “whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement,”[32] citing Cañet as authority for its statement.

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases. 

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case.  The Cañet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Cañet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction. 

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court.  As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.     

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place.  This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[33] the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue of criminal actions.  Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. 

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC.  As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity. 

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.  

  Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed.  When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.  If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed. 

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