REVISED RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE (RRACCS), CSC Resolution No. 1101502, Nov. 8, 2011 (“RRACCS”); BASIC FEATURES.

INTRODUCTION.

1.      The old 1999 Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (cf. CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, dated August 31, 1999, and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, S. 1999) was repealed or modified accordingly by 2011 RRACCS.

2.    Sec. 2, Rule 1, of RRACCS provides that RRACS applies to all disciplinary and nondisciplinary administrative cases brought before the Civil Service Commission, “agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government”, local government units, and government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters except as may be provided by law.

3.     All provisions in the old Departmental Rules of the Executive Branch which are inconsistent w/ 2011 RRACCS should be deemed void, ineffective, and ultra vires.

4.    Section 126, Rule 124, of RRACCS (Repealing Clause) provides that the 1999 Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999; CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999) and “all other memorandum circulars, resolutions, rules or regulations inconsistent with this Rules are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”

CONSTRUCTION.

5.     Section 3 (Construction) of RRACCS provides that RRACCS shall be “liberally construed” in order to promote their objective in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of administrative cases.

6.    It also provides that administrative investigations shall be conducted “without strict recourse to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings”.

DEFINITIONS.

7.     Section 4 (Definition of Terms) of RRACCS defines “AGENCY” as referring to “any bureau, office, commission, administration, board, committee, institute, corporation with original charter, whether performing governmental or proprietary function, or any other unit of the national government as well as provincial, city or municipal government.”

8.    The term “DEPARTMENT” refers to any of the “executive departments or entities having the category of a department, including the judiciary, legislative and the other constitutional commissions”. (Id.). 

9.    “DISCIPLINING AUTHORITY” refers to the “person or body duly authorized to impose the penalty provided for by law or rules.”

JURISDICTION OF CSC EN BANC.

10.                        Section 7 (Cases Cognizable by the Civil Service Commission)  provides that the CSC shall take cognizance, inter alia, of decisions of heads of agencies imposing penalties exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary brought before it on appeal.

11.  Section 9 (Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies) provides that:

11.1.       The Dept. Secretaries and heads of agencies, and other instrumentalities, shall have original concurrent jurisdiction with the Commission over their respective officers and employees.

11.2.      They shall take cognizance of complaints involving their respective personnel.

11.3.      In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission (i.e., Dismissal), the same “may” be initially appealed to the department and “finally” to the Commission.

11.4.      Pending appeal, the Decision shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

  

DECISION.

         

12.Section 45 (Finality of Decisions) provides that if the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding thirty (30) days [ie., DISMISSAL], or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary, the same shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing “a motion for reconsideration or an appeal” and no such pleading has been filed.

12.1.      The use of the disjunctive term “OR” shows that:

(a)            The dismissed employee may or may not file a motion for reconsideration w/ the 1^st-Level Disciplining Authoirty;

(b)            The employee may directly appeal the questioned Decision (Dismissal) to the  2^nd-Level/Dept.-Level/Appellate Disciplining Authority (Dept. Sec.) w/o first filing a motion for recon w/ the 1^st-Level Disciplining Authority;

(c)             The employee may appeal the Decision of the 1^st-Level Disciplining Authority (lower than Dept. Sec. level):

·        First to the Department Secretary

·        And, finally, to the CSC En Banc;

·        Or, the employee may appeal the Decision of the 1^st-Level Disciplining Authority directly to the CSC En Banc.

·        In the meantime, even while the CSC appeal is pending [bypassing the Dept. Sec.], the he may proceed w/ his own “confirmation” process to determine if the dismissal can be/should be executed pending appeal w/ the CSC En Banc.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

13. Section 56 provides that  the party adversely affected by the decision may file a motion for reconsideration with the Disciplining Authority who rendered the same within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

13.1.      A motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is not allowed.

14.Section 59 provides that only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

14.1.      If a second motion for reconsideration is filed the finality of the Decision shall be reckoned from the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.

15. Section 60 provides that the filing of a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days shall stay the execution of the decision sought to be reconsidered.

15.1.      This refers to a decision of a 1^st-Level Disciplining Authority.

15.2.     The exception is the case of a Dismissal which must first be confirmed by the Dept. Sec. to be immediately executory pending appeal by the employee before the CSC En Banc.

15.2.1.          Here, if the Dismissal was confirmed by the Dept. Sec., and even if it was appealed further by the employee to the CSC En Banc, it would be immediately executory pending such appeal.

APPEALS.

16.Section 61 provides that, subject to Section 45, supra, decisions of Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension (i.e., Dismissal) or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary, may be appealed to the Commission within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

17. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same

·        may be initially appealed to the Dept. Head/Dept. Sec.;

·        and then finally to the Commission.

18.All decisions of heads of agencies are immediately executory pending appeal before the Commission.

19.The decision imposing the penalty of dismissal by disciplining authorities in departments is not immediately executory unless confirmed by the Dept. Sec..

20.                      However, the Commission may take cognizance of the appeal pending confirmation by the Secretary.

20.1.    It seems that the “confirmation” process before the Dept. Sec. is not equivalent to the “regular appeal” process before him.

20.2.  It seems that even if the dismissed employee directly appeals to the CSC En Banc, by-passing the Dept. Sec., the latter may still proceed with the “confirmation” process at his level to make the dismissal immediately executory pending appeal w/ the CSC En Banc.

21.Section 64 (Perfection of an Appeal) provides that to perfect an appeal, the appellant shall submit three (3) copies of the following documents:

21.1.      Appeal memorandum containing the grounds relied upon for the appeal, together with the certified true copy of the decision, resolution or order appealed from, and certified copies of the documents or evidence.

21.1.1.           The appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate authority, copy furnished the disciplining authority.

21.1.2.          The latter (“Disciplining Authority”) shall submit the Case Record to the Appellate Authority with his Comment, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Appeal Memo.

21.2.    Proof of service of a copy of the appeal memorandum to the disciplining office;

21.3.     Proof of payment of the appeal fee; and

21.3.1.          Section 63 (Appeal Fee) provides that the appellant shall pay an appeal fee and a copy of the official receipt thereof shall be attached to the appeal.

21.4.    A statement or certificate of non-forum shopping.

22.                       The doctrine of  LIBERALITY is applied by the CSC En Banc here. (Sec. 64).

22.1.    When an appellant fails to comply with any of the appeal requirements within the reglementary period, the Commission shall direct compliance within a period of not more than ten (10) days from receipt thereof, with a warning that failure to comply shall be construed as failure to perfect an appeal and shall cause the dismissal of the appeal with prejudice to its refiling.

23.                       Please note that the 2011 RRACCS does not require a Notice of Appeal, unlike the old rules of some Departments.

24.                       Section 65 (Effect of Filing an Appeal) provides that in Decisions requiring confirmation the Department Secretary (i.e., Dismissal), an appeal shall stop the decision from being executory.

24.1.    In other words:

24.1.1.          If the penalty is Dismissal, requiring the confirmation of the Dept. Sec., and an appeal is filed by the employee w/ the Dept. Sec., the execution of the Dismissal is suspended pending regular appeal w/ the Dept. Sec. or pending his “confirmation” process.

24.1.2.        If the Dept. Sec. confirms the Dismissal, it is immediately executory even if the employee appeals further to the CSC en Banc.

25.                       Section 66 (Remand of an Appealed Case to Agency of Origin) provides that if a formal charge has been issued but the disciplining authority has violated respondent-appellant’s right to procedural due process, the Commission shall remand the appealed case to the agency of origin for further proceedings to be conducted within three (3) calendar months from the date of receipt of the case records.

25.1.     The absence of the cold neutrality of a judge destroys an employee’s rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the law. (Cf. “Caesar’s Wife” doctrine).

26.                       After the Remand Order, if at the end of the three (3) month period, the disciplining authority failed to conduct further proceedings, the Commission upon motion of the respondent-appellant shall vacate and set aside the appealed decision and declare the respondent-appellant exonerated of the charges.

Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.

Summary judgment vs. Judgment on the Pleadings; distinctions.

OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION AND DR. PABLO R. OLIVAREZ VS. BENJAMIN CASTILLO, G.R. No. 196251, July 09, 2014.



“x x x.

Summary judgment in this case is proper.

A motion for summary judgment is filed either by the claimant or the defending party. The trial court then hears the motion for summary judgment. If indeed there are no genuine issues of material fact, the trial court shall issue summary judgment. Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admission at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

An issue of material fact exists if the answer or responsive pleading filed specifically denies the material allegations of fact set forth in the complaint or pleading. If the issue of fact “requires the presentation of evidence, it is a genuine issue of fact.” However, if the issue “could be resolved judiciously by plain resort” to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file, the issue of fact raised is sham, and the trial court may resolve the action through summary judgment.

A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings. Under Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, trial may likewise be dispensed with and a case decided through judgment on the pleadings if the answer filed fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the claimant’s pleading.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer filed fails to tender any issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations in the complaint. On the other hand, in a summary judgment, the answer filed tenders issues as specific denials and affirmative defenses are pleaded, but the issues raised are sham, fictitious, or otherwise not genuine.

In this case, Olivarez Realty Corporation admitted that it did not fully pay the purchase price as agreed upon in the deed of conditional sale. As to why it withheld payments from Castillo, it set up the following affirmative defenses: First, Castillo did not file a case to void the Philippine Tourism Authority’s title to the property; second, Castillo did not clear the land of the tenants; third, Castillo allegedly sold the property to a third person, and the subsequent sale is currently being litigated before a Quezon City court.

Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s answer tendered an issue, Castillo properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment.

However, the issues tendered by Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s answer are not genuine issues of material fact. These are issues that can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file; otherwise, these issues are sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial.”

X x x.”

Revocation of donation vs. Quieting of title.

EDGARDO D. DOLAR vs. BARANGAY LUBLUB (now P.D. Monfort North) of the Municipality of Dumangas, herein represented by its Punong Barangay, PEPITO DUA, PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, DUMANGAS WATER DISTRICT, 4th ILOILO MOBILE GROUP, ILOILO PROVINCIAL POLICE, ILOILO REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 68, G.R. No. 152663, November 18, 2005 

"x x x.

It bears stressing that petitioner, at the outset, predicated his action to quiet title on the ground of ineffectiveness of the donation, albeit he would later add the matter of its invalidity. Indeed, the make or break issue to be resolved and to which all others must yield turns on the validity and/or continued efficacy of the subject donation. Valid and effective, the donation virtually forecloses any claim which petitioner may have over the donated property against the donee and other occupants thereof, and his action to quiet title is virtually doomed to fail. Invalid and ineffective, however, the arena is left open for petitioner to recover ownership and possession of the donated property and have the cloud on his title thereto, if any there be, removed.

According to petitioner, the subject donation is, by force of Article 745[15] of the Civil Code, void, the accepting barangay captain being without sufficient authority for the purpose. On this point, petitioner cites Section 88 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337[16] - the law then in force - and Sections 91 and 389 the Local Government Code of 1991[17]. In gist, these provisions empower the punong barangay to enter into contracts for the barangay upon authorization of the Sangguniang Barangay, or, in the alternative, theSanggunian may authorize the barangay head to enter into contracts for the barangay.

Excepting, however, respondent barangay alleged that then barangay captain Jose Militar accepted the donation in the same Deed of Donation per authority granted by the barangay council.[18]

The question then of whether Militar was clothed with authority to accept the donation for respondent barangay stands as disputed. Since the present recourse is interposed on pure questions of law, we need not resolve the factual issue regarding Militars authority, or lack of it, to accept the donation in behalf of respondent barangay. It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that petitioner is hardly the proper party to challenge the validity of the donation which is presumed to be valid - on the ground he presently invokes. The honor to question Militars ultra vires act, if this be the case, belongs to the Sanggunian of Barangay P.D. Monfort North. And more to the point, even assuming ex gratia argumenti petitioners legal standing to raise such a question, the final answer would still lean towards the validity of the donation. For, from the allegations of all the parties, it would appear that, through the years, the Sanggunian of Lublub as well as all the succeeding Sangunians of P.D. Monfort North neither repudiated the acceptance of the donation by Militar nor acted in a manner reflective of their opposition to the donation. On the contrary, the respondent barangay has been enjoying the material and public-service benefits arising from the infrastructures projects put up on the subject property. In a very real sense, therefore, the Sangguniang Barangay and the good people of P.D. Monfort North, by availing themselves of such benefits for more than two decades now, effectively ratified Militars acceptance of the donation.

This brings us to the question of the efficaciousness of the donation. Petitioner asserts that the 1981 and 1989 deeds of donation, pursuant to the uniform automatic rescission/reversion clauses therein, ceased to be effective upon respondents failure to meet the conditions for which it was charged to fulfill. To petitioner, the automatic rescission/reversion clause works, in appropriate instances, to revoke the donation and revert the ownership of the donated property to the donor without the need of judicial intervention. In support of this argument, petitioner cites De Luna vs. Abrigo[19] wherein this Court put to rest any lingering doubt as to the validity of a stipulation providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance by the donee of the conditions or charges incumbent upon him.

Cited likewise is the subsequent complementary holding in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals[20], thus:

Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary.

De Luna and Archbishop of Manila are, to be sure, apropos. However, petitioners argument to support his thesis on the automatic rescission of the donation in question and the consequent reversion of the property to the donor is an incomplete presentation of the Courts pronouncements on the point.

We shall explain.

If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for automatic rescission and/or reversion in case of breach of the condition therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with the condition, the donated property reverts back automatically to the donor. Such provision, De Luna teaches, is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract in case of breach, without need of going to court and that upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. Where, however, the donee denies, as here, the rescission or challenges the propriety thereof, then only the final award of the court can, to borrow from University of the Philippines vs. de los Angeles,[21] conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not. Or, in the language of Catholic Archbishop of Manila:[22]

The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.

When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.

In the case at bench, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent barangay denied or challenged the purported revocation of the donation. In fact, the denial or challenge is embodied in respondent barangays complaint in Civil Case No. 00‑140 and in its Answer cum motion to dismiss in Civil Case 98-033, which similarly prayed for, among other things, the cancellation of petitioner's title on the subject property.

The foregoing discussion veritably disposes of the second formulated issue.

Now back to the first issue. It is petitioners posture that his action in Civil Case No. 98-033 is one for quieting of title under Article 476[23] of the Civil Code, not, as erroneously regarded by the trial court, an action to revoke donation under Article 764 of the Code which, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows:

Article 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter.

xxx xxx xxx.

This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs. (Underscoring added)

Petitioners posture does not persuade.

As aptly observed by the trial court, the petitory portion of petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 98-033 seeks for a judgment declaring him the absolute owner of the donated property, a plea which necessarily includes the revocation of the deed of donation in question. Verily, a declaration of petitioner absolute ownership appears legally possible only when the deed of donation is contextually declared peremptorily revoked.

Owing to the prescriptive component of Article 764 of the Civil Code, petitioners dread of the invocation and application of said provision is at once apparent as it is understandable. For, an action to revoke thereunder prescribes after four (4) years from non-compliance by the donee with any of the conditions set forth in the deed of donation. A little less than seventeen (17) years separate September 16, 1981, when the Deed of Donation was executed, from May 6, 1998, when petitioner filed his complaint in Civil Case No. 98-033. Seventeen (17) years is, in turn, too far removed, as shall be illustrated shortly, from the 4-year prescriptive period referred to in Article 764 or even from the 10-year period under Article 1144.[24]

It cannot be overemphasized that respondent barangay traces its claim of ownership over the disputed property to a valid contract of donation which is yet to be effectively revoked. Such rightful claim does not constitute a cloud on the supposed title of petitioner over the same property removable by an action to quiet title. Withal, the remedy afforded in Article 476 of the Civil Code is unavailing until the donation shall have first been revoked in due course under Article 764 or Article 1144 of the Code.

Lest it be overlooked, the rule on the imprescriptibility of actions to quiet title admits of exceptions. The trial court correctly mentioned one, referring to a situation where the plaintiff in an action to quiet title is not in actual possession of the land.[25] In the case at bench, petitioner is not in possession of the property. For sure, he is even asking in his complaint in Civil Case No. 98-033 for recovery of possession of the donated property.

Given the above disquisition, petitioner can hardly fault the trial court for its holding that petitioners action to revoke is time-barred. As may be recalled, respondent barangay had, under the terms of the deed of donation, five (5) years from the execution of the conveying deed in September 1981, or up September 1986, within which to introduce and complete the contemplated development of the donated area. Following Article 764 of the Civil Code, petitioner had four (4) years from September 1986, or up to September 1990, within which to seek the revocation of the subject donation on the ground of breach of contract.

The Court can grant that the prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donations, as here, are governed by the general rules on prescription,[26] which, in context, is Article 1144 of the Civil Code providing that actions upon a written contract shall be brought within ten (10) years from accrual of the right of action. Ten years from September 1986 the date when petitioners right to revoke accrued - would be September 1996. Here, however, what partakes as petitioners suit to revoke was filed only in May 1998.

In all, petitioners right of action to revoke or cancel the donation had indeed prescribed, regardless of whether the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article 1144 of the Civil Code. It should be stated in this regard, however, that respondent barangay had disputed the existence of the grounds upon which petitioner anchored his right to revoke, claiming it had already complied with the construction and development conditions of the donation. From the records, it would appear that respondent barangays boast of compliance is not an empty one. As we see it, the establishment on the donated area of telephone service, a water service, a police mobile force, and a courtroom, all for the benefits of the barangay residents, substantially satisfies the terms and conditions of the subject donation. The concrete paving of roads and the construction of government offices, sports complex for public enjoyment and like infrastructures which, per respondent barangays estimate, cost not less than P25 Million,[27] add persuasive dimension to the conclusion just made.

Petitioner's long silence vis--vis the kind of development structures that Barangay Lublub had decided to put up or allowed to be established on the subject area cannot but be taken as an indicia of his satisfaction with respondent barangays choice of public service projects. The prolonged silence was broken only after the provincial and municipal governments advertised, then sold the property in a public auction to satisfy questionable tax liabilities.

Much is made by petitioner about his execution of the 1989 deed of donation, which, to him, should be utilized as a point of reference in determining the prescriptive period[28] defined under either Article 764 or 1144 of the Civil Code. He states:

xxx It has not been explained up to this juncture why the Deed of Donation of June 1989 is not being mentioned or considered when it is alleged in the complaint. As will be noted in the Deed of Donation dated 1981 the property was jointly owned by plaintiff Dolar and Jarantilla, with separate title; in Annex B, the Donation of 1989 only plaintiff Dolar signed the same as the only registered owne[r] of the lot donated; xxx. As previously adverted to, the prescriptive period for violation or contravention of the terms and conditions of Annex B should be reckoned from 1994 and therefore this action filed in 1998 is within the period.

With the view we take of the case, the execution of the 1989 deed of donation is really of little moment in terms of furthering petitioners cause. For, at that time, the property subject of this recourse was no longer his to donate, having earlier relinquished his ownership thereon. Nemo dat qui non habet No one can give what he has not.[29] Stated a bit differently, respondent barangays right over the donated area proceeds from the 1981 donation. The legal effects, therefore, of its action or inaction respecting the donated property should be assayed on the basis of the 1981 donation.

The last issue raised pivots on whether or not respondent barangay can acquire the subject property by acquisitive prescription, the petitioners thesis being that prescription does not run against registered land.[30]

Petitioners point is theoretically correct and may perhaps tip the balance in his favor, but for the fact that the respondent barangay anchors its title and right over the donated lot, first and foremost, by virtue of the deed of donation. Admittedly, standing alone, adverse, continuous and long possession of a piece of real property cannot defeat the title of a registered owner. But, then, this postulate presupposes a Torrens title lawfully acquired and issued. As may be recalled, however, respondent barangay instituted Civil Case No. 00-140, supra, for Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance/Issuance of Title precisely because of the dubious manner by which petitioner allegedly acquired his TCT No. T-129837 over a lot he admits donating.

Parenthetically, petitioners contention that the donation was invalid because it was not registered in the Registry of Property deserves no merit. For, as between the parties to the donation and their assigns, the registration of the deed of donation with the Registry of Deeds is not needed for its validity and efficacy. In Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[31] the Court emphatically dismissed the notion that registration was necessary to make the donation a binding commitment insofar as the donor and the donee were concerned.

As a final consideration, let it be made clear that this opinion merely resolves the question of the correctness of the dismissal by the trial court of Civil Case No. 98-033 on the basis of facts attendant thereto in the light of applicable laws and jurisprudence. It is not meant to prejudge the outcome of Civil Case No. 00-140 which, while related to Civil Case No. 98-033, tenders different issues, foremost of which is the validity of a Torrens title issued over a piece of land to one who had previously donated the same.

x x x."

Immutability of final judgments; exceptions.

PHILIPPINE WOMAN’S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC. VS. TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS FOUNDATION, INC., G.R. No. 199595, April 02, 2014.





“x x x.

While firmly ingrained as a basic procedural tenet in Philippine jurisprudence, immutability of final judgments was never meant to be an inflexible tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances. The doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness and substantial justice. Hence, it’s application admits the following exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[2]

Here, the third exception is attendant. The nullity of the RTC judgment and all subsequent rulings affirming the same, render inoperative the doctrine of immutability of judgment, and consequently justify the propriety of giving due course to the present petition.

To expound, the RTC judgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and all proceedings taken in relation thereto were void because the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the fundamental subject matter of TRY Foundation’s petition for the issuance of a title which was in reality, a complaint for revocation of donation, an ordinary civil action outside the ambit of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.

X x x.”

RA 9262; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right to due process.

x x x.

Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.

In Garcia v. Drilon,wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.

The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.”

x x x 

“Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.”

RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, Respondents, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014.

x x x."

De Lima mum on ‘deal’ with Iglesia | Inquirer News

See - De Lima mum on ‘deal’ with Iglesia | Inquirer News


"x x x.

Expressing fears of a whitewash, Samson’s lawyers Trixie Cruz-Angeles and Ahmed Paglinawan, in a statement, called on President Aquino and Interior Secretary Mar Roxas to disclose the alleged agreement to the public.

“What is the nature of this agreement? What are its conditions and terms? It is our client who had unintentionally set off these events by filing his case, yet somehow we have not been included in this so-called agreement. Assuming of course there is one,” they said.

“There are two things you need to do, sirs, speaking as part of the body you call your bosses. First is to be transparent with your agreement. Tell us whether or not you’ve sold our client down the river or tell us if you haven’t. But you need to disclose this to us. A criminal case is not a political pawn. The law provides that it cannot be compromised. The president can grant pardons and issue clemency and amnesty. But you do NOT have the power to refuse prosecution,” they added

The two lawyers also said they wanted the government to assure Samson and his family that their complaint would be given due process and treated fairly.

“[Y]ou must guarantee our client a fair hearing at preliminary investigation. The fear now is that given the so-called agreement, a finding of ‘no probable cause’ to make this nightmare go away for the INC’s Sanggunian is a very real possibility,” they said.
The lawyers warned that the non-disclosure of the alleged agreement and the secret talks that led to it might also hurt the government’s credibility in resolving the cases filed by Samson.

“[Y]ou would not have raised so many doubts had you been transparent with these proceedings, had you included our client. Whether you stood up to defend him, or sold him out, he had and has the right to know. Instead, you conducted it in secret, and now you have made your ability to deliver justice subject to a very real, very reasonable suspicion,” they said.
Angeles and Paglinawan also said they were not surprised that INC leaders were very vocal about the understanding reached with the government.

“The idea is to make the public feel that they had flexed their muscle and the government has responded in a manner favorable to them. The idea is to make us feel that in relation to whatever it is they were rallying for (or against), the government has capitulated. And sadly that capitulation may involve trampling on the rights of our client,” they said.

x x x."

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Iglesia ni Cristo: Marcos babies goose-stepping to the front of the line | The Society of Honor by Joe America

See - Iglesia ni Cristo: Marcos babies goose-stepping to the front of the line | The Society of Honor by Joe America


"x x x.

Well, I tell you, it is a funny way to run a religion, one that calls itself Christian, where compassion and goodness of heart is generally expected to rule one’s value system. You know, mercy and compassion, as that other Christian, the Pope of the Catholic Church, put it.

The Iglesia ni Cristo rulers . . . er, sorry . . . leaders claim their cause (which is mainly to get the Secretary of the Department of Justice to butt out of their affairs) is a matter of separation of church and state. Well, that is a matter for the courts to sort out, it seems to me. I don’t understand what realm of civility calls for storm troopers.

The leaders claim it is an internal affair. The criminal complaint was filed by a non-member of the church. He used to be a member, but now he is not. By definition, it is not an internal affair.

The good Secretary De Lima is supposed to do, what, exactly? Ignore the law that says she must enforce the law, because the entitled leaders of the Church are exercising their impunity and have the storm troopers with which to do it?
Do you know what the Iglesia ni Cristo leaders say about the traffic jams? “Blame it on our enemies.”

Ah, that would be the State’s representatives then. Their enemy is the Philippines.

To me, this is very simple.

And it is, at the root, very tragic.

It is tragic that the leaders of the Iglesia ni Cristo church would choose war, not peace, in the name of God. This is an ISIS mentality. It is tragic that they hold they are above the law, for whatever sorry justification they can muster up. It is tragic that innocent people will likely be hurt.

Secretary Roxas set forth clear guidelines: maximum tolerance within the laws to preserve the well-being of others.

x x x."

BusinessWorld | The Supreme Court lost the chance to strengthen the Bill of Rights when it granted bail to Enrile

See - BusinessWorld | The Supreme Court lost the chance to strengthen the Bill of Rights when it granted bail to Enrile


"x x x.

Thus, in letters, statements, and court pleadings, we repeatedly asked the same key questions: “Doesn’t this practice of immediately denying bail to an accused charged with a capital offense, upend and undermine the constitutional presumption of innocence?” “Doesn’t the presumption of innocence require that the State should instead immediately admit the accused to bail until and unless the state proves that the evidence of guilt is strong?”

Our campaign to reform procedure was of course unmarred by any victory, especially in court. This was, after all, the very procedure established and enabled in the Rules of Court. And it still is, at present under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “[n]o person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”

The courts obliged, never mind that this particular rule of court was, on its face, already a distortion of the Constitutional command that “[A]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.”

But while we always lost this argument, I never ceased believing in the idea that the right to bail can still be better served by reforming our criminal procedure, even if its latest advocate was Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, a man who so profoundly personified a regime that had done so much to harm civil liberties and human rights in the Philippines.

The Supreme Court had a singular opportunity, in resolving the Senator’s petition, to definitively strengthen the right to bail by redefining the procedure for its exercise in relation to the presumption of innocence. Had the Supreme Court seized that opportunity to declare that the accused, even those charged with capital offenses, should henceforth be allowed to bail and freedom until the state succeeds in showing that its evidence is strong, it would have returned criminal procedure to its libertarian moorings in the Bill of Rights, and truly reconciled the right to bail to the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Indeed, had the Supreme Court chosen this course, the consequent freeing of Senator Enrile would have been a modest price to pay because then, all Filipinos, Senators and farmers alike, would at last be truly entitled to bail as a matter of right and would at last be truly presumed innocent as promised them by their Constitution.

But the Court, courtesy of the majority decision, chose to do something else altogether. It chose instead to free the Senator on the basis of an argument he did not make, and reasoning that, in this lawyer’s opinion, only further dislodges the Bill of Rights from its proper place in the center of the administration of justice.

The majority admitted the senator’s request for bail because he was old and supposedly ill, and because he was allegedly not a flight risk. But jurisprudence instructs that “flight risk” is relevant in the grant or denial of bail only when the seeker of bail is in danger of extradition to another country and thus irrelevant where the accused is not to be extradited but tried for a capital offense in the Philippines. In the latter situation, the sole measure of entitlement to bail remains to be the one provided in the Constitution: the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt.
There is, to be sure, a 1946 Supreme Court decision which suggests that bail may be granted an accused who is seriously ill. But the majority simply ignored the several inconvenient truths that should have cautioned against the invocation of this dated precedent in favor of the senator. To begin with, he himself did not feel sufficiently ill to raise the state of his health in his plea for bail. Also, there was no competent evidence, tested in proper judicial proceedings, of his true afflictions and their gravity. Finally, and in any event, the Sandiganbayan had already made adequate provision for any deterioration in his health.
Bail is discretionary only after conviction, and only under certain, strictly defined circumstances. On the other hand, bail is a matter of right before conviction, even in capital offenses, except only when the evidence of guilt is strong. But the Supreme Court allowed the senator to post bail without any judicial finding that the evidence of his guilt was not strong. In so doing, the Court had effectively removed the right to bail from the careful calibrations in the Constitution and in statue and case law, and relocated it to the treacherous reaches of magisterial discretion.
The decision to grant bail was liberally couched in the vestments of compassionate justice and human rights. Ironically, however, to the extent that compassionate discretion has only rarely -- if ever -- been exercised in favor of the poor, marginalized, and nameless, human rights has not at all been well served in this instance.

Rafael A. L. Aquino is a partner in the Santos Parungao Aquino and Santos Law Offices, a member of the Free Legal Assistance Group, married to another lawyer, and the father of a young lady who is not interested in becoming a lawyer.

x x x."