Work-related illness, injury, death; presumption of compensability

CONCHITA J. RACELIS vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. and/or HOLLAND AMERICA LINES, INC.,*and FERNANDO T. LISING, G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

The Court's Ruling

Deemed incorporated in every seafarer’s employment contract, denominated as the POEA-SEC or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract, is a set of standard provisions determined and implemented by the POEA, called the "Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels," which are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.47

Among other basic provisions, the POEA-SEC – specifically, its 2000 version – stipulates that the beneficiaries of a deceased seafarer may be able to claim death benefits for as long as they are able to establish that (a) the seafarer’s death is work-related, and (b) such death had occurred during the term of his employment contract. These requirements are explicitly stated in Section 20 (A) (1) thereof, which reads:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In the case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphases supplied)

After an assiduous examination of the records, and as will be expounded on below, the Court, similar to both the LA and the NLRC, finds that the above-stated requirements positively attend petitioner’s claim for death benefits.

I. The Death of the Seafarer is Work-Related.

In the recent case of Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation48 (Canuel), the Court clarified that the term "work-related death" refers to the seafarer’s death resulting from a work-related injury or illness.

Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, the terms "work-related injury" and "work-related illness" are, in turn, defined as follows:

Definition of Terms:

For purposes of this contract, the following terms are defined as follows:

x x x x

11. Work-Related Injury – injury(ies) resulting indisability or death arising out of and in the course of employment.

12. Work-Related Illness – any sickness resulting todisability or deathas a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. (Emphases supplied)

Case law explains that "[t]he words ‘arising out of’ refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise ‘in the course of employment’ when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto."49

In this case, respondents submit that petitioner was unable to prove that Rodolfo’s illness, i.e., Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation, which had supposedly supervened during the term of his employment on board the vessel MS Prinsendam, was not related to his work.50 To bolster the argument, respondents point to the fact that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A51 of the 2000 POEA-SEC.

The contention is untenable.

While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEASEC, Section 20 (B) (4) of the same explicitly provides that "[t[he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related." In other words, the 2000 POEA-SEC "has created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability[,] saying that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-Aof the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption."52 This presumption should be overturned only when the employer’s refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence,53 which, as traditionally defined is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion."54 

As held in the case of Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel:55

Anent the issue as to who has the burden to prove entitlement to disability benefits, the petitioners argue that the burden is placed upon Laurel to prove his claim that his illness was work-related and compensable. Their posture does not persuade the Court.

True, hyperthyroidism is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Nonetheless, Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) of the said POEA-SECstates that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as workrelated." The said provision explicitly establishes a presumption of compensability although disputable by substantial evidence. The presumption operates in favor of Laurel as the burden rests upon the employer to overcome the statutory presumption. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by the seafarer’s employer/s, this disputable presumption stands. In the case at bench, other than the alleged declaration of the attending physician that Laurel’s illness was not work-related, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden. In fact, they even conceded that hyperthyroidism may be caused by environmental factor.56

Similarly in Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Babol:57

The Principle of Work-relation

The 2000 POEA-SEC contract governs the claims for disability benefits by respondent as he was employed by the petitioners in September of 2006.

Pursuant to the said contract, the injury or illness must be work related and must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment in order for compensability to arise. Work-relation must, therefore, be established.

As a general rule, the principle of work-relation requires that the disease in question must be one of those listed as an occupational disease under Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC. Nevertheless, should it be not classified as occupational in nature, Section 20 (B) paragraph 4 of the POEA-SEC provides that such diseases are disputed are disputably presumed as work-related.

In this case, it is undisputed that NPC afflicted respondent while on board the petitioners’ vessel. As a non-occupational disease, it has the disputable presumption of being work-related. This presumption obviously works in the seafarer’s favor. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by the employers, the work-relatedness of the disease must be sustained.

And in Fil-Star Maritime Corporation v. Rosete:58

Although Central Retinal Vein Occlusion is not listed as one of the occupational diseases under Section 32-A of the 2000 Amended Terms of POEA-SEC, the resulting disability which is loss of sight of one eye, is specifically mentioned in Section 32 thereof (Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases Including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted). More importantly, Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) states that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related."

The disputable presumption that a particular injury or illness that results in disability, or in some cases death, is work-related stands in the absence of contrary evidence. In the case at bench, the said presumption was not overturned by the petitioners. Although, the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. Consequently, the Court concurs with the finding of the courts below that respondent’s disability is compensable.59

X x x.”

Evidence; the document presented cannot be given probative value as it was a mere print out of an e-mail that was not signed or certified to by the doctor

CONCHITA J. RACELIS vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. and/or HOLLAND AMERICA LINES, INC.,*and FERNANDO T. LISING, G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

Records show that respondents’ sole evidence to disprove that Rodolfo’s illness is work-related was the medical opinion of Dr. Abaya, wherein it was explained that Rodolfo’s ailment is a congenital malformation of blood vessels in the brain that may be due to familial strains.60 However, as correctly observed by the LA, the document presented cannot be given probative value as it was a mere print out of an e-mail that was not signed or certified to by the doctor.61 Moreover, records reveal that Rodolfo was attended by Dr. Legaspi from the time he was admitted at the Medical City on February 20, 2008 up to his death on March 2, 200862 and not by Dr. Abaya whose qualifications to diagnose such kind of illness was not even established. Likewise, the medical opinion was not backed up by any medical findings to substantiate the claim that Rodolfo’s ailment was congenital in origin or that there were traces of the disease in Rodolfo’s family history. Under the foregoing premises, the unsubstantiated and unauthenticated medical findings of Dr. Abaya are therefore highly suspect and cannot be considered as substantial evidence to support respondents’ postulation. Thus, with no substantial evidence on the part of the employer and given that no other cogent reason exists to hold otherwise, the presumption under Section 20 (B) (4) should stand. Accordingly, the Court is constrained to pronounce that Rodolfo’s death, which appears to have been proximately caused by his Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation, was work-related, in satisfaction of the first requirement of compensability under Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC.

X x x.”

While it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of terminating the seafarer’s contract of employment, it is, however, enough that the work-related illness, which eventually becomes the proximate cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had.

CONCHITA J. RACELIS vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. and/or HOLLAND AMERICA LINES, INC.,*and FERNANDO T. LISING, G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

II. The Seafarer’s Death Occurred During the Term of Employment.

Moving to the second requirement, respondents assert that Rodolfo’s death on March 2, 2008 had occurred beyond the term of his employment, considering his prior medical repatriation on February 20, 2008 which had the effect of contract termination. The argument is founded on Section 18 (B) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, which reads:

SECTION 18. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

x x x x

B. The employment of the seafarer is also terminated when the seafarer arrives at the point of hire for any of the following reasons:

1. when the seafarer signs-off and is disembarked for medical reasons pursuant to Section 20(B)[5]63 of this Contract.

While it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of terminating the seafarer’s contract of employment, it is, however, enough that the work-related illness, which eventually becomes the proximate cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had. A further exposition is apropos.

Consistent with the State’s avowed policy to afford full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,64 the POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. As such, it is a standing principle that its provisions are to be construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in their favor.65

Guided by this principle, the Court, in the recent case of Canuel, recognized that a medical repatriation case constitutes an exception to the second requirement under Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that the seafarer’s death had occurred during the term of his employment, in view of the terminative consequences of a medical repatriation under Section 18 (B) of the same. In essence, the Court held that under such circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his employment as it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death had occurred during the term of his employment. As rationalized in that case:

With respect to the second requirement for death compensability, the Court takes this opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is that the seafarer’s death should occur during the term of his employment, the seafarer’s death occurring after the termination ofhis employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a work-related injury or illness constitutes an exception thereto. This is based on a liberal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC as impelled by the plight of the bereaved heirs who stand to be deprived of a just and reasonable compensation for the seafarer’s death, notwithstanding its evident work-connection.1âwphi1 The present petition is a case in point.

Here, Nancing’s repatriation occurred during the eighth (8th) month of his one (1) year employment contract. Were it not for his injury, which had been earlier established as work-related, he would not have been repatriated for medical reasons and his contract consequently terminated pursuant to Part 1 of Section 18 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC as hereunder quoted:

x x x x

The terminative consequence of a medical repatriation case then appears to present a rather prejudicial quandary to the seafarer and his heirs. Particularly, if the Court wereto apply the provisions of Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC as above-cited based on a strict and literal construction thereof, then the heirs of Nancing would stand to be barred from receiving any compensation for the latter’s death despite its obvious work-relatedness. Again, this is for the reason that the work-related death would, by mere legal technicality, be considered to have occurred after the term of his employment on account of his medical repatriation. It equally bears stressing that neither would the heirs be able to receive any disability compensation since the seafarer’s death in this case precluded the determination of a disability grade,which, following Section 20 (B) in relation to Section 32 of the 2000 POEA-SEC, stands as the basis therefor. However, a strict and literal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC, especially when the same would result into inequitable consequences against labor, is not subscribed to in this jurisdiction. Concordant with the State’s avowed policy to give maximum aid and full protection to labor as enshrined in ArticleXIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, contracts of labor, such as the 2000 POEA-SEC, are deemedto be so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavoured in favor of the laborer. The rule therefore is one of liberal construction. As enunciated in the case of Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC[(405 Phil. 487 [2001])]:

The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must [therefore] be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor [as it is only] then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court is thus brought to the recognition that medical repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Accordingly, the phrase "work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract" under Part A (1) of the said provision should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have precisely occurred during the term of his employment. Rather, it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment. Taking all things into account, the Court reckons that it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer and his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if the laborer’s death was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had harbored for his master’s profit, then it is but proper that his demise be compensated. Here, since it has been established that (a) the seafarer had been suffering from a workrelated injury or illness during the term of his employment, (b) his injury or illness was the cause for his medical repatriation, and (c) it was later determined that the injury or illness for which he was medically repatriated was the proximate cause ofhis actual death although the same occurred after the term of his employment, the above-mentioned rule should squarely apply. Perforce, the present claim for death benefits should be granted.66 (Citations omitted)

As elucidated in Canuel, the foregoing liberal approach was applied in Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated v. Candava,67 Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo,68and Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC,69 wherein the Court had previously allowed the recovery of death benefits even if the seafarers in those cases had died after repatriation, given that there was proof of a clear causal connection between their work and the illness which was contracted in the course of employment, and their eventual death. The converse conclusion was reached in the cases of Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin70 (Gau Sheng), Spouses Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp.71 (Spouses Aya-ay, Sr.), Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc.,72 Prudential Shipping and Management Corp. v. Sta. Rita73 (Prudential), and Ortega v. CA74 (Ortega),since the element of work relatedness had not been established. All in all, the sense gathered from these cases, as pointed out in Canuel, is that it is crucial to determine whether the death of the deceased was reasonably connected with his work, or whether the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease that resulted in the seafarer’s death. If the injury or illness is the proximate cause, or at least increased the risk of his death for which compensation is sought, recovery may behad for said death, or for that matter, for the injury or illness. Thus, in Seagull Ship management and Trans., Inc. v. NLRC,75 the Court significantly observed that:

X x x.”

Even assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him of compensation benefits. For what matters is that his work had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death. Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease.

CONCHITA J. RACELIS vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. and/or HOLLAND AMERICA LINES, INC.,*and FERNANDO T. LISING, G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

Even assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him of compensation benefits. For what matters is that his work had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death. Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee’s death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease.76 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Employing the same spirit of liberality as fleshed out in Canuel, the Court finds that it would be highly inequitable and even repugnant to the State’s policy on labor to deny petitioner’s claim for death benefits for the mere technicality triggered by Rodolfo’s prior medical repatriation. As it has been clearly established that Rodolfo had been suffering from a work-related illness during the term of his employment that caused his medical repatriation and, ultimately, his death on March 2, 2008, it is but proper to consider the same as a compensable work-related death despite it having occurred after his repatriation. To echo Canuel, "it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment. Taking all things into account, the Court reckons that it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer and his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if the laborer’s death was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had harbored for his master’s profit, then it is but proper that his demise be compensated."77

Lest it be misunderstood, the conclusion above-reached does not run counter to the Court’s ruling in Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer Anthony s. Allas (Klaveness),78 which the CA inaccurately relied on. As similarly pointed out in Canuel, the Klaveness case involved a seafarer who was not medically repatriated but was actually signed off from the vessel after the completion of his contract, his illness not proven to be work-related,and died almost two (2) years after the termination of his contract. Since the employment contract was terminated without any connection to a work-related cause, but rather because of its mere lapse, death benefits were denied to the seafarer’s heirs.79 This is definitely not the case here since Rodolfo’s employment contract was terminated only because ofhis medical repatriation. Were it not for his illness, Rodolfo would not havebeen medically repatriated and his employment contract, in turn, terminated. Evidently, the termination of employment was forced upon by a work-related cause and it would be in contrast to the State’s policy on labor todeprive the seafarer’s heirs of death compensation despite its ascertained work-connection.80

This variance also exists as to the cases of Gau Sheng,81 Spouses Ayaay, Sr.,82Prudential,83 and Ortega,84 which respondents invoke in their Comment dated February 16, 2012.85 As a common denominator, the element of work-relatedness was not established in those cases. Thus, being the primary factor considered in granting compensation, the Court denied the beneficiaries’ respective claims. Again, the Court has pored over the records and remains satisfied that Rodolfo’s death is work-related. Accordingly, this precludes the application of the above-stated rulings.

X x x.”

Footnotes

47 See Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag, G.R. No. 191491, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 670, 676-677.

48 G.R. No. 190161, October 13, 2014.

49 Iloilo Dock & Eng’g. Co. v. WCC, 135 Phil. 95, 98 (1968).

51 See Section 32-A Occupational Diseases of the 2000 POEA-SEC.

52 Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel,G.R. No. 195518, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 225, 245.

53 See Ortega v. CA, 576 Phil. 601, 606-607 (2008).

54 Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 184722, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 529, 544.

55 Supra note 52, at 244-245.

56 Id. at 244-245.

57 G.R. No. 204076, December 4, 2013; emphases supplied.

58 G.R. No. 192686, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 247.

59 Id. at 255; emphasis supplied.

60 CA rollo, p. 104.

61 Id. at 175.

62 See Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Legaspi; rollo, p. 105.

63 5. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.

64 See Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

65 Seagull Maritime Corporation v. Dee, 548 Phil. 660, 671-672 (2007).

66 Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, supra note 48.

67 G.R. No. 201251, June 26, 2013, 700 SCRA 174.

68 G.R. No. 181112, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 237.

69 376 Phil. 738 (1999).

70 481 Phil. 222 (2004).

71 516 Phil. 628 (2006).

72 504 Phil. 564 (2005).

73 544 Phil. 94 (2007).

74 576 Phil. 601 (2008).

75 388 Phil. 906 (2000).

76 Id. at 914-915.

77 Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, supra note 48.

78 566 Phil. 579 (2008).

79 See Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, supra note 48.

80 Id.

81 In Gau Sheng, seafarer therein was repatriated upon mutual consent, and thus effectively terminated his contract with his employer. He died eight (8) months after his repatriation of chronic renal failure which illness is not listed as a compensable illness. See supra note 70.

82 In Spouses Aya-ay, Sr., while the seafarer therein was repatriated on account of an eye injury, he subsequently died of a stroke, which was not established to be in connection with/ or a result of his eye injury. See supra note 71.

83 In Prudential, while the seafarer was repatriated due to umbilical hernia, he was declared fit to work after undergoing several treatments. His death, about a year later was due to cardio pulmonary arrest which was not shown to have been work-related. See supra note 73.

84 In Ortega, the seafarer therein was repatriated due to lung cancer, which illness was not establish to have been brought about by his short stint (almost two weeks only) on board the employer’s vessel.

See supra note 74.

85 Rollo, pp. 156-162 and 164-166.

86 CA rollo, pp. 131-132.

87 See Section 20 (A) (1) of 2000 POEA-SEC.

88 CA rollo, p. 135.

89 SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

x x x x

4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:

x x x x

c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippines currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

90 United Philippine Lines Inc. v. Sibug, G.R. No. 201072, April 2, 2014.

91 See LA Decision dated November 28, 2008 (CA rollo, p. 221) as affirmed in toto by the NLRC. (rollo, p. 39)

92 Rollo, p. 187.

93 613 Phil. 696 (2009).

94 Id. at 706-707; citations omitted.

Seafarer; death benefits

CONCHITA J. RACELIS vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. and/or HOLLAND AMERICA LINES, INC.,*and FERNANDO T. LISING, G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

III. Amount of Death Benefits.

With the compensability of Rodolfo’s death now traversed, a corollary matter to determine is the amount of benefits due petitioner.

Records show that respondents do not deny – and therefore admit – the late Rodolfo’s membership in the AMOSUP that had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with HAL, or the ITWF-CBA.86 Its provisions therefore must prevail over the standard terms and benefits formulated by the POEA in its Standard Employment Contract.87 Hence, the NLRC’s award of US$60,000.00as compensation for the death of Rodolfo in accordance with Article 21.2.188 of the ITWF-CBA was in order. The same holds true for the award of burial assistance in the amount of US$1,000.00which is provided under Section 20 (A) (4) (c)89 of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Moreover, conformably with existing case law, the NLRC’s grant of attorney’s fees in the amount of US$6,100.00was called for since petitioner was forced to litigate to protect her valid claim. Where an employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the award.90

All in all, the NLRC’s award of US$67,100.0091 – which, as the records bear, had already been paid92 by respondents – is hereby sustained.

X x x.”

Labor cases; appeals from NLRC to CA; the CA’s parameter of analysis in cases elevated to it from the NLRC is the existence of the latter’s grave abuse of discretion, considering that they come before the appellate court through petitions for certiorari.

CONCHITA J. RACELIS vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. and/or HOLLAND AMERICA LINES, INC.,*and FERNANDO T. LISING, G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

As a final point of rumination, it must be highlighted that the CA’s parameter of analysis in cases elevated to it from the NLRC is the existence of the latter’s grave abuse of discretion, considering that they come before the appellate court through petitions for certiorari. This delimitation, in relation to the Court’s task of reviewing the case eventually appealed before it, was explained in Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation93 as follows:

[W]e review in this Rule 45 petition the decision of the CA on a Rule 65 petition filed by Montoya withthat court.1âwphi1 In a Rule45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review ofa CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?94

Given that the NLRC’s ruling was amply supported by the evidence on record and current jurisprudence on the subject matter, the Court, in opposition to the CA, finds that no grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the labor tribunal. Hence,the CA’s grant of respondents’ certiorari petition before it ought to be reversed, and consequently the NLRC Decision be reinstated.

X x x.”

2006 SEC Rules of Procedure; appeal to SEC en banc.

COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION vs.COMMISSION EN BANC of the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) and JUSTINA F. CALLANGAN, in her capacity as Director of the Corporation Finance Department of the SEC, G.R. No. 199028, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly treated Cosmos’s appeal before the SEC En Banc as a motion for reconsideration, and consequently, affirmed its dismissal for being a prohibited pleading under the 2006 SEC Rules of Procedure.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

As an administrative agency with both regulatory and adjudicatory functions,36 the SEC was given the authority to delegate some of its functions to, inter alia, its various operating departments, such as the SECCFD, the Enforcement and Investor Protection Department, and the Company Registration and Monitoring Department, pursuant to Section 4.6 of the SRC, to wit: SEC. 4. Administrative Agency.

x x x x

4.6. The Commission may, for purposes of efficiency, delegate any of its functions to any department or office of the Commission, an individual Commissioner or staff member of the Commission except its review or appellate authority and its power to adopt, alter and supplement any rule or regulation.

The Commission may review upon its own initiative or upon the petition of any interested party any action of any department or office, individual Commissioner, or staff member or the Commission. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Naturally, the aforesaid provision also gives the SEC the power to review the acts performed by its operating departments in the exercise of the former’s delegated functions. This power of review is squarely addressed by Section 11-1, Rule XI of the 2006 SEC Rules of Procedure, which provides that "[a]n appeal to the Commission En Banc may be taken from a decision, order, or resolution issued by an Operating Department if there are questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law."

In this case, the Court disagrees with the findings of both the SEC En Banc and the CA that the Revocation Order emanated from the SEC En Banc. Rather, such Order was merely issued by the SEC-CFD as one of the SEC’s operating departments, as evidenced by the following: (a) it was printed and issued on the letterhead of the SEC-CFD, and not the SEC En Banc; (b) it was docketed as a case under the SEC-CFD as an operating department of the SEC, since it bore the serial number "SEC-CFD Order No. 027, [s.] 2008;" and (c) it was signed solely by Director Callangan as director of the SEC-CFD, and not by the commissioners of the SEC En Banc. Further, both the SEC En Banc and the CA erred in holding that the Revocation Order merely reflected Resolution No. 87, s. 2008, and thus, should already be considered as the ruling of the SEC En Banc in this case. As admitted by respondents, the SEC-CFD’s referral of the case to the SEC En Banc for its consideration in its March 13, 2008 meeting, which eventually resulted in the issuance of Resolution No. 87, s.2008, was merely an internal procedure inherent in the exercise by the SEC of its administrative and regulatory functions.37 Moreover, Cosmos never knew of the existence of Resolution No. 87, s. 2008, as it was not furnished a copy thereof; nor did the Revocation Order make any specific reference to the same. Essentially, Cosmos was only apprised of the existence of Resolution No. 87, s. 2008 when it was finally cited by the SEC En Banc in its September 10, 2009 Decision.38Accordingly, when Cosmos received the Revocation Order, it had every reason to believe that it was issued by the SEC-CFD as an Operating Department ofthe SEC, and thus, appealable to the SEC En Banc. Therefore, the outright dismissal of Cosmos’s appeal by the SEC En Banc effectively denied it of its right to appeal, as provided for under the SRC and the 2006 SEC Rules of Procedure, and therefore could not be countenanced.

In sum, the Revocation Order is properly deemed as a decision issued by the SEC-CFD as one of the Operating Departments of the SEC, and accordingly, may be appealed to the SEC En Banc, as what Cosmos properly did in this case. Perforce, the SEC En Banc and the CA erred in deeming Cosmos’s appeal as a motion for reconsideration and ordering its dismissal on such ground. In view thereof, the Court deems it prudent to reinstate and remand the case to the SEC En Banc for its resolution on the merits.

X x x.”

Footnotes

8 Section 17.1 (a) of the SRC reads:

SEC. 17. Periodic and Other Reports of Issuers.

17.1. Every issuer satisfying the requirements in Subsection 17.2 hereof shall file with the Commission:

a) Within one hundred thirty-five (135) days, after the end of the issuer’s fiscal year, or such other time as the Commission may prescribe, an annual report which shall include, among others, a balance sheet, profit and loss statement and statement of cash flows, for such last fiscal year, certified by an independent certified public accountant, and a management discussion and analysis of results of operations; x x x

x x x x

28 Section 3-6 of the 2006 SEC Rules of Procedure reads:

SEC. 3-6. Prohibited Pleadings. – The following pleadings or any submission that is filed or made under a similar guise or title shall not be allowed:

x x x x

(c) Motion for New Trial, Reconsideration of Judgment or Order, or Reopening of Trial;

x x x x

Should one be filed, said prohibited pleadings or submissions shall be automatically expunged from the records of the case.

x x x x

36 See Calma v. CA, 362 Phil. 297, 301 (1999), citing SEC v. CA, 316 Phil. 903, 906 (1995).

Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that "temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty"

S.V. MORE PHARMA CORPORATION and ALBERTO A. SANTILLANA vs. DRUGMAKERS LABO RA TORIES, INC. and ELIEZER DEL MUNDO, G.R. No. 200408, November 12, 2014; with accompanying case - S.V. MORE PHARMA CORPORATION and ALBERTO A. SANTILLANA vs. DRUGMAKERS LABO RA TORIES, INC. and ELIEZER DEL MUNDO, G.R. No. 200416, November 12, 2014.

“x x x.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision29 dated September 13, 2002, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents, and accordingly ordered petitioners, Hizon Laboratories and Rafael, to jointly and severally pay Drugmakers the following amounts: (a) P6,000,000.00 as actual damages representing loss of income and/or loss of business opportunity; (b) P500,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; (d) P250,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and (e) costs of suit.30

It found that both the Agreement and the Deed of Sale/Assignment explicitly provided that Drugmakers had the right to exclusively manufacture the subject 28 pharmaceutical products; thus, the act of S.V. More in contracting with Hizon Laboratories to manufacture some of the said products constituted a clear violation of their contractual obligations for which they are liable for damages.31 Moreover, it disregarded petitioners’ claim that Atty. Carag surreptitiously inserted certain gratuitous provisions into the subject contracts for being unsubstantiated in the light of Alberto’s admission that he prepared the draft of the Agreement and had read the Agreement and Deed of Sale/Assignment before signing the same.32 Being aware of the fact that petitioners are legally obliged to maintain Drugmakers as the sole and exclusive manufacturer of the subject pharmaceutical products, the RTC declared Hizon Laboratories and Rafael guilty of bad faith in agreeing to manufacture at least six (6) of them, hence, liable for damages together with petitioners.33

X x x.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision37 dated August 5, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC Ruling with modifications in that: (a) it deleted the award for moral and exemplary damages; and (b) it absolved Rafael and Hizon Laboratories from any liability.

It found that petitioners indeed breached their contractual obligation when they entered into another manufacturing agreement with Hizon Laboratories, and its owner, Rafael, instead of availing of the option under the Agreement to invalidate the same when Drugmakers failed to provide them with a copy of the manufacturing agreement for the renewal of the license to operate.38 Hence, respondents are entitled to be paid actual damages representing unrealized profits,39 attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.40 The CA, however, decreed that since Drugmakers is a juridical entity, it is not therefore entitled to moral and exemplary damages.41

Further, the CA absolved Hizon Laboratories and Rafael from any liability as they were not parties to the Agreement and Deed of Sale/Assignment nor can they be faulted for manufacturing the pharmaceutical products because their actions were only the direct consequences of petitioners’ breach of their obligations.42

X x x.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed petitioners’ liability for breach of contract.

X x x.

These provisions notwithstanding, records disclose that petitioner S.V More, through the CMPP and absent the prior written consent of respondent Drugmakers, as represented by its President, respondent Eliezer, contracted the services of Hizon Laboratories to manufacture some of the pharmaceutical products covered by the said contracts. Thus, since the CMPP with Hizon Laboratories was executed on October 23, 1993,54 or seven (7) days prior to the expiration of the CMA on October 30, 1993, it is clear that S.V. More, as well as its President, petitioner Alberto, who authorized the foregoing, breached the obligation to recognize Drugmakers as exclusive manufacturer, thereby causing prejudice to the latter.

While the CA correctly affirmed the existence of the aforementioned breach, the Court, however, observes that the appellate court’s award of actual damages (due to loss of profits) in the amount of P6,000,000.00 was erroneous due to improper factual basis.

Records reveal that in their attempt to prove their claim for loss of profits corresponding to the aforesaid amount, respondents based their computation thereof on a Sales Projection Form55 for the period November 1993 to February 1995.56 However, it is readily observable that the breach occurred only for a period of seven (7) days, or from October 23, 1993 until October 30, 1993– that is, the date when the CMA expired. Notably, the CMA – from which stems S.V. More’s obligation to recognize Drugmakers’s status as the exclusive manufacturer of the subject pharmaceutical products and which was only carried over in the other two (2) above-discussed contracts – was never renewed by the parties,57 nor contained an automatic renewal clause, rendering the breach and its concomitant effect, i.e., loss of profits on the part of Drugmakers, only extant for the limited period of, as mentioned, seven (7) days.

Aside from the lack of substantiation as regards the length of time for which supposed profits were lost, it is also evident that only six (6) of the 28 pharmaceutical products58were caused by petitioners to be manufactured by Hizon Laboratories.

Since the sales projection on which the CA based its award for actual damages was derived from figures representing the "alleged unregistered or fabricated sales invoices" of E.A. Northam from 1990 to 199359 and the "desired profit" of 15-20%,60 it would therefore be a legal mishap to sustain that award. As case law holds, the amount of loss warranting the grant of actual or compensatory damages must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, based on competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.61 The CA’s finding on respondents’ supposed loss of profits in the amount of P6,000,000.00 based on the erroneous sales projection hardly meets this requirement. Accordingly, it must be set aside.

Nevertheless, considering that respondents palpably suffered some form of pecuniary loss resulting from petitioners’ breach of contract, the Court deems it proper to, instead, award in their favor the sum of P100,000.00 in the form of temperate damages.62 This course of action is hinged on Article 2224 of the Civil Code which states that "temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty," as in this case.

As a final matter, the Court resolves that the CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in awarding respondents' attorney's fees, it appearing that the latter were compelled to litigate in order to protect their rights and interests in this case,63 hence, justifying the same.

X x x.”

Footnotes

61 Calibre Traders, Inc. v.Bayer Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 161431, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 34, 56.

62 See Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 202247, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 290, 301-302.

63 See Maglasang v. Northwestern University, Inc., G.R. No. 188986, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 128, 140.

In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINE, and MS. CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA vs. JOEL P. HIPE, JR., G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.64

In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence,65 or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.66 The onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish his claim for disability benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence to justify the grant of relief.67

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in granting Hipe’s certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for permanent disability benefits for Hipe’s failure to establish his claim through substantial evidence.

X x x.”

The issue of whether the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the employer/manning agency for an injury or illness suffered may be determined from the pertinent provisions of Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC which enumerates the duties of an employer to his employee who suffers a work-related injury or disease during the term of his employment

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINE, and MS. CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA vs. JOEL P. HIPE, JR., G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014

“x x x .

The issue of whether the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the employer/manning agency for an injury or illness suffered may be determined from the pertinent provisions of Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC68 which enumerates the duties of an employer to his employee who suffers a work-related injury or disease during the term of his employment,69 viz.:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

x x x x

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers workrelated injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

x x x x

2. x x x.

However,if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. (Emphases supplied)

x x x x

Pursuant to the afore-quoted provision, two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable: (a) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (b) that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.70

In the present case, Hipe was made to continuously perform work aboard the vessel beyond his six-month contract without the benefit of a formal contract. Considering that any extension of his employment is discretionary on the part of respondents and that the latter offered no explanation why Hipe was not repatriated when his contract expired on June 5, 2008, the CA correctly ruled that he was still under the employ of respondents when he sustained an injury on June 22, 2008. Consequently, the injury suffered by Hipe was a work-related injury and his eventual repatriation on August 5, 2008, for which he was treated/rehabilitated can only be considered as a medical repatriation.

Nonetheless, Hipe was subsequently declared fit to work by the company-designated physician on October 9, 2008, or merely 65 days after his repatriation, thus negating the existence of any permanent disability for which compensability is sought. Said fit-to-work certification must stand for two (2) reasons:

First, while Hipe’s personal doctor disagreed with the above mentioned assessment, opining that "it would be impossible for him to work as seaman-plumber"71 and recommending a disability grade of five, records show, however, that such opinion was not supported by any diagnostic tests and/or procedures as would adequately refute the fit-to-work assessment, but merely relied on a review of Hipe’s medical history and his physical examination;72 and

Second, Hipe failed to comply with the procedure laid down under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarer’s personal doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician’s fit-to-work assessment. In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag73 (Philippine Hammonia), the Court held that the seafarer’s non-compliance with the said conflict resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician, viz.:74

The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of [the seafarer’s] contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. x x x Thus, the complaint should have been dismissed, for without a binding third opinion, the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician stands x x x.

x x x x

Whatever his reasons might have been, [the seafarer’s] disregard of the conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot and should not be tolerated and allowed to stand, lest it encourage a similar defiance. x x x The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEASEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties’level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court. Given the circumstances under which [the seafarer] pursued his claim, especially the fact that he caused the non-referral to a third doctor, [the company doctor’s] fit-to-work certification must be upheld. In Santiago v. Pacbasin Ship Management, Inc., the Court declared: "[t]here was no agreement on a third doctor who shall examine him anew and whose finding shall be final and binding. x x x [T]his Court is left without choice but touphold the certification made by [the company doctor] with respect to [the seafarer’s] disability. (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

In light of the contrasting diagnoses of the company-designated physician and Hipe’s personal doctor, Hipe filed his complaint before the NLRC but prematurely did so without any regard to the conflict-resolution procedure under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Thus, consistent with Philippine Hammonia, the fit-to-work certification of the company designated physician ought to be upheld.

In fine, given that Hipe’s permanent disability was not established through substantial evidence for the reasons above-stated, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for permanent disability benefits, thereby warranting the reversal of the CA’s contrary ruling. Verily, while the Court adheres tothe principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the POEA-SEC, when the evidence presented then negates compensability, the claim for disability benefits must necessarily fail,75 as in this case.

X x x.”

Campaign contributions by corporations are absolutely illegal | The Manila Times Online

See - Campaign contributions by corporations are absolutely illegal | The Manila Times Online

"x x x.

by YEN MAKABENTA

The response to my query about the legality and ethics of San Miguel Corporation’s lending or renting of its planes and helicopters to Grace Poe in the current election campaign (“Offputting commercials in GMA debate broadcast,” Times, 25 February 2015) was swift and unequivocal.

I have learned and I have been told that both the Corporation Code of the Philippines and the Omnibus Election Code declare that political contributions by corporations are absolutely illegal.

SEC legal opinion

According to my colleague and fellow Times columnist Emeterio Perez, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has already issued its legal opinion on the matter of political contributions by companies.

On July 27,2015, the SEC declared that political donations by companies are illegal. It quoted the governing provisions of both the Corporation Code and the Omnibus Election Code to back its legal opinion.

Citing the pertinent provisions of the Corporation Code, the SEC said: “There is an absolute prohibition for corporations, both foreign and domestic, from giving donations to any political party, candidate or for the purpose of any partisan political activity.”

In Section 95 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it explicitly warns corporations against giving political contributions.

MOA of Comelec and SEC

On October 19, 2015, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) and the SEC signed a memorandum of agreement to strengthen their monitoring of campaign contributions, especially from private companies, in the 2016 elections.

The agreement, signed by Comelec Chairman Juan Andres Bautista and SEC Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, paves the way for the sharing of information in order to determine illegal contributions by SEC-registered firms.

“Under the MOA, the Comelec will provide the SEC with information on corporations and other SEC-registered entity that have engaged in partisan political activities.”

For its part, the SEC will provide information on SEC-registered companies that have been granted secondary permits to check if they violated the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

“With this MOA, we can request from the Comelec any document that a candidate may have filed that would give or show a list of his donors or contributors,” Herbosa said.

Our election laws also prohibit any person from soliciting or receiving any contribution from any of the identified persons or entities.

A violation of the provisions of the election code is considered an election offense, which carries a penalty of one to six years imprisonment, removal of the right to vote, and disqualification from public office.

Seemingly conflicting provisions

In a report to clients by Pricewaterhouse Coopers dated 17 September 2015, it noted:

“Under Section 36 (9) of the Corporation Code of the Philippines (CCP), corporations are allowed to make reasonable donations, including those for the public welfare or for hospital, charitable, cultural, scientific, civic, or for similar purposes, provided that no corporation, domestic or foreign, shall give donations in aid of any political party or candidate or for purposes of partisan political activity….

“However, under Section 95 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), only certain corporations or juridical entities are prohibited to make such donations. These include public or private financial institutions, and juridical persons operating a public utility or in possession of or exploiting any natural resources of the nation.”

Is there a conflict between these two laws? If yes, which provision would prevail?

In its legal opinion of July 2015, the SEC clarified that the provision of the CCP was not repealed or amended by Section 95 of the OEC. There is no conflict between the two provisions and they can be harmonized.

Even so, corporate lawyers can argue that a corporation may still donate now without violating the Corporation Code provision. In a 2009 Supreme Court (SC) ruling, the SC held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

So, if a corporation is planning to fund the infomercial of a political aspirant, it can donate before the campaign period starts without violating the CCP provision. This explains why there was so much political campaign advertising on TV and radio long before the start of the campaign period.

PCIJ and William Gatchalian

In a three-part series on corporate campaign donations in the 2013 elections, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) reported that top executives of firms barred from making campaign donations funded Senate bets and parties in the elections.

One prime example cited by PCIJ was plastics king William T. Gatchalian, a businessman who learned to invest in politics as well during the campaign for the presidency of former president Joseph Estrada in 1998.

During the 2013 election campaign, Gatchalian donated P20.9 million to the opposition coalition, the United Nationalist Alliance (UNA). He also donated P10 million to Estrada’s party, Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP), which was part of UNA.

Now, Gatchalian is backing Grace Poe’s candidacy for president.

SMC lending of aircraft covered by ban

According to lawyers, San Miguel’s lending of its aircraft to Ms. Poe’s campaign falls under the prohibition of our laws.

The separate issue of stockholders’ complaints against SMC’s taking a partisan interest in the elections can be the subject of a formal complaint with the SEC.

San Miguel has not commented on the point I raised that the company must maintain a strict distinction between Mr. Ramon Ang and the corporation, because “their interests, political or otherwise, are not identical.” Mr. Ang is free to donate his own money and assets to Ms. Poe’s campaign, but not those of SMC.

Grace Poe tried to defend her use of SMC air assets by saying that (1) others, including president Aquino have also availed themselves of these assets of San Miguel; (2) she pays for the aviation fuel in her campaign trips; and (3) she gives the pilots a tip after every campaign sortie.

This is incredibly naïve and laughable. I feel ashamed for our country that she is being considered (at least for now) as a serious candidate for the presidency, and that many are enabling her to flout the law and the Constitution via campaign donations.

Plutocrats and oligarchs cast a menacing shadow on the 2016 elections, and they could destroy our republic if they are not stopped.

- yenmakabenta@yahoo.com

x x x."