Injustice and misery in PH jails | Inquirer Opinion

See - Injustice and misery in PH jails | Inquirer Opinion

"x x x.

By: Carlos H. Conde, March 8th, 2016 12:06 AM

ON DEC. 3, 2010, antidrug police in Muntinlupa City arrested 30-year-old tricycle driver Ronaldo Rivera on drug trafficking charges. During his first court hearing three months later, Rivera said police produced 0.02 grams—equivalent to 10 grains of salt—of shabu.

That was the last time Rivera, who asserts his innocence, saw the inside of a courtroom. Instead, he has spent more than five years in detention at the Muntinlupa City Jail, unable under the drug laws to obtain bail or challenge the charges against him. Subsequent court proceedings have been repeatedly rescheduled or canceled by the court so many times that he said he has lost count.

Rivera’s plight is far from unique and is emblematic of a broken judicial system in which tens of thousands of people in the Philippines are detained for prolonged periods without either ever seeing a judge, or whose perfunctory court appearances stretch over years. 

According to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), between 85 and 90 percent of the more than 94,000 inmates in its custody are awaiting or undergoing trial. This makes the Philippines the Southeast Asian country with the highest number of pretrial and remand detainees and the second highest in all of Asia. Prolonged detention without charge or trial violates international human rights instruments, including Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Philippines ratified in 1986. Moreover, it “shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody,” but rather released with guarantees of appearing for trial.

The sources of this injustice are multifold: corrupt and incompetent investigators and prosecutors, a judicial and court system clogged with too many cases, and too few judges to try them. 

According to the Supreme Court, 26 percent of Philippine courts are vacant of judges. As a result, existing courts must share judges with other courts, resulting in extremely slow trial procedures. These institutional pathologies result in unjust and prolonged detention. Many detainees have been in jail longer than the maximum sentence for the offense with which they were charged, with some people spending as long as 14 years in detention before being convicted or released by the courts.

The injustice of lengthy detention is compounded by the horrific conditions of the jail facilities. Many detention centers in the Philippines fail to meet the minimum United Nations standards for such facilities, including inadequate amounts of food, poor nutrition, and unsanitary conditions. Torture and other forms of ill-treatment are also common. Because most of those who run afoul of the law are poor, posting bail is often not an option. And even if they can afford bail, the majority of detainees in most of these jails face drug charges that are nonbailable.

These problems are made worse by critical and chronic overcrowding of jail facilities. The BJMP, which runs 415 detention facilities in 17 regions, said that on average, its jailhouses are 380 percent overcapacity. In Metro Manila alone, the BJMP’s total cell area of 22,318 square meters, which is designed for 4,749 detainees, currently holds 21,868 detainees, or a congestion rate of 361 percent. In another region, the rate is 720 percent.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), in a report published in April 2015, determined that overcrowding is the main concern in police lockup cells. This congestion is the primary source of mistreatment in these facilities. The CHR found that all of the 26 lockup cells it visited in several Metro Manila areas were overcrowded, some by nearly 300 percent of the intended capacity. Those conditions breed disease and tension among the detainees.

The lack of space frequently forces detainees to sleep while sitting, or even standing; some take turns sleeping. Bedding is so inadequate that many inmates sleep on discarded cardboard boxes or attach makeshift hammocks from the ceilings. These cells are also often dilapidated, with poor ventilation and absence of natural light; at least two cells at the Manila

Police District are in a basement and “are in a suffocating condition,” the CHR report said.

Sanitation in most of these cells is dire—toilet facilities “either do not exist or are poorly maintained,” the CHR said. In one cell, “a hole directly connected to the sewage” serves as a toilet while others are clogged, causing “odious stench.”

Detention facilities also lack adequate medical care for detainees, particularly pregnant women. In most Metro Manila lockup cells, prenatal services are nonexistent. Some cells do not provide medical attention at all to pregnant detainees. In several of the police cells in Quezon City and Manila that the CHR visited, not a single medical officer was available. The International Committee of the Red Cross has expressed concerns about health conditions in Philippine jails, particularly the spread of pulmonary illnesses such as tuberculosis, and skin infections, diarrhea, and sepsis.

The Philippine government has taken some initial steps to address these problems. Quezon City has piloted a program since 2013 designed to digitize court filings and proceedings. A justice-sector reform program funded by the European Union has been training police officers and investigators on investigation and case management procedures. The Public Attorney’s Office has added more lawyers to represent indigent suspects.

These initiatives show promise. But for them to make any meaningful impact on the thousands of Filipinos who waste years behind bars in pretrial detention or detention on remand, they need the government’s commitment and support to extend them nationwide. Until they do, the long wait for justice for detainees such as Rivera will continue.

Carlos H. Conde is the researcher in the Philippines at Human Rights Watch.

x x x."

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Supreme Court exempts Ayala's 221-ha Westgrove expansion from land reform

See - COCKTALES | Divided Sereno court exempts Ayala's 221-ha Westgrove expansion from land reform

"x x x.

InterAksyon.com

The online news portal of TV5

Ayala Land has obtained approval from a divided Supreme Court to exempt 221 hectares of forested hilly lands adjoining its high-end Westgrove Heights subdivision from the comprehensive agrarian reform program.

With no less than Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno herself writing the unpublicized decision, the high tribunal last month voted 9-5, with one abstention, and reversed the Court of Appeals decision that would have barred the conversion of the disputed property into another exclusive, gated subdivision.

Sereno was joined by Antonio Carpio, Presbitero Velasco Jr., Arturo Brion, Mariano del Castillo, Jose Perez, Jose Mendoza, Bienvenido Reyes, and Estella Perlas-Bernabe.

Those who voted to keep the disputed property within the agrarian reform program were recently retired Martin Villarama Jr., who wrote the dissenting opinion, Teresita Leonardo-de Castro, Diosdado Peralta, Lucas Bersamin and Marvic Leonen.

Francis H. Jardeleza, a former solicitor-general and San Miguel general counsel, declined to vote.

"This is not a case of a feudal landowner unjustly enriched by the hard work of a long-suffering tenant," Sereno said. "Respondents are residents who have not yet established any claim – let alone substantial rights – over the land. On the contrary, what has been duly established is that they have received disturbance compensation."

About half the size of Westgrove Heights, the disputed property was acquired by Ayala Land in 1995 from an auction conducted by the Bangko Sentral as receiver for the shuttered Manila Bank, which in turn had foreclosed on the real estate mortgage of Capitol Citifarms Inc., an agribusiness venture.

Then agrarian reform secretary Ernesto Garilao had initially rejected the application for exemption, but later turned around, after the Office of the President granted the appeal of the Bangko Sentral and Capitol Citifarms to be given a five-year window to seek conversion of the Manila Bank landholdings for non-agricultural use.

Two years later, Garilao issued the conversion order, saying the disputed property, on barangay Munting-Ilog in Silang, Cavite, was beyond the 18 degree slope and therefore outside the CARP coverage.

Garilao's conversion order was subsequently upheld by his two successors, despite the disputed property having already been covered by a DAR notice of acquisition, but whose documentation had inexplicably disappeared.

"Here, however, CARP was never given the chance to be implemented as a result of the landowner's legal maneuvers until conditions of the land had so changed with the lapse of time," Villarama said.

"The unabated land-use conversion from agricultural to industrial, commercial, residential or tourist purposes has been aptly described as 'systematically reversing land reform in a way that was never foreseen by the framers of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law," he added.

But Sereno took pains to shield Ayala Land from whatever machinations implied by Villarama and the land claimants.

"Ayala Land Inc. is in the precarious position of having been that third-party buyer that offered the terms and conditions most helpful to, ultimately, the Bangko Sentral," Sereno said. "Prior to that acquisition, there was absolutely no relationship between ALI and the farmers."

It was not immediately clear if the Silang property, which also overlooks the Laguna TechnoPark and is just 10 kilometers away from the provincial road, will be annexed to the highly successful Westgrove Heights project.

Highlighted by a 28-hectare park, the 400-hectare Westgrove Heights is now on its phases 14 and 15 of development, with Ayala Land offering 430 to 720-square-meter lots costing anywhere from P5.7 million to P8.5 million cash.

Resellers and lot flippers, on the other hand, especially those with properties closer to the main gate and the schools, have been asking for P20,000/sqm or P14.4 million for a similar 720-sqm plot.

x x x."

Ex-Davao del Sur gov, 5 others guilty of graft | Malaya Business Insight

See - Ex-Davao del Sur gov, 5 others guilty of graft | Malaya Business Insight

"x x x.

By PETER J. G. TABINGO

March 07, 2016

FORMER Davao del Sur governor Benjamin P. Bautista Jr. and five other former provincial officials were found guilty of four counts of graft by the Sandiganbayan in connection with irregularities in the purchase of five service vehicles in 2003.

In a 17-page decision, the graft court’s First Division sentenced the defendants to 24 years and four months in jail with an additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Court informants said Bautista is running for a vice mayoralty post in one municipality in his province under the administration’s Liberal Party.

Also convicted were provincial accountant Richard T. Martel, general services officer Allan C. Putong, treasurer Abel A. Guiñares, budget officer Victoria G. Mier, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Edgar C. Gan. Martel, Guiñares, Mier and Gan were all members of the provincial Bids and Awards Committee that approved the purchase.

Associate Justice Rafael R. Lagos penned the decision with Associate Justices Efren de la Cruz and Rodolfo Ponferrada concurring. 

According to evidence presented by prosecutors during trial, the accused provincial officials authorized the purchase of the vehicles in a span of six months in 2003. The vehicles are two Toyota Hilux 4x4 pickups worth P2.5 million bought on January 24, one Mitsubishi L300 Exceed van worth P878,919.50 on February 18, one Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 pickup worth P1 million on July 15, and another Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 worth P1.218 million on July 21. None of the purchases were made through public bidding.

In their defense, the provincial officials claimed the vehicles were acquired from exclusive distributors of foreign brands of vehicles but the court swept aside this claim noting that certifications issued by both Toyota Davao Inc. and Ford-Davao made no assertion that they are exclusive distributors.

“The evidence clearly point out that the five vehicles were purchased by the province of Davao without any public bidding as Bautista and the Bids and Awards Committee chose the suppliers through direct purchase route,” the Sandiganbayan said.

Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that the procurement of the vehicles were not even included in the annual procurement program of the provincial government.

Even without proof of undue injury to the government, the Sandiganbayan said the failure to comply with public bidding and award of the contract directly to a supplier showed that the vehicle dealers profited from the transactions despite absence of proof that they gave the most beneficial price to the government. 

“Thus, it shows some haste in the procurement which ultimately benefited the dealers of the brands. No records were presented to show the urgency for each purchase to justify the procurement of these vehicles,” the court said.

x x x ."

Presumption of innocence; moral certainty of culpability; proof beyond reasonable doubt.

"In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at least infavor of the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and noton the weakness of the defense."

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.36 It is thus required that every circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.37 Given the deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence of alcohol and executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. 

As stressed in People v. Ambrosio,38 the presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. 

In the present case, the absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.

In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at least infavor of the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and noton the weakness of the defense.

X x x.”

Presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty. - "(T)he presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability."

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.36 It is thus required that every circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.37 Given the deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence of alcohol and executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. 

As stressed in People v. Ambrosio,38 the presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. 

In the present case, the absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.

In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at least infavor of the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and noton the weakness of the defense.

X x x.”

Improper harassment motive. - "Certainly not to be overlooked is the fact that petitioner, in so filing his complaint, could not have possibly been inspired by improper motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa. Withal, unless he had a legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that petitioner would expose himself to harm’s way by filing a harassment criminal suit against policemen.”

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution35 of November 21, 2006 found, on the strength of another physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the same day,June 12, but later hour, probable cause for slight physical injuries against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. 

That finding to be sure tends to indicate that the police indeed man handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled out, the purported Dr. Balucating’s finding as to petitioner’s true state.

The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost no time in commencing the appropriate criminal charges against the police officers and Dr. Balucating, whom he accused of issuing Exh. "F" even without examining him. 

The element of immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioner’s profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. 

Certainly not to be overlooked is the fact that petitioner, in so filing his complaint, could not have possibly been inspired by improper motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa. 

Withal, unless he had a legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that petitioner would expose himself to harm’s way by filing a harassment criminal suit against policemen.

X x x.”

Immediate filing of counter charges. - "The element of immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioner’s profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. "

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution35 of November 21, 2006 found, on the strength of another physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the same day,June 12, but later hour, probable cause for slight physical injuries against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. 

That finding to be sure tends to indicate that the police indeed man handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled out, the purported Dr. Balucating’s finding as to petitioner’s true state.

The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost no time in commencing the appropriate criminal charges against the police officers and Dr. Balucating, whom he accused of issuing Exh. "F" even without examining him. 

The element of immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioner’s profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. 

Certainly not to be overlooked is the fact that petitioner, in so filing his complaint, could not have possibly been inspired by improper motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa. 

Withal, unless he had a legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that petitioner would expose himself to harm’s way by filing a harassment criminal suit against policemen.

X x x.”

Retroactivity of penal laws when favorable to the accused. - "Under Art. 22 of the RPC, penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar as they are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006."

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. 

The legal situation has of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),33 a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. 

And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver isdriving under the influence of alcohol. 

Viewed from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. 

Under Art. 22 of the RPC,34 penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar as they are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.

X x x.”

Poof of blood alcohol content in drunk driving cases under RA 10586

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are differing concepts. 

Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. 

The legal situation has of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),33 a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. 

And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver isdriving under the influence of alcohol. 

Viewed from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. 

Under Art. 22 of the RPC,34 penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar as they are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.

X x x.”

Opinion evidence; when admissible under Sec. 50, Rule 130

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation about being physically hurt before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. 

What the policemen claimed was that it took the three (3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136. 

They relied on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner showed no physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact challenged not only because the petitioner insisted at every turn that he was not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating failed to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified, but only to attest that the hospital has a record of the certificate. The trial court, in its decision, merely stated:

At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon by the doctor who issued it. Instead, the Records Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented by the Prosecution to testify on the said documents.

However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to affirm the contents of the Medical Certificate he issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath), this court finds that the observation of herein private complainants as to the accused’s behavior and condition after the incident was sufficient.

Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding x x x x

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.32

In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate Dr. Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the former was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the assumption that he and his fellow police officers were acting in the regular performance of their duties. 

It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are differing concepts. 

Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. 

The legal situation has of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),33 a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. 

And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver isdriving under the influence of alcohol. 

Viewed from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC,34 penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar asthey are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.

X x x.”

Resisting arrest - "But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC."

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. 

But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches30 to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. 

As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.31

Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. 

And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action. 

As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention to invite him to Station 9 so he could rest before he resumes driving. 

But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face. 

X x x.”

Art. 151, Rev. Penal Code - resisting arrest, serious disobedience; elements of.

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. 

Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order.28 He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. 

It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. 

The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.29

X x x.”

Swerving is not necessarily a punishable crime unless it constitutes "reckless driving" under Sec. 48, RA 4136, Land Transportation and Traffic Code

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014 

“x x x. 

In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner has not committed any crime or suspected of having committed one. 

"Swerving," as ordinarily understood, refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or movement.25

The act may become punishable when there is a sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature of reckless driving, a concept defined under RA 4136, as: 

SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. – No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safety or rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. 

Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. 

To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.26

Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone." 

Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. 

When the police officers stopped the petitioner’s car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section 29 of RA 4136. 

Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. X x x. 

X x x.”

Footnotes

5 Land Transportation and Traffic Code:

SECTION 56. Penalty for Violation. – The following penalties shall be imposed for violations of this Act: x x x

(f) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor x x x a fine of not less than one thousand pesos or imprisonment of not less than three nor more than six months, or both, at the discretion of the court.

6 Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties; When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed upon the offender.

15 SECTION 58. Duty of Clerks of Court. – It is hereby made the duty of clerks of the Court of First Instance, the City Court or Municipal Court trying traffic violation cases to certify to the Commission the result of any case, whether criminal or civil, involving violations of any provision of this Act or of other laws and ordinances relating to motor vehicles. Said certificate shall specifically contain the name of the driver or owner of the vehicle involved, his address, the number of his license and/or of the certificate or registration of his vehicle, and the date thereof, and the offense of which he was convicted or acquitted.

17 Sec. 50, Rule 130. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding —

(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

19 People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 78, 90.

20 People v. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, July 20, 2001, 361 SCRA 622.

21 Willy Tan y Chua v. People, G.R. No. 148194, April 12, 2002; Olimpio Pangonorom Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. People, G.R. No. 143380. April 11, 2005.

22 Balais v. Abuda, A.M. No. R-565-P, November 27, 1986.

23 G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007.

25 Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Ed. 1997.

26 Caminos, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 348, 357.

28 Abenes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 690.

29 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 18th ed., 2008, p. 154 .

30 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III , Section 2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

31 Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659.

33 Sec. 5. Punishable Act.- It shall be unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or similar substances.

34 Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.- Penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

36 People v. Castro, G.R. No. L-42478 October 4, 1989.

37 People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.

38 G.R. No. 135378, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 312.

SC may review findigns of fact of lower courts when it appears in the record that facts and circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.

"x x x.

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial court’s findings of fact does (not) hold sway when, as here, it appears in the record that facts and circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.20 Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in criminal prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for review, inclusive of the matter of credibility and appreciation of evidence.21` Peace officers and traffic enforcers, like other public officials and employees are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution and attention, which careful men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs.22

X x x.”

How Pinoys can protect themselves against fraud | ABS-CBN News

See - How Pinoys can protect themselves against fraud | ABS-CBN News

"x x x.

SAN FRANCISCO – Officials from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are reaching out to minority communities to protect them from falling victim to scammers.

Experts who fight fraud say immigrant communities, including many Filipinos, have been scammed into purchasing millions of dollars in fake services and worthless products.

The FTC said minorities have been defrauded through promises of services related to immigration, housing, health, debt collection, jobs and education.

"We have seen what we would call infinity scams and that’s where someone from your community who speaks Tagalog, who may have come from your village, or your family’s village and they may really try to promise you that you’re going to get some benefits. The important thing is don’t give money, don’t give money right away. Talk to someone about it," said Thomas Dahdouh, FTC Regional Director.

FTC Chairman Edith Ramirez added, "The most recent data that we made public is that in 2014, we had more than 1.5 million complaints relating to fraud, more than 250,000 came from California."

According to the FTC, immigrant communities experience more scams related to debt collection, citing frequent reports of abusive debt collectors who threaten victims with deportation.

The FTC suggests steps to protect yourself against fraud:

- Don't be pressured to make fast decisions.

- Research the organization.

- Never provide personal information.

- Do not click on links from unsolicited emails/texts.

- If unsure about validity, call business directly

- Never send money to someone you don't know or never met

- Never send money for an emergency situation, unless you can verify it.

The FTC encourages Filipinos to not be afraid and report all cases of fraud.

"I think that it is important to convey the message that we are there to protect consumers. We don’t care about immigration status. We want to get information in order to be more effective as an agency," said Ramirez.

To report any cases of fraud, contact the FTC or call 1-877-ftc-help.

You can also log a complaint with the Better Business Bureau.

All complaints are forwarded to the FTC.

Read more on Balitang America

x x x ."

Surname of illegitimate children; Article 176, Family Code, as amended by RA 9255; The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.

GRACE M. GRANDE vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

“x x x.

The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:

Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?

Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:

The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.

7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:

x x x x

7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].

7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.

7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.

x x x x

Rule 8. Effects of Recognition

8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births.

x x x x

8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:

"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname) pursuant to RA 9255."

The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.

8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:

"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.)

Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:

After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.

Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.

To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.

At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.

X x x.”

Footnotes

14 RA 9255 - An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of Their Father Amending for the Purpose Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, Otherwise Known as the "Family Code of the Philippines," signed into law on February 24, 2004 and took effect on March 19, 2004 fifteen (15) days after its publication on Malaya and the Manila Times on March 4, 2004.

15 Rule 132, Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authotirty, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last will and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

16 Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255; Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, No. L-44717, August 28, 1985, 138 SCRA 273; Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 26419, October 19, 1970, 35 SCRA 270; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, No. L-25659, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111.

17 Agpalo, Ruben, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 460 (6th ed., 2009); citations omitted.

18 No. L-51201, May 29, 1980, 97 SCRA 858.

19 126 Phil. 1 (1967).

20 G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 76, 83-84.

21 Office of Civil Registrar General (OCRG) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004, issued by the National Statistics Office-Office of the Civil Registrar General. Approved on May 14, 2004, published on May 18, 2004 on the Manila Times, and took effect on June 2, 2004.

22 G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408, 453.

23 Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173 (1935); Molina v. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 545 (1918).

24 The Office of the Civil Registrar General exercises quasi-judicial powers under Rule 13, Title 1, of NSO Administrative Order 1-93, December 18, 1993, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No. 3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration:

RULE 13. Posting of the Pending Application. — (1) A notice to the public on the pending application for delayed registration shall be posted in the bulletin board of the city/municipality for a period of not less than ten (10) days.

(2) If after ten (10) days, no one opposes the registration, the civil registrar shall evaluate the veracity of the statements made in the required documents submitted.

(3) If after proper evaluation of all documents presented and investigation of the allegations contained therein, the civil registrar is convinced that the event really occurred within the jurisdiction of the civil registry office, and finding out that said event was not registered, he shall register the delayed report thereof.

(4) The civil registrar, in all cases of delayed registration of birth, death and marriage, shall conduct an investigation whenever an opposition is filed against its registration by taking the testimonies of the parties concerned and witnesses in the form of questions and answers. After investigation, the civil registrar shall forward his findings and recommendations to the Office of the Civil Registrar-General for appropriate action.

(5) The Civil Registrar-General may, after review and proper evaluation, deny or authorize the registration.

25 Tan v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 166143-47 & 166891, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 352, 370-371.

27 Rule 132. Sec. 34. Offer of' evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

28 In family law. the right granted by a court to a parent or other relative who is deprived custody of a child to visit the child on a regular basis. See DICTIONARY or LEGAL TERMS 529 (3rd ed.).

Republic Act No. 9255 - February 24 2004 - AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

See - R.A. 9255

Republic Act No. 9255 February 24 2004

AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

SECTION 1. Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."

SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 3. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Parents don’t have right to change child’s surname | The Manila Times Online

See - Parents don’t have right to change child’s surname | The Manila Times Online

"x x x.

As a rule, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. 

The only exception to this is if the filiation of the illegitimate children has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father, in which case the illegitimate children may use the surname of their father (Article 176, Family Code of the Philippines, as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] No. 9255).

In the situation of your child, he is already using the surname of his biological father. 

We can only surmise that this is for the reason that you registered him under his father’s surname in view of the recognition that he made of your son in the latter’s birth certificate. 

Thus, your son will be identified with his given name as appearing in his birth certificate until the proper court says otherwise.

Now, to seek for the change of the entry of your child’s surname as appearing in his birth certificate, we submit that neither you nor his biological father has the right to institute the same. 

Such discretion is left to your child alone. 

Thus, demanding from your child’s biological father to help you change the latter’s surname to that of your surname is useless, because his cooperation or decision over the matter will not be given weight by the court. 

To reiterate, it is the child’s decision that will be taken into consideration not that of his parents. 

This is in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Grande vs. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014), which states:

“x x x Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. x x x”

Insofar as the custody of your child, the right is granted to you pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9255. 

However, your child’s biological father may seek for visitation rights provided that he can establish that the grant thereof will be beneficial for the welfare and total upbringing of your child.

x x x."