Thursday, January 3, 2019

In Pursuit of Liberty

See - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAYxecbGotUyOGDXLw2M4NR4uK6WrAFbt


In Pursuit of Liberty

19 videos 34,694 views Last updated on Dec 11, 2018

In this series we promote the pursuit of liberty and individual freedom.



Academy of Ideas



1


7:51


How We Enslave Ourselves
Academy of Ideas



2


8:54


Why We Can’t Vote Our Way to Freedom
Academy of Ideas



3


9:29


Political Authority - An Examination
Academy of Ideas



4


8:54


Why We Can’t Vote Our Way to Freedom
Academy of Ideas



5


8:43


Aldous Huxley and Brave New World: The Dark Side of Pleasure
Academy of Ideas



6


7:38


George Orwell and 1984: How Freedom Dies
Academy of Ideas



7


9:42


The Individual vs. Tyranny
Academy of Ideas



8


12:37


Public Schools, the Fixation of Belief, and Social Control
Academy of Ideas



9


9:59


Fear and Social Control
Academy of Ideas



10


10:52


Democracy and the Road to Tyranny
Academy of Ideas



11


10:34


Spontaneous Order vs. Centralized Control
Academy of Ideas



12


7:49


Collectivism and Individualism
Academy of Ideas



13


11:10


John Stuart Mill - On Liberty
Academy of Ideas



14


9:32


Frédéric Bastiat - The Law
Academy of Ideas



15


11:26


Introduction to Propaganda
Academy of Ideas



16


10:31


Decentralization and Freedom
Academy of Ideas



17


12:33


The Psychology of Obedience and The Virtue of Disobedience
Academy of Ideas




18


8:54


The Role of Ideas in History
Academy of Ideas



19


8:04


Carl Jung, the Shadow, and the Dangers of Psychological Projection
Academy of Ideas





Rise of litigation finance companies raises legal and ethical concerns

See - http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/litigation_finance_legal_ethical_concerns


"x x x.

Other People's Money: Rise of litigation finance companies raises legal and ethical concerns

BY MARY ELLEN EGAN
DECEMBER 2018
http://www.abajournal.com 


x x x.


KEEP THE CASH FLOWING

Litigation funding started in Australia and the United Kingdom in the mid-1990s and entered the U.S. commercial market in the mid-2000s. It is now a multibillion-dollar global industry with a dozen commercial litigation funding companies in the U.S. market.

Financing is conducted on a single-case basis or on a portfolio of suits. Portfolio financing provides law firms with a large chunk of money in exchange for returns tied to a pool of cases.

Litigation financing is used for a variety of purposes. For individual plaintiffs, particularly those involved in personal injury lawsuits, the money can come in the form of cash advances to pay for such things as medical expenses or attorney fees. Advances tend to run between $2,500 and $7,500.

Meanwhile, for law firms and companies, it can be used for litigation or arbitration costs such as attorney fees, expert witness and court fees, or as working capital to cover such costs as salaries, rents and other business expenses. For individuals and companies, the money also can be used to provide cash flow during the period after a judgment has been issued and before the settlement or verdict money has come in.

That cash flow can be a lifeline—especially for law firms, allowing them greater flexibility with their caseloads. “A good piece of strong litigation is an asset; it can pay for itself or other costs,” says Allison Chock, the Los Angeles-based chief investment officer at Bentham IMF, which provides litigation finance to plaintiffs and law firms in the United States and for international arbitration.

Chock says litigation finance can allow clients to hire counsels who don’t normally take cases on a contingency basis. And it also enables firms to take on more contingency or hybrid fee cases than they ordinarily would because the firm is not carrying 100 percent of the risk throughout the case. “At a high-end contingency firm, you can only do a certain number at a time; otherwise the expense could bankrupt your firm,” she says.

Founded in 2001 in Australia, Bentham is the second-largest litigation funding company in the world, with $200 million dedicated to funding U.S. matters and another $106 million for legal funding in other jurisdictions around the world. The company entered the U.S. market in 2011 and currently has U.S. offices in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Houston.

“Our company is made up of almost exclusively lawyers, including even some of our marketing personnel. Our CMO is a former litigator, as is our marketing manager in LA,” says Chock, a former litigation associate at Latham & Watkins and partner at litigation-only boutique firm Hennigan, Bennett & Dorman, which later merged with McKool Smith. “When a case comes in, we will do our due diligence—collection risks, how solid is the case, etc., and then based on our evaluation, we will decide what terms will be offered.”

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WHO’S THE BOSS?

Critics, however, have argued that litigation funding is rife with ethical conflicts and potentially illegal behavior. One of the oft-cited concerns about litigation funding is that it will create a deluge of frivolous lawsuits.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been particularly vocal on this front, fearing that businesses will be awash in specious lawsuits and/or forced to settle frivolous suits to avoid having to pay to litigate them. On its Institute for Legal Reform website, the chamber argues that “more litigation funding means more litigation,” and that funding “can undercut a plaintiff’s control of litigation.”

“The people who rail against us, the ones that say we are gambling or drumming up business, overlook the fact that we only take on cases we can win,” Perla says. “Because of the way that we carefully vet cases on either a single-case or portfolio basis, we are actually creating efficiency in the [legal] system.”

Robinson, who advises Stevens & Lee’s clients about the benefits and potential pitfalls of litigation financing, concurs. “The big funders are sophisticated and vet claims carefully. As a result, they weed out the weak claims that shouldn’t be brought. In that sense, they’re having a positive effect on the market,” he says.

Meanwhile, in February 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the New York attorney general sued RD Legal, one of the largest consumer litigation financing firms, over allegations that it scammed 9/11 first responders and NFL concussion victims out of millions of dollars by luring them into costly settlement payouts while disguising the terms of the advance agreements.

In its court papers, RD Legal has claimed that the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional while maintaining that it has done nothing wrong. “Far from engaging in the ‘deceptive and abusive’ practices alleged in this lawsuit, the RD entities provide customers the information necessary to make informed decisions about whether to sell their settlement proceeds,” RD Legal said in its motion to dismiss. “The RD entities even encourage customers—in bold type in every contract, above the signature line—to consult with an attorney and other professionals who can assist in determining if the transaction fulfills the customers’ financial needs.”

In June, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York agreed with RD Legal as to the unconstitutionality of the CFPB and dismissed the claims brought by that bureau. However, it upheld the claims brought by the New York attorney general and allowed those to proceed.

Meanwhile, in March, the New York Times reported that federal prosecutors are looking into consumer litigation financing firms for, among other things, high interest rates. According to the Times, prosecutors are looking into whether the financial arrangements between cash-advance firms and lawyers constituted illegal kickbacks.

John Beisner, the Washington, D.C.-based leader of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom’s mass torts, insurance and consumer litigation group, says litigation financing firms might not file a single meritless suit. But portfolio financing could allow some flawed suits to make it into the courts.

“Back in the day, funders said, ‘We’d be crazy to invest in a frivolous lawsuit.’ And I said that they could spread risk on a portfolio basis. If you’re a plaintiffs lawyer, why not spread risk around cases? If one or two ships come in, you’ve covered all of your bases,” says Beisner, who represents the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. But he adds that the opinions stated in this piece are his own.

Eric Robinson: “Some firms don’t want to risk the contingency fee model, but that may change if a client is willing to consider a litigation funder.” Photo by Frank Veronsky Photography.

One of the biggest tension points between proponents and critics of litigation financing is the potential for interference by the third-party funder, either by dictating legal strategy or pressuring attorneys over settlement amounts.

“Funders say, ‘We don’t have any control,’ but some get to pick the counsel, and most get notified about settlement offers,” Beisner says. “They are certainly exercising influence.”

Critics such as Beisner point to Burford Capital’s involvement in the long-running Chevron case. The Chevron Corp. was being sued by a group of Ecuadorean villagers who claimed that the oil giant polluted their land.

In a civil RICO case against Steven Donziger, the lawyer for the villagers, court documents revealed that Burford, in a confidential presentation to the plaintiffs, was concerned about an “unnaturally low” settlement and asked them not to settle for less than $900 million without Burford’s consent. And if plaintiffs settled for less than that, Burford wanted to be compensated for $900 million anyway.

That presentation, however, predated the actual agreement signed by the plaintiffs attorneys including Patton Boggs (now Squire Patton Boggs) and Donziger, who stipulated that if they settled for less than $1 billion, Burford would be compensated as if the settlement was $1 billion. Additionally, if Burford invested $15 million, it would receive 5.5 percent of any recovery.

Burford ultimately invested just $4 million and later sold its stake. In February 2011, the plaintiffs were awarded $18.2 billion from Ecuador courts. However, the company refused to pay, accusing plaintiffs and their lawyers of engaging in fraud. Burford also accused Donziger and others of fraudulent inducement and terminated its relationship with the plaintiffs in September 2011.

Burford released a joint statement with Chevron in April 2013 renouncing any claims to the litigation. U.S. courts have ruled for Chevron, rejecting attempts by the Ecuadorean plaintiffs to collect the judgment. Donziger, meanwhile, has been suspended from the practice of law in Washington, D.C., and New York.

“That’s the problem [with litigation funding]—the settlement isn’t dictated by the strength or weakness of the case, but by the investors,” Beisner says.

x x x."


Duterte’s appointees dominate Supreme Court

See - https://opinion.inquirer.net/118206/dutertes-appointees-dominate-sc?fbclid=IwAR2VGtFVIu3nSheN6Y0Dqk0bg3IU5FGid-kSGaxJ573OFzeOCqQvsWML4IY


"x x x.

Duterte’s appointees dominate SC

By: Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban 

/ 05:08 AM December 16, 2018


Despite being in office for only two and a half years, President Duterte has already filled seven of the 14 seats of the Supreme Court. His appointees are Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Justices Noel G. Tijam, Andres B. Reyes Jr., Alexander G. Gesmundo, Jose C. Reyes Jr., Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Rosmari D. Carandang. Once he fills the lone vacant seat, he would have appointed the majority.

In fact, before the end of 2019, he would be able to fill 12 seats. Only three appointees of President Benigno Aquino III—Justices Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic M. V. F. Leonen and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa— would remain. This is because five justices will retire in 2019: Tijam on Jan. 5, Mariano C. del Castillo on July 29, Francis H. Jardeleza on Sept. 26, Bersamin on Oct. 18 and Antonio T. Carpio on Oct. 26.

Moreover, Mr. Duterte has already named two chief justices: Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, and would be able to choose the latter’s successor. If the successor will have a short term like his first two appointees, he can name a fourth or even a fifth CJ.

In contrast, Aquino named only one CJ and five associate justices who remained in the Court at the end of his six-year term: CJ Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno and Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes, Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza and Caguioa.

Why? Because President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Aquino’s predecessor, appointed relatively young justices whose terms of office lasted longer than Aquino’s tenure and whose retirements fell within Mr. Duterte’s presidency.

Thus far, Mr. Duterte’s appointees have been career jurists, thereby endearing him to the appellate service. Note, too, that many of his appointees have short terms, giving him more chances to promote more appellate justices. This practice has a domino effect that moves even the trial judges up the judicial ladder.

President Duterte’s CJ choices (De Castro and Bersamin) are also career justices. Since the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution up to 2016 when he ascended to the top, only two career justices have become CJs (Claudio Teehankee and Reynato S. Puno), compared with seven noncareer CJs (Pedro L. Yap, Marcelo B. Fernan, Andres R. Narvasa, Hilario G. Davide Jr., yours truly, Renato C. Corona and Sereno).

In total, four CJs have been selected from the career and seven from the noncareer service — i.e., those who were appointed associate justices from private practice or the academe or other government posts without passing through the appellate service, and from there, rose to the top judicial post.

Of the 14 current members, 10 are career justices and only four are noncareer (Carpio, Jardeleza, Leonen and Caguioa). Two of them (Carpio and Jardeleza), as stated earlier, will retire in 2019. To maintain the tradition of having about five noncareer justices, the President may want to consider appointing from the private practice or the academe or other government posts next year.

In the past, dominance did not automatically translate to subservience, as shown by many crucial decisions that voided, when proper, the policies of then Presidents Arroyo and Cory Aquino. (The other post-Edsa presidents did not enjoy dominance.) How will dominance affect the present Court’s decisions on controversial cases? We should know soon enough.

To combat corruption and other unethical practices, the Court formed on Oct. 2, 2018, the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) and the Corruption Prevention and Investigation Office (CPIO). Together, they constitute the rough equivalent of the Office of the Ombudsman for the judiciary.

The JIB shall be composed of a chairperson, a vice chairperson and three regular members. The first two shall be retired Supreme Court justices and the latter three shall be retired appellate court justices.

The JIB shall hear corruption and ethics complaints against the justices and personnel of the appellate and trial courts. The CPIO shall conduct “investigations, intelligence, surveillance or entrapment operations, or lifestyle checks” on them. However, complaints against Supreme Court justices shall be tackled by the Court’s committee on ethics, not the JIB.

Comments to chiefjusticepanganiban@ hotmail.com

Read more: https://opinion.inquirer.net/118206/dutertes-appointees-dominate-sc#ixzz5bUwxmyxf

Bangsamoro Organic Law; constitutionality questioned.

See - https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/10/31/18/sulu-asks-sc-to-void-bangsamoro-organic-law-stop-plebiscite


"x x x.

Sulu asks SC to void Bangsamoro Organic Law, stop plebiscite

By Mike Navallo, ABS-CBN News
Posted at Oct 31 2018 04:49 AM



MANILA—Months into its passage into law and before it could even be ratified, the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) is facing its first legal challenge yet.

The Province of Sulu questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 11054 or the BOL before the Supreme Court and is asking the high court to halt efforts to conduct a plebiscite to ratify it.

In a 48-page petition filed this month, the provincial government represented by Governor Abdusakur Tan II claimed the BOL violated several provisions of the 1987 Constitution and should be declared unconstitutional.

It asked the SC to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea and DILG Secretary Eduardo Año from implementing the law, and the Commission on Elections from holding the plebiscite scheduled on January 21, 2019.

Other respondents named in the petition include Presidential Peace Adviser Jesus Dureza, the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections, the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Objections to law itself

In particular, the petition alleged that the law cannot abolish the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and replace it with a Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BAR) because this will violate constitutional provisions that allow only 1 organic act to establish an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.

“Since ARMM is created by Constitutional fiat, Congress, by itself, has absolutely no authority to abolish ARMM. Only through an amendment of the Constitution may ARMM be abolished. This is so, because only the Constitution may create or abolish an autonomous region,” the petition said.
Objections to form of government

Among the provisions the petition objected to is the form of government the BAR will take.

Under the BOL, the BAR will have a parliamentary form of government with elected members of the legislative assembly who will choose from among themselves a chief minister who will lead the executive department.

According to the petition, this will violate the doctrine of the separation of powers under the Constitution.

“Under this parliamentary set-up, the powers of Parliament (legislative branch), and those of the Cabinet (executive branch), are not separate but, in fact, fused. This is contrary to the requirement under the Constitution that the structure of the government for each of the autonomous regions should consist of the executive department and the legislative assembly, compliant with the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the Constitution,” it said.

And because the chief minister will be chosen only by members of the parliament, “the right of the people to elect the head of the executive branch of the Bangsamoro government is not recognized,” the petition argued, citing a constitutional provision requiring executive and legislative officials to be elected and to be representative of their constituent political units.

The petition also questioned the composition of the legislative assembly.

Under the BOL, 50% of the members of the assembly will come from political parties, 40% from parliamentary districts and 10% is reserved to sectoral representatives.

According to the petition, representation in the legislative assembly must correspond to constituent political units – in this case, 5 provinces and 2 cities under the current ARMM.

ARMM is composed of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi and the cities of Marawi and Lamitan.

Objections to plebiscite

Justifying its personal interest in filing the petition, the Province of Sulu is claiming personal injury from the manner by which the plebiscite to ratify the BOL will be conducted in January.

The BOL provision on the plebiscite states that the votes of the provinces and cities that are currently part of the ARMM will be treated as “one geographical area.”

For Sulu, this means that it “is being coerced to be part of the soon-to-be-established BAR, even if the votes cast in the province fail to secure the acquiescence of the majority.”

“[T]o consider the provinces and cities of the ARMM as one geographical area for purposes of voting in the plebiscite to ratify the BOL violates the constitutional requirement enshrined in Section 18, 2nd paragraph, Article X of the Constitution that the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,” it said.

Objections to territorial jurisdiction

In addition, Sulu took issue with its automatic inclusion in the territory of the BAR, along with other existing members of the ARMM.

It claimed that this will effectively mean that Congress has erased the identity of indigenous cultural minorities and violate their rights to ancestral domains and lands.

Objections to MILF as Bangsamoro Transition Authority lead

The petition also questioned why the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has been designated to lead the Bangsamoro Transition Authority.

It alleged that this violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution because there are other rebel groups in Mindanao and there are also non-Muslims and Muslims who are not members of the MILF.

“Without a doubt, Section 2, Article XVI of BOL was included in the law solely for the purpose of placing the MILF in a class of its own, to the exclusion of others similarly situated, in violation of the equal protection clause mandated by our Constitution,” it said.

The petition also accused the Philippine government of promoting Islam to the prejudice of other religions in providing funds for the BAR.

The Supreme Court en banc has asked the government to comment on the petition.

Read More: Sulu BOL Bangsamoro Organic Law SC Supreme Court plebiscite

x x x."

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11054 - ORGANIC LAW FOR THE BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO

See - https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2018/07/27/republic-act-no-11054/


[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11054]

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIC LAW FOR THE 


BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, 

REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734, 

ENTITLED “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO,” 

AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9054, 

ENTITLED “AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO”


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The CCP’s model of social control goes global

See - https://sinopsis.cz/en/the-ccps-model-of-social-control-goes-global/?fbclid=IwAR3IYr8EPt4b-JvkG7XZ8Tzk-gLqGzHm93ESC-KvEGJFF7Lasv7S4SCqKMY


"x x x.

The CCP’s model of social control goes global
Jichang Lulu, Martin Hála


One of the most striking aspects of Xi Jinping’s “New Era” is the rapid externalisation of systems and policies previously only applied, for the most part, domestically. This external activism is of course a reflection of the CCP’s new effort to utilise the “historic window of opportunity” in international relations, identified by Xi as one of the defining characteristics of the “New Era”. The advancement of the PRC’s global interests, in particular through Xi’s ‘Belt and Road’ and other geopolitical initiatives, includes the extraterritorial expansion of social control mechanisms once mostly reserved to the PRC. These mechanisms comprise cooptive and coercive tactics: United Front work and repression, both intensified under Xi.

The academic study of global cooptation by New Zealand academic Anne-Marie Brady has proven sensitive enough to trigger cross-border coercion: the publication of her Magic Weapons paper on global United Front work has been followed with state-media attacks and a harassment campaign. In response, we initiated an open letter in her support that gathered 303 signatures, largely from the Chinese studies community. Beyond solidarity with a researcher facing apparent retaliation for her scholarly work, the response reflects widespread concern with the CCP’s intent to project its repression mechanisms abroad, shielding its cooptive influence mechanism from expert scrutiny.
Three Magic Weapons for the three realms of control

The CCP’s Leninist model of governance applies several basic mechanisms to maximize control over a vast population by a small “vanguard” without the explicit consent of the governed masses. The model is onion-shaped, made up of three concentric layers of governance. The tools to control these three realms are, to echo a Maoist simile, “three magic weapons” (三大法宝): Party building, armed struggle (succeeded by state violence) and cooptation tactics (the United Front).

The inner realm is the Party itself, the “vanguard” of China’s working class, the Chinese people and the Chinese “nation” (民族), controlled by the party discipline imposed by its core leadership. Resuming a trend often encountered in Communist history, Xi as the Party’s “Core” (核心) has been consolidated as potentially perpetual dictator. Party discipline is mostly enforced through extra-legal bodies, notably the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI, 中央纪律检查委员会), prominent in Xi’s “anti-corruption” campaign. When these instruments are not deemed sufficient and discipline loosens, the Party is brought under control again with periodic purges. Individual Party members enjoy various privileges and certain career paths are only open to them, but at the same time are bound by strict Party discipline that subjects them to more direct control by the Core than any other social group.

Apart from its own members, the Party also aspires to control everything else, a notion expressed by a famous Mao Zedong dictum, which Xi Jinping has quoted and added to the Party constitution: “The Party, government, Army, civilian sector and education, East, West, South, North and Centre – the Party leads it all” (党政军民学,东西南北中,党是领导一切的). [1] Xi’s tenure has also strengthened the Party’s (and thus Xi’s own) authority over the central institutions through which it controls China’s society and economy: the Army and the state. Xi’s reform of the PLA, following an anti-corruption campaign, has disbanded the general departments, seen as concentrating too much power. The restructuring after the 19th Party Congress has reduced the separation between Party and state. Party control over state-owned enterprises has increased, admonishing them not to “forget the Party spirit [党性, партийность]” and stressing the Party’s leadershipand the role of Party committees. The Party’s extra-judicial discipline system, once reserved to Party members, has been extended into state administration with the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission (国家监察委员会), in practice subordinate to the CCDI.

Cooptation and coercion outside the Core

The Party may strive to control everything, but farther from the Core, the two remaining Magic Weapons are needed to rein in the two extra-Party (党外) realms: repression and United Front work.

The inner layer in the onion outside the Party core is reserved for those who do not openly challenge the Party’s dominance in the system, and can be, at least temporarily, “united” with. Such alliances are carefully managed, without absorbing them into the Party itself lest they dilute its “purity”. There is, after all, a difference between the inner and outer circles (内外有别). The “magical” mechanism to achieve this uneven alliance is the United Front (UF) work.

UF tactics were first prescribed by the Comintern to non-Soviet Communist parties as a way to reach state power through temporary alliances, eventually in the French and Spanish Popular Fronts; later, United and ‘National’ Fronts were institutionalised to help govern Communist states in Eastern Europe and East Asia. The CCP’s variant of the concept seeks to dominate such key social groups as business, religions and the Chinese diaspora by rewarding members with positions within an elaborate system of UF organisations that institutionalises these alliances: eight ancillary parties, chambers of commerce, patriotic religious associations, Overseas Chinese groups, as well as membership of non-CCP delegates in the National People’s Congress, the national Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and their versions at lower levels of administration. These appointments, useful to their beneficiaries as marks of official support, in turn keep such influential figures under control, turning them into ‘United Frontlings’ who can help advance Party policy.

These groups were as essential to the CCP’s revolutionary struggle as they are to its rule over today’s PRC; like his predecessors, Xi continues to repeat Mao’s adage on UF work as a magic weapon. Beyond speeches, Xi has strengthened the role of the UF system and the Party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) within it, with tens of thousands of new cadres and the formal absorption of what used to be state organs.

As a third weapon, state repression can be seen as having inherited the role of armed struggle. It is reserved primarily for the outer circle in the governance model, inhabited by those deemed too hostile to be “united” with. The criteria for who falls into which circle outside the Party continue to shift, at the sole discretion of its Core. Those on the wrong side of this arbitrary divide can expect (often extremely vicious) repression.

Under Xi, persecution of lawyers and labour activists has dramatically increased. In Xinjiang, Xi’s apartheid-like policies criminalise expressions of non-Han and Muslim identity, confining hundreds of thousands, possibly over a million Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other mostly Muslim citizens to a network of internment camps.

Globalisation 2.0: Party control goes global

The traditional domain of the CCP’s control model is the territory it rules (the PRC), territories it aspires to rule (Taiwan and, before handover, Hong Kong and Macau), and the Chinese diaspora, target of the Qiaowu 侨务 (Overseas Chinese affairs) system.

As a natural consequence of the PRC’s increasing economic clout and Xi’s strengthening of Party power, this dual model of control is now spreading abroad. The Xiist expansion of the model globalises its domestic and diasporic version of social control, appropriating the existing political and social structures of target countries.

The tools of extraterritorial repression at the CCP’s disposal remain limited, but the PRC’s economic power continues to add new options. The crackdown in Xinjiang extends to the Uyghur diaspora, through forced repatriations, blackmail, threats, extensive surveillance, spying and diplomatic pressure to prevent scrutiny of these activities. Threats of punishment to family members in China allows the Party to try and silenceChinese critics abroad. Direct harassment of dissidents overseas has also been documented. In Sweden, the Tibetan refugee Dorjee Gyantsan (རྡོ་རྗེ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་) was recruited by the MSS to spy on the local Tibetan community. Kidnappings beyond its jurisdiction have brought the PRC no major negative consequences, opening the door to more cases like that of Gui Minhai 桂民海, the Swedish editor abducted in 2015 in Thailand. Extraterritorial censorship, still often ineffective in the form of open threats to media outlets, works well with companies seeking business in China, as seen in the recent erasure of Taiwan from country lists on airline websites. The US government called the renaming requests “Orwellian nonsense”, but such rhetorical response did not prevent American airlines from eventually toeing the line.

Outside the overseas Chinese communities, extraterritorial coercion remains for the time being an exception, rather than a rule. Cooptation, on the other hand, encounters few impediments. The expansion of United Front work beyond its traditional domestic and diasporic domain preserves its core methods: empower friendly figures with favours, access and representation, while ostracising recalcitrant elements. Traditional UF groups, notably ‘Reunification’ councils, have seen their role expanded from the control of Chinese communities to the political and economic mainstream, as documented in Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere. UF organisations are instrumental in forging localised contacts with the PRC, as seen in the case of the Fujian ‘embassy’ of a Czech region. ‘Sinicised’ religion might become another way of targeting foreign societies, as already seen in state-driven contacts with Buddhism in Mongolia.

Beyond the UF system, various organisations involved in international exchanges employ similar methods to coopt foreign elites. The CCP’s International Liaison Department (ILD, 中联部), which once mainly liaised with fellow Communist parties, has seen its purview expanded to include the ‘bourgeois’ spectrum. No less an authority than its former head Zhu Liang 朱良 has compared this rightward expansion to domestic UF work; the CCP’s ‘dialogues’ with parties from abroad indeed resemble the CPPCC. The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT, 中国国际贸易促进委员会), linked to, e.g., recent subnational-level attempts to bypassAustralia’s reticence towards Xi’s “Belt and Road”, frames its activity as “international UF work”, functioning as a sort of global version of domestic business associations.

International UF work straddles the borders between official and private, and between legal and illegal activity. The global activities of CEFC, an ostensibly private firm linked to a PLA front organisation, illustrate this ambiguity. The company’s role in the cooptation of the Czech political elite has been covered in detail by Sinopsis. Beyond the Czech Republic, CEFC was among the entities working to engineer the installation of CCP discourse at the United Nations. CEFC’s “economic diplomacy” exposed the dark underbelly of BRI: bribes were used as liberally as more traditional interactions with “friends” of the CCP. The conferral of symbolic appointments characteristic of UF work is once again encountered in CEFC’s exchange of honorary ‘advisor’, ‘consultant’ or ‘guest’ positions: the organisation’s top brass has ‘advised’, or appointed as advisors, such figures as UN General Assembly presidents Vuk Jeremić, John Ashe and Sam Kutesa, Czech president Miloš Zeman, former Georgian PM Irakli Gharibashvili or, apparently, development guru Jeffrey Sachs.

More generally, the tactical logic behind UF thinking can be seen at play geopolitically. Positioning Eastern Europe as a more manageable tool for pressure on Western Europe under the ‘16+1’ arrangement and appropriating ‘South-South’ concepts to seek alliances in the Third World are among the best examples. Often subsumed under Xi’s ‘Belt and Road’ geopolitical initiative, these interactions rely on the CCP’s methods of ‘friendly contact’ and UF cooptation of malleable political groups, businesses, think tanks and, importantly, academics and their institutions.

Coercion protects cooptation

Brady’s case combines the coercive and cooptive aspects of the CCP’s activity abroad. Brady’s study of the Propaganda system and her recent work on global United Front have brought tactical arrangements only accessible through Party writings to a broader audience. In particular, her Magic Weapons paper, on New Zealand as a case study of the CCP’s global influence operations, has revealed the remarkable success of UF work among the country’s elite.

The paper wasn’t universally welcome. Since its publication, burglars have stolen electronic devices from Brady’s home and office. Her car was tampered with in ways described as consistent with intentional sabotage. The months-long investigation of these attacks reportedly involves Interpol and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. Academics who hosted Brady in China have been interrogated by Ministry of State Security officials. State media in the PRC and New Zealand media under the CCP’s ‘guidance’ have carried attacks on Brady. It seems reasonable to interpret these events as a harassment campaign meant to intimidate Brady and others researching the CCP’s political influence. In other words, coercive measures seem directed to prevent the exposure of cooptation mechanisms.

Our letter, following a statement by a New Zealand Chinese community organisation and three other local appeals, calls for an adequate response by local authorities to this harassment, and engagement with the substance of Brady’s research, so far not exactly forthcoming in New Zealand. It thus advocates scrutiny of both the coercive and the cooptive sides of the CCP’s control mechanisms.

Preserving the integrity of political systems depends on informed analysis of UF tactics able to vitiate them. Left unchallenged, these tactics can gradually undermine democratic governance, repurposing local institutions as tools of extraterritorial control. The New Zealand case is of unique interest for research on such tactics: in this democracy noted for its transparency, a donation from a prominent United Front figure was recently discussed in connection with a parliamentary candidacy for one of his associates; among political parties, the main beneficiary of UF-linked donations has been the one to echo CCP propaganda calling internment camps “vocational training centres”.

The CCP’s effort to coerce analysts into silence greatly concerns the China specialist community, judging by the unexpected number of signatures the letter attracted. These concerns are hardly conjectural. A signatory, Feng Chongyi of the University of Technology Sydney, was detained and interrogated for ten days in Guangzhou in 2017. The Swedish NGO worker Peter Dahlin, who also signed, was detained in China 2016 and only released after a staged confession. Colleagues who expressed support for the contents of the letter chose not to sign, fearing, in one case, being refused a visa and, in another, being taken hostage in retaliation for the recent arrest in Canada of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou 孟晚舟.

Beyond solidarity with a fellow researcher and interest in New Zealand’s democracy, the extent to which the appeal has resonated within the Chinese studies community points to global concerns over Xi’s increasingly authoritarian rule and the cooptive and coercive modes of its projection abroad.

[1] In the 1962 form, “industry, agriculture, commerce, education, the Army, the government and the Party” (工、农、商、学、兵、政、党); Mao had expressed the idea in similar terms as early as 1942, and it has been frequently restated and elaborated since. The locus classicus for the now canonical form is from 1973.

Thanks to Kuan-chu Chou.

x x x."

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