G.R. No. 116512 March 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
WILLIAM O. CASIDO @ "MARIO," and FRANKLIN A. ALCORIN @ "ARMAN," accused-appellants.
"x x x.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. In Barrioquinto, 2 we stated as follows:
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong contention of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994.
The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the "pardon."
As to the "pardon," we find unsatisfactory the Explanation of the Secretariat of the Committee. It borders on the absurd that its members were unaware of the resolutions of this Court in People v. Hinlo 4 and People v.
Salle. 5 As early as 1991, this Court, in People v. Sepada, 6 cited in our Resolution of 30 July 1996 in this case, already stressed in no uncertain terms the necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended. Even in their Comment of 28 August 1996, the Members of the Secretariat implied that they were all the time aware that a pardon could only be granted after conviction by final judgment; hence, they required from the lawyers of the applicants the filing with this Court of "motions for the withdrawal of the applicants' appeals." Thus, they cannot plead ignorance of this condition sine qua non to the grant of pardon. They should have demanded from the applicants the submission of proof of their compliance of the requirement before submitting to the President a favorable recommendation. That alone, at the very least, could have been the basis of a finding of good faith. In failing to observe due care in the performance of their duties, the Members of the Committee caused the President serious embarrassment and thus deserve an admonition.
x x x."
