Commander-in-Chief powers explained: martial law vs. suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus vs. power to call the armed forces.

"x x x.

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of purposeful hesitation[32] before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

x x x

The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:

x x x

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces.The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.[33] That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

x x x

FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: The President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First Sentence: The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.[34]

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.

Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila...[35] We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

x x x."


Read:

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

Grave abuse of discretion: "By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."

"X x x.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[29] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.[30] A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.[31]

x x x."

Read:

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

Political question: "Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution."

"X x x.

As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

As Taada v. Cuenco[23] puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,[24] [p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question.

x x x."


Read:

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

"Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged."

"x x x.

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.[13] The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[14] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[15]

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines.What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.[16] In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.[17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.[18] In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.

x x x."

Read:

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

The power of judicial review [Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution]

"x x x.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.


When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[12]

x x x."


Read:

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

Writing Tutorials

See - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL3NZ2Kum3rWwfCLUMGED2vPDgXmooWSYv


Writing Tutorials6 videos 126 views Last updated on Mar 1, 2018

By Commando Solo

1

35:45


Politics and the English Language, by George Orwell
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30:24


Poe's The Philosophy of Composition
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23:43


Literary Composition, by HP Lovecraft
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14:42


Language's Dirty Little Secret
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1:00:06


On Fairy Stories, by JRR Tolkien
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6

16:31


"Why are Americans Afraid of Dragons?" by Ursula K. Le Guin
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Will There Be War With China? [and other educational videos]

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Crouching Tiger: Episodes From the Documentary Film4 videos 1,831 views Last updated on Jul 2, 2016


These videos are from the Crouching Tiger book and film project. For more information, visit http://crouchingtiger.net

By DeathByChina


1


45:01


Crouching Tiger Episode 1: Will There Be War With China?
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42:59


Crouching Tiger Episode 2: The World At the Tip of a Chinese Spear
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Crouching TIger Episode 3: The Wild Card of North Korea
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37:05


Crouching Tiger Episode 4: The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier of Taiwan
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About the Kasambahay Law - by lawyer, author and Philippine labor law speaker Atty. Elvin Villanueva.

See - https://legalcounseling.wordpress.com/2013/07/01/about-the-kasambahay-law/


"x x x.

About the Kasambahay Law
“Kasambahay” or household employee refers to persons who render services at home and are compensated for their services. They are your:

yaya
cook
gardener
houseboy
laundry person or labandera
general househelp

or any other person who regularly performs domestic work in your home. “Family drivers” and other persons who perform work occasionally and not on a regular basis at home are NOT considered “kasambahay” for purposes of the Kasambahay Law.

Employment contract: This law seeks to standardize employment terms of employment by requiring the employer to issue an employment contract to the Kasambahay and to provide the office of the punong barangay a copy of the contract– employers are required to make 3 copies. The terms and conditions must follow the form of the Employment Contract that the Department of Labor prescribed. 

You can find the standard format at the DOLE site or click HERE for a free copy.
Payment of certain benefits: In addition to the kasambahay’s monthly salary, the employer is also required to pay the kasambahay’s contribution in SSS, Pag-ibig fund and PhilHealth (if the kasambahay’s monthly salary does not exceed Php 5,000.) The kasambahay is also entitled to 13th month pay and service incentive leave of 5 days.

Other features of the kasambahay law include:

Issuance of a payslip (click here for DOLE prescribed form)
Right to a certificate of employment (click here for DOLE prescribed form)
20% limit on amount to be deducted for repayment of kasambahay’s loan, debt or salary cash advanceProhibition on debt bondage
Valid and invalid grounds for termination

The law (RA 10361) and its implementing rules contain other important provisions that every household employer must know in order to avoid legal labor problems. 

If you’re interested in knowing more about the Kasambahay Law and what your rights and obligations are as an employer, you may want to check out the latest book “Batas Kasambahay” written by lawyer, author and Philippine labor law speaker Atty. Elvin Villanueva. Available at National Book Store outlets and Fully Booked Stores.
x x x."

R.A. 10361 - Batas Kasambahay [Domestic Workers Act]

See - https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2013/ra_10361_2013.html


REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10361

AN ACT INSTITUTING POLICIES FOR THE PROTECTION AND WELFARE OF DOMESTIC WORKERS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Workers Act" or "Batas Kasambahay".
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. – It is hereby declared that:

(a) The State strongly affirms labor as a primary social force and is committed to respect, promote, protect and realize the fundamental principles and rights at work including, but not limited to, abolition of child labor, elimination of all forms of forced labor, discrimination in employment and occupation, and trafficking in persons, especially women and children;

(b) The State adheres to internationally accepted working conditions for workers in general, and establishes labor standards for domestic workers in particular, towards decent employment and income, enhanced coverage of social protection, respect for human rights and strengthened social dialogue;

(c) The State recognizes the need to protect the rights of domestic workers against abuse, harassment, violence, economic exploitation and performance of work that is hazardous to their physical and mental health; and

(d) The State, in protecting domestic workers and recognizing their special needs to ensure safe and healthful working conditions, promotes gender-sensitive measures in the formulation and implementation of policies and programs affecting the local domestic work.

Section 3. Coverage. – This Act applies to all domestic workers employed and working within the country.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the term:

(a) Debt bondage refers to the rendering of service by the domestic worker as security or payment for a debt where the length and nature of service is not clearly defined or when the value of the service is not reasonably applied in the payment of the debt.

(b) Deployment expenses refers to expenses that are directly used for the transfer of the domestic worker from place of origin to the place of work covering the cost of transportation. Advances or loans by the domestic worker are not included in the definition of deployment expenses.

(c) Domestic work refers to work performed in or for a household or households.

(d) Domestic worker or "Kasambahay" refers to any person engaged in domestic work within an employment relationship such as, but not limited to, the following: general househelp, nursemaid or "yaya", cook, gardener, or laundry person, but shall exclude any person who performs domestic work only occasionally or sporadically and not on an occupational basis.

The term shall not include children who are under foster family arrangement, and are provided access to education and given an allowance incidental to education, i.e. "baon", transportation, school projects and school activities.

(e) Employer refers to any person who engages and controls the services of a domestic worker and is party to the employment contract.

(f) Household refers to the immediate members of the family or the occupants of the house that are directly provided services by the domestic worker.

(g) Private Employment Agency (PEA) refers to any individual, legitimate partnership, corporation or entity licensed to engage in the recruitment and placement of domestic workers for local employment.

(h) Working children, as used under this Act, refers to domestic workers who are fifteen (15) years old and above but below eighteen (18) years old.

ARTICLE II
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

Section 5. Standard of Treatment. – The employer or any member of the household shall not subject a domestic worker or "kasambahay" to any kind of abuse nor inflict any form of physical violence or harassment or any act tending to degrade the dignity of a domestic worker.

Section 6. Board, Lodging and Medical Attendance. – The employer shall provide for the basic necessities of the domestic worker to include at least three (3) adequate meals a day and humane sleeping arrangements that ensure safety.

The employer shall provide appropriate rest and assistance to the domestic worker in case of illnesses and injuries sustained during service without loss of benefits.

At no instance shall the employer withdraw or hold in abeyance the provision of these basic necessities as punishment or disciplinary action to the domestic worker.

Section 7. Guarantee of Privacy. – Respect for the privacy of the domestic worker shall be guaranteed at all times and shall extend to all forms of communication and personal effects. This guarantee equally recognizes that the domestic worker is obliged to render satisfactory service at all times.

Section 8. Access to Outside Communication. – The employer shall grant the domestic worker access to outside communication during free time: Provided, That in case of emergency, access to communication shall be granted even during work time. Should the domestic worker make use of the employer’s telephone or other communication facilities, the costs shall be borne by the domestic worker, unless such charges are waived by the employer.

Section 9. Right to Education and Training. – The employer shall afford the domestic worker the opportunity to finish basic education and may allow access to alternative learning systems and, as far as practicable, higher education or technical and vocational training. The employer shall adjust the work schedule of the domestic worker to allow such access to education or training without hampering the services required by the employer.

Section 10. Prohibition Against Privileged Information. – All communication and information pertaining to the employer or members of the household shall be treated as privileged and confidential, and shall not be publicly disclosed by the domestic worker during and after employment. Such privileged information shall be inadmissible in evidence except when the suit involves the employer or any member of the household in a crime against persons, property, personal liberty and security, and chastity.

ARTICLE III
PRE-EMPLOYMENT

Section 11. Employment Contract. – An employment contract shall be executed by and between the domestic worker and the employer before the commencement of the service in a language or dialect understood by both the domestic worker and the employer. The domestic worker shall be provided a copy of the duly signed employment contract which must include the following:

(a) Duties and responsibilities of the domestic worker;

(b) Period of employment;

(c) Compensation;

(d) Authorized deductions;

(e) Hours of work and proportionate additional payment;

(f) Rest days and allowable leaves;

(g) Board, lodging and medical attention;

(h) Agreements on deployment expenses, if any;

(i) Loan agreement;

(j) Termination of employment; and

(k) Any other lawful condition agreed upon by both parties.

The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall develop a model employment contract for domestic workers which shall, at all times, be made available free of charge to domestic workers, employers, representative organizations and the general public. The DOLE shall widely disseminate information to domestic workers and employers on the use of such model employment contract.

In cases where the employment of the domestic worker is facilitated through a private employment agency, the PEA shall keep a copy of all employment contracts of domestic workers and shall be made available for verification and inspection by the DOLE.

Section 12. Pre-Employment Requirement. – Prior to the execution of the employment contract, the employer may require the following from the domestic worker:

(a) Medical certificate or a health certificate issued by a local government health officer;

(b) Barangay and police clearance;

(c) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance; and

(d) Duly authenticated birth certificate or if not available, any other document showing the age of the domestic worker such as voter’s identification card, baptismal record or passport.

However, Section 12(a), (b), (c) and (d) shall be standard requirements when the employment of the domestic worker is facilitated through the PEA.

The cost of the foregoing shall be borne by the prospective employer or agency, as the case may be.

Section 13. Recruitment and Finder’s Fees. – Regardless of whether the domestic worker was hired through a private employment agency or a third party, no share in the recruitment or finder’s fees shall be charged against the domestic worker by the said private employment agency or third party.

Section 14. Deposits for Loss or Damage. – It shall be unlawful for the employer or any other person to require a domestic worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss or damage to tools, materials, furniture and equipment in the household.

Section 15. Prohibition on Debt Bondage. – It shall be unlawful for the employer or any person acting on behalf of the employer to place the domestic worker under debt bondage.

Section 16. Employment Age of Domestic Workers. – It shall be unlawful to employ any person below fifteen (15) years of age as a domestic worker. Employment of working children, as defined under this Act, shall be subject to the provisionsof Section 10(A), paragraph 2 of Section 12-A, paragraph 4 of Section 12-D, and Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7610, as amended, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act".

Working children shall be entitled to minimum wage, and all benefits provided under this Act.

Any employer who has been sentenced by a court of law of any offense against a working child under this Act shall be meted out with a penalty one degree higher and shall be prohibited from hiring a working child.

Section 17. Employer’s Reportorial Duties. – The employers shall register all domestic workers under their employment in the Registry of Domestic Workers in the barangay where the employer’s residence is located. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall, in coordination with the DOLE, formulate a registration system for this purpose.

Section 18. Skills Training, Assessment and Certification. – To ensure productivity and assure quality services, the DOLE, through the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), shall facilitate access of domestic workers to efficient training, assessment and certification based on a duly promulgated training regulation.

ARTICLE IV
EMPLOYMENT – TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Section 19. Health and Safety. – The employer shall safeguard the health and safety of the domestic worker in accordance with laws, rules and regulations, with due consideration of the peculiar nature of domestic work.

Section 20. Daily Rest Period. – The domestic worker shall be entitled to an aggregate daily rest period of eight (8) hours per day.

Section 21. Weekly Rest Period. – The domestic worker shall be entitled to at least twenty-four (24) consecutive hours of rest in a week. The employer and the domestic worker shall agree in writing on the schedule of the weekly rest day of the domestic worker: Provided, That the employer shall respect the preference of the domestic worker as to the weekly rest day when such preference is based on religious grounds. Nothing in this provision shall deprive the domestic worker and the employer from agreeing to the following:

(a) Offsetting a day of absence with a particular rest day;

(b) Waiving a particular rest day in return for an equivalent daily rate of pay;

(c) Accumulating rest days not exceeding five (5) days; or

(d) Other similar arrangements.

Section 22. Assignment to Nonhousehold Work. – No domestic worker shall be assigned to work in a commercial, industrial or agricultural enterprise at a wage rate lower than that provided for agricultural or nonagricultural workers. In such cases, the domestic worker shall be paid the applicable minimum wage.

Section 23. Extent of Duty. – The domestic worker and the employer may mutually agree for the former to temporarily perform a task that is outside the latter’s household for the benefit of another household. However, any liability that will be incurred by the domestic worker on account of such arrangement shall be borne by the original employer. In addition, such work performed outside the household shall entitle the domestic worker to an additional payment of not less than the existing minimum wage rate of a domestic worker. It shall be unlawful for the original employer to charge any amount from the said household where the service of the domestic worker was temporarily performed.

Section 24. Minimum Wage. – The minimum wage of domestic workers shall not be less than the following:

(a) Two thousand five hundred pesos (P2,500.00) a month for those employed in the National Capital Region (NCR);

(b) Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month for those employed in chartered cities and first class municipalities; and

(c) One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00) a month for those employed mother municipalities.

After one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the Regional Tripartite and Productivity Wage Boards (RTPWBs) shall review, and if proper, determine and adjust the minimum wage rates of domestic workers.

Section 25. Payment of Wages. – Payment of wages shall be made on time directly to the domestic worker to whom they are due in cash at least once a month. The employer, unless allowed by the domestic worker through a written consent, shall make no deductions from the wages other than that which is mandated by law. No employer shall pay the wages of a domestic worker by means of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens, tickets, chits, or any object other than the cash wage as provided for under this Act.

The domestic worker is entitled to a thirteenth month pay as provided for by law.

Section 26. Pay Slip. – The employer shall at all times provide the domestic worker with a copy of the pay slip containing the amount paid in cash every pay day, and indicating all deductions made, if any. The copies of the pay slip shall be kept by the employer for a period of three (3) years.

Section 27. Prohibition on Interference in the Disposal of Wages. – It shall be unlawful for the employer to interfere with the freedom of any domestic worker to dispose of the latter’s wages. The employer shall not force, compel or oblige the domestic worker to purchase merchandise, commodities or other properties from the employer or from any other person, or otherwise make use of any store or services of such employer or any other person.

Section 28. Prohibition Against Withholding of Wages. – It shall be unlawful for an employer, directly or indirectly, to withhold the wages of the domestic worker. If the domestic worker leaves without any justifiable reason, any unpaid salary for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days shall be forfeited. Likewise, the employer shall not induce the domestic worker to give up any part of the wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever.

Section 29. Leave Benefits. – A domestic worker who has rendered at least one (1) year of service shall be entitled to an annual service incentive leave of five (5) days with pay: Provided, That any unused portion of said annual leave shall not be cumulative or carried over to the succeeding years. Unused leaves shall not be convertible to cash.

Section 30. Social and Other Benefits. – A domestic worker who has rendered at least one (1) month of service shall be covered by the Social Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), and the Home Development Mutual Fund or Pag-IBIG, and shall be entitled to all the benefits in accordance with the pertinent provisions provided by law.

Premium payments or contributions shall be shouldered by the employer. However, if the domestic worker is receiving a wage of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and above per month, the domestic worker shall pay the proportionate share in the premium payments or contributions, as provided by law.

The domestic worker shall be entitled to all other benefits under existing laws.

Section 31. Rescue and Rehabilitation of Abused Domestic Workers. – Any abused or exploited domestic worker shall be immediately rescued by a municipal or city social welfare officer or a social welfare officer from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in coordination with the concerned barangay officials. The DSWD and the DILG shall develop a standard operating procedure for the rescue and rehabilitation of abused domestic workers, and in coordination with the DOLE, for possible subsequent job placement.

ARTICLE V
POST EMPLOYMENT

Section 32. Termination of Service. – Neither the domestic worker nor the employer may terminate the contract before the expiration of the term except for grounds provided for in Sections 33 and 34 of this Act. If the domestic worker is unjustly dismissed, the domestic worker shall be paid the compensation already earned plus the equivalent of fifteen (15) days work by way of indemnity. If the domestic worker leaves without justifiable reason, any unpaid salary due not exceeding the equivalent fifteen (15) days work shall be forfeited. In addition, the employer may recover from the domestic worker costs incurred related to the deployment expenses, if any: Provided, That the service has been terminated within six (6) months from the domestic worker’s employment.

If the duration of the domestic service is not determined either in stipulation or by the nature of the service, the employer or the domestic worker may give notice to end the working relationship five (5) days before the intended termination of the service.

The domestic worker and the employer may mutually agree upon written notice to pre-terminate the contract of employment to end the employment relationship.

Section 33. Termination Initiated by the Domestic Worker. – The domestic worker may terminate the employment relationship at any time before the expiration of the contract for any of the following causes:

(a) Verbal or emotional abuse of the domestic worker by the employer or any member of the household;

(b) Inhuman treatment including physical abuse of the domestic worker by the employer or any member of the household;

(c) Commission of a crime or offense against the domestic worker by the employer or any member of the household;

(d) Violation by the employer of the terms and conditions of the employment contract and other standards set forth under this law;

(e) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the domestic worker, the employer, or member/s of the household; and

(f) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Section 34. Termination Initiated by the Employer. – An employer may terminate the services of the domestic worker at any time before the expiration of the contract, for any of the following causes:

(a) Misconduct or willful disobedience by the domestic worker of the lawful order of the employer in connection with the former’s work;

(b) Gross or habitual neglect or inefficiency by the domestic worker in the performance of duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer on the domestic worker;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the domestic worker against the person of the employer or any immediate member of the employer’s family;

(e) Violation by the domestic worker of the terms and conditions of the employment contract and other standards set forth under this law;

(f) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the domestic worker, the employer, or member/s of the household; and

(g) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Section 35. Employment Certification. – Upon the severance of the employment relationship, the employer shall issue the domestic worker within five (5) days from request a certificate of employment indicating the nature, duration of the service and work performance.

ARTICLE VI
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES

Section 36. Regulation of Private Employment Agencies (PEAs). – The DOLE shall, through a system of licensing and regulation, ensure the protection of domestic workers hired through the PEAs.

The PEA shall be jointly and severally liable with the employer for all the wages, wage-related benefits, and other benefits due a domestic worker.

The provision of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the "Labor Code of the Philippines", on qualifications of the PEAs with regard to nationality, networth, owners and officers, office space and other requirements, as well as nontransferability of license and commission of prohibited practices, shall apply.

In addition, PEAs shall have the following responsibilities:

(a) Ensure that domestic workers are not charged or levied any recruitment or placement fees;

(b) Ensure that the employment agreement between the domestic worker and the employer stipulates the terms and conditions of employment and all the benefits prescribed by this Act;

(c) Provide a pre-employment orientation briefing to the domestic worker and the employer about their rights and responsibilities in accordance with this Act;

(d) Keep copies of employment contracts and agreements pertaining to recruited domestic workers which shall be made available during inspections or whenever required by the DOLE or local government officials;

(e) Assist domestic workers with respect to complaints or grievances against their employers; and

(f) Cooperate with government agencies in rescue operations involving abused or exploited domestic workers.

ARTICLE VII
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Section 37. Mechanism for Settlement of Disputes. – All labor-related disputes shall be elevated to the DOLE Regional Office having jurisdiction over the workplace without prejudice to the filing of a civil or criminal action in appropriate cases. The DOLE Regional Office shall exhaust all conciliation and mediation efforts before a decision shall be rendered.

Ordinary crimes or offenses committed under the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws by either party shall be filed with the regular courts.

ARTICLE VIII
SPECIAL PROVISIONS

Section 38. Information Program. – The DOLE shall, in coordination with the DILG, the SSS, the PhilHealth and Pag-IBIG develop and implement a continuous information dissemination program on the provisions of this Act, both at the national and local level, immediately after the enactment of this law.

Section 39. "Araw Ng Mga Kasambahay". – The date upon which the President shall approve this "Domestic Workers Act" shall be designated as the "Araw ng mga Kasambahay".

ARTICLE IX
PENAL AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Section 40. Penalty. – Any violation of the provisions of this Act declared unlawful shall be punishable with a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil or criminal action by the aggrieved party.

Section 41. Transitory Provision; Non-Diminution of Benefits. – All existing arrangements between a domestic worker and the employer shall be adjusted to conform to the minimum standards set by this Act within a period of sixty (60) days after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That adjustments pertaining to wages shall take effect immediately after the determination and issuance of the appropriate wage order by the RTWPBs: Provided, further, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to cause the diminution or substitution of any benefits and privileges currently enjoyed by the domestic worker hired directly or through an agency.

Section 42. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, and the Director General of the Philippine National Police, in coordination with other concerned government agencies and accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs) assisting domestic workers, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act.

ARTICLE X
FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 43. Separability Clause. – If any provision or part of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining parts or provisions not affected shall remain in full force and effect.

Section 44. Repealing Clause. – All articles or provisions of Chapter III (Employment of Househelpers) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended and renumbered by Republic Act No. 10151 are hereby expressly repealed. All laws, decrees, executive orders, issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 45. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,



(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE
President of the Senate (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker of the House of Representatives


This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 78 and House Bill No. 6144 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on November 27, 2012 and November 26, 2012, respectively.


(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES
Secretary of Senate

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP
Secretary General
House of Representatives


Approved: JAN 18 2013

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
President of the Philippines

Judicial corruption - In an en banc resolution dated Oct. 2, 2018, the SC approved the recommendation of the Technical Working Group on Judicial Integrity to create the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) and the Corruption Prevention and Investigation Office (CPIO).

See - https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1053247/sc-forms-2-new-offices-to-prevent-judicial-corruption


"x x x.

SC forms 2 new offices to prevent 

judicial corruption

By: Daphne Galvez - Reporter / @DYGalvezINQ
INQUIRER.net / 02:23 PM November 13, 2018


The Supreme Court (SC) has created two permanent offices to monitor members of the judiciary and “strengthen integrity and prevent corruption.”

In an en banc resolution dated Oct. 2 but released only on Tuesday, the SC approved the recommendation of the Technical Working Group on Judicial Integrity to create the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) and the Corruption Prevention and Investigation Office (CPIO).

The JIB will be tasked to act on complaints against erring justices, judges, and personnel while the CPIO will conduct a lifestyle check on justices, judges, and court personnel.

The CPIO is tasked to conduct investigation, surveillance or entrapment operations, and lifestyle checks on justices from the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, and personnel of lower courts, including the Shari’a Courts.

It will likewise monitor officials and employees of the Office of the Jurisconsult, Court Administrator, Deputy Court Administrator, Assistant Court Administrator.

The disciplinary proceedings of the justices, judges, and court personnel “may be instituted, Motu propio, by the SC, in the JIB, and also through verified complaints supported by affidavits and other authentic documents or upon anonymous complaint supported by public records.

The resolution, however, noted that if the disciplinary action was filed with the JIB six months before the retirement of the erring individual and is intended to harass and embarrass the said individual, the JIB shall recommend to the SC the dismissal of the complaint. The complainant may be cited for indirect contempt.

Documents and court records of disciplinary actions that can be resolved through pleas of the parties filed or submitted to the JIB will be deemed submitted for the preparation and submission JIB’s report and recommendation to the SC within 60 days from its receipt.

However, if there is a prima facie case based on the pleadings of the parties and substantial issues are raised, the JIB shall recommend to the SC that the case be considered as a regular administrative matter.

The JIB will also conduct a formal investigation of the issues raised and submit a report and recommendation to the SC.

The JIB shall be composed of a Chair, Vice Chair, and three regular members who will be appointed for a term of three years without reappointment.

The Chair and Vice Chair must be retired SC justices, and they will be entitled to a compensation equivalent to that of an incumbent SC justice. Regular members must either be a retired justice of the CS, SB or CTA and will be entitled to a compensation equivalent to the salary of the CA, SB, or CTA. /ee

Read more: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1053247/sc-forms-2-new-offices-to-prevent-judicial-corruption#ixzz5YiB5XMOQ

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x x x."

The Dictatorships

See - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLT0U7K0pmnUcN7kxuRtz32YhElH0UpMbv

The Dictatorships11 videos 

54,692 views 

Last updated on Jun 1, 2018


European dictatorships of the 20th century, including the later history of the USSR.

By Dr Alan Brown

1

1:28:38


Stalin: Inside the Terror
Dr Alan Brown



2

47:27


Albert Speer: The Nazi who said Sorry
Dr Alan Brown



3

59:05


Reagan and Gorbachev: Geneva Summit 1985
Dr Alan Brown



4

59:11


Khrushchev and Kennedy: Vienna Summit 1961
Dr Alan Brown




5

46:45


Fascism in Italy
Dr Alan Brown



6

47:45


Mr and Mrs Hitler
Dr Alan Brown



7

1:17:24


Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives
Dr Alan Brown



8

48:48


Italy and the road to war
Dr Alan Brown



9

47:44


Stalin: part 1 of 3
Dr Alan Brown



10

47:53


Stalin: part 2 of 3
Dr Alan Brown



11

47:36


Stalin: part 3 of 3
Dr Alan Brown

"The best test of a good lawyer isn’t the bar exams, it is being able to live up to every word of the oath that is taken, every day."

See - https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/217231-opinion-deep-dive-bar-exams?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwAR1VS6UqlTzowTKYZ0SmwruRVnpJjYnM0Y8cB7madQvb6P7uH0WIG20phhk#Echobox=1542849184

"x x x.

What's the big deal about the bar exams?The bar exams – whose results are much-awaited and covered by the media – are, at best, simply a measure of a particular year’s test takers, nothing more

By Atty Theodore Te
www.rappler.com
Published 9:32 PM, November 21, 2018
Updated 9:32 PM, November 21, 2018


This Sunday, November 25, the 2018 bar examinations will conclude, officially signaling the start of the waiting period for the 8 bar examiners to check and grade all the notebooks – a process that will, on the average, take the next 4 to 5 months to complete.

The bar examinations are notoriously difficult and the preparations for taking them – 5 months of review with life being placed in suspended animation – highly stressful. Yet, the number of bar exam hopefuls has increased every year (except in 2016). This year’s 8,701 admitted candidates is the highest since 2013:

2017 – 7,227 candidates were admitted
2016 – 6,831
2015 – 7,146
2014 – 6,344
2013 – 5,593

These numbers show that, despite the low national passing average every year (with the sole exception of 2016 (59.06%), taking the bar exams is still a big deal.

This week’s “Deep Dive” is into the annual bar examinations and why they are not (or shouldn’t be) a big deal.

Open-ended questions, handwritten answers

The bar examinations are the only professional licensure exam not administered by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC). It is administered by the Supreme Court under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

It is the only examination that still uses open-ended questions, not standardized or multiple-choice questions (although this was done in 2011 and partly in 2012), and is still the only examination that requires the examinees to answer by writing in long hand.

It consists of 8 subjects and is given in 4 Sundays in November. Examinees are required to have a general average of 75% in all 8 subjects, without falling below 50% in any subject (although this has recently been waived). Each subject is given a specific relative weight, thus:

Political and International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law – 15%
Labor and Social Legislation, Taxation, and Criminal Law – 10%
Remedial Law – 20%
Legal Ethics – 5%

The passing percentage, set at 75%, may also be lowered at the discretion of the Supreme Court en banc upon recommendation of the bar chair.

The annual series of examinations is chaired by a Supreme Court associate justice, who is given a free hand to choose the 8 examiners, all presumed to be experts in their respective fields, to formulate the questions. The final questions will then be chosen by the chair of the bar examinations from the list of questions submitted and included in the examination to be given for each particular subject.

The human factor

The bar examinations are the only licensure exam where the human factor is highly significant.

Each bar examiner is asked by the chair to submit a list of handwritten questions, anywhere from 100 to 150 (depending on the chair’s preference), in the examiner’s field.

In 2014, as bar examiner in criminal law, and again in 2015, as bar examiner in labor law, I was asked to submit 100 handwritten questions for criminal law and labor law. From the questions submitted for each field, the chair then chooses the final questions that she or he wants to include in the final examination for each subject in the early morning of each Sunday. This is a security measure to ensure against leakages.

After each exam, the notebooks for each subject are given to the examiners in batches, confidentially. The identity of the examiner is known only to the chair, the bar confidant, and a small, discreet group of people with “need to know.” Again, this is a security measure to guard against undue pressure that may be exerted on the examiner. The examiner must personally check by hand each and every notebook.

Because the human factor is so significant – the examiner may be checking anywhere from 250 to 500 notebooks a week, depending on how fast she or he checks – a great deal depends on luck, not just knowledge. A great deal also depends on penmanship. As a former examiner in 2014 and 2015, I found that it was much easier to give points, even token points, for answers that were legible, even if not completely correct, than for answers that were barely readable.

Sui generis

The bar examinations are also the only exam completely sui generis – meaning, completely unique and different every year.

The bar chair is new every year and she or he is free, at her or his level, to introduce innovations, changes, and improvements that do not require the approval of the Supreme Court en banc. For instance, the use of transparent bags for easier security spotting was implemented in 2014 during Associate Justice Peralta’s term as bar chair.

The chair appoints the examiners, entirely at his or her discretion. The bar chair has discretion to fix the scope and field of questions (but this was done, in the past years, in consultation with the law deans), and to select the questions that will come out.

Because it is completely sui generis every year, it is difficult to spot trends and patterns other than to look at which areas of law are asked more than others. It is also difficult to anticipate the questions themselves as even the manner of formulating the questions may vary from year to year.

With the exception of 2011, when the Court allowed an experiment with multiple-choice questions (MCQs) as the predominant mode of questioning, the bar has always favored open-ended situationer or problem-type questions that require the examinee to articulate his or her answer and the reasons for the answer. The lack of predictability in the manner the questions are formulated every year makes it a challenging exam to prepare for.

What’s the best test of good lawyer?

At bottom, the bar examinations are still just a licensure exam; for law students, a necessary hazard to overcome on their way to a career in the legal profession. The bar exams should be, and are, no different from the medical, engineering, accountancy licensure examinations; yet, the bar is the only examination that enjoys prominent media coverage, with the results being highly-anticipated and flashed live from a big screen at the Supreme Court, with the top 10 most successful examinees being interviewed live and featured prominently.

So, what’s the big deal about the bar exams?

For law schools, it is a great marketing tool if their graduates place in the top 10 or have a high institutional passing percentage. It is great bragging rights for one year, until short-term memory fades, or until the next bar examinations start.

For law students who pass, it is a big deal because it ends their waiting period – after 8 (or more) years of formal education with 4 (possibly more) years of undergraduate education and 4 (possibly more) years of law school – before they can officially join the legal profession. It is the second to the last gate before the final door to legal practice is opened – the taking of the oath.

For law students who fail, it may be the signal that life must go on – perhaps a life not in the law, for, certainly, there is more to life than law or becoming a lawyer.

I wish I could say that the bar examinations are a complete measure of legal competence, character, or even potential. But it is very difficult to say that because they are, at best, simply a measure of a particular year’s test takers, nothing more.

The best test of a good lawyer isn’t the bar exams, it is being able to live up to every word of the oath that is taken, every day. – Rappler.com

Theodore Te, Ted to many, is a human rights lawyer and advocate, law educator, font geek and comic book fan, occasional movie and music reviewer, a life-long Boston Celtics fan and a loud opponent of the death penalty, violations of human rights, government abuse, and social injustice. Deep Dive is his attempt at probing into issues of law and rights, politics and governance (and occasionally entertainment and sports) beyond the headlines, the sound bites, the spin, and the buzz.

x x x."

"Socioeconomic rights should be viewed as mandates to Congress and as standards for judges in passing upon the validity of legislation enacted to implement them. Conflating them with civil and political rights, which are self-executing, will make the latter’s enforcement through the courts uncertain and contingent on legislative actions.".

See - https://opinion.inquirer.net/117803/socioeconomic-rights-in-bill-of-rights


"x x x.

Socioeconomic rights in Bill of Rights?

By: Vicente V. Mendoza 

- @inquirerdotnet
Philippine Daily Inquirer 

/ 05:24 AM November 30, 2018
The Bill of Rights has been traditionally a body of civil and political rights (e.g., freedom of speech, freedom of religion, right to a fair trial) which are enforceable through the courts.

Socioeconomic rights (rights to quality education, decent housing, adequate standard of living, health, social security, a healthy environment, etc.), which are in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution, are restated and included in what is proposed by the President’s consultative committee as an “expanded Bill of Rights,” and it is declared that:

The rights under this article [Bill of Rights] are demandable against the State and non-State actors and their enforcement shall be consistent with international standards. (Article III, Section 1)

Violations of civil and political rights raise justiciable questions and are remediable in the courts. But can any person bring suit to demand “adequate food,” “adequate and decent housing,” “universal and comprehensive healthcare,” a “healthful environment and balanced ecology,” “clean air, clean soil and clean surroundings,” to name only some of the socioeconomic rights in the Draft Bill of Rights?

By putting socioeconomic rights in the Bill of Rights and declaring all rights to be demandable against the State and non-State actors, the Draft Constitution implies that they are all enforceable in courts. However, recent studies show that, while there is “near consensus” among the countries in the world that socioeconomic rights should be included in constitutions, the United States being the exception, no similar consensus exists as to how they should be enforced.

Some states, like South Africa and India, provide for enforcement of socioeconomic rights in a “weak-form or dialogical manner,” by simply pointing out violations of rights, leaving the remedies to the political branches as they balance the need to enforce these rights on the one hand, and democratic legitimacy and capacity on the other. Other states, typified by Colombia, advocate a “stronger form” of judicial review, employing aggressive remedies, but the results have been to benefit middle or upper classes rather than lower-income groups for whom the socioeconomic rights are intended. (David Landau, “The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement,” 53 Harv. Int’l L.J., 2012)

In the Philippines, the Supreme Court in Oposa vs Factoran (1993) upheld the right of the petitioners to sue the government for the cancellation of licenses of loggers whom they accused of being responsible for the deforestation of the country and the violation of their right to “a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” But the Court’s ruling stopped at reversing the lower court’s dismissal of the case, and there is no record of what the decision on the merits was.

Indeed, there is no “international standard” for enforcing socioeconomic rights. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which has been the impetus for the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in national constitutions, simply enjoins state parties “to take steps… to the maximum of [their] resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant, by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”

The Draft Bill of Rights itself, in Section 26, also provides that “The Federal Republic shall adopt measures to guarantee the progressive realization of these rights,” thereby placing the primary responsibility for implementing socioeconomic rights on the political departments of the government.

It is thus a mistake to put socioeconomic rights in the Bill of Rights together with civil and political rights and, without distinction, declare that all the rights “shall be demandable… and their enforcement shall be consistent with international standards.” Social and economic rights should be left where they are in the present Constitution: in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), in Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports Education), and Article XV (Family), or in the corresponding provisions of the Draft Constitution, as the case may be.

Socioeconomic rights should be viewed as mandates to Congress and as standards for judges in passing upon the validity of legislation enacted to implement them. Conflating them with civil and political rights, which are self-executing, will make the latter’s enforcement through the courts uncertain and contingent on legislative actions.
In amending or revising the Constitution, especially those parts concerning ancient institutions like the judiciary, care must be taken that exuberance does not ride roughshod over history and tradition. In Goethe’s vivid phrase, care must be taken that the trees do not scrape the skies.

Vicente V. Mendoza is a retired associate justice of the Supreme Court and professor of constitutional law at the UP College of Law.
x x x."

Read more: https://opinion.inquirer.net/117803/socioeconomic-rights-in-bill-of-rights#ixzz5YQPCK6g5

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