Rally permits, maximum tolerance, and freedom parks

"x x x.

Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.

In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny."26

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

X x x."


G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169848 April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief, Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169838_2006.html

Police power and freedom of speech

"x x x.

The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.18

Reyes v. Bagatsing19 further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows:

1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.

2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.

There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use," which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta.

4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee,’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that ‘a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. "Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection."

x x x

6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."

x x x

8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x.

X x x."

G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169848 April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief, Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169838_2006.html

Free speech

"x x x.

Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA,15 the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado,16 already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as follows:

There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:

"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising."

Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso,17 the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.

X x x."




G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169848 April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief, Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169838_2006.html

PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT OF 1985

Batas Pambansa Blg. 880

An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes

Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. – The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.

Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.

Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. – A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Sec. 5. Application requirements. – All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. –

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. – Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.

Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. – It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;|avvphi|.net

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.

Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. – Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.

Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. – It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenadesater cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. – No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.

Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. – When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The following shall constitute violations of the Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

Sec. 14. Penalties. – Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.

Sec. 16. Constitutionality. – Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Sec. 17. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Sec. 18. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 22, 1985.

G.R. No. 169838             April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169848             April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief, Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169881             April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169838_2006.html

Legal easement of right of way

"x x x.

The conferment of the legal easement of right of way is governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code:

ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.

ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

In summary, an entitlement to the easement of right of way requires that the following requisites must be met.

The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);

There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);

The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and

The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).15

All the above requisites are present in this case.

As regards the first requisite, there is no dispute that the respondent's property was surrounded by other immovables owned by different individuals, including Spouses Williams. The isolation was further shown in the Sketch Plan16 prepared by Honorato R. Bisnar, the geodetic engineer deputized by the parties. Moreover, contrary to Spouses Williams' claim that there was a barangay road closest to the dominant estate, the RTC, during the ocular inspection, observed that "there was no existing barangay road xxx."17

The second requisite of payment of indemnity was also complied with by the respondent when he wrote Spouses Williams on January 27, 2004, formally asking them to provide him with a right of way, for which he was in willing to pay a reasonable value or to swap a portion of his property.18

Anent the third requisite, the isolation of the dominant estate was not due to the respondent's own acts. The property he purchased was already surrounded by other immovables leaving him no adequate ingress or egress to a public highway. Spouses Williams refused to grant a right of way and averred that the isolation of the dominant estate was attributable to the respondent's own acts. They pointed out that when the respondent purchased the dominant estate, he knew that Sierra was in negotiation with them for the sale of the dominant estate, thus, he was in bad faith. Nonetheless, it cannot be used to defeat the respondent's claim for a right of way. Sierra had every right to sell his property to anybody. Further, when the respondent bought the dominant estate there could have been no existing contract of sale yet considering that Spouses Williams and Sierra were still in negotiation. Hence, consent, one of the essential requisites for a valid contract, was lacking.

As to the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the right of way sought by the respondent is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and it is the shortest distance to the national highway. This is evident in the Sketch Plan19 showing that the requested right of way was alongside the perimeter of Spouses Williams' property. Moreover, during the ocular inspection, the RTC observed that the right of way, which the respondent was seeking was alongside a precipice.20 Spouses Williams insisted that they intended to build structures on the portion claimed by the respondent, but at a safe distance from the precipice, not immediately beside it. In addition, the 705.20 sq. m long pathway would only affect a small portion of the 12,200 sq. m. property of Spouses Williams, and for which the respondent expressed willingness to pay.

Even assuming that the right of way being claimed by the respondent is not the shortest distance from the dominant estate to the public highway, it is well-settled that "[t]he criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation, xxx In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. If having these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest."21 As previously discussed, the right of way claimed by the respondent is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

X x x."

G.R. No. 207146, March 15, 2017

SPOUSES LARRY AND ROSARITA WILLIAMS, Petitioners, v. RAINERO A. ZERDA, Respondent.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2017marchdecisions.php?id=228

The economy under Duterte

"10 things about the economy that the Duterte administration should admit

April 4, 2022

by IBON Foundation


X x x.

All this will seek to distract from how social and economic development have been set back by the Duterte administration even before the pandemic, with the last two years of poor COVID-19 response just making things even worse. Despite recent hyped economic growth:

The Philippines has the third worst performing economy during the pandemic in Southeast Asia. The Philippine economy, measured by real gross domestic product (GDP), is still 4.5% smaller than before the pandemic in 2019 behind only Thailand (4.6% smaller) and Myanmar (15.8% smaller).[1] Other countries contracted by less or – like Vietnam, Lao PDR and Singapore – were even able to grow.

The Philippines has the highest unemployment rate (7.4% in Q4 2021) compared to Indonesia (6.5% in Q3 2021), Malaysia (4.3% in Q4 2021), Vietnam (3.6% in Q4 2021), Thailand (2.3% in Q3 2021), and Singapore (2% in Q4 2021).[2]

The Philippines has the highest inflation rate (3.9% in 2021) compared to Malaysia (2.5%), Singapore (2.3%), Indonesia (1.6%), Thailand (-0.1%) and Vietnam (-5.1%).[3]

The Philippines has the biggest trade deficit (11% of GDP in 2021) compared to Thailand (0.7% surplus), Vietnam (1.4% surplus), Indonesia (3% surplus), Singapore (12.8% surplus), and Malaysia (16.3% surplus).[4]

The Philippines has the biggest fiscal deficit (8.6% of GDP in 2021) compared to Malaysia (6.1%), Thailand (around 6.1% as of the first three quarters of 2021), Indonesia (4.6% in 2021), Singapore (1.5% surplus), and Vietnam (2.0% surplus).[5]

Even before the pandemic, job generation was the worst of the last six (6) administrations in the past 36 years – average annual net employment creation of only 313,338 over the period 2016-2019 was already the worst in the post-Marcos era.[6] This only got worse upon the pandemic and especially after the administration’s protracted lockdowns.

Between January 2020 and January 2022, unemployment grew more than employment –employment increased by only 1.1% (or by 475,000 to 43 million) while unemployment increased by 22.3% (or by 534,000 to 2.9 million).[7]

This is set to be the only administration under which real wages declined in the last six (6) administrations and 36 years – the real wage in the National Capital Region (NCR) has fallen by 8.2% since the start of the Duterte administration, as of February 2022.[8]

The Duterte administration did not prioritize COVID-19 response. Only Php616 billion was spent on COVID-19 response in 2020 and 2021 versus Php1.9 trillion for Build, Build, Build infrastructure and Php2.3 trillion for debt servicing (interest and principal).[9]

The economy is at its weakest in 70 years – manufacturing has fallen to its smallest share of GDP (18.6% in 2020 and 19.2% in 2021) in 70 years and agriculture to its smallest (9.2% in 2019 and 9.6% in 2021) in history.[10]

[1] IBON estimates from data collected from World Bank and national statistical agencies.

[2] From data collated by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (https://www.bsp.gov.ph/Statistics/Economic%20Indicators%20of%20Selected%20Countries/tab48_sas.aspx)

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] IBON computations from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) Labor Force Survey data (various years).

[7] Ibid.

[8] IBON estimates from National Wages and Productivity Commission wage data and BSP inflation data.

[9] COVID-19 response, infrastructure spending and debt servicing data from Department of Budget and Management.

[10] National income data from PSA.

X x x. "

Read: 

 https://www.ibon.org/10-things-about-the-economy-that-the-duterte-administration-should-admit/

Sovereignty vs. Sovereign Rights

"Sovereignty Vs. Sovereign Rights: De-escalating Tensions in the South China Sea

24 June 2022

PRATNASHREE BASU

https://www.orfonline.org/research/de-escalating-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea/?amp



X x x.


Decoupling Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights

The disputes discussed in the previous sections are multidimensional. However, the critical distinction is between a state's absolute ‘sovereignty’ and its ‘sovereign rights’. Sovereignty, as applied to states, comprises “rights and power over a territory, responsibility and accountability over a population, general and specific authorities, and recognition by other sovereign states”; sovereign rights, meanwhile, as utilised by UNCLOS, “pertains to the entitlements or privileges of a state to a defined area of a sea called the exclusive economic zone” and thus “represents the limited rights of a state over its exclusive economic zone.”[19] Every state's right to exclude external actors from its area of jurisdiction, as conceptualised in the principle of Westphalian[c] sovereignty, assumes great significance in the context of the SCS.[20] This principle, if applied to the SCS dispute, raises questions on the validity of concepts such as ‘innocent passage’ and ‘cooperative maritime boundary settlement’ as envisioned in international law on marine administration. The conflict is mostly due to differences in the understanding of historical and modern sovereignty. It is not surprising, therefore, that administering a mutually acceptable framework of sovereign rights in the maritime zone is highly complex and challenging.

There is a rethinking of the idea of sovereignty, from an absolutist notion of complete non-interference in a state’s domestic affairs to ensuring the state discharges its responsibility to protect the rights of its citizens, especially human rights. This has provided space for limited interventions by the international community on legitimate grounds. It has made sovereignty partly conditional on a state's performance in fulfilling its obligations.[21] The question is whether this reassessment of sovereignty can be extended to a state's obligation in the maritime domain under international maritime law. The UN’s Declaration on Principles of International Law creates a responsibility for states to duly acknowledge equal sovereignty of all and the sovereign rights inherent therein. Suppose it is established that China is leveraging its economic and political heft to violate the sovereignty of coastal states of the region. Can this be a legitimate ground for intervention by external players such as the US and its allies, international and regional bodies such as the UN and ASEAN, or even multi-nation associations such as the QUAD (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of Australia, India, Japan, and the US) and the AUKUS (a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US)?

Sovereignty is often inflated by attaching a sense of divinity to its character. However, in its application, sovereignty is not absolute.[22] In international politics, there are continuous negotiations over the extent to which a ‘sovereign’ nation needs to restrain itself while exercising its sovereign rights in exchange for its association with international, regional, or supranational entities. Similarly, the signatories of UNCLOS are subject to specific restrictions in the exercise of sovereignty in their maritime jurisdictions. Articles 207 to 212 of the UNCLOS provide that states must adopt regulatory policies to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution. Article 17 says states enjoy the right of ‘innocent passage’ through the territorial sea of other states. This provision is the most critical distinction between sovereignty over territorial land and territorial sea. This is also perhaps why it is vehemently opposed by countries such as China.

Article 56 of the Convention confers sovereign rights on states for the exploitation, exploration, conservation, and management of living and non-living resources in the waters of their EEZs and continental shelves. Article 73 also enables states to take necessary punitive measures to ensure compliance with the Convention's provisions. In the M/V Virginia G case, a dispute over Guinea-Bissau’s arrest of a Panama coastal tanker in 2009, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea addressed the restrictions on the exercise of sovereign rights by coastal states. It declared that in the exercise of such rights, the state must respect the rights of other coastal states, considering the UNCLOS's relevant provisions.[23]

The restrictions on sovereign rights are institutionalised in the rules and regulations of various international treaties. These rules are constantly evolving according to the socio-political context. Changes in restrictions on sovereign rights give such rights a dynamic character, while sovereignty is a far more concrete concept. Sovereign rights are the parts, and sovereignty is the whole of an interactive system of the jurisdictional power of the states. The whole, however, cannot be reduced to the sum of the mechanical properties of the parts. The transfer or delegation of certain sovereign rights to an external entity does not dilute the state's sovereign integrity.[24]

There is another distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights that pertains specifically to maritime jurisprudence. Maritime boundaries only separate sovereign rights that are functional and limited in character. Possession of sovereign rights over a marine space does not imply sovereignty over it; albeit sovereign rights are contingent on sovereignty over the ‘baseline’.[d] In land administration, delimitation of territory also implies demarcation of exclusive rights. However, in the maritime domain, two or more states may have equal and valid entitlements to a given territory, and reasonable sacrifices are required by both for a mutually acceptable resolution to the boundary question.[25]

China’s refusal to acknowledge these crucial distinctions is one of the primary reasons for the tensions in the SCS. Any assertion of sovereign rights by other coastal states is perceived as a challenge to its sovereign integrity. The SCS’s resources—existing and potential—and its own significance in global maritime trade may also have prompted China to conveniently ignore these distinctions.

To be sure, however, the distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights is only part of the problem. Another aspect is that of China claiming sovereignty over almost all the major island groups in the region. The other littoral states consider these claims untenable as per international norms.

The first reference to ‘sovereign rights’ in international maritime law was made in the 1970s, around the same time that the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was held (which eventually led to the signing of the UNCLOS in 1982). The term has come to govern the rights of coastal states over resources in their continental shelves and EEZs, as well as their energy resources, since the 1990s. However, sovereignty is not automatically conferred because a state possesses sovereign rights over resources in its EEZ. The sovereign rights (a limited set of rights and powers) of a coastal state do not correspond to the right to exercise sovereignty (i.e., supreme political authority) over the area.

Thus there is divergence between international maritime law and China’s view of its authority.[26] Beijing regards the SCS as its adjacent and relevant waters.[27] But these terms are not spelt out in international law. China’s maritime understanding is consequently an extension of its ‘historical rights’ over the SCS. From China’s perspective, its activities in these waters—whether the construction of artificial islands or the passing of its new coast guard law—are entirely justified. They are, however, in contravention of international maritime law as laid out by the UNCLOS.

X x x."

Revised Domestic Adoption Guidelines

From the Supreme Court...

"xxx. 

June 21, 2022

Following the enactment of RA 11642, or the DOMESTIC ADMINISTRATIVE ADOPTION AND ALTERNATIVE CHILD CARE ACT, the Supreme Court has issued GUIDELINES on the IMPLICATIONS of the law on the RULE ON ADOPTION. 

In an En Banc Resolution, the Court adopted the recommendations of the Committee on Family Courts and Juvenile Concerns, led by then Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, as follows:

Upon effectivity of RA 11642, COURTS MAY NO LONGER RECEIVE OR ACCEPT PETITIONS FOR DOMESTIC ADOPTION. 

JURISDICTION over domestic adoption cases shall now be with the NEWLY CREATED NATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CHILD CARE (NACC), a QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY attached to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

XXX. 

Petitioners have the OPTION to immediately WITHDRAW judicial petitions for domestic adoption PENDING IN COURT, REGARDLESS OF THE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. Otherwise, the courts shall continue to hear and decide such petitions.

The courts shall give petitioners time to manifest their intent to withdraw. If petitioners fail to notify the court within the set period, they are considered to have WAIVED THE OPTION TO WITHDRAW THEIR PETITIONS. 

Petitioners, and their respective counsels, who avail of the benefits of RA 11642 without first withdrawing their pending petitions before the courts shall be sanctioned under the Rules of Court.

Domestic adoption provisions in the RULE ON ADOPTION are NOW RENDERED INEFFECTIVE except for pending domestic cases before the courts not withdrawn by petitioners.

Rescission of adoption under Section 47 of RA 11642 covers judicial adoptions.

INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION petitions pending before the courts pursuant to Part B of the Rule on Adoption shall be DISMISSED. 

All courts are required to submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a list and status report of all pending adoption cases, including archived cases.

RA 11642 TOOK EFFECT on JANUARY 28, 2022 with the goal of making domestic adoption proceedings simpler and less costly. The law also seeks to streamline alternative child care services.

FULL TEXT of A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC dated April 19, 2022 at:https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28076/

Xxx. "

Link: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28079/

Effect of a substantive ground for disqualification that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy

Part 1.

VOID CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY  - 

In the 2013 case decided by the Supreme Court en banc entitled CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., docketed as G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013 and written by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, which cited the cases of ARATEA V. COMELEC and JALOSJOS V. COMELEC, it was held that A VOID CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (CIC) CANNOT PRODUCE ANY LEGAL EFFECT.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

THAT THE DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE HAS ALREADY BEEN PROCLAIMED AND HAS ASSUMED OFFICE IS OF NO MOMENT. THE SUBSEQUENT DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE GROUND THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY VOIDS NOT ONLY THE COC BUT ALSO THE PROCLAMATION.

The Court cited SECTION 6 of R.A. NO. 6646 which provides:

"Section 6. EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION CASE. - Any candidate who has been declared by FINAL JUDGMENT to be DISQUALIFIED shall NOT BE VOTED FOR, and the votes cast for him shall NOT BE COUNTED. If for any reason a candidate is NOT declared by final judgment BEFORE AN ELECTION to be DISQUALIFIED and he is VOTED FOR and receives the WINNING NUMBER OF VOTES in such election, the Court or Commission shall CONTINUE WITH THE TRIAL and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, UPON MOTION of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof ORDER THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF SUCH CANDIDATE whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

Where certificate of candidacy is void ab unitio

Part 2.

WHERE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY IS VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT, THE ELIGIBILE CANDIDATE WHO GARNERED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL BE PROCLAIMED THE WINNER -

In the case of CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, it was held that with Arnado (winning candidate for mayor) being BARRED from even becoming a candidate, his CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY was thus rendered VOID FROM THE BEGINNING. It could NOT have produced any other LEGAL EFFECT. His proclamation was VOID ab initio.

To hold that such proclamation was valid would negate the prohibitory character of the DISQUALIFICATION which Arnado possessed EVEN PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. The affirmation of Arnado's DISQUALIFICATION, although made long AFTER THE ELECTION, REACHED BACK TO THE FILING OF HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. Arnado was declared to be NOT A CANDIDATE AT ALL in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a NON-CANDIDATE, the VOTES cast in his favor SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COUNTED. This left MAQUILING as the QUALIFIED CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES.

Therefore, the RULE ON SUCCESSION under the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WILL NOT APPLY.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

Failure to quality as a candidate

Part 3.

NOTHING SHOULD STOP THE COURT FROM ADJUDGING ANOTHER ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVED THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES AS THE WINNER -

In the case of CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, it was held that when the issue being decided upon by the Court was the ELIGIBILITY of the candidate receiving a PLURALITY OF THE LEGALLY CAST BALLOTS and his INELIGIBILITY was THEREAFTER ESTABLISHED, nothing should stop the Court from ADJUDGING ANOTHER ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVED THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES AS THE WINNER.

An INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE candidate who received the highest number of votes is a WRONGFUL WINNER. By express legal mandate, HE COULD NOT EVEN HAVE BEEN A CANDIDATE IN THE FIRST PLACE, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might NOT have been passed upon PRIOR TO ELECTION DATE. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his INELIGIBILITY as a candidate REMAINS UNCHANGED. INELIGIBILITY does not only pertain to his QUALIFICATIONS as a candidate but necessarily affects his RIGHT TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE. The number of ballots cast in his favor CANNOT CURE THE DEFECT OF FAILURE TO QUALIFY with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

POPULAR VOTE CANNOT CURE THE INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE.

Part 4.

POPULAR VOTE CANNOT CURE THE INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE. -

In the case of CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, it was held that the POPULAR VOTE CANNOT CURE THE INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate.

When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.

To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.

We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC when the Court pronounced:

"x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state." (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC5, where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."

The Court has ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements." (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

Void certificate of candidacy

Part 5

THE AFFIRMATION OF A CANDIDATE'S DISQUALIFICATION, ALTHOUGH MADE LONG AFTER THE ELECTION, REACHES BACK TO THE TIME OF FILING OF HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. THE RULE ON SUCCESSION DOES NOT APPLY . THE QUALIFIED OR ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE (THE SECOND-RANKING CANDIDATE) WHO GARNERED THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS DEEMED THE WINNER.

In the case of CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, it was held that with Arnado’s DISQUALIFICATION, Maquiling then became the WINNER in the election as he obtained the HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES FROM AMONG THE QUALIFIED CANDIDATES.

The Court has ruled in the cases of ARATEA v. COMELEC54 and JALOSJOS v. COMELEC that A VOID CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) CANNOT PRODUCE ANY LEGAL EFFECT.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE are NOT CONSIDERED at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE do NOT constitute the SOLE AND TOTAL EXPRESSION OF THE SOVEREIGN VOICE. The votes cast in favor of ELIGIBLE AND LEGITIMATE CANDIDATES form part of that voice and must also BE RESPECTED.

As in any contest, elections are GOVERNED BY RULES that determine the QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be INELIGIBLE, their VICTORY IS VOIDED and the laurel is AWARDED to the NEXT IN RANK WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS NOR LACKS ANY OF THE QUALIFICATIONS set in the rules TO BE ELIGIBLE as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in LABOR V. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor of said candidate, then the ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE obtaining the NEXT HIGHER number of votes may be DEEMED ELECTED. That rule is also a MERE ORBITER that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is NOT a prerequisite for the DISQUALIFICATION to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The SECOND-PLACER in the vote count is ACTUALLY THE FIRST-PLACER among the QUALIFIED CANDIDATES.

That the DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE has already been PROCLAIMED and has ASSUMED OFFICE is of NO MOMENT. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that EXISTED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY VOIDS NOT ONLY THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) BUT ALSO THE PROCLAMATION.

SECTION 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

"SECTION 6. EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION CASE. - Any candidate who has been DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT to be DISQUALIFIED shall NOT be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall NOT BE COUNTED. If for any reason a candidate is NOT DECLARED by final judgment BEFORE AN ELECTION to be disqualified and he is VOTED FOR and receives the WINNING NUMBER of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall CONTINUE WITH THE TRIAL and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, UPON MOTION of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof ORDER THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, LONG AFTER the ELECTIONS and after he was ALREADY PROCLAIMED as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his CITIZENSHIP. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY is thus rendered VOID FROM THE BEGINNING. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such PROCLAMATION is valid is to NEGATE the PROHIBITORY CHARACTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION which Arnado POSSESSED EVEN PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made LONG AFTER THE ELECTIONS, REACHES BACK TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. Arnado is declared to be NOT A CANDIDATE AT ALL in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a NON-CANDIDATE, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves MAQUILING as the QUALIFIED CANDIDATE who obtained the HIGHEST number of votes. Therefore, the RULE ON SUCCESSION under the Local Government Code WILL NOT APPLY.



LAWS AND CASES CITED:

Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

Sec. 39, Sec. 40(d) and Sec. 44, Local Government Code

Commonwealth Act No. 63

Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574 [2000];

Santos v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 628 [1981];

Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102 [1961];

Reyes v. COMELEC, 97 SCRA 500 [1980].

Mercado vs. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999).

Sinsuat vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 105919, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 309.

AASJS v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, 11 May 2007, 523 SCRA 108.

Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.

Fivaldo v. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934, 944 (1989).

Velasco vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 590, 614-615.

Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 635, Saya-ang v. COMELEC, 462 Phil. 373 (2003).

Aratea vs. Comelec, G. R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012.

Jalosjos vs. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 9 October 2012.

Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 105111, 3 July 3 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 312.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

Disqualification cases; rule of succession applies (Sec. 44, Local Government Code)

In DISQUALIFICATION CASES, if the winning candidate is INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED, the COMELEC is NOT EMPOWERED by law and jurisprudence TO PROCLAIM AS WINNER the candidate who obtained THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES.

(The doctrine applies to the DISQUALIFICATION CASE against Marcos Jr. pending in the Supreme Court, assuming the Court disqualifies him) -

JURISPRUDENCE:

In the 2006 case decided by the Supreme Court en banc in the case of DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT, ET. AL. VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., docketed as GR NO. 169106, June 23, 2006, 525 Phil. 473 and written by Justice Leonardo Quisumbing, the Court held that it was a SETTLED DOCTRINE that the COMELEC was NOT empowered by law and jurisprudence TO PROCLAIM as winner the candidate who obtained the SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES in case the winning candidate was INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED.

According to the Court, there were two requisites for the EXCEPTION to the above-mentioned general rule, to wit:

(1) the candidate who OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES WAS DISQUALIFIED; and

(2) the ELECTORATE WAS FULLY AWARE in fact and in law of the CANDIDATE'S DISQUALIFICATION, so as to bring such awareness within the realm of NOTORIETY, but WOULD NONETHELESS CAST THEIR VOTES IN FAVOR OF THE INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE.

In the case at bar, the COMPLAINT FOR DISQUALIFICATION of the candidate Gunsi was FILED BEFORE THE ELECTION but the COMELEC en banc DISQUALIFIED HIM SUBSEQUENT TO THE ELECTION.

Thus, WHEN THE ELECTORATE VOTED Gunsi for mayor on May 10, 2004, it was UNDER THE BELIEF THAT HE WAS QUALIFIED.

There was NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE ELECTORATE AGREED to the INVALIDATION of their votes as STRAY VOTES IN CASE of Gunsi’s DISQUALIFICATION.

The Court DID NOT adhere to petitioner Israel’s contention that the votes cast in favor of Gunsi were STRAY VOTES.

The Court held that the SUBSEQUENT FINDING of the COMELEC en banc that Gunsi WAS INELIGIBLE DID NOT RETROACT TO THE DATE OF THE ELECTION SO AS TO INVALIDATE the votes cast for him.

At the time of the election, he was NOT NOTORIOUSLY KNOWN BY THE PUBLIC TO BE INELIGIBLE to run for mayor.

Conformably then, according to the Supreme Court, the RULES ON SUCCESSION under the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WAS APPLICABLE, thus,

"SECTION 44. PERMANENT VACANCIES in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.—If a PERMANENT VACANCY occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. . . .

x x x x.

For purposes of this Chapter, a PERMANENT VACANCY arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, FAILS TO QUALIFY, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office."


Considering that Gunsi had FAILED TO QUALIFY as mayor of South Upi, the PROCLAIMED VICE-MAYOR SUCCEEDED HIM AS MAYOR.


LAWS AND CASES CITED:

Omnibus Election Code, Art. XX, Sec. 241.

Local Government Code of the Philippines, SECTION 44.

COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, Sec. 13(b).

Chu v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135423, November 29, 1999, 319 SCRA 482, 491.

Patoray v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125798, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 470, 480.

Lucman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166229, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 299, 308.

Dumayas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 358, 367.

Bautista v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 299, 323-324.

Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 501.

Domino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546, 575.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jun2006/gr_169106_2006.html#fnt26

Application of RULE ON SUCCESSION in DISQUALIFICATION CASE

TOPIC: A 2010 DISQUALIFICATION CASE decided by the Supreme Court (NOT a case for the CANCELLATION OF A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY) -

In the 2010 decision of the Supreme Court en banc in the case of MOZART P. PANLAQUI VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NARDO M. VELASCO, docketed as G. R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010 and written by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, which involved a DISQUALIFICATION CASE against a mayoralty candidate, the Supreme Court APPLIED THE RULE ON SUCCESSION IN FAVOR OF THE ELECTED VICE MAYOR, considering that AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION there was NO FINAL JUDGMENT YET DISQUALIFYING the winning candidate for mayor, Velasco (WHO WAS EVENTUALLY DISQUALIFIED).

The Supreme Court DID NOT deem the SECOND-PLACER CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR, Panlaqui, who LOST the election, to be the duly elected mayor. The Court instead held that the ELECTED VICE MAYOR should SUCCEED the DISQUALIFIED WINNING CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR.

The Court ruled, thus:

"IN FINE, the Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion when it denied Panlaqui’s motion for proclamation. Since Velasco’s DISQUALIFICATION AS A CANDIDATE HAD NOT BECOME FINAL BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, the COMELEC PROPERLY APPLIED THE RULE ON SUCCESSION.

x x x To simplistically assume that the SECOND PLACER would have received the other votes would be TO SUBSTITUTE OUR JUDGMENT for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He LOST the elections. He was REPUDIATED by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are NOT prepared TO EXTRAPOLATE the results under such circumstances.

To allow the DEFEATED AND REPUDIATED CANDIDATE to take over the mayoralty despite his REJECTION by the electorate is TO DISENFRANCHISE them through no fault on their part, and TO UNDERMINE the importance and the meaning of DEMOCRACY and the RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO ELECT OFFICIALS OF THEIR CHOICE.

Theoretically, the SECOND PLACER could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be ABSURD TO PROCLAIM THE TOTALLY REPUDIATED CANDIDATE AS THE VOTERS’ CHOICE. x x x. "

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_188671_2010.html#rnt5

The acquittal of accused-appellant is in order. Jurisprudence dictates that the correct course of action depends on whether the prosecution has presented evidence to establish the guilt of the accused

"The acquittal of accused-appellant is in order. Jurisprudence dictates that the correct course of action depends on whether the prosecution has presented evidence to establish the guilt of the accused


The State insists that the case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings so that the trial court may comply with the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 116.


For his part, accused-appellant insists that he should be acquitted because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. In support thereof, he cited Janjalani80 which ruled that "[c]onvictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment."


Unfortunately, accused-appellant's quote is misleading. While it is true that convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are indeed set aside if the plea is the sole basis of the judgment, it does not automatically result in the acquittal of the accused. Rather, the case is remanded to the lower court for compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules.


The issue of the effects of an improvident plea of guilty on a conviction is not novel.


The applicable course of action prior to the 1985 Rules is clear. As stated above, the conviction of the accused simply depends on whether the plea of guilty to a capital offense was improvident or not. An indubitable admission of guilt automatically results to a conviction. Otherwise, a conviction on the basis of an improvident plea of guilt, on appeal, would be set aside and the case would be remanded for presentation of evidence. An exception to this is when, despite the existence of an improvident plea, a conviction will not be disturbed when the prosecution presented sufficient evidence during trial to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existing rules, however, shifted the focus from the nature of the plea to whether evidence was presented during the trial to prove the guilt of the accused.


People v. Derilo81 explained this shift, thus:


Over the years and through numerous cases, this Court has adopted an exception to the erstwhile rule enunciating that there is no need to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances alleged in an information or complaint when the accused pleads guilty to the charge. Our rulings regarding this principle were expressed more or less in this wise:


Having pleaded guilty to the information, these aggravating circumstances were deemed fully established, for the plea of guilty to the information covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime.


We are not, however, concerned here merely with the doctrine itself but more specifically with the consequences thereof. Thus, in People vs. Rapirap, it was formerly explained that the subject doctrine has the following effects:


A plea of guilty does not merely join the issues of the complaint or information, but amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material facts alleged in the complaint or information and in this sense takes the place of the trial itself. Such plea removes the necessity of presenting further evidence and for all intents and purposes the case is deemed tried on its merits and submitted for decision. It leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty prescribed by law.


Then, in People vs. Lambino, we prevented the accused in criminal actions from contradicting the outcome of his admission, with our holding that by the plea of guilty, the accused admits all the facts alleged in the information and, by that plea, he is precluded from showing that he has not committed them.


People vs. Yamson, et al. thereafter expanded the application of the doctrine to both capital and non-capital cases:


A plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the complaint or information. A plea of guilty when formally entered in arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the information, without the necessity of requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof. It matters not even if the offense is capital for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances.


Finally, People vs. Apduhan, Jr. cited by some of the cases relied upon by the lower court, declared that —


While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of all material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstance therein recited, x x x The prosecution does not need to prove the three aggravating circumstances (all alleged in the second amended information) since the accused, by his plea of guilty, has supplied the requisite proof.


With the foregoing presentation, the trial court must have believed that it had acted correctly in presuming the existence of evident premeditation based on appellant's plea of guilty without any proof being presented to establish such aggravating circumstance. However, the developmental growth of our procedural rules did not stop there. With the advent of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, a new rule, specifically mandating the course that trial courts should follow in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty, was introduced into our remedial law with this provision:


SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.


We expounded on this in People vs. Camay with this explanation:


Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: 1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.


The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and pertinent jurisprudence. We had several occasions to issue the caveat that even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the Court must still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant. This is the proper norm to be followed not only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Court in determining whether or not the accused really and truly comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.


The presentation of evidence is required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalty.


To emphasize its importance this Court held in People vs. Dayot that the rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the warning that any judge who fails to observe its command commits a grave abuse of discretion.


This Court has come a long way in adopting a mandatory rule with regard to the presentation of evidence in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty to the criminal charge. From granting trial courts in the


earlier Rules of Court sufficient discretion in requiring evidence whenever guilt is admitted by the accused, the Court has now made it mandatory on the part of the lower courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make sure that the accused fully comprehends the nature and consequences of his plea of guilty.82 (citations omitted)


Thus, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in place of the evidence that must be presented and is called for by Sec. 3 of Rule 116. Trial courts should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the attending circumstances alleged in the information as they are now required to demand that the prosecution prove the exact liability of the accused. The requirements of Sec. 3 would become idle and fruitless if we were to allow conclusions of criminal liability and aggravating circumstances on the dubious strength of a presumptive rule.83


As it stands, the conviction of the accused shall be based principally on the evidence presented by the prosecution. The improvident plea of guilty by the accused becomes secondary.


Accordingly, convictions involving improvident pleas are affirmed if the same are supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the conviction is set aside and the case remanded for re-trial when the conviction is predicated solely on the basis of the improvident plea of guilt, meaning that the prosecution was unable to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus:


As in the case of an improvident plea of guilty, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard per se does not work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case and enforce an automatic remand thereof to the trial court. In People v. Molina, to warrant the remand of the case it must also be proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial —


In People v. Abapo we found that undue reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further proceedings. Similarly in People v. Durango where an improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the defense, we ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the criminal case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant matter that justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by xxx the "attendant circumstances."


Conversely, where facts are adequately represented in the criminal case and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that the guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. Verily, in such a case, it would be a useless ritual to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings.84 (emphases supplied)


Accordingly, this Court has sustained convictions85 involving impro­vident pleas of guilt because, in any case, the sentence of conviction is supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt independent of the accused's plea of guilty.


However, where the conviction is predicated solely on the basis of an improvident plea of guilty, this Court has consistently chosen to set aside said conviction and, instead, remand the case to the lower court for further proceedings. This was the ruling in an unbroken line of jurisprudence.86 "Further proceedings" usually entails re-arraignment and reception of evidence from both the prosecution and the defense in compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116.


In People v. Dalacat,87 this Court, in deciding to remand the case, stated the following:


Given the unchanging state of the three-tiered requisites in Section 3, Rule 116, there is, indeed, no justification for the trial court's failure to observe them.


Thus, we purge the decision under review of its errors and remand the case to the trial court for further re-arraignment, a more incisive searching inquiry and the reception of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, if the latter so desires, in accordance with the foregoing guideposts.88 (citation omitted)


Parenthetically, it is a mistake to assume that an invalid arraignment automatically results to a remand of the case. In People v. Ong (Ong),89 the Court decided the case on its merits despite a determination of an invalid arraignment.


Jurisprudence has developed in such a way that cases are remanded back to the trial court for re-arraignment and re-trial when undue prejudice was brought about by the improvident plea of guilty. The Court explains this course of action in People v. Abapo,90 viz:


We are not unmindful of the rulings of this Court to the effect that the manner by which the plea of guilt was made, whether improvidently or not, loses its legal significance where the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged. However, after a careful examination of the records of this case, we find that the improvident plea of guilt of the accused-appellant has affected the manner by which the prosecution conducted its presentation of the evidence. The presentation of the prosecution's case was lacking in assiduity and was not characterized with the meticulous attention to details that is necessarily expected in a prosecution for a capital offense. The state prosecutor in his examination of the victim was evidently concerned only with proving the respective dates of the commission of the repeated rapes, and did not attempt to elicit details about the commission of each rape that would satisfy the requirements for establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt that the offenses charged have in fact been committed by the accused. It is clear to our mind that the prosecution did not discharge its obligation as seriously as it would have had there been no plea of guilt on the part of the accused, x x x[.]91 (citation omitted)


The Court repeated the rule in People v. Molina (Molina)92 when it held that:


It is also urged in the Brief for the Appellant that an improvident plea of guilty per se results in the remand of the criminal case(s) to the trial court for the re-arraignment of accused-appellant and for further proceedings. We hold that this argument does not accurately reflect the standing principle. Our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per se rule that once a plea of guilty is deemed improvidently made that the accused-appellant is at once entitled to a remand. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, it must also be proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial. In People v. Abapo, we found that undue reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further proceedings. Similarly in People v. Durango where an improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the defense, we ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the criminal case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant matter that justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by the improvident plea of guilty, or what People v. Tizon, encapsulizes as the "attendant circumstances."93 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)


Here, the Court cannot sustain the conviction as there is nothing in the records that would show the guilt of accused-appellant. Neither is it just to remand the case. This is not a situation where the prosecution was wholly deprived of the opportunity to perform its duties under the 2000 Revised Rules to warrant a remand. In this case, the prosecution was already given reasonable opportunity to prove its case against accused-appellant. Regrettably, the State squandered its chances to the detriment of accused-appellant. If anything, the State, given its vast resources and awesome powers, cannot be allowed to vex an accused with criminal prosecution more than once. The State should, first and foremost, exercise fairness.


The records also do not disclose that the improvident plea of guilty jeopardized the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, to the prejudice of either the prosecution or accused-appellant.


Therefore, in instances where an improvident plea of guilt has been entered and the prosecution was given reasonable opportunity to present evidence to establish the guilt of the accused but failed to do so, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, if only to give rise to the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and the presumption of innocence.


Since the prosecution was given four (4) separate hearing dates to present evidence against accused-appellant and, despite these chances, the prosecution was unable to prove his guilt, the Court acquits accused- appellant for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder."



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html