COMMENT/OPPOSITION
(To Complainants’
“Motion For Reconsideration”,
Dated 21 December 2015)
The RESPONDENTS, pro se, respectfully
state:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
1.
MATERIAL DATES.
X x x.
2.
ADOPTION CLAUSE.
For the record, the respondents hereby adopt into this Comment, by
incorporation and reference, all their allegations, arguments, and
supporting documents stated, described and attached to their (a) JOINT COUNTER AFFIDAVIT, dated June 2, 2015,
and their (b) JOINT
REJOINDER-AFFIDAVIT, dated Jun2, 22, 2015.
COMPLAINANT’S SOLE GROUND
IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
3. The sole ground for
the complainant’s motion for reconsideration is that no Prejudicial Question exists and that the instant case should be
resolved on the merits.
In effect, the complainant prays that the herein respondents be
indicted for alleged violation of R.A. No. 8041, otherwise known as the Water
Crisis Act of 1995, as charged by the complainant.
4. X x x.
5. X x x .
X x xx.
ON THE ISSUE
OF
PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION.
6. The questioned
Resolution, dated 4 August 2015, of this Honorable Office, suspending and
archiving the instant case on the ground of PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, should be
affirmed, upheld and respected by this Honorable Office:
(a) For being
fair, reasonable, and just;
(b) For
promoting jurisprudential stability (stare
decisis) and procedural orderliness in the administration of the criminal justice
system; and
(a)
For being in
consonance with the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence on the matter.
To repeat, the complainant had previously filed a civil case (Exh. “14”, Joint Counter
Affidavit) against the herein respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch xxx, of xxx, docketed as Civil
Case No. xxx, for Injunction
and Damages.
The said pending civil case raises and
involves legal and factual issues similar or intimately related to the issues
raised in the instant case.
The core issue in the
said pending related/”prejudicial” civil case is:
Whether or not the xxx BOARD of xxx (i.e.,
herein respondents) has the legal authority to manage, control, supervise and
operate the xxx Water System, pursuant to
Board Resolution No. xxx which revoked Board Resolution No. xxx.
Board
Resolution No. xxx expressly revoked the authority of complainant ASMPC to
operate and manage the ASHAI Water System under Board Resolution No. xxx.
Board
Resolution No. xxx was ratified by
496 homeowners, an overwhelming majority,
in a Mass Petition, dated February 25, 2015.
The validity
of the said board resolutions is legal and factual issue that must be resolved
and determined by the RTC, Branch xxx, of xxx, xxx after trial on the merits of
the said pending related/”prejudicial” civil case.
If the Trial Court determines, with finality, that the xxx Board
has the legal authority to manage,
control, supervise and operate the xxx Water System,
(a) pursuant to Board Resolution No. 010-2014 which revoked
Board Resolution No. xxx,
(b) pursuant to the February 25, 2015 ratification by the
overwhelming majority of 496 members of xxx, and
(c) pursuant to the terms and conditions of the valid xxx-MWCI
Bulk Water Service Agreement that was duly mediated by the HLURB,
then, the legal effect of
such a Judicial Determination in the said related “prejudicial” civil case would
be to wholly ACQUIT the herein respondents of any and all criminal charges of
alleged violation/s of the Water Crisis Act of 1995.
We
reiterate Sect. 6 and 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec.
6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.
- A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor – x – x - conducting the
preliminary investigation. – x – x –
Sec.
7. Elements of prejudicial question.
- The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
7.
JURISPRUDENCE. –
A.
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE, INC.
represented by MICHAEL C. U. DE GUZMAN vs. SEC.
JOSEFINA TRINIDADLICHAUCO and the HON. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 134887, July
27, 2006.
The aforecited case involved a civil case and an Ombudsman case for
criminal
violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
undergoing preliminary investigation before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In the said case, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
(EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman found
the existence of a prejudicial question after considering that “the case filed with the RTC involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based and that the guilt or
the innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined in the resolution
of the issues raised in the civil case.”
It thus concluded that the filing of the complaint before the Ombudsman
“is premature
since the issues involved herein are now subject
of litigation in the case filed with the RTC.”
The main issue in the said case was “whether there exists a prejudicial question”.
The Supreme Court cited Section
7, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Section
7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The Supreme Court
held that “the rationale for the principle of
prejudicial question is that although it does not conclusively resolve
the guilt or innocence of the accused, it tests the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint or information in order to sustain the
further prosecution of the criminal case”. Hence, the need for
its prior
resolution before further proceedings in the criminal action may be
had.”
The Supreme Court stated
that “to determine the existence of a
prejudicial question in the case before the Ombudsman, it is necessary
to examine the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for which
Lichauco (respondent) was charged and the causes of action in the civil
case.”
The Supreme Court stated that
the civil case against Lichauco on the other hand involved three causes of
action. The first, for injunction; the second, for declaration
of nullity of award; and the third, for damages arising from
Lichauco’s questioned acts.
The Supreme Court added:
“If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153ºE is, in the civil
case, declared valid for being within Lichauco’s scope of authority to thus
free her from liability for
damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of nor
would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been
suffered by petitioner. The
finding by the Ombudsman of the
existence of a prejudicial question is thus
well-taken.”
B. VINCENT E. OMICTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.
al., G.R. No.148004, January 22, 2007.
In this case the main
issue was whether or not a prejudicial
question
existed to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings for Estafa pending the resolution of the intra-corporate
controversy that was originally filed with the SEC.
The Supreme Court held
that “a prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.” Here the case which was lodged originally
before the SEC and which was now pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by
virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involved facts that were “intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution is based”, the Supreme Court added.
It stated that
“ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute
will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of
estafa filed against him by petitioner before the RTC of Makati”.
C.
RICARDO
QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA
BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA, respondents-appellees, LAND
AUTHORITY, G.R. No. L-48157 March
16, 1988
In this case the controversy boiled down to “the sole question of whether or not the administrative
case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of
the ejectment
case constitutes a prejudicial question which would
operate as a bar to said ejectment case.” Here, the two cases involved were a civil case and an administrative case.
Even in such a scenario, the Supreme Court appreciated the presence of prejudicial
question.
The Supreme Court held that “a prejudicial question is understood in law
to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal.”
It stated that “the doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a
situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues
involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be
pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can
proceed.”
“Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is
alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending
final determination of the former”, the Supreme Court added
It stated that “the essential elements of a prejudicial
question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court
are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed”.
In this case the actions involved were a civil and an
administrative case. Technically,
there was no prejudicial question to speak of, the Supreme Court stated. But it
held that “equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said
two [2] proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private
respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on
the resolution of the pending administrative case.”
It added that “for while it may be true that private
respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the
institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had been
terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land
Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor.” Further,
it stated that “whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise
their right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue
involved in the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the
cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion
to petitioner.” It added that “if the
cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner
are voided, then private respondents would have every right to eject petitioner
from the disputed area.” It added,
“otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost and so would their
right to eject petitioner from said portion.”
Hence, the Supreme Court held:
“Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more
prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment
proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case.
Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow
the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's
right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to
needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time,
effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is
pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for
a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of
another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues
are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action
cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action
are settled the second action should be stayed. “
Citing the case of Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502, which was an analogous situation, the Supreme Court sustained
the assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental
ordering the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document
against several persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until
the civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged
document shall have been decided.
The
Supreme Court further stated that “if a pending civil case may be
considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to an administrative
case, it saw no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in the
proper case, such as in the petition at bar.”
8.
GOOD
FAITH OF RESPONDENTS. - The respondents stress the
good faith inherent in their official acts as legitimate xxx leaders.
Good
faith
is presumed on the part of herein respondents as duly elected incumbent village
leaders of ASHAI.
In
the case of Heirs of Severa Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, et al, G. R. No.
117609, December 19, 1998, the Supreme Court held that “it is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed
unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced”; that “it is incumbent upon the party alleging bad
faith to sufficiently prove such allegation”; that “absent enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails”;
that “the burden of proving bad faith lies with petitioners but they failed to
discharge such onus probandi”; and that “without a clear and persuasive substantiation
of bad faith, the presumption of good faith in favor of respondents stands”.
Further, the respondents reiterate the doctrine
held in the case of FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ, et. al. vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al., G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999, where the
Supreme Court held that “any mistake on a doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good faith”; that “an erroneous interpretation of the
meaning of the provisions of an ordinance by a city mayor does not amount to
bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to damages against that
official” that “officials may not be liable for damages in the discharge of their
official functions absent any bad faith”; that “under
the law on public officers, acts done in the performance of official duty are
protected by the presumption of good faith.”
The
official actions of herein respondents, as leaders of the Association, were
legal, made in good faith, were not intended to harm, injure, or violate the
rights of anybody or to violate any law.
X x x.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondents
respectfully pray that the motion for consideration of the complainant be
DENIED for lack of merit.
FURTHER, the respondents respectfully pray
for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.
xxx, xxx, January 12, 2015.
