We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.[26] Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.[27] On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19[28] and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.[29]
The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution[30] while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation,[31] for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation.[32] It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved to acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings. In either case, NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly requires NPC to pay the fair market value of such property at the time of the taking, thusly:
(h) To acquire, promote, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber and otherwise dispose of property incident to, or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which the Corporation was created: Provided, That in case a right of way is necessary for its transmission lines, easement of right of way shall only be sought: Provided, however, That in case the property itself shall be acquired by purchase, the cost thereof shall be the fair market value at the time of the taking of such property.
This was what NPC was ordered to do in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim,[33] where NPC had denied the right of the owners to be paid just compensation despite their land being traversed by the underground tunnels for siphoning water from Lake Lanao needed in the operation of Agus II, Agus III, Agus IV, Agus VI and Agus VII Hydroelectric Projects in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, in Nangca and Balo-I in Lanao del Norte and in Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City. There, NPC similarly argued that the underground tunnels constituted a mere easement that did not involve any loss of title or possession on the part of the property owners, but the Court resolved against NPC, to wit:
Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property of the respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents’ property as this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property. Significantly, though, landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of law.[34]
