"x x x.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.[12] Otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit, so long as counsel could allege its own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.
The rationale for this rule is reiterated in the recent case Bejarasco v. People:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself.
It is the client’s duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)
In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
As clients, petitioners should have maintained contact with their counsel from time to time, and informed themselves of the progress of their case, thereby exercising that standard of care “which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his business.”
Even in the absence of the petitioner’s negligence, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a party is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. In the earlier case of Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, we emphasized –
It has been repeatedly enunciated that “a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.”
Thus, with the ordinary remedy of appeal lost through the petitioner’s own fault, we affirm that no reversible error was committed in the dismissal of the petition by the appellate court.[14]
Petitioner was granted bail, and he had all the time to contact his counsel or follow up on the appeal himself. He is similarly responsible for procuring the services of new counsel after having been told of Atty. Quimpo’s withdrawal. Yet he offered no explanation why it took him so long to apprise Atty. Barrientos of the case, or why they had repeatedly failed to comply with the CA’s Orders after several extensions. As he has lost the ordinary remedy of appeal because of his own laxity, we cannot allow him to haphazardly take advantage of the remedy of certiorari.
The Court cannot tolerate habitual failure to follow the procedural rules, which are indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. Otherwise these rules would be rendered useless.[15] InPolintan v. People, the Court of Appeals gave the petitioner therein a total of 75 days to submit his Appellant’s Brief, but he failed to do so. In that case, the accused Polintan filed a “Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief.” This Court affirmed the CA Resolution declaring his appeal abandoned, after finding his excuses too flimsy to warrant reversal.
In the present case, accused Lagua was given more time, not only to file his Appellant’s Brief, but also to secure new counsel to adequately prepare the appeal. The CA issued two Show Cause Orders and two Resolutions declaring the appeal as abandoned. Despite these issuances, his second Motion for Reconsideration was filed 18 days after his receipt of the second and final CA Resolution. To our mind, this delay is indicative of sheer laxity and indifference on his part, for which he has lost the statutory right of appeal. Even during the intervening period after counsel has withdrawn, litigants are expected to be vigilant and conscious of the status of their cases, viz:
The appellate court committed no error therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and justifiable reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for their counsel’s utter inaction and gross indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same. They could not even claim ignorance of the appellate court’s notice to file brief since it had required withdrawing counsel Valente to secure their written conformity before granting his withdrawal as counsel, and certainly they must have ascertained from him as well as new counsel the status of their appeal — which accounts for Atty. Valente’s repeated prayers in his two motions for withdrawal for the granting of sufficient time for new counsel to file the brief. They had almost a year thereafter to make sure that their new counsel did attend to their appeal and did file the brief.[16]
In Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang v. Gaviola,[17] the Court made a clear finding of negligence on the part of the lawyer handling the petitioner’s case, but nevertheless affirmed the denial of the appeal. It confirmed that the petitioner was bound by his counsel’s negligence. It ruled that “the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law.”
Neither can we deem petitioner Lagua’s Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief as substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. In Cariño v. Espinoza,[18]the appellate court rightly disallowed the submission of the Appellant’s Brief after a delay of seven months. In this case, it took petitioner almost two years from 26 February 2004 (after the CA gave him a second non-extendible period of 45 days) to finally submit his Appellant’s Brief on 19 December 2005.
Lastly, it is erroneous for petitioner to declare that there would be no prejudice to the People if his appeal is reinstated.[19] The judgment of conviction having attained finality, respondent is now entitled to execution as a matter of right. This Court has recently declared:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded, for the immediate enforcement of the parties’ rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the full execution of final and executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, or enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution and upon a strict observance of the requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence.[20] x x x.
x x x."
