Bar by prior judgment vs. conclusiveness of judgment

G.R. No. 191101               October 1, 2014

SPOUSES MARIO OCAMPO and CARMELITA F. OCAMPO, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF BERNARDINO U. DIONISIO, represented by ARTEMIO SJ. DIONISIO, Respondents.

" x x x.

The doctrine of res judicata is laid down under Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which 

pertinently provides that:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.— The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

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(b) In other cases, the judgment orfinal order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its faceto have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgmentand (2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 In Judge Abelita III v. P/Supt. Doria, et al.,19 the Court explained the two aspects of res judicata, thus:

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusivelysettled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.20

For res judicataunder the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the following requisites must concur, viz: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must bea judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.21

The first three requisites are present in this case. The Decision dated September 12, 1997 in the forcible entry case rendered by the MTC, a court which has jurisdiction over the subjectproperty and the parties, had long become final. The said MTC decision is an adjudication on the merits. However, the fourth requisite is not present. Although there is identity of parties and subject matter as between the forcible entry case and recovery of possession case, there is no identity of causes of action.

As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the forcible entry case only involves the issue of possession over the subject property while the recovery of possession case puts in issue the ownership of the subject property and the concomitant right to possess the same as an attribute of ownership.

In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, or physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.22

Thus, even the MTC, in its Decision dated September 12, 1997 in the forcible entry case, stressed that its determination is only limited to the issue of who has "actual prior possession" of the subject property regardless of the ownership of the same.23

On the other hand, the recovery of possession case is actually an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. A perusal of the complaint filed by the respondents in the recoveryof possession case shows that the respondents, as successors-in-interest of Dionisio, are asserting ownership of the subject property and are seeking the recovery of possession thereof.

A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action.24 Such determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.

The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC’s determination that the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the respondents failed to prove their prior physical possession; it is not conclusive as to the ownership of the subject property. Besides, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a "judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land."

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