"x x x.
The petitioner's argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A. No. 4670 is misplaced.
In Puse v. Santos-Puse[1], it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government.[2] Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987[3]) and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines[4]) expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers.
Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the investigating committee constituted therein.[5] Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.[6]
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.[7]
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.[8]
In CSC v. Alfonso[9], it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and foremost, a civil servant accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged against him as a public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670 divests the CSC of its power to discipline public school teachers would negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established and would impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v. Macud[10] that R.A. No. 4670, in imposing a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings against public school teachers, should be construed to refer only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DepEd. By no means, then, did R.A. No. 4670 confer an exclusive disciplinary authority over public school teachers on the DepEd.
At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened.[11] Here, instead of opposing the CSC's exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.[12]
x x x."
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