Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s recovery of possession over the real property as owner.

 See -  G.R. No. 181303 (lawphil.net)

CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners, vs. BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 18130, September 17, 2009.

 

 

“x x x.

 

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.21

 

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

 

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:

 

Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)

 

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

 

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

 

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)

 

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.22

 

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

 

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.23

 

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed ₱20,000.00, thus:

                                                                                                 

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

 

x x x x

 

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)

 

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only ₱410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

 

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.25

 

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.26

 

In the present case, petitioners’ Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter’s express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners’ title.

 

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s recovery of possession over the real property as owner.27

 

Petitioners’ Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at ₱410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners’ Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.

 

As for the RTC dismissing petitioners’ Complaint motu proprio, the following pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v. Abellana28 proves instructive:

 

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

 

Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners’ Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.29 No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

 

X x x.”

 

 

CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners, vs. BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 18130, September 17, 2009.

 

 

“x x x.

 

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.21

 

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

 

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:

 

Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)

 

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

 

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

 

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)

 

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.22

 

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

 

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.23

 

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed ₱20,000.00, thus:

                                                                                                 

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

 

x x x x

 

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)

 

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only ₱410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

 

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.25

 

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.26

 

In the present case, petitioners’ Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter’s express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners’ title.

 

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s recovery of possession over the real property as owner.271avvphi1

 

Petitioners’ Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at ₱410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners’ Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.

 

As for the RTC dismissing petitioners’ Complaint motu proprio, the following pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v. Abellana28 proves instructive:

 

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

 

Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners’ Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.29 No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

 

X x x.”

Where tax declaration is not equal to actual possession

 See -  G.R. No. 158385 (lawphil.net)

MODESTO PALALI, Petitioner, vs. JULIET AWISAN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact GREGORIO AWISAN, Respondent. G.R. No. 158385, February 12, 2010.

 

“x x x.

 

As found by the trial court, petitioner was able to prove his and his predecessors’ actual, open, continuous and physical possession of the subject property dating at least to the pre-war era (aside from petitioner’s tax declaration over the subject property). Petitioner’s witnesses were long time residents of Sitio Camambaey. They lived on the land, knew their neighbors and were familiar with the terrain. They were witnesses to the introduction of improvements made by petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest.

 

From their consistent, unwavering, and candid testimonies, we find that petitioner’s grandfather Mocnangan occupied the land during the pre-war era. He planted camote on the property because this was the staple food at that time. He then gave the subject property to his daughter Tammam, while he gave a separate one to his son Pacolan Mocnangan. In the 1960s, Tammam and her husband Palalag cultivated the land, built a cogon home, and started a family there. Palalag introduced terraces and, together with his sons, built earth fences around the property. Palalag’s family initially planted bananas, coffee, and oranges; they later added avocadoes, persimmons, and pineapples. When Tammam and Palalag died, their son, petitioner herein, buried them in the subject property and continued cultivating the land. He also constructed a new home.

 

On the other hand, respondent relied merely on her tax declaration, but failed to prove actual possession insofar as the subject property is concerned. To be sure, respondent attempted to prove possession of the subject property. Her predecessor-in-interest, Cadwising, had allegedly introduced improvements like a piggery, poultry, terracing, plantings, and a barbed wire fence. However, not one of these alleged improvements was found during the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court. The absence of all his alleged improvements on the property is suspicious in light of his assertion that he has a caretaker living near the subject property for 20 years. Cadwising did not even bother to explain the absence of the improvements. The trial court’s rejection of Cadwising’s assertions regarding the introduction of improvements is therefore not baseless.1avvphi1

 

Thus, respondent having failed to prove possession, her claim rests solely on her tax declaration. But tax declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.37 Respondent’s tax declaration, therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war.

 

Neither can respondent rely on the public instruments dealing with the 6.6698-hectare property covered by her tax declaration. Such public documents merely show the successive transfers of the property covered by said documents. They do not conclusively prove that the transferor actually owns the property purportedly being transferred, especially as far as third parties are concerned. For it may very well be that the transferor does not actually own the property he has transferred, in which case he transfers no better right to his transferee. No one can give what he does not have – nemo dat quod non habet.38 Thus, since respondent’s predecessor-in-interest Cadwising appeared not to have any right to the subject property, he transferred no better right to his transferees, including respondent.

 

All told, we hold that as between the petitioner and the respondent, it is the petitioner who has the better claim or title to the subject property. While the respondent merely relied on her tax declaration, petitioner was able to prove actual possession of the subject property coupled with his tax declaration. We have ruled in several cases that possession, when coupled with a tax declaration, is a weighty evidence of ownership.39 It certainly is more weighty and preponderant than a tax declaration alone.

 

The preponderance of evidence is therefore clearly in favor of petitioner, particularly considering that, as the actual possessor under claim of ownership, he enjoys the presumption of ownership.40 Moreover, settled is the principle that a party seeking to recover real property must rely on the strength of her case rather than on the weakness of the defense.41 The burden of proof rests on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. For he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that fact. Having failed to discharge her burden to prove her affirmative allegations, we find that the trial court rightfully dismissed respondent’s complaint.

 

X x x.”

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings

 

G.R. No. 158385 (lawphil.net)

 

MODESTO PALALI, Petitioner, vs. JULIET AWISAN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact GREGORIO AWISAN, Respondent. G.R. No. 158385, February 12, 2010.

 

“A final note. Like the trial court, we make no ruling regarding the southern portion of the property (or Lot 3, as referred to by the parties), because this property was not included in respondent’s complaint. Although the Rules of Court provide that "when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings,"42 such rule does not apply here. Respondent objected43 when petitioner tried to prove his ownership of Lot 3 on the ground of immateriality, arguing that ownership of Lot 3 was not an issue. Respondent cannot now insist otherwise.”

The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the respondents may be lawfully ejected from the subject property.

 

See  -  G.R. No. 196741 (lawphil.net)

 

PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (Now known as TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENTERPRISE ZONE AUTHORITY), Petitioner, vs. MARCOSA A. SABANDAL-HERZENSTIEL, PEDRO TAPALES, LUIS TAPALES, and ROMEO TAPALES, Respondents. G.R. No. 196741, July 17, 2013.

 

“x x x.

 

The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the respondents may be lawfully ejected from the subject property.

 

X x x.

The petition is meritorious.

 

In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the disputed property and that the defendant deprived him of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.23

 

In this case, respondents failed to establish their prior and continued possession of the subject property after its sale in favor of petitioner in 1981. On the contrary, they even admitted in their answer to the complaint that petitioner exercised dominion over the same by instituting caretakers and leasing portions thereof to third persons.24 Suffice it to state that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession.25 Thus, finding petitioner’s assertion to be well-founded, the MCTC properly adjudged petitioner to have prior possession over the subject property as against Sabandal-Herzenstiel, who never claimed ownership or possession thereof.26

 

Petitioner’s supposed failure to describe in detail the manner of respondents’ entry into the subject property is inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor – as petitioner had sufficiently demonstrated – would necessarily imply the use of force. As held in Estel v. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr.:28

 

x x x Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them through violence and force.29

 

And in David v. Cordova:30

 

x x x The foundation of a possessory action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcibly entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.31

 

Similarly, in Arbizo v. Santillan,32 it has been held that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force, as in this case.1âwphi1

 

In fine, the Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the MCTC, adjudging petitioner to be the lawful possessor of the subject property, square as they are with existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, the CA’s ruling on the merits must perforce be reversed and set aside.

 

X x x.”

There is no collateral attack on the Certificate of Title.

 See -  G.R. No. 187633 (lawphil.net)

HEIRS OF DELFIN and MARIA TAPPA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, HENRY CALABAZARON and VICENTE MALUPENG, Respondents. G.R. No. 187633, April 4, 2016.

 

“x x x.

 

There is no collateral attack

on the Certificate of Title.

 

Spouses Tappa argue that respondents collaterally attacked the certificate of title of Lot No. 3441 when they raised the issue of its validity. Spouses Tappa used the same argument against the CA when it declared the certificate of title to be without legal effect. 85

 

Spouses Tappa's argument is without merit. The certificate of title was not collaterally attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529,86 provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." This rule is not applicable in this case.

 

We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,87 where we stated that, "[ w ]hat cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document."88 Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter being only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. 89 Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.90

 

In Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla, 91 citing Lacbayan v. Samay, Jr., 92 we reaffirm this ruling, and stated that:

 

Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.93

 

In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their Answer, is Spouses Tappa's claim of sole ownership over Lot No. 3341. As affirmative defense, respondents claimed that Spouses Tappa were owners of only one-half (1/2) of the lot since it was originally owned by Genaro, the father of Lorenzo and Irene. 94 Respondents claim that Lorenzo and Irene became ipso facto co-owners of the lot. 95 Thus, respondents claim that, by virtue of a valid transfer from Irene's heirs, they now have ownership and title over portions of Lot No. 3341, and that they have been in continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of their occupied portions.96 Malupeng and Calabazaron claim ownership and title over their respective portions by virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims ownership and title by virtue of succession. Therefore, it is the ownership and title of Spouses Tappa which respondents ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only serves as the document representing Spouses Tappas' title.

 

Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title of Spouses Tappa is indefeasible.97 We have already ruled that the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the property.98 This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is imprescriptible.99 In this case, respondents have been proved to be in possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. Thus, their claim against Spouses Tappa cannot be barred by the one-year prescriptive period.

 

X x x.”

 

 

The action for quieting of title should not prosper.

 See  -  G.R. No. 187633 (lawphil.net)

HEIRS OF DELFIN and MARIA TAPPA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, HENRY CALABAZARON and VICENTE MALUPENG, Respondents. G.R. No. 187633, April 4, 2016.

 

“x x x.

 

The action for quieting of title

should not prosper.

 

The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 59 an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit:

 

x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure"... an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim." In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, "... not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x. "60 (Emphasis in the original.)

 

In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state:

 

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

 

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

 

Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

 

From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.61

 

Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.

 

First, Spouses Tappa's claim of iegal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent and the certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103 issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of title indjcates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We agree with the CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of the Public Land Act,62 which governs public patent applications.

 

The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects. whatsoever.1awp++i1 Private ownership of land-as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership.63

 

In Magistrado v. Esplana, 64 we cancelled the titles issued pursuant to a free patent after finding that the lots involved were privately owned since time immemorial. A free patent that purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. 65

 

In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has been in possession of the Tappa family, even before the 1963 Affidavit was executed. After the execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective portions of the property. Delfin testified that before his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo had been occupying the lot since before the war, and that Delfin was born there in 1934.66

 

Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as 1948, and paid the real property taxes (evidenced by real property tax payment receipts in the name of Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961).67 Spouses Tappa were likewise shown to pay the real property taxes from 1961 to 2000.68 Similarly, respondents also declared their respective portions of Lot No. 3341 for taxation in their names in 1994, and paid real property taxes on those portions from 1967 to 2004.69 Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 70

 

Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property, while Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.71 The complaint stated further that since 1963. the respondents "continuously occupied portion of the subject land." 72

 

In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had been segregated from the public domain. 73 At the time the patent and the certificate of title were issued in 1992, Spouses Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at least to the half of the lot, since 1934; and respondents were also in possession of the other half since 1963. Therefore, the free patent issued covers a land already segregated from the public domain.

 

In Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,74 we ruled, thus:

 

Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land by respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent. Hence, the free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are void.75

 

Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of some of its portions. Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void not only because it covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently included76 respondents' portion of the property. In Avila v. Tapucar, 77 we held that "[i]f a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included."78

 

In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. 79 As discussed, the free patent and the certificate of title issued to Spouses Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.

 

The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights to the property.

 

A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.80

 

The 1963 Affidavit it is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated and appears to be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother, and sisters. It is also notarized by a public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half (l/2) of which is actually owned by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary to the claim of

 

Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo's. Respondents' argue that this affidavit evidences the title of their predecessor-in-interest over Lot No. 3341 and effectively, theirs.81

 

The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA correctly found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiated."82 The CA pointed out that, "[a]side from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was presented to prove the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving."53 Also, the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution.

 

Thus, we affirm the ruling of the CA that the requisites for an action to quiet title are wanting in this case.84

 

X x x.”

Search warrants

ON SEARCH WARRANTS

Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights), of the 1987 Constitution refers to the RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

Let us discuss its legal concept.

1. The right of the people "to be secure" in their "PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, and EFFECTS" against unreasonable searches and seizures "OF WHATEVER NATURE" and "FOR ANY PURPOSE" shall be "INVIOLABLE."

To repeat, the right against unreasonable search and seizure is "INVIOLABLE".

2. No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon "PROBABLE CAUSE" to be "DETERMINED PERSONALLY" by "THE JUDGE."

The powers (a) to determine the existence of "probable cause" and (b) to issue a search warrant are EXCLUSIVELY VESTED by the Constitution on the JUDICIARY.

These powers DO NOT BELONG to the EXECUTIVE, the CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY, the AFP and the PNP.

The determination of the existence of "probable cause" must be "PERSONALLY" performed by "THE JUDGE".

It MAY NOT BE DELEGATED by him.

3. The judge shall PERSONALLY conduct an "EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION" of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

The examination to be conducted by the judge must be SEARCHING in character, NOT PERFUNCTORY HAPHAZARD OR RECKLESS.

The searching examination partakes of the nature of an ADVERSARIAL CROSS EXAMINATION.

The reason behind the MANDATORY SEARCHING EXAMINATION RULE is that the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure and the sanctity of his LIFE, LIBERTY, PROPERTY and SECURITY and those of his FAMILY are at stake.

The "COMPLAINANT" is the "APPLICANT" for a search warrant (policeman or soldier).

He is a POLICEMAN OR A SOLDIER in a military or a police intelligence unit or in a field operations unit, tasked with a mission order to SURVEIL A SUSPECT and to BUILD UP THE CRIMINAL CASE against him.

The allegations in the application may include the intelligence reports of his CONFIDENTIAL ASSET.

The applicant is NOT DUTY BOUND TO REVEAL to the judge the IDENTITY and personal circumstance of his CONFIDENTIAL ASSET.

Judges respect the CONFIDENTIALITY RULE of the AFP and the PNP as to the identities and personal circumstances of their CONFIDENTIAL ASSETS.

The applicant must file with the judge an APPLICATION UNDER OATH,

(a) stating THE FACTS supporting such an application and
(b) attaching the DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

to justify the approval of the aplication.

As earlier stated, the issuing judge is duty bound to CROSS EXAMINE the applicant THROUGH SEARCHING QUESTIONSS.

He must actively and tediously SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH through his PENETRATING ADVERSARIAL QUESTIONS.

The proceeding may be held inside the chamber of the judge -- not inside the regular court sala where public trials are usually held -- to maintain the CONFIDENTIALITY of the application.

4. The SEARCH WARRANT issued by the judge shall "PARTICULARLY" describe:

(a) "THE PLACE to be searched" and (b) "THE PERSONS or THINGS to be seized."

A violation of the aforementioned PARTICULARITY RULE (or any of the constitutional principles discussed above, for that matter) shall INVALIDATE THE SEARCH WARRANT upon filing by an aggrieved party of a timely MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT and a MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.

FURTHER, it must be noted that Section 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution provides that "ANY EVIDENCE" obtained in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, as discussed above, shall be "INADMISSIBLE: for "ANY PURPOSE" in "ANY PROCEEDING."

Parenthetically, the aforementioned Section 3 also provides that the "PRIVACY" of "COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE" shall be "INVIOLABLE"

The exceptions thereto are:

(a) a "LAWFUL ORDER" of the court, or
(b) when "PUBLIC SAFETY OR ORDER" requires otherwise, "AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW."

Similarly, "ANY EVIDENCE" obtained in violation of foregoing RIGHT TO "PRIVACY" shall be "INADMISSIBLE" for "ANY PURPOSE" in "ANY PROCEEDING."

AS A FINAL WORD, any party who VIOLATES athe foregoing constitutional requirements -- be he a JUDGE, a POLICEMAN, a SOLDIER or a CIVILIAN -- may be exposed to CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES, as may be WARRANTED by the facts of the case, pursuant to applicable laws, e.g.,

*Revised Penal Code (perjury, falsification, etc.),
*New Civil Code (abuse of right, torts and damages or quasi-delict/culpa acquillana),
*Anti-Torture Act of 2009 (RA 9745),
*Anti-Terrorism Act (R.A 11479, now being questioned in the SC),
*Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019),
*Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees (RA 6713),
*Revised Administrative Code (Book V, E.O. No. 292),
*and others.

Duties of attorneys.

RULE 138, RULES OF COURT
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar):

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain ALLEGIANCE to the REPUBLIC OF RHE PHILIPPINES and to support the CONSTITUTION and obey the LAWS of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him TO BE JUST, and such defenses only as he believes TO BE HONESTLY DEBATABLE UNDER THE LAW.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, SUCH MEANS ONLY AS ARE CONSISTENT WITH TRUTH AND HONOR, and NEVER SEEK TO MISLEAD the judge or any judicial officer BY ANY ARTIFICE OR FALSE STATEMENTS OF FACT OR LAW;

(e) To maintain inviolate the CONFIDENCE, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the SECRETS OF HIS CLIENTS, and TO ACCEPT NO COMPENSATION in connection with his client's business EXCEPT FROM HIM or with his knowledge and approval;

(f) To ABSTAIN from all OFFENSIVE PERSONALITY and TO ADVANCE NO FACT PREJUDICIAL TO THE HONOR OR REPUTATION OF A PARTY OR WITNESS, UNLESS REQUIRED BY THE JUSTICE OF THE CAUSE WITH WHICH HE IS CHARGED;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an ACTION OR PROCEEDING, or DELAY any man's cause, from any CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the DEFENSELESS OR OPPRESSED;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, BY ALL FAIR AND HONORABLE MEANS, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

Contract to sell - no transfer of ownership yet

See - https://www.manilatimes.net/2020/12/23/legal-advice/dearpao/mortgaging-property-that-is-subject-to-contract-to-sell/815774/



"x x x.

It is important to emphasize that the contract you entered with a realty is a “contract to sell.” There is no transfer of ownership yet because ownership is transferred only to the buyer upon delivery or the execution of a Deed of Sale, and there is full payment of the total consideration. This is in consonance with the New Civil Code of the Philippines which state that:

“Article 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. (n)

“Article 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. (n)

“Article 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price. (n)”

Since the owner of the unit is the developer, the latter may furnish the same as a guaranty for its loan. This finds support in the decision of the court in Philippine National Bank vs Dee, et al. (GR 182128, Feb. 19, 2014), where the Supreme Court, speaking through Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes, stated that:

“It must be stressed that the mortgage contract between PEPI and the petitioner is merely an accessory contract to the principal three-year loan takeout from the petitioner by PEPI for its expansion project. It need not be belaboured that [a] mortgage is an accessory undertaking to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation, and it does not affect the ownership of the property as it is nothing more than a lien thereon serving as security for a debt.

“Note that at the time PEPI mortgaged the property to the petitioner, the prevailing contract between respondents PEPI and Dee was still the Contract to Sell, as Dee was yet to fully pay the purchase price of the property. On this point, PEPI was acting fully well within its right when it mortgaged the property to the petitioner, for in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass until full payment of the purchase price. In other words, at the time of the mortgage, PEPI was still the owner of the property.

Thus, in China Banking Corporation v [s] Spouses Lozada, the Court affirmed the right of the owner/developer to mortgage the property subject of development, to wit: [Presidential Decree]…957 cannot totally prevent the owner or developer from mortgaging the subdivision lot or condominium unit when the title thereto still resides in the owner or developer awaiting the full payment of the purchase price by the installment buyer. x x x”

Applying the above-quoted decision in your situation, a realty is still the owner of the property which is the object of the contract to sell. The owner has the right to mortgage the same even without your consent, however, the mortgage is subject to the approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

x x x."

Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty

See -  http://chr.gov.ph/statement-of-commissioner-karen-gomez-dumpit-on-the-united-nations-general-assembly-resolution-on-moratorium-on-the-use-of-the-death-penalty/


December 17, 2020

Statement of Commissioner Karen Gomez-Dumpit on the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty


The Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines welcomes the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty (A/RES/75/183). The Philippines is one of the 123 UNGA Member States that voted in favor of the resolution on 16 December 2020. There are 38 Member States against the resolution with 24 abstentions.

The Commission recognizes this positive development particularly with the Philippine vote, which signals the government veering away from the reintroduction of the death penalty. The vote is also a visible indication that on this issue the government can change course to correct its position and deliver its commitments as a State Party to international human rights treaties including the Second Optional Protocol on Civil and Political Rights.

Globally there is a trend towards abolition of the death penalty. Since 2007, UN Member States have called for moratorium on the death penalty and the 2020 UNGA resolution presents an increase of States voting encouragingly for moratorium. [1]

The CHR is resolutely opposed of the death penalty and its reimposition. We are strongly advocating against the death penalty bills tabled in Congress, and we have released advisories and research studies advising government of its treaty obligations. We presented empirical data and evidenced-based findings of capital punishment not having a place in the justice system. [2] International human rights mechanisms such as the UN Treaty Bodies, Special Procedures and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have called the attention of the Philippine government of its position on reintroduction of the death penalty. The June 2020 OHCHR report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines highlighted this concern and recommended the government to reconsider its legislative agenda in light of its human rights obligations. The CHR continues to support these calls from the UN Bodies and has recommended in its interventions in the Human Rights Council to remove death penalty from the legislative agenda of the Philippine government.

The CHR is committed to monitoring the Philippines’ treaty obligations and we remain open to collaborate with the government in working towards a functional, unbiased, efficient justice system that guarantees certainty of punishment for perpetrators and respects the rights of all – defendants, victims and witnesses, through due process and rule of law. ■

______________

[1] 2007: 104 UN members states, while 54 voted against and 29 abstained; 2008: 106 countries voted in favor, 46 against and 34 abstained; 2010: 109 votes in favor, 41 votes against and 35 abstentions; 2012: 111 states voting in favor, 41 voting against and 34 abstaining; 2014: 117 votes in favor, 37 against, 34 abstentions and five absent; 2016: 117 votes in favor, 40 against, 31 abstentions and five absent; and 2018: 21 votes in favor, 35 against, 32 abstentions and five absent. Data from the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty. Read more here: http://www.worldcoalition.org/moratorium.html

[2] The Commission’s studies, position papers and other resources are available at: http://righttolifeph.online/

Oral or written declarations of heads of State, heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs can be the basis of international accountability or liability of that state or the state's government even in the absence of any treaty or bilateral/multilateral agreement regarding the pronouncements. This is the “unilateral binding declaration” doctrine.

Dean Mel Sta. Maria:

A counterproductive Duterte utterance

China must be ecstatic. President Duterte, the head of state of the Republic of the Philippine publicly declared: "Nag file sila ng kaso, nanalo tayo. 'Yang papel, sa totoong buhay, between nations, 'yang papel, wala 'yan," …."Pinursue ko, walang nangyari. Actually, sa usapang bugoy, sabihin ko sa 'yo, 'Bigay mo sakin? Putangina papel lang 'yan. Itatapon ko 'yan sa waste basket.”

When a President makes a statement concerning international affairs, it can be taken as his country’s foreign policy declaration. And, in international law, well-entrenched is the rule that the oral or written declarations of heads of State, heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs can be the basis of international accountability or liability of that state or the state's government even in the absence of any treaty or bilateral/multilateral agreement regarding the pronouncements. This is the “unilateral binding declaration” doctrine. China might utilize that “waste basket” statement to support its claim against the Philippines that the West Philippine Sea decision should be discarded.

A number of International Court of Justice (ICJ) decisions held countries answerable or estopped on the basis of unilateral declarations. This is why oral and written statements of Presidents or their subalterns must be well-thought of ------ the wordings cautiously selected to avoid great prejudice to their own country.

For President Duterte therefore to publicly declare that the West Philippine Sea (WPS) decision is throwable does not do the Philippines any benefit at all. On the other hand, China can use it to assert that the WPS decision has become worthless as the president’s public statement is an open declaration against the interest of the Philippines which, in the ordinary rules of evidence, may have some measure of consideration.

It is necessary that President Duterte personally make a categorical clarification that he did not mean the “waste basket” statement. The Department of Foreign Affairs announcement does not have the same gravitas if made by the head of state himself.

Also, when some of President Duterte’s cabinet members like Defense Secretary Lorenzana and Foreign Affairs Secretary Locsin and allies like Senator Pacquiao publicly made statements opposite President Duterte’s tone, it highlights how disturbing the off-the-cuff opinions of the President were.

The present mess in the WPS has been greatly enhanced by the President Duterte's pivot toward China. In October 2016 in China, in front of the members of the Chinese and Filipino business community, President Duterte declared that “in this venue, your honors, in this venue, I announce my separation from the United States.” He added “Both in military, not maybe social, but economics also. America has lost.” Also , he declared: “I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to Putin and tell him that there are three of us against the world - China, Philippines and Russia. It’s the only way.”

President Duterte’s thinking appears to be this: the Philippine pivot toward China necessarily means moving away from the US -- a clearly antiquated mindset belonging to a by-gone era. It exposes President Duterte’s lack of knowledge or ignorance of the present dynamics in world affairs.

The cold war had long ended. The world is no longer divided between the United States of America and Russia/China in terms of influence ideologically, economically and politically. Even communist Russia and China now embrace a capitalistic attitude in their busineses.

Likewise, the rise of other countries either individually or collectively has gained significant global relevance: the powerful G7 block, the European Union, the Asean, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India, even South Korea ( economically), the oil-rich countries of the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar. Even decisions of world and regional organizations such as the OPEC and the World Bank affect world prices.

Let China and US compete against each other. Let the Philippines’ economic and military treaties with other countries be maintained. Alliances are part of international relations and are not bad. But President Duterte need not put the country in the armpit of China, making pronouncements emboldening China to occupy areas within the Philippines’ maritime preferential zone.

Lamentably, President Duterte favored China despite its continued aggression blatantly disrespecting the Philippines’ maritime rights. So China, after losing a landmark international case, took advantage of this earnest show of Duterte favor and weakness and modified its strategy.

While continuing its illegal ways, China moved to beat the Philippines "legally" with a scheme designed to even make the President of the Philippines participate, wittingly or unwittingly, in its ploy.

Thus, whereas before, their concocted 9-dash-line boundary was declared baseless under international law, now they might assert that its territorial and maritime claims are “legal” based on the doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence exhibited by the Philippine government as manifested by President Duterte’s voluntary public utterances and omissions. That doctrine, as far as China may be concerned, could be within the "generally accepted principle of law recognized by civilized nation" which, in turn, is one of the sources of international law.

Also, whereas before, China blatantly island-grabbed , now the modality is a calculated series of actions where even the Philippine president declared his helplessness, tolerance and acquiescence to the de facto situation of China’s dominance in the West Philippine Sea, to the point of President Duterte admitting China is “in possession of the property” to the great prejudice of the Philippines.

And that strategy was patiently pursued. The latest result was this uncalled for declaration by President Duterte himself to the effect that the Hague decision was disposable. The President said: “Putang inang papel iyan.Itatapon ko 'yan sa waste basket.”

With the kind of statements he has been spewing, the Philippines might lose a number of islands and its maritime rights within its 200-mile exclusive economic zone.

If that happens, President Duterte must be held accountable for such a terrible tragedy grossly and unimaginably prejudicial to the Filipino nation.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the President Duterte’s irresponsible statements, the Philippine position on the West Philippine Sea is still supremely strong. This is even supported by major countries in the world. China may attempt to use President Duterte’s utterances against the Philippines, but its 9-dash-line boundary is just utterly absurd and without historical and legal basis. That facticity will never change. And the Philippines has proven that extremely well, thanks to the legal team assembled by former Ambassador Albert del Rosario to fight for our maritime rights at the Hague.

But still circumspection is the order of the day. During his remaining months in office, President Duterte must be careful. Foreign policy cannot be based on his whims and caprice. He cannot equate his emotional feelings with public interest. Personal opinions and knee-jerk reactions have no place in formulating a foreign policy declaration.

It is better for him to read a well-prepared statement sufficiently nuanced by the Philippines’ stand on the issue and the tenets of international law rather than just spontaneously jibber-jabber something about it. The president simply lacks that depth in international relations.

As a starter, President Duterte himself must expressly, boldly and with a sense of utmost urgency, assert the Philippines’ maritime rights and frontally call on China to abide by the rule of international law.

An action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute.

"x x x.

The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.

On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,29 an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.

It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.

x x x."

RULE 63 - DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. 

See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/aug2013/gr_181359_2013.html#rnt31

G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners, vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.

The award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is proper because of petitioners’ bad faith.

See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/aug2013/gr_181359_2013.html#rnt31

G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners, vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.


"x x x.

The award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is proper because of petitioners’ bad faith.

Petitioners’ actual and prior knowledge of the first sale to Juanito makes them purchasers in bad faith. It also appears that petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was remiss in his duties as counsel to the Muertegui family. Instead of advising the Muerteguis to register their purchase as soon as possible to forestall any legal complications that accompany unregistered sales of real property, he did exactly the opposite: taking advantage of the situation and the information he gathered from his inquiries and investigation, he bought the very same lot and immediately caused the registration thereof ahead of his clients, thinking that his purchase and prior registration would prevail. The Court cannot tolerate this mercenary attitude. Instead of protecting his client’s interest, Atty. Sabitsana practically preyed on him.

Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana took advantage of confidential information disclosed to him by his client, using the same to defeat him and beat him to the draw, so to speak. He rushed the sale and registration thereof ahead of his client. He may not be afforded the excuse that he nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot because he believed or assumed that the Muerteguis were simply bluffing when Carmen told him that they had already bought the same; this is too convenient an excuse to be believed. As the Muertegui family lawyer, he had no right to take a position, using information disclosed to him in confidence by his client, that would place him in possible conflict with his duty. He may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on his client’s word, believing it at one time and disbelieving it the next. He owed the Muerteguis his undivided loyalty. He had the duty to protect the client, at all hazards and costs even to himself.38

Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana is enjoined to "look at any representation situation from the point of view that there are possible conflicts, and further to think in terms of impaired loyalty, that is, to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair his loyalty to a client."39

Moreover, as the Muertegui family’s lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was under obligation to safeguard his client's property, and not jeopardize it. Such is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his general agency.40

Even granting that Atty. Sabitsana has ceased to act as the Muertegui family's lawyer, he still owed them his loyalty.1âwphi1 The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client on a matter involving confidential information which the lawyer acquired when he was counsel. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.41 This is underscored by the fact that Atty. Sabitsana obtained information from Carmen which he used to his advantage and to the detriment of his client.

From the foregoing disquisition, it can be seen that petitioners are guilty of bad faith in pursuing the sale of the lot despite being apprised of the prior sale in respondent's favor. Moreover, petitioner Atty. Sabitsana has exhibited a lack of loyalty toward his clients, the Muerteguis, and by his acts, jeopardized their interests instead of protecting them. Over and above the trial court's and the CA's findings, this provides further justification for the award of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs in favor of the respondent.

Thus said, judgment must be rendered in favor of respondent to prevent the petitioners' void sale from casting a cloud upon his valid title.

x x x."