To give meaning to the legislative intent of RA 9344, the promotion of the welfare of a CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW should extend even to one who has EXCEEDED THE AGE LIMIT OF TWENTY-ONE (21) YEARS, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender COMMITTED THE OFFENSE WHEN HE/SHE WAS STILL OF TENDER AGE. - 2009 REVISED RULE ON CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.

"Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years of age who committed a crime and was found guilty, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence even if such child has reached 18 years or more at the time of judgment. Thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and alter considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

Notwithstanding, the RTC did not apply the law saying that the benefits of a suspended sentence shall not apply to appellant Allain because he is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua making reference to Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,65 Rule, on Juveniles in Conflict with the law.

We do not agree.

In People v. Sarcia,66 we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA No. 8344 even if the minor therein was convicted of reclusion perpetua and we ratiocinated as follows:

The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.

Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. x x x67

In fact, the Court En Banc promulgated on November 24, 2009, the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which echoed such legislative intent.68

Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time the judgment of conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No. 9344, to wit:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to Section 38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40 is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the application of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law.

In People v. Jacinto,69 we ruled:

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section 48 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility.70

Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility pursuant to Section 51 of RA No. 9344."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Computation of PENALTY for RAPE where the accused is a MINOR. - CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW. - Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006. - AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. - DISCERNMENT Defined.

"Under Article 266-B, in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, when rape is committed by 2 or more persons, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both appellants notwithstanding that appellant Allain was only 17 years old, a minor, at the time of the commission of the crime on July 16, 1998. His birth certificate59 showed that he was born on December 19, 1980. The RTC did not consider such minority saying that the penalty imposed upon the two accused is reclusion perpetua which is a single indivisible penalty; and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the said penalty should be applied and imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of minority.

We beg to differ.

To begin with; on May 20, 2006, Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, took effect, RA No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application, as held in People v. Sarcia,60 which stated:

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.

Hence, RA No. 9344 should be considered in determining the imposable penalty on appellant Allain even if the crime was committed seven years earlier. Section 6 of RA No. 9344 provides:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) yours but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

In Madali, et al. v. People,61 we held that discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.

In this case, it was established that appellant Allain acted with discernment as shown by his act of covering AAA's mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting and conspired with appellant Vergel in raping AAA.

As the crime of rape was committed by two persons, the penalty imposable under Article 266 (B) of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. Since no aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable. Appellant Allain was only 17 years old when he committed the crime; he is, therefore, entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.

Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e., from reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.63 To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its medium period. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full range of prision mayor.64"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

DNA TEST is not essential, while there exists other evidence pinning down appellants as the perpetrators.

"Appellants' claim that a DNA test on the spermatozoa found on AAA's vagina should have been submitted for DNA testing to know whether the sperm indeed came from both appellants or from AAA's boyfriend.

It has already been established that appellants were the ones who raped AAA. The DNA test is not essential, while there exists other evidence pinning down appellants as the perpetrators.58 Moreover, if the prosecution had not conducted such DNA test, appellants should have moved for such test during the trial to prove their innocence.

All told, we find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Entries in a POLICE BLOTTER, although regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are NOT CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF THE TRUTH OF SUCH ENTRIES, for these are often incomplete and inaccurate.

"Appellants' contention that if AAA was positive as to their identification as the perpetrators of the crime charged, why were there two other names included in the police blotter, is also unmeritorious.

The same police blotter stated a notation that:

Progress Report on Rape Alarm (Entry Nr. 98-257). As per sworn statement of offended party AAA that the alleged suspects were Allain Ancajas and Vergel Ancajas and she refused (sic) the other suspects.55

The inclusion of the two additional names was cured by the sworn statement of AAA and her categorical declaration56 in open, court that appellants were the perpetrators of the crime charged and no other. It is well entrenched that entries in a police blotter, although regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries, for these are often incomplete and inaccurate. These, therefore, should not be given undue significance or probative value as to the facts stated therein.57"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

People react differently to emotional stress and no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a RAPE VICTIM following her defilement.

"Appellants' argument that AAA's conduct after the alleged sexual assault, i.e., washing her bloodied panty and maong pants, and washing her private part, are not the normal behavior of a woman who had just been raped deserves scant consideration.

It is not accurate to say that there is a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims.53 On the contrary, people react differently to emotional stress and no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement.54 What is notable in the records was the fact that after she had regained consciousness at 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, she immediately went back to her employers' house and narrated to them what appellants had done to her, later reported the rape incident to the police and underwent a physical examination of her private parts. Her actions indeed showed her desire to obtain justice for what appellants did to her."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

For ALIBI to prosper, it does not suffice to prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown that there was PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY for him to have been at the scene of the crime.

"We find that the RTC correctly rejected appellants' defense of denial and alibi. AAA positively identified appellants as the persons who raped her. She knew them as they were neighbors since childhood. Denial fails in the light of AAA's positive declaration.

Appellants' alibi is also unavailing. For alibi to prosper, it does not suffice to prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown that there was physical impossibility for him to have been at the scene of the crime.51 Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.52 Appellant Allain testified that at around 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. of July 16, 1998, he was at Kit's house, which was located around 100 meters away from their own house. On the other hand, appellant Vergel testified that he passed by Kit's house at past 8:00 p.m. and saw Allain thereat. Notably, appellant Allain testified that AAA's house is also 100 meters away from their house. Thus, it would show that Kit's house is also in the same vicinity where the crime was committed. Hence, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is CONSPIRACY when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it.

"We find the presence of conspiracy in this case between the appellants. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.49

The prosecution had established that appellants held AAA's hands, and when she tried to shout, appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in the abdomen which caused her to lose consciousness. It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective which were present in this case.50"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants' guilt for the crime of RAPE. - The Crime of Rape Defined. - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

"Appellants claim that based on AAA's testimony, the element of carnal knowledge was not established since she claimed to be unconscious, hence, she would not know the act allegedly done to her; that she only believed that they had carnal knowledge of her because she felt pain on her vagina. They claim that there were inconsistencies in her testimony and that her conduct after the alleged rape negate the commission thereof.

The issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants' guilt for the crime of rape.

Article 266-A38 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements of the crime of rape as follows:

Art. 266-A- Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

The prosecution must prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, (2) that the same was accomplished under any of the above-enumerated circumstances. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testily with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.39 Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the victim's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted of the crime.40

Appellants' claim that rape was not was established as AAA had been unconscious during its alleged commission is not persuasive.

While it is true that there was no direct evidence to establish that appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA as the latter was unconscious, however, proof of the commission of the crime need not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt.41 Indeed, the Court had affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence.42

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (3) and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.43 A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.44

Here, AAA was on her way to her parents' house when appellants, her neighbors since childhood, appeared and held her hands. She struggled and shouted but appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting, while appellant Vergel punched her in the stomach which caused her to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain all over her body and her vagina. She found her bra, bloodied parity and maong pants beside her. She went back to her employers' house and told them that appellants raped her. AAA's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Jabat's declaration that the lacerations in AAA's perineum and hymen were due to the insertion of a foreign object or the male organ and the presence of spermatozoa signified recent sexual intercourse. It is well settled that when the victim's testimony is corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisites of carnal knowledge.45 The lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.46

We find no error committed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in giving credence to AAA's testimony. In fact, it was put down in record that AAA was crying while she was testifying before the trial court.47 It has been held in several cases that the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain the victim feels when she recounts the detail of her traumatic experience.48"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_199270_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

"Lascivious Conduct" (RA 7610) vs. "Acts of Lasciviousness" (Revised Penal Code)

The Supreme Court En Banc has clarified that LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT punishable under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a DISTINCT offense from the Revised Penal Code offense of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and that the applicable penalty under Section 5(b) is reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua, depending on the circumstances. 

However, an important qualification must be made:

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 11648 (2022), the En Banc ruled that Section 5(b) of RA 7610 generally applies only to child victims aged 16 years but below 18 years who are exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse" involving defective consent induced by an adult. Where the child is below 16 years old, or where the act is committed through force, intimidation, unconsciousness, or similar circumstances, the proper charge is ordinarily under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 11648, rather than Section 5(b) of RA 7610. 

Relevant Philippine laws

1. Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5(b)

Section 5(b) provides that:

> Those who commit sexual intercourse or LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

The law further provides that when the victim is under the age specified in the proviso, prosecution is under the Revised Penal Code, although the penalty for lascivious conduct remains specially prescribed by RA 7610. 

2. Republic Act No. 11648

RA 11648 raised the age of sexual consent from 12 to 16 years and amended several provisions of the Revised Penal Code affecting sexual offenses against children. It also influenced how Section 5(b) of RA 7610 is now interpreted by the Supreme Court. 

3. Revised Penal Code

Article 336 – Acts of Lasciviousness (now renumbered in the Revised Penal Code after the amendments introduced by RA 11648, but still commonly referred to in jurisprudence by its traditional article number).

The Revised Penal Code now governs many cases involving victims below 16 years old that were previously prosecuted under RA 7610. 

Latest Philippine jurisprudence

1. Gramatica v. People (Supreme Court En Banc, April 6, 2026)

This is now the leading En Banc decision.

The Court held that:

Section 5(b) of RA 7610 applies to victims 16 to below 18 years old.

It covers situations where the child's apparent consent is legally defective because of coercion, influence, persuasion, or exploitation by an adult.

It does not apply where the child is an entirely unwilling victim or where force, intimidation, fraud, unconsciousness, or grave abuse of authority is employed.

The Court laid down uniform prosecution guidelines distinguishing RA 7610 from the Revised Penal Code. 

2. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 274549, April 6, 2026

Applying Gramatica, the Court ruled that because the victim was a 13-year-old unwilling victim, the accused should have been convicted under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness rather than Section 5(b) of RA 7610. 

3. Laconsay v. People

The Court reiterated that where Section 5(b) properly applies, the crime is Lascivious Conduct under RA 7610, not merely Acts of Lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code. The Court imposed an indeterminate sentence with a maximum within the reclusion temporal range. 

Practical effect of the En Banc ruling

The En Banc decision significantly changed prosecution practice:

Prosecutors must first determine the victim's age.

They must determine whether the child merely appeared to consent because of adult influence (RA 7610) or was an unwilling victim (Revised Penal Code).

The proper statute—not merely the factual acts—determines the offense and penalty.

Sources

Supreme Court of the Philippines – "SC Issues Guidelines on Proper Prosecution of Lascivious Conduct Cases under the Child Abuse Law and Revised Penal Code": [https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-issues-guidelines-on-proper-prosecution-of-lascivious-conduct-cases-under-the-child-abuse-law-and-revised-penal-code/](https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-issues-guidelines-on-proper-prosecution-of-lascivious-conduct-cases-under-the-child-abuse-law-and-revised-penal-code/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

Lawphil – People v. XXX, G.R. No. 274549, April 6, 2026: [https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2026/apr2026/gr_274549_2026.html](https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2026/apr2026/gr_274549_2026.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

Supreme Court E-Library – Laconsay v. People: [https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/assets/pdf/philrep/2024/G.R.%20No.%20259861.pdf](https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/assets/pdf/philrep/2024/G.R.%20No.%20259861.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

Supreme Court E-Library – RA 7610 penalty discussion: [https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/21/60076](https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/21/60076?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

When are ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTS valid and justified?

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 242957. February 28, 2023 ]

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER, PETITIONERS, VS. YUAN WENLE, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/feb2023/gr_242957_2023.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

"Hence, for administrative warrants to be valid and justified, all of the following conditions must be present and shall be strictly complied with, to wit:

1. The danger, harm, or evil sought to be prevented by the warrant must be imminent and must be greater than the damage or injury to be sustained by the one who shall be temporarily deprived of a right to liberty or property.

2. The warrant's resultant deprivation of a right or legitimate claim of entitlement must be temporary or provisional, aimed only at suppressing imminent danger, harm, or evil and such deprivation's permanency must be strictly subjected to procedural due process requirements.

3. The issuing administrative authority must be empowered by law to perform specific implementing acts pursuant to well-defined regulatory purposes.

4. The issuing administrative authority must be necessarily authorized by law to pass upon and make final pronouncements on conflicting rights and obligations of contending parties, as well as to issue warrants or orders that are incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.

5. The issuance of an administrative warrant must be based on tangible proof of probable cause and must state a specific purpose or infraction allegedly committed with particular descriptions of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

6. The warrant issued must not pertain to a criminal offense or pursued as a precursor for the filing of criminal charges and any object seized pursuant to such writ shall not be admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding.

7. The person temporarily deprived of a right or entitlement by an administrative warrant shall be formally charged within a reasonable time if no such period is provided by law and shall not be denied any access to a competent counsel of his or her own choice. Furthermore, in cases where a person is deprived of liberty by virtue of an administrative warrant, the adjudicative body which issued the warrant shall immediately submit a verified notice to the Regional Trial Court nearest to the detainee for purposes of issuing a judicial commitment order.

8. A violation of any item of these guidelines is a prima facie proof of usurpation of judicial functions, malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or graft and corrupt practices on the part of responsible officers."

Assignment of errors on appeal: a matter not raised by the parties may be reviewed if necessary for a complete resolution of the case.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 242957. February 28, 2023 ]

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER, PETITIONERS, VS. YUAN WENLE, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/feb2023/gr_242957_2023.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

"Nonetheless, a matter not raised by the parties may be reviewed if necessary for a complete resolution of the case;66 as this Court is imbued with sufficient authority and discretion to do so.67 The following instances include: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.68

Here, it appears that both parties do not dispute the constitutional validity of warrants issued by administrative bodies – specifically the Bureau of Immigration. What they are arguing instead is whether SDOs violate a foreign detainee's right to due process. However, a closer look at this issue will reveal that the same cannot be meaningfully resolved without passing upon the constitutional validity of administrative warrants."

The exercise of judicial power requires an actual case calling for it; thus, courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions, or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 242957. February 28, 2023 ]

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER, PETITIONERS, VS. YUAN WENLE, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/feb2023/gr_242957_2023.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

"The exercise of judicial power requires an actual case calling for it; thus, courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions, or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests.63 This involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution.64 Hence, courts should decline jurisdiction when that sought by the parties involve rendering advisory opinions which would provide no practical use or value.65"

Doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and of primary jurisdiction

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 242957. February 28, 2023 ]

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER, PETITIONERS, VS. YUAN WENLE, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/feb2023/gr_242957_2023.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

"Besides, this Court cannot also allow respondent to disregard the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and of primary jurisdiction for the sake of convenience. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention in order to give an administrative officer every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction.59 Such doctrine is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.60 Relatedly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.61 The objective of this doctrine is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.62 Thus, allowing one to directly resort to a habeas corpus proceeding before the regular courts will be to allow a preemption of the Bureau's statutory duty to determine for itself the issues of legality in all deportation cases specifically and supposedly under its jurisdiction."

On the Propriety of Resorting to Rule 45 in Assailing the RTC's Decision or Final Order Disposing a Habeas Corpus Case

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 242957. February 28, 2023 ]

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER, PETITIONERS, VS. YUAN WENLE, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/feb2023/gr_242957_2023.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

"I. On the Propriety of Resorting to Rule 45 in Assailing the RTC's Decision or Final Order Disposing a Habeas Corpus Case

A. Existence of a Question of Law

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.44 Moreover, such questions must be of such substance as to be of distinctly significant consequence and value.45 A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.46 Accordingly, for a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts.47 Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.48 Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.49

In this case, the Court finds respondent's argument – that the issue on whether he was accorded due process – to be a question of law. The records clearly show that the alleged denial of due process was anchored on the RTC's finding that the SDO's very nature did not give respondent a chance to present or mount his defense. Although the RTC did not pass upon the constitutionality or validity of SDOs, invalidating the July 26, 2018 SDO and its effects on the ground that the Omnibus Rules purportedly do not give arrested aliens any opportunity to assail such issuance amounts to an indirect approach of challenging these procedural rules themselves. Such observations demonstrate that there is no need for this Court to examine anew the probative value of any evidence for the purpose of determining the existence of due process. As it stands now, respondent sufficiently justified its recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by presenting a legal question for resolution.

B. Pursuit of the Proper Remedy

The current version of Sec. 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellants shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphases supplied)

The mandatory nature of the 48-hour reglementary period of appeal in habeas corpus cases ensures that no unnecessary time will be wasted before a decision or final order will be re-evaluated.50 Corollary, the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, jurisdictional, and mandatory; that is why it should be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.51 Verily, the reason why competent courts in habeas corpus proceedings have no other alternative but to dismiss an appeal filed out of time is that Sec. 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 12952 (B.P. Blg. 129) clearly states:

Section 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

However, by way of exception, there are other available remedies aside from that provided in Sec. 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court against an adverse judgment or final order in a habeas corpus case. For one, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and is considered no judgment at all in legal contemplation as it may even be subject to a collateral attack.53 Since it has been settled that the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain pleas against an SDO issuance in a habeas corpus proceeding for the power to deport aliens is vested with the President through the Bureau,54 a writ of certiorari – a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction55 — may also issue in such instance. In some cases, a party may also opt to challenge an adverse judgment or final order not on the basis of factual misappreciation, but of legal misapplication or misinterpretation. Under such circumstance, elevating an adverse RTC decision or final order directly to this Court on appeal by certiorari (Rule 45) is proper.

Even though the Court of Appeals (CA) may, at times, pass upon questions of law in appellate proceedings under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,56 it has been recognized in Elepante v. Madayag,57 that an appeal in habeas corpus cases may be taken directly to this Court on pure questions of law.58 This is also in deference to Sec. 5(2)(e), Art. VIII of the Constitution which empowers this Court to "[r]eview, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in" "[a]ll cases [where] only an error or question of law is involved." Therefore, the OSG did not err in availing the remedial facilities in Rule 45 in place of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court as this case, as pointed out earlier, does not need a re-examination or recalibration of evidentiary weight."

Whether Senator Dela Rosa was entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) to stop government authorities from arresting or surrendering him pursuant to an ICC warrant, Interpol Red Notice, or similar foreign process without a Philippine judicial warrant.

Rodrigo Roa Duterte and Sen. Ronald Dela Rosa v. Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin, et al.

G.R. No. 278747

Resolution dated May 20, 2026

En Banc

Nature of the Case

This case involves the petition of former President Rodrigo Duterte and Senator Ronald Dela Rosa questioning the possible enforcement in the Philippines of an alleged warrant of arrest issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The immediate issue before the Court was narrow:

Whether Senator Dela Rosa was entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) to stop government authorities from arresting or surrendering him pursuant to an ICC warrant, Interpol Red Notice, or similar foreign process without a Philippine judicial warrant. 

The Court did not yet resolve the constitutionality or legality of ICC enforcement in the Philippines. It only ruled on the request for interim injunctive relief.

Facts

After the filing of the petition, Senator Dela Rosa alleged that:

NBI operatives were positioned around the Senate and GSIS compound;

Armed men allegedly attempted to enter the Senate premises;

There was a real threat of his arrest pursuant to an ICC warrant;

If arrested and surrendered to the ICC, the case would become moot because he would already be outside Philippine jurisdiction. 

He argued that his constitutional rights were under imminent threat, specifically:

liberty,

due process,

freedom from unlawful seizure,

right to remain in Philippine territory,

and his right to discharge his duties as senator. 

The government, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application and argued that:

Dela Rosa was still freely moving within the Senate;

he was under Senate “protective custody”;

no actual arrest had occurred;

and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. had publicly stated that no order to arrest Dela Rosa had been issued. 

Issue

Whether Senator Ronald Dela Rosa was entitled to the issuance of:

a TRO, or

a Status Quo Ante Order

to stop his possible arrest and surrender to the ICC pending resolution of the main petition.

Ruling

The Supreme Court DENIED the application for TRO and SQAO for lack of merit. 

Ratio Decidendi (Reasons for the Ruling)

1. No “Right in Esse” Was Established

The Court emphasized that injunctive relief requires a:

“clear and unmistakable right to be protected.” 

The Court ruled that Dela Rosa failed to establish such right because the legality of his possible arrest depended on unresolved constitutional and legal questions, including:

whether ICC warrants remain enforceable after Philippine withdrawal from the Rome Statute;

whether Philippine courts must first issue a domestic warrant;

the President’s authority to cooperate with the ICC;

interpretation of Section 17 of RA 9851;

and the applicability of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 

Because these issues remain unresolved, his alleged rights were merely contingent and disputed, not clear and established.

The Court reiterated the doctrine that injunction cannot protect:

> “contingent, abstract, or future rights.” 

2. No Actual or Material Invasion of Rights

The Court held there was no actual deprivation of liberty because:

Dela Rosa remained free;

the Senate had placed him under protective custody;

and there was no concrete proof of imminent arrest. 

The Court even stated:

 “Senator Dela Rosa’s claimed invasion of his purported rights is more imagined than real.” 

This is one of the strongest and most politically significant lines in the Resolution.

3. No Irreparable Injury

The Court ruled that irreparable injury presupposes an existing legal right.

Since Dela Rosa failed to establish a clear legal right, there could likewise be no irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief. 

4. TRO Would Effectively Prejudge the Main Case

The Court warned that issuing a TRO would effectively resolve the merits of the petition even before full hearing.

The Court stressed that injunctions should not:

pre-emptively decide the main controversy,

reverse the burden of proof,

or prematurely assume the petitioner is correct. 

5. SQAO Also Improper

The Court refused to issue a Status Quo Ante Order because:

equity cannot override law;

and granting SQAO despite failure to meet TRO requisites would effectively circumvent Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. 

6. Petition Relied on Unverified Allegations

The Court criticized the petition for relying heavily on:

reports,

interviews,

video statements,

and speculative claims. 

The Court stressed that it is:

> “not a trier of facts”

and cannot grant extraordinary relief based on speculative allegations. 

Important Doctrines Reaffirmed

The Resolution reaffirmed several doctrines on provisional remedies:

TRO and Preliminary Injunction Require:

clear legal right,

material invasion of that right,

irreparable injury,

absence of adequate remedy. 

Injunction Will Not Protect:

contingent rights,

speculative injuries,

disputed claims,

future or uncertain rights. 

Equity Follows the Law

The Court stressed that equitable remedies like SQAO cannot override procedural requirements. 

Voting Breakdown

The Resolution revealed substantial division within the Court:

Concurring:

Chief Justice Alexander Gesmundo

Justice Marvic Leonen

Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa

Justice Ricardo Rosario and others filed concurring opinions. 

Dissenting:

Justice Ramon Paul Hernando

Justice Jhosep Lopez

Justice Mario Lopez

Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier

Justice Samuel Gaerlan and others dissented or issued separate opinions. 

The split indicates that the Court itself remains deeply divided on the ICC and executive cooperation issues.

Legal Significance

This Resolution is important because:

1. It avoids prematurely ruling on the ICC issue itself;

2. It preserves the status quo while the main petition is pending;

3. It strongly emphasizes procedural standards for TROs;

4. It signals judicial caution in intervening in politically explosive ICC matters;

5. It leaves unresolved the central constitutional question:

> Can the Philippine government legally cooperate with the ICC despite withdrawal from the Rome Statute?

That issue remains pending in the main petition.

Key Takeaway

The Supreme Court did not declare ICC cooperation legal or illegal.

It merely ruled that Senator Dela Rosa failed to prove the extraordinary requirements necessary for immediate injunctive protection.

The core constitutional issues remain unresolved.

Section 3(f), Republic Act No. 3019: Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

"Xxx.

Meanwhile, Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 states:

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

The violation of this provision has the following elements:

[1.] The offender is a public officer;

[2.] The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made on him;

[3.] Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and

[4.] Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another.112

Petitioner alleges that respondents neglected to respond to its December 29, 2009 letter within the 15-day period required by law. According to petitioner's, this demonstrates respondents' malicious intent in increasing petitioner's rental arrears.113 Moreover, respondents' refusal to heed petitioner's requests to alter the schedule of its unpaid rental obligations, and refusal to create a Joint Committee, were unreasonable and oppressive acts which failed to give effect to the objective of the lease.114

We are not convinced.

The alleged delay in responding to petitioner's letter beyond the 15-day period under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, by itself, is not sufficient to establish malice. There must be intentional inaction or deliberate refusal to act on the part of the public officer to do what is incumbent upon him or her. Moreover, the inaction or refusal to act must be unjustified.

In Lacap v. Sandiganbayan,115 the mayor of Masantol, Pampanga was convicted for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 because of her intentional inaction or deliberate refusal to act on an application for mayor's permit despite submission of complete requirements. Lacap rule that the mayor's refusal to act on the application was unjustified and was motivated by her personal grudges against and political rivalry with the applicant:

The Constitution mandates that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." Thus, "[they] are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying approval or disapproval may the [public] continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and the [public] is left in the darkness of uncertainty."

In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or city, the procedure is fairly standard and uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the required documents and the payment of the assessed business taxes and fees. In case of failure to comply with the requirements, the application deserves to be disapproved. If the application is compliant, then approval is the action to be taken. An inaction or refusal to act is a course of action anathema to public service with utmost responsibility and efficiency. If the deliberate refusal to act or intentional inaction on an application for mayor's permit is motivated by personal conflicts and political considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory, and constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.116 (Citations omitted)

In this case, the Ombudsman found no proof of the alleged delay and/or refusal of respondents to perform their obligations under RMOA:

There is no proof of the alleged delay and/or refusal of respondents to perform their obligations under RMOA. Records show that the parties' dispute hinges on who actually defaulted in their contractual obligations. Even assuming that there was a delay or refusal to perform an act/s on the part of respondents, there is no showing that the same was unjustified or for the purpose of securing material or pecuniary benefits from interested parties and/or to discriminate complainant.

To note, BCDA's obligation under the RMOA has been in existence prior to the assumption of office of herein respondents, as shown by the letter-reply of BCDA signed by its then President and CEO Narciso Abaya, which letter-reply complainant claims was sent only after 60 days from the time it sent its letter request.117 (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, petitioner failed to show that respondents' refusal to create a joint committee to settle a dispute was unjustified. Records show that respondents have previously denied the creation of a joint committee and suspension of payments as it found no compelling reason to grant petitioner's requests:

This refers to your letter dated December 29, 2009, which is a response to BCDA's demand letter of December 2, 2009.

....

We reiterated our pos1t10n on the matter contained in our December 2, 2009 letter. The OSAC has been fully established and functional the way it was envisioned in all other special economic zones (SEZs). Per the report submitted by JHMC/OSAC, the causes of delay in the processing of permits are not attributable to OSAC's failure to fulfill its duties in the timely issuance and/or endorsement of permits to appropriate agencies but to the incomplete and incorrect submission of documentary requirements by CJHDC, its subsidiaries and its locators. It is clear in the report of JHMC that the OSAC is not remiss in reminding CJHDC, its subsidiaries and its locators through constant follow-ups, written or thru telephone calls, to submit a complete application for the permits to be processed. JHMC even allowed your locators to operate their business within the JSHEZ while their permits are being processed. With this kind of accommodation we cannot think of how CJHDC can justify that it was unable to internally generate revenues from sale of its inventory because of alleged delays of issuance of permits by the OSAC.

We maintain that BCDA and the JHMC/OSAC is compliant to the provisions of the RMOA more particularly the provisions under Article IV, Section 3 and Article V on the establishment of the OSAC, and that, there is no more compelling reason for CJHDC to suspend payment and to convene a joint committee to resolve this alleged dispute.118

As previously discussed, petitioner did not even dispute its failure to submit complete requirements for its applications for permits and licenses. Unlike in Lacap, there is no discriminatory motive that this Court can infer from respondents alleged non-issuance of permits and clearances because its duty did not even arise. Mere delay in replying to the December 29, 2009 letter of petitioner is not indicative of respondents' malice. It must be shown that such delay is for the purpose of (1) "obtaining . . . from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit," or (2) gaining "advantage in favor of an interested party," or (3) "discriminating against another."119

Petitioner attempts to prove BCDA's discrimination and antagonism against it through the following acts: (1) filing of a complaint for estafa against the officers of CJHDC; (2) publication of malicious advertisements against CJHDC, its officers and affiliates; and (3) publication of notice to the public which allegedly shows tortious interference with its third party contracts.120 These acts were supposedly calculated to discredit and destroy petitioner's reputation and shows a pattern of deceit and fraud by respondents to evade from complying with their contractual obligations.121

We fail to see how these acts are discriminatory against petitioner and violative of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019.1aшphi1 Respondents admitted the foregoing acts and explained the context behind them:

14. Apart from and in addition to CJH DevCo's breach of its financial obligations, BCDA also discovered that CJH DevCo committed other material and incurable breaches of its contractual obligations by undertaking several activities that were not only fraudulent, but also threatened the viability and efficient functioning of Camp John Hay. For instance, BCDA discovered that one of the properties that CJH DevCo dacioned to it under the 2008 RMOA had been previously sold in 1999 to a third person, Wilson Sy.

15. Consequently, BCDA filed a complaint for estafa with the National Prosecution Service of the Department of Justice, asking what CJH DevCo's responsible officers be prosecuted for estafa for having falsely pretended to own VOA Loghome No. 9 and to possess the power and right to transfer it to BCDA when in reality, CJH DevCo had already sold and transferred the ownership of the property to Wilson Sy as early as July 27, 1999. The case, entitled "Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Robert John Sobrepena, et al.," was docketed as NPS No. XVI-12C-00136.

16. Moreover. it appears that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) wrote a letter dated March 14, 2012 to CJH DevCo, notifying it of its violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 with respect to the then Camp John Hay Suites[.]

....

17. BCDA also received reports about questionable business practices of CJH DevCo. For instance, Kim Sung Hwan, a Korean national who bought a unit in the Camp John Hay Suites from CJH DevCo, informed BCDA that, contrary to the clear provisions of the 1996 Lease Agreement, CJH DevCo misled and misrepresented to him and his family that its lease with BCDA had a guaranteed term of fifty (50) years. Moreover, Kim Sung Hwan disclosed that, contrary to CJH DevCo's promises to him and his family, CJH DevCo failed to deliver the unit despite the full payment of the purchase price.

18. Under these factual circumstances, BCDA caused the publication of a Notice in the April 10, 2012 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. In furtherance of the public trust reposed in Respondents' public offices, BCDA informed the public of the foregoing events involving the properties in Camp John Hay[.]

....

19. Subsequently, on June 7 and 8, 2012, BCDA caused the publication of another Notice to inform the public that BCDA had terminated its lease with CJH DevCo. BCDA also requested all unit owners, sub-lessees, and locators in Camp John Hay "to register their interest and investments in the John Hay Special Economic Zone (JHSEZ) with the BCDA."122 (Citation omitted)

While this Court does not rule on the veracity of these factual allegations, We cannot infer that these acts were pursued to defraud and discredit petitioner. Instead, these acts were committed in response to petitioner's alleged breach of obligations. Any assertion of right against another necessarily opposes and competes with each other. Unless there is a clear showing of abuse of right, this Court will not infer malicious intent based on the exercise and protection of one's rights.

In Barons Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,123 no abuse of right was imputed on a creditor exercising its right under Article 1248 of the Civil Code to refuse the debtor's proposal to pay in installments. The burden of proving bad faith in the exercise of rights falls on the party alleging the same:

Both parties agree that to constitute an abuse of rights under Article 19 the defendant must act with bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. They cite the following comments of Tolentino as their authority:

Test of Abuse of Right. - Modem jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, are anti­social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. Hence, every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. Ultimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the sound exercise of their discretion, will have to determine all the facts and circumstances when the exercise of a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right.

The question, therefore, is whether private respondent intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it rejected petitioner's offer and filed the action for collection.

We hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent. Petitioner's allegation that private respondent was motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent itself may deal directly with Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such supposition is merely speculative.

Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for rejecting petitioner's offer and instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private respondent, the corporation had its own "cash position to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations." This is not such "a lame and poor rationalization" as petitioner purports it to be. For if private respondent were to be required to accept petitioner's offer, there would be no reason for the latter to reject similar offers from its other debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof. Under these circumstances, we do not deem private respondent to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.

....

It may not be amiss to state that petitioner's contract with private respondent has the force of law between them. Petitioner is thus bound to fulfill what has been expressly stipulated therein. In the absence of any abuse of right, private respondent cannot be allowed to perform its obligation under such contract in parts. Otherwise, private respondent's right under Article 1248 will be negated, the sanctity of its contract with petitioner defiled. The principle of autonomy of contracts must be respected.124 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Barons, this Court held that parties are bound by the express stipulations in the contract, and the refusal of a creditor to accept payment of due and demandable obligation in parts is not an abuse of its rights.

Much like in Barons, petitioner in this case cannot compel BCDA to restructure the payment of its due and demandable obligation or to unilaterally suspend payments. Petitioner fails to cite any provision in the RMOA which compels the BCDA to agree to Camp John Hay Development's proposed payment schemes. Hence, BCDA, as the lessor, cannot be compelled to receive in installment payments of petitioner's due and demandable rental.

Article 1248 of the Civil Code states:

ARTICLE 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required to make partial payments.

However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the debtor may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the liquidation of the latter. (1169a)

Here, the parties are bound by the terms of payment in the RMOA:

a. LESSEE shall, upon signing of this Agreement and without further need of demand, pay LESSOR Pesos: One Hundred Mullion (Php100,000,000.00) in cash.ᇈWᑭHIL

b. LESSEE shall pay LESSOR Pesos: One Hundred Eight Mullion Three Hundred Forty One Thousand One Hundred Eighteen (Php180,341,118.00) by way of dacion en pago of various properties as detailed in Annex "B".

....

c. LESSEE shall pay LESSOR the remaining balance of Pesos: Two Billion Four Hundred Six Million One Hundred Forty Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Five (Php2,406,140,525.00), plus three percent (3%) interest on a diminishing balance basis, without further need of demand, after application of cash and property payments under Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Section for a period of fifteen (15) years with three (3) years moratorium on the principal.

c.1. For calendar years 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2011, the three percent (3%) interest due on the remaining balance during the three (3) year moratorium shall be payable every 30th of June.

c.2. For calendar years 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2023, the principal of the remaining balance shall be paid in twelve equal yearly installments plus three percent (3%) interest per annum on a diminishing balance basis every 30th of June.

However, for the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2013, the annual principal due for the period shall be paid in twelve equal monthly installments plus three percent (3%) interest per annum on a diminishing balance basis every end of the month.

If LESSEE fails to pay any amortization, a surcharge of 3% per annum shall be imposed on the principal and the LESSOR can automatically terminate this Agreement pursuant to Article VIII below.125

However, in its letters to respondents, petitioner proposed a different payment scheme contrary to the schedule of payments stipulated in the RMOA.126 Moreover, it imposed a condition on its proposed settlement:

The Board of Directors of CJHDevCo resolved to condition the above settlement scheme on the BCDA's commitment to issue, within a thirty (30)-day period from the submission of all pertinent documentary requirements, all business, building and other developmental permits, certificates and licenses, local and national, from all government agencies to facilitate construction and commercial operations in Camp John Hay. It is understood that where by law, a permit, license, certificate may not directly be issued by the BCDA, as envisioned in the RMOA, to cause the issuance of all such permits, licenses, and certificates. It shall not be sufficient to simply endorse the applications therefore to some government agency in that the BCDA/JHMC shall remain contractually bound to see the timely and actual issuance of all permits, licenses, and certificate applied for by CJHDevCo and its locators.127

Respondents denied these proposals for being prejudicial to the best interest of the government and opted to exercise its right to demand the full payment of the rental obligations due under the RMOA:

43. BCDA did reject CJH DevCo's proposals, and legitimately so. After due deliberation, it was decided that it would not be to the best interest of Government if BCDA were to accept CJH DevCo's offer of settlement by paying only the amount of P428,948.913.00, the full payment of which was even conditional. Hence on December 6, 2011, Respondent Casanova, on behalf of BCDA, wrote a letter to CJH DevCo to demand the payment of its current obligation of P581,504,590.00.128

All considered, it cannot be said that respondents had any obligation to grant the proposed restructuring of petitioner's obligations. Thus, there is no unjust refusal to act that can be imputed to respondents' denial of the creation of a joint committee and suspension of due rental payments as petitioner is bound by the schedule of payment stipulated in the RMOA. One party cannot unilaterally change the terms of the contract. Hence, the Ombudsman was correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Xxx."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 225565, January 13, 2021 ]

CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY MANUEL T. UBARRA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, FELICITO C. PAYUMO, ZORAYDA AMELIA C. ALONZO, TERESITA A. DESIERTO, MA. AURORA GEOTINA-GARCIA, FERDINAND S. GOLEZ, ELMAR M. GOMEZ AND MAXIMO L. SANGIL, RESPONDENTS.

Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019: Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

"Xxx.

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 states:

SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

....

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Its elements are as follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2. He [or she] must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or [gross] inexcusable negligence;

3. That his [or her] action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.95

As to the second element, there are three modalities for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. These are "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross inexcusable negligence." These modalities are defined in Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan:96

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. These definitions prove all too well that the three modes are distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under Section 3(e) should suffice to warrant conviction.

The use of the three phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence" in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses but only implies that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the law.97 (Citations omitted)

On the third element, there are two separate component acts which may be committed: "causing undue injury to any party, including the Government" or "giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference." As explained in Coloma, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan:98

In a catena of cases, the Court has held that there are two ways by which a public official violates Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or both. The disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction. Further, the term "undue injury" in the context of Section 3 (e) of the R.A. No. 3019 punishing the act of "causing undue injury to any party," has a meaning akin to that civil law concept of "actual damage." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.99 (Citations omitted)

In addition, undue injury cannot be merely presumed but must be alleged with specificity and proven with competent evidence:

In Santos v. People, the Court equated undue injury - in the context of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act punishing the act of "causing undue injury to any party - with that civil law concept of "actual damage". As the Court elaborated in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, to wit:

... Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual damage." Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal"; and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another". Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.

In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by Article 2199 of the Civil Code as follows:

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

It naturally follows that the rule that should likewise be applied in determining undue injury is that in determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding specific facts that could afford some basis for measuring compensatory or actual damage.

The foregoing rule is made more concrete in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan. Therein respondent Leticia Fuertes (Fuertes) accused therein petitioner Cresente Llorente (Llorente) of causing her undue injury by delaying the release of salaries and allowances. The Sandiganbayan convicted Llorente based, among others, on the testimony of Fuertes on the distress caused to her family by the delay in the release of her salary. Reversing the conviction of Llorente, the Court held:

Complainant's testimony regarding her family's financial stress was inadequate and largely speculative. Without giving specific details, she made only vague references to the fact that her four children were all going to school and that she was the breadwinner in the family. She, however, did not say that she was unable to pay their tuition fees and the specific damage brought by such nonpayment. The fact that the "injury" to her family was unspecified or unquantified does not satisfy the element of undue injury, as akin to actual damages. As in civil cases, actual damages, if not supported by evidence on record, cannot be considered.100 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The Ombudsman is correct that the crux of the controversy is the alleged default in the obligations under the RMOA and the party responsible for it.101 Petitioner anchors its charge of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 on respondents' failure to comply with their obligations under the RMOA. It also cites respondents' evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence in complying with their obligations, which unduly injured petitioner.

There is no question as to the existence of the first element. Respondents are being charged in the performance of their official functions as members of the Board of Directors of BCDA, a government instrumentality. There is doubt, however, as to the second and third elements of the offense charged.

We agree with the Ombudsman that petitioner failed to establish with moral certainty that respondent acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Other than bare allegations, petitioner did not present evidence to prove that the BCDA, through the respondents, was not compliant with its obligations in the RMOA. The Ombudsman's finding that the OSAC has been operational since 2005 is supported by evidence on record:

There is no proof the respondents acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. BCDA has already established the OSAC, also known as the John Hay Management Corporation (JHMC), as evidenced by the Affidavit of the Manager Zaldy A. Bello, of the Special Economic Zone; and the Memorandum dated 23 May 2005 of the JHMC circulating a copy of the approved policy for accreditation.102 (Citations omitted)

The affidavit of OSAC officer Zaldy A. Bello states:

1. I am the One Stop Action Center (OSAC) Officer, now Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Manager of John Hay Management Corporation (JHMC);

2. The OSAC is located in a building that it shares with the Customs Clearance Area of JHMC beside the Intercontinental Hotel Group Building in Ordoño Drive, Camp John Hay, Baguio City;

....

6. By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 2005-05-001 dated May 23, 2005, which took effect June 1, 2005, it shall be mandatory for all enterprises doing business inside the John Hay Special Economic Zone to seek accreditation with JHMC, hereto attached as Annex "A", thus, said enterprises will file and secure their Permit to Operate with the ONE STOP ACTION CENTER of JHMC in lieu of the Business Permit issued by the City Government of Baguio as provided under the policy guideline and procedure on the accreditation policy, to wit:

"1.3 The application shall be approved upon favourable recommendation of OSAC and subsequent approval of the Vice President and Chief Operating Officer", hereto attached as Annex "B" and Series.103

Petitioner did not present any evidence to prove its assertion that the OSAC was not compliant with the RMOA. It did not even allege the specific permits and licenses that the OSAC supposedly failed to issue beyond the guaranteed 30-day period in the RMOA. In lieu of competent proof, petitioner merely reiterated Article V, Section 1 of the RMOA and that the necessary permits and clearances were not acted upon by the OSAC within the 30-day period to the prejudice of petitioner.104

Petitioner forgets that the issuance of permits, certificates and licenses within 30 days is not an absolute obligation of BCDA. Their issuance is still premised on the complete submission of required documents by CJHDC, its locators, concessionaires, contractors or buyers:

ARTICLE V

LESSOR'S OBLIGATIONS AND WARRANT[I]ES

Section 1. Permits and Licenses. In order to facilitate the implementation of the Project, the LESSOR through the Administrator, shall maintain the operation of OSAC with full authority to process and issue all the business, building and other developmental permits, certificates and licenses, local and national, from all government agencies necessary to facilitate construction and commercial operation in Camp John Hay for the implementation of the Revised Camp John Hay Master Development Plan and the Project which are applicable in the JHSEZ.

LESSOR hereby acknowledges that the OSAC's issuance of these permits and licenses for the LESSEE is essential to the fulfillment of the developmental and financial commitments made by LESSEE herein and therefore warrants that the OSAC shall issue said business, building and other developmental permits, certificates and licenses within thirty (30) days from compliance with the provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 5, Article IV hereof and complete submission of all required documents by the LESSEE, its sub-locators, concessionaires, contractors or buyers as specified in Article IV, Section 3.105 (Emphasis supplied)

Aside from the submission of complete requirements, Article IV, Sections 3 to 5 of the RMOA must likewise be complied with:

ARTICLE IV

JHSEZ ADMINISTRATOR

....

Section 3. One Stop Action Center. The One Stop Action Center ("OSAC") shall facilitate the registration, licensing and issuance of permits within the JHSEZ with full authority to process and issue all the business, building and other developmental permits, certificates and licenses, local, and national, from all government agencies to facilitate construction and commercial operations in Camp John Hay. The appropriate government agencies (ie. DTI, LGU, BIR and BOC) shall assign their respective representatives in the OSAC for this purpose....

In relation thereto, the PARTIES shall complete the following actions and deliver the following documents to the OSAC on or before the following specified dates:

a. At least thirty (30) days prior to construction of a particular component or building, the LESSEE, its sub-locators, concessionaires, contractors or buyers, shall submit to the OSAC an application for the issuance of the development and business permit/s supported by detailed engineering and structural plans, and such other documents as may be required in compliance with all the requirements of the government of the Republic of the Philippines such as five (5) sets of documents for the Contract Drawings/Documents Phase signed and sealed by a duly licensed Architect, Civil, Structural, Electrical, and or Mechanical Engineer. Submission of design development documents for specific features shall be in accordance with the Revised Project Implementation Plan Schedule.

b. The OSAC shall review contract drawings/documents and issue the development and business permit/s within thirty (30) days from the complete submission of all required documents of the LESSEE, its sub-locators, concessionaires, contractors or buyers;

c. All physical infrastructure plans shall conform to the approved Revised Camp John Hay Master Development Plan. No deviation from the Revised Camp John Hay Master Development Plan shall be allowed without the prior written consent of the LESSOR.

d. At least thirty (30) days prior to the start of the commercial operations of each facility, the LESSEE, its sub-locators, concessionaires, contractors or buyers shall submit to the OSAC one (1) original and one (1) duplicate copy of the as-built drawings and/or plans for all structures. The OSAC shall review the as-built drawings and/or plans and issue the relevant occupancy permit/s, business permit/s, and/or permit/s to operate within thirty (30) days from complete submission of all required documents of the LESSEE, its sub-locators, concessionaires, contractors or buyers.

Section 4. JHSEZ rules and regulations. The implementing rules and regulations and operating manual of the JHSEZ formulated in coordination with concerned government agencies by the LESSOR and/or the ADMINISTRATOR and LESSEE shall be made an integral part of this Agreement.

Section 5. Compliance with JHSEZ rules and regulations. LESSEE hereby expressly acknowledges the jurisdiction, power and authority of the ADMINISTRATOR to enforce the rules and regulations governing the JHSEZ. The LESSEE agrees to abide by all the rules and regulations of the JHSEZ. Any material violation of such rules and regulations and the failure to remedy such violation within sixty (60) days from receipt of written notice thereof shall be a cause for the termination of this Agreement.106

The Petition is bereft of any allegations that petitioner submitted all the requirements and complied with Article IV, Sections 3 to 5 of the RMOA. Equally telling is petitioner's failure to refute respondents' material allegation that the delay in the issuance of petitioner's permits, clearances, and licenses, was due to its failure to submit complete requirements.107 As petitioner failed refute this material allegation, it is effectively admitted. Hence, without its submission of complete documentary requirements, petitioner had no right to demand the issuance of permits, clearances, and licenses within 30 days. There being no established violation of the RMOA, petitioner's alleged undue injury has no leg to stand on.

Assuming a violation of the RMOA has been established, We agree with the Ombudsman that petitioner failed to establish the undue injury from the acts of respondent.108

Petitioner asserts that it suffered undue injury when it assumed the consideration of the RMOA amounting to P2,686,481,644.00 without respondents' issuance of permits and clearances, in violation of the RMOA.109 In addition, it claims that it lost "great amounts of unrealized profits" because of respondents' inaction to its letter requests.110

However, the allegation of "great amounts of unrealized profits" is based on conjectures and speculation. Petitioner did not submit competent proof which could have allowed the Ombudsman to determine and measure the actual damage it supposedly suffered.

Neither is petitioner's assumption of the P2,686,481,644.00 consideration of the RMOA sufficient to establish undue injury. Records show that such amount represents petitioner's unpaid rental obligations under the 1996 Lease Agreement and subsequent Agreements with BCDA. Petitioner expressly acknowledged this in Section 3 of the RMOA:

Section 3. Acknowledgement and Settlement by LESSEE of prior obligations under the 19 October 1996 Lease Agreement, the 14 July 2000 MOA, and the 18 July 2003 MOA. LESSEE hereby acknowledges its obligations under the 19 October 1996 Lease Agreement, the 14 July 2000 MOA, and the 18 July 2003 MOA for the years 1999 to 30 June 2008 amounting to Pesos: Two Billion Six Hundred Eighty Six Million Four Hundred Eighty One Thousand Six Hundred Forty Four (PHP2,686,481,644.00) inclusive of interest as summarized in Annex A hereof and subject to the provisions of Sections 4 and 6, Article I hereof, PARTIES have mutually agreed to settle the acknowledged obligations under the preceding paragraph[.]111

In agreeing to pay its due and demandable obligations, petitioner did not suffer any undue injury. The RMOA was executed for the benefit of both parties to continue the lease and restructure payments of petitioner's rental arrears. There being no sufficient allegation and proof of undue injury, petitioners failed to establish the third element for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Thus, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding no probable cause for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 due to petitioner failure to prove that respondents acted in evident bad faith and gross negligence resulting in undue injury.

Xxx."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 225565, January 13, 2021 ]

CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY MANUEL T. UBARRA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, FELICITO C. PAYUMO, ZORAYDA AMELIA C. ALONZO, TERESITA A. DESIERTO, MA. AURORA GEOTINA-GARCIA, FERDINAND S. GOLEZ, ELMAR M. GOMEZ AND MAXIMO L. SANGIL, RESPONDENTS.

Probable Cause as Determined by Ombudsman

"Xxx.

Probable cause is defined in Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan:92

Probable cause is defined as 'the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.' In Ganaden v. Ombudsman, this Court explained the nature of a finding of probable cause, thus:

[A] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.... Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction....

The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not rule on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. The Ombudsman is mandated to only evaluate the evidence presented by the prosecution and the accused, and then determine if there is enough reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of committing the crime.93 (Citations omitted)

A finding of probable cause is determined in relation to the elements of the offense charged.94 We agree with the Ombudsman that petitioner failed to establish the elements of violations of Section 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Xxx."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 225565, January 13, 2021 ]

CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY MANUEL T. UBARRA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, FELICITO C. PAYUMO, ZORAYDA AMELIA C. ALONZO, TERESITA A. DESIERTO, MA. AURORA GEOTINA-GARCIA, FERDINAND S. GOLEZ, ELMAR M. GOMEZ AND MAXIMO L. SANGIL, RESPONDENTS.