In Republic of the Phils. v. Silim, we classified donations according to purpose. A pure/simple donation is the truest form of donation as it is based on pure gratuity. The remuneratory/compensatory type has for its purpose the rewarding of the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional/modal donation, on the other hand, is a consideration for future services; it also occurs where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, whose value is inferior to the donation given. Lastly, an onerous donation imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation; this is made for a valuable consideration whose cost is equal to or more than the thing donated.
In De Luna v. Judge Abrigo, we recognized the distinct, albeit old, characterization of onerous donations when we declared: “Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in the cases ofCarlos v. Ramil, L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa, L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495.” In the same case, we emphasized the retention of the treatment of onerous types of donation, thus: “The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.”
We agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming the property for P15,000.00, the donation was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of contract will govern and Article 765 of the New Civil Code finds no application with respect to the onerous portion of the donation.
Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation exists, and the legal provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the provisions on donation to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not dissolve the donation. She has no factual and legal basis for its revocation, as aptly established by the RTC. First, the ungrateful acts were committed not by the donee; it was her husband who committed them. Second, the ungrateful acts were perpetrated not against the donor; it was the petitioner’s sister who received the alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place the case out of the purview of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.”
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See - G.R. No. 171937, November 25, 2013, CERILA J. CALANASAN, REPRESENTED BY TEODORA J. CALANASAN AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES VIRGILIO DOLORITO AND EVELYN C. DOLORITO, RESPONDENTS.