“It is a basic precept that the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. The levy by the sheriff on property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made under the authority of the court only vis-a-vis property belonging to the defendant. For indeed, “one man’s goods shall not be sold for another man’s debts.” In the case at bar, the property levied on by the sheriff was clearly not exclusively owned by Pablito Villarin. It was co-owned by herein private respondent who was a stranger in the HLURB case. The property relation of spouses Villarin was governed by the regime of complete separation of property as decreed in the order4 dated November 10, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Parañaque City.
Articles 145 and 146 of the Family Code governing the regime of complete separation of property provide:
Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during his marriage from his or her separate property. (214a)
Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.
The liability of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary. (215a)
It is clear from the foregoing that the only time the separate properties of the spouses can be made to answer for liabilities to creditors is when those liabilities are incurred for family expenses. This has not been shown in the case at bar.”