Tuesday, December 8, 2015

Doctor not negligent in ordering the retrieval and transplant of internal organs



DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, G.R. No. 175540, April 7, 2014


“x x x.

The first two issues boil down to the question of whether respondent's sufferings were brought about by petitioner's alleged negligence in granting authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal organs of respondent's son who had been declared brain dead.

Petitioner maintains that when he gave authorization for the removal of some of the internal organs to be transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance with the letter of the law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 349, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 856, i.e., giving his subordinates instructions to exert all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of respondent's son. In fact, announcements were made through radio and television, the assistance of police authorities was sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was notified. Thus, petitioner insists that he should not be held responsible for any damage allegedly suffered by respondent due to the death of her son and the removal of her son’s internal organs for transplant purposes.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that there was negligence on petitioner's part when he failed to ensure that reasonable time had elapsed to locate the relatives of the deceased before giving the authorization to remove said deceased's internal organs for transplant purposes. However, a close examination of the records of this case would reveal that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on this Court. There are some important circumstances that the lower courts failed to consider in ascertaining whether it was the actions of petitioner that brought about the sufferings of respondent.6

The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by petitioner, stated thus:

As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next-of-kin of the said deceased patient, such as appeal through the radios and television, as well as through police and other government agencies and that the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case.

If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and survive.7

A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates to "make certain" that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also clearly stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department of Surgery has complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the requirements of the law.

Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the doctors and personnel of NKI disseminated notices of the death of respondent's son to the media and sought the assistance of the appropriate police authorities as early as March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued the Memorandum. Prior to performing the procedure for retrieval of the deceased's internal organs, the doctors concerned also the sought the opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.

Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death because the notices did not properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner's door. The trial and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who had the opportunity to ascertain the name of the deceased, who recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased's identity to NKI. The NKI could not have obtained the information about his name from the patient, because as found by the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.

Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate evidence that doomed this case. As stated in Otero v. Tan,8 "[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent."9 Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated, cannot be considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert witness to prove that given the medical technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980's, the doctors could or should have waited longer before harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.

Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower court. Finding petitioner liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on record to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her son's lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.

X x x.”